Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg

Rating:
Summary: Very well done
Review: As a historian and national Park Ranger at Gettysburg, Harman provides a new insight into Lee's plan of battle at Gettysburg that has otherwise been clouded by too much attention to Little Round Top, a loss of critical survivors of the battle and theiur reports, too much Confederate fault finding and internal arguments and too much attention given the famous corpse of trees that ended up as the center of Pickett's (Longstreet's charges) misdirected assualt. Harman, through battle reports, primarily Lee's and Longstreet's, demonstrates that Lee's overall strategy was to attack Cemetary Hill with converging forces to break the center of the Union line thus controlling the most dominant ground of the battlefield. As Hartman notes, Lee plans to take Cemetery Hill from day one but is stymied by Ewell's inability to coordinate an attack based partly by midguided fears of an attack from the east.

Hartman proves through reports and witnesses that Lee focuses on Cemetery Hill on the second day but his plans were severely hindered by incorrect surveilance from a staff officer who stated that the area around the Peach Orchard and the southern end of Cemetery ridge was devoid of Union troops. Lee's plan was to send Longstreet's troops up the Emmitsburg Road making an oblique towards Cemetary Hill to strike at an angle with Anderson hiting perpindicular. As the attack goes underway, as we all know today, Sickles entire Corps is in the Peach Orchard withh additional reinforcements along the way. After Hood is shot down, his forces inadvertently sweep to Little Round Top and lose focus for the primary attack. Little Round Top is of no interest to Lee and the movement to the right stymies the coordination of the attack along with Sickles forces and supports.

Hartman's evidence makes less argument of Longstreet's turning movement since Longstreet does abide by Lee's orders including Longstreet's refusing of Hood's ill advised attempt to flank the round tops which would be in total conflict with Lee's plans.

Hartman also goes on to demonstrate that Zielgler's Grove on top of Cemetery Hill was Lee's focus for attack on Day 2 and Day 3 when Pickett's Charge is made. Changes to the battlefield over time made the corpse of trees mistaken as Lee's focal point of the attack and Hartman provides evidence that Ziegler's Grove, which was chopped down after the war, was the better land mark for the center of Cemetary Hill while the corpse of trees are at a less significant part of Cemetery Ridge. Pettigrew and Picket's lead forces ended up there primarily because flanking fire on their failing flanks combined with the lack of artillery support collaped the attack more south of the original converging point. The failure to reach their assigned attack point also reduced the possibility of additional support.

Very articulate book that demonstrates that historians have missed a clear understanding of Lee's attentions to bring superior forces to bear on one important part of the Union line. Hartman notes severall of the problem associated with Pickett's charge but does not offer an in depth critique. I think he leaves that to the reader. After reading Hartman's description, the reader has to wonder how Pickett's charge could have been made since the artillery have limited ammunition and the long oblique that Pickett's division had to make to meet up with Pettigrew exposes him to significant Union artillery and small arms. Hartman should wite a follow up analyzing why Pickett's charge was ever made.

Rating:
Summary: Finally, a book that uses realism to evaluate!
Review: As an old Army Field Artillery Officer, I had always wondered why the obvious nature of the Cemetery Hill was never presented. It was the high ground for crying out loud! Anyone worth their salt would see the case presented by Harmon is long overdue. He did an exceptional job of presenting factual evidence, and did not present a tired rehashing of the same old "accepted story." It was an eminently readable effort. The next time that I travel to the battlefield I will have to meet this man for an autograph in my copy of the book. (Maybe they should read this one in the service schools too.)

Rating:
Summary: Intellgent and very readable
Review: Excellent! This a well thought out idea that "fits" within the accepted story of the battle. In place of Lee blundering into battle and willing to trying anything in the hopes that something would work. In place of Lee being controlled by Ewell or unable to move Longstreet. In place of a sick desperate Lee willing to throw away the lives of his men. In place of fixing the "blame" for losing Gettysburg on Longstreet or Ewell or Stuart. In place of missing cannons, lack of water or the thousands of other "reasons" why the South lost at Gettysburg this small book presents a logical overall plan that Lee had and kept to from the afternoon of the July First to the end of the battle. Excellent maps and photos illustrate the why and how of the central idea. In addition, the author defines what happened to cause Lee's master plan to fail. This is not an introduction to the Battle of Gettysburg and without a good working knowledge of the battle the reader will quickly become lost. For students of the battle this will be a "must have" book that will be referenced and augured over as long as people talk about the Battle of Gettysburg.

