None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam

Rating:
Summary: Balanced Deep Trustworthy View of Policy-Intelligence Gaps
Review:

This book is destined to be a classic. There is no other person who spent over 17 years focused on intelligence about Viet-Nam, and very rare is the person who can say they have spent over 50 years in continuous intelligence appointments, 20 of them after retirement. It is a personal story that I consider to be balanced, deep, and trustworthy. While it has gaps, these are easily addressed by reading, at least on the intelligence side, such books at Bruce Jones' "War Without Windows", Orrin DeForest's "SLOW BURN", Douglas Valentine's "The Phoenix Program", Jim Witz's "The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War", Tom Mangold & John Penycate's "The Tunnels of Chu Chi", and the Viet-Nam portions of Jim Bamford's "Body of Secrets."

I mention these books in part to emphasize that George Allen has produced a book that will stand the test of time and should be regarded as an exceptional historical, policy, intelligence, and public administration case study. It is truly humbling and sobering to read such a calm, complete, and broad treatment of the history of both American intelligence in relation to Viet-Nam, and the consistent manner in which policy-makers refused to listen to accurate intelligence estimates, while their Generals and Ambassadors steadfastly "cooked the books." The manipulation of truth from the Saigon end, and the refusal to listen to truth on the Washington end, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Vietnamese, Loatian, Cambodian, and American, as well as allied nationalities.

This book is gripping. I could not put it down. It is one of the most serious personal accounts I have ever read where the vivid realities of intelligence, ignorance, and policy come together. The author excells at painting the details in context, and his many specific portraits of key individuals and situations are superior.

This book is relevant to today's war on terrorism. Many of the same issues prevail--rather than enumerate them, I will give this book my very highest mark, and simply say that you cannot understand intelligence, or the intelligence-policy relationship, without having absorbed all this author has to say.

He's hit it out of the park. Every voter who wonders what it will take to hold politicians accountable for "due diligence" in decision-making, needs to read this book.

Rating:
Summary: Balanced Deep Trustworthy View of Policy-Intelligence Gaps
Review:

This book is destined to be a classic. There is no other person who spent over 17 years focused on intelligence about Viet-Nam, and very rare is the person who can say they have spent over 50 years in continuous intelligence appointments, 20 of them after retirement. It is a personal story that I consider to be balanced, deep, and trustworthy. While it has gaps, these are easily addressed by reading, at least on the intelligence side, such books at Bruce Jones' "War Without Windows", Orrin DeForest's "SLOW BURN", Douglas Valentine's "The Phoenix Program", Jim Witz's "The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War", Tom Mangold & John Penycate's "The Tunnels of Chu Chi", and the Viet-Nam portions of Jim Bamford's "Body of Secrets."

I mention these books in part to emphasize that George Allen has produced a book that will stand the test of time and should be regarded as an exceptional historical, policy, intelligence, and public administration case study. It is truly humbling and sobering to read such a calm, complete, and broad treatment of the history of both American intelligence in relation to Viet-Nam, and the consistent manner in which policy-makers refused to listen to accurate intelligence estimates, while their Generals and Ambassadors steadfastly "cooked the books." The manipulation of truth from the Saigon end, and the refusal to listen to truth on the Washington end, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Vietnamese, Loatian, Cambodian, and American, as well as allied nationalities.

This book is gripping. I could not put it down. It is one of the most serious personal accounts I have ever read where the vivid realities of intelligence, ignorance, and policy come together. The author excells at painting the details in context, and his many specific portraits of key individuals and situations are superior.

This book is relevant to today's war on terrorism. Many of the same issues prevail--rather than enumerate them, I will give this book my very highest mark, and simply say that you cannot understand intelligence, or the intelligence-policy relationship, without having absorbed all this author has to say.

He's hit it out of the park. Every voter who wonders what it will take to hold politicians accountable for "due diligence" in decision-making, needs to read this book.

Rating:
Summary: There Was No "Intelligence Failure"
Review: An outrageously good book! George Allen offers us a look into the notoriously secretive world of intellence analysts. What is stunning is that just as I suspected, there was no "failure" on the part of the Intelligence Community in Vietnam. The CIA predicted,prior to US involvement, that we could not stop the spread of Communism in Vietnam. As far back as the Indochina War, intelligence analysts, like George Allen, had observed the French struggle against a Viet Minh insurgency that was determined, well-supplied, and well-led. The almost endless supply of weapons flowing in from China (and Russia?) meant that the Viet Mihn could outlast us. All this was communicated to the higher ups including "the best and the brightest". But Hubris (sound familiar?) got in the way. Good intelligence was ignored. Rosy, upbeat reports were printed by Washington to coverup a fiasco. Career obsessed generals placed too much confidence in technology and forgot about man's Darwinian capacity to adapt and thus survive. Reading this book was like reading a memoir on the Iraq War. Let's hope Iraq is not another Vietnam. However, I'm haunted by Hegel's famous line: "History shows us that people don't learn anything from History."