Rating:
Summary: Troy Harman's Gettysburg
Review: From the moment of its conclusion, the Battle of Gettysburg has provoked endless controversy regarding its significance, the plans and strategies employed by the armies, the tactics, and the reasons for the result. It has been said that if a reader doesn't like a particular account of the battle, it is only necessary to read on to find a more appealing version.

Troy Harman is a historian and a ranger with the National Park Service at Gettysburg. He has intimate familiarity with the Battlefield and a thorough grasp of the literature on the Battle. In his book, "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" (2003), Mr. Harman takes issue with what he terms the "affirmed version" of the Battle and offers what he believes to be a new and competing account. His account is well and lucidly presented and will provoke thought among students.

Mr. Harman argues that most students of the Battle have tended to focus on the details of the three days of fighting and have failed to understand the plan that the Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee, developed for the Battle and pursued during its entirety. According to Mr. Harman, Lee's focus throughout was on the heights of Cemetery Hill on the Union right. At the conclusion of the first day's fighting, the Confederates did not attempt to capture Cemetery Hill. But in the second day of fighting on the Union left, (Little Round Top, primarily) and in Pickett's Charge on the third day, the objective of Lee's plans, Mr. Harman maintains, was Cemetery Hill, due to its height, its control of the town and roads, and its vulnerability as a salient exposed to potential attack on three sides.

This is a challenging claim, particularly as it involves the second day of the Battle. Mr. Harmon argues that Longstreet's troops were to advance along the Emmitsburg Road, which essentially parallels the Union line and take Cemetery Hill, giving only slight attention to Little Round Top. Mr. Harmon argues that the objective of Pickett's famous charge on day 3 was Zeigler's grove on the right of the Union line rather than the more famous Angle and Copse of Trees.

There is a great deal to be learned from this, and from any attempt to revisit a received and too comfortably accepted account. But I think Mr. Harman tends to overemphasize the originality of his approach and to type-cast the account with which he takes issue. The basic points in Mr. Harman's approach, involving the alleged importance of Little Round Top, the advance of the Third Corps of the Union Army to the Peach Orchard, and the focus of Pickett's Charge have been addressed by many writers. These points are and will remain highly controversial, and Mr. Harman's understanding of each of them is shared with (and also disputed by) many other scholars. Mr. Harman's primary claim -- the importance of Cemetery Hill -- has also been addressed in a slightly different way in a book called "Last Chance for Victory" by Bowden and Ward which likewise challenges the received account of Gettysburg.

Mr. Harman also is too quick, I think, in forulating his understanding of the "affirmed version" of Gettysburg. Most of the accounts of the battle I have read take a more nuanced view than that indicated in Mr Harman's summations. They recognize, I think, the changing nature of the Battle and the choices these changes forced on commanders North and South. Lee does seem to me to have ordered a charge up the Emmitsburg Road, based on the faulty information he had about the size and position of the Union troops, but this plan had to change on the spot when Longstreet discovered the location of Sickles and his third Corps. Pickett's charge on the third day may well have had Zeigler's grove as its objective, but the fact remains that the Southern attack crested at the Copse of Trees, thus entitling it to its reputation as the "High Water Mark".

Mr Harman has taken a fresh, lively approach to the Battle which taught me a great deal and which will inspire the interested reader to learn more. It will instill in the reader a sense of fluidity and a reluctance to dogmatize over significant historical events.

Rating:
Summary: Old Wine-New Bottle
Review: Harmon's book is a repackaging of his thesis in his original book entitled Cemetary Hill-The General Plan was Unchanged. So if you have that book, you essentially know what he is talking about. This new book is a bit more polished. He presents an interesting theory, although unconvincing for me.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting but isn't it bit obvious??
Review: I found this book to be pretty interesting but I wondered if the author was really stating the obvious here. Cemetary Hill according to the author, was the real objective of Robert E. Lee's plans during the three days at Gettysburg. I don't think that itself was any great discovery on it own. Anyone with any knowledge of the battle would know this as I did for a super long time since it don't take much to read a map of the battle. Why is this so? Well, as the author clearly pointed out, Cemetary Hill is one of the major keys to the Union position. Capture of it would be a key to winning the battle. No great mystery here.

The book goes on to describe how Lee planned this battle to support this thesis. While I do not debate the central concept, I think the author overstates his case when he focus too narrowly on Cemetary Hill. After all, Lee's deployments and movements during the battle tells us that while he was aiming for Cemetary Hill as his ultimate target, he had other ways of getting there. The author dismissal of Little Round Top appears too casual. Of course he says this because he wondered how the Confederates can benefit from capturing Little Round Top with Union Sixth Corps so closed by. Of course, Lee didn't know that but the author does. This sound bit self-serving. The author often dismissed many accounts because they were made in hindsight after the fact, he too make too much assumptions of his own based on hindsight after the fact. Not only that, I don't think author's idea that Longstreet on the second day would advanced toward Cemetary Hill from his starting position to be very practical even if Union III Corps stay where it was supposed to be.

The book is not very strong when it deals with Pickett's charge. There seem to a lot of guessing and conjectures here over where the charge was to hit home. The idea that once the Confederate forces broke the Union lines, it will roll up the Union lines toward Cemetary Hill sound bit like a fantasy scenario considering all the reserves Union army had which will prevent such manuvers.

As any commander would say, any plan is worthless once contact is made with the enemy. I think what may defeat this book in the end will be the actual deployment, movements and attacks of the Army of Northern Virginia which historians will see as Lee's actual plans at work.

Rating:
Summary: The forest for the trees
Review: Sometimes you can't see the forest for the trees. As an airline pilot, civil war buff, and trained historian I found Mr. Harman's thesis right on the mark. For years I've wondered why
no one else saw the obvious. As one reviewer stated, "it was the high ground." General Lee was a brilliant tactician and strategist whoes training in the Mexican War would have demanded the obvious-Take the high ground! Unfortunately, the fog of war trumped his plan. Read the entire book during a long layover in Chicago. Mr Harman walked, worked, and lived the grounds of Gettysburg-he knows his history well. Thank you.

Rating:
Summary: the rest of the story
Review: Troy Harman has written a truly outstanding and engaging work of revisionist history--revisionism based not upon some ideological or personal agenda but upon getting to the truth behind years of myths and (usually unintentional) distortions. He uses the historiographical methods of Carl Becker as a starting point, particularly the notion of an "ephemeral event" versus an "affirmed event." The ephemeral event is the actual historical occurrence--here, the battle--as it unfolds; the affirmed event is the event as it is described, explained, and constructed by participants and historians in the years following. The ephemeral event evanesces, is never completely knowable, while the affirmed event assumes layer upon layer of interpretation, exaggeration, and distortion. Harman seeks to strip away the chaff and get to what he believes is the true story of the ephemeral battle of Gettysburg.

Harman's thesis is straightforward: Lee's real plan at Gettysburg was to gain control of Cemetery Hill. His argument is cogently and logically presented; one point flows into, and provides a foundation for, the next. Beginning with the opening of the battle, Harman explains the importance of Cemetery Hill and why Lee focused on it. From there, he spends a great deal of time--indeed, the bulk of the book--on the battle's second day, July 2, and places the rebel assault, particularly Longstreet's, within the Cemetery Hill scheme, rather than in the affirmed version that depicts the day's action as an assault on both Union flanks. Lee's day-two objective was the Peach Orchard, from which artillery could fire on Cemetery Hill, and thus Sickles's moving his III Corps is seen as somewhat less foolish. Moreover, as Harman posits, Lee did not aim for Little Round Top; rather, the fight for it occurred quite by accident when the intended Confederate attack up the Emmitsburg Road diverted to the right and toward the Round Tops after Hood was wounded. Finally, day three and Pickett's Charge receive treatment. The objective of the attack was Cemetery Hill, which commanders such as Longstreet and Hancock understood, and Harman explains at length how the "copse of trees" came to be seen as Lee's focus.

Harman supports his points with the words of the participants, with his intimate familiarity with the lay of the land (from his experience as a Park Ranger), and with his rigorous analysis and close-reading of sources. So much of this book's fun is seeing Harman build up his argument piece by piece and assemble Lee's tactical strategy into a coherent whole. It is a joy to read. Except for a minor quibble here or there, I find Harman's thesis convincing. More than that, his insightful and refreshing ephemeral-versus-affirmed approach has fundamentally changed the way I look at history; I will now view the past through that lens. As others have said, this is not a book for the neophyte, but anyone interested in Gettysburg, willing to think, and willing to re-consider traditional understandings should enjoy this book.