Rating:
Summary: Amazing book on US involvement in Vietnam
Review: I have read a number of books on the US involvement in Vietnam, some of them quite good. This is the best, the ONE book you should read if you're limited to one book. Other recommended books are _To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Forty-Seven Americans and Southeast Asians_ by Al Santoli, and _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth.
With first-hand knowledge -- not just reading from second-hand sources or going through one general's papers -- George Allen describes what happened in Vietnam from before Dien Bien Phu through the fall of Saigon. He has detailed information on the US side, and informed accounts of what the North Vietnamese strategy was. He introduces us to the personalities and events so important to the way Vietnam happened, all in a very engaging and readable style.
One of the most fascinating parts of the book is the listing of the many times the US took action without a full examination of the complete situation. Allen writes, "In foreign affairs and national security matters, there is no substitute for thorough, conscientious, and objective analysis of all the factors bearing on a decision, of alternative courses of action, and of a weighing of the consequences -- domestic as well as foreign -- of all the options available." This was rarely done in Vietnam. Among the hasty decisions the US made were to consider the northern Vietnamese as part of a monolithic Communist threat, to aid the French in maintaining their empire, to take over the French role in Vietnam, to give the green light to the Diem coup, to not realize the problems the lack of post-Diem leadership would create, to not encourage South Vietnam to develop an effective political message and a stable appealing government, to appear to favor Thieu as a candidate (by proclaiming neutrality), by failing to build an effective intelligence system in south Vietnam, by US in-country personnel repeatedly lying to their superiors by exaggerating US success and minimizing enemy strength (thus depriving themselves of the needed resources to meet the real threat), by the false "light at the end of the tunnel" PR campaign (setting the government up for an even bigger fall when Tet '68 came), by giving South Vietnam false assurances of our post-withdrawal support, etc. etc.
These just touch the surface. Allen explains how even minor decisions like insisting ARVN units included artillery support, and not replacing ONE incompetent colonel, possibly had very significant bad effects. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in Vietnam, recent American history, or politics. It should be required reading for US policy-makers.
Hopefully someday we'll have someone the caliber of George Allen tell the true story of 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Rating:
Summary: Amazing book on US involvement in Vietnam
Review: I have read a number of books on the US involvement in Vietnam, some of them quite good. This is the best, the ONE book you should read if you're limited to one book. Other recommended books are _To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Forty-Seven Americans and Southeast Asians_ by Al Santoli, and _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth.
With first-hand knowledge -- not just reading from second-hand sources or going through one general's papers -- George Allen describes what happened in Vietnam from before Dien Bien Phu through the fall of Saigon. He has detailed information on the US side, and informed accounts of what the North Vietnamese strategy was. He introduces us to the personalities and events so important to the way Vietnam happened, all in a very engaging and readable style.
One of the most fascinating parts of the book is the listing of the many times the US took action without a full examination of the complete situation. Allen writes, "In foreign affairs and national security matters, there is no substitute for thorough, conscientious, and objective analysis of all the factors bearing on a decision, of alternative courses of action, and of a weighing of the consequences -- domestic as well as foreign -- of all the options available." This was rarely done in Vietnam. Among the hasty decisions the US made were to consider the northern Vietnamese as part of a monolithic Communist threat, to aid the French in maintaining their empire, to take over the French role in Vietnam, to give the green light to the Diem coup, to not realize the problems the lack of post-Diem leadership would create, to not encourage South Vietnam to develop an effective political message and a stable appealing government, to appear to favor Thieu as a candidate (by proclaiming neutrality), by failing to build an effective intelligence system in south Vietnam, by US in-country personnel repeatedly lying to their superiors by exaggerating US success and minimizing enemy strength (thus depriving themselves of the needed resources to meet the real threat), by the false "light at the end of the tunnel" PR campaign (setting the government up for an even bigger fall when Tet '68 came), by giving South Vietnam false assurances of our post-withdrawal support, etc. etc.
These just touch the surface. Allen explains how even minor decisions like insisting ARVN units included artillery support, and not replacing ONE incompetent colonel, possibly had very significant bad effects. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in Vietnam, recent American history, or politics. It should be required reading for US policy-makers.
Hopefully someday we'll have someone the caliber of George Allen tell the true story of 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent perspective on the Vietnam war
Review: I initially expected this book to be interesting, but fairly dry in parts. I was pleasantly surprised when I found myself unable to put the book down.

Mr. Allen, a top official with the CIA during the Vietnam war, shares his experiences, insights and perspectives as to "the intelligence failure" in the war. Based on Mr. Allen's account, the real intelligence failure was on the part of the military and political leaders of the time; they simply refused to lend any credence at all to any intelligence that didn't tell them what they had already determined they wanted to hear.

This book will make you angry at times as you read of the author's continued frustration at people either ignoring his message or "killing the messenger". This is a very well-written book. I would consider it essential reading for anyone interested in the history of Vietnam, the war, or the politics of that era.

Rating:
Summary: Goes beyond most Vietnam guides
Review: None So Blind provides a personal account of the intelligence failure in Vietnam by an ex-CIA intelligence official who documents who intelligence appraisals of the situation were either ignored or rejected by policymakers because they failed to support common assumptions of the government. A fascinating examination of these assumptions, None So Blind goes beyond most Vietnam guides to probe the sources of underlying failures.

Rating:
Summary: A personal Account of INtelligence and Vietnam
Review: The author enlisted in the U.S. Navy in the Second World War and then transferred to military intelligence before ultimately ending up in the CIA. Thsi book is the story of his life in the intelligence community and his opposition to the methods used by the United States to fight the war in Vietnam.

The book is a very useful primer to those who are interested in the actual practice of military intelligence in the field, explaining exactly how armies compile intelligence on their enemies, and how that intelligence is collected into reports which are of use to those higher up the chain of command. The author shares his frustrations with the intelligence war in Vietnam, and makes useful observations of the efforts by the French in Vietnam, prior to the Americans, and also the British in Malaya.

I recommend this book as a good insight to what field intelligence is really about, and also for its breezy style.

Rating:
Summary: ONE OF THE VERY BEST BOOKS ON VIETNAM
Review: This is an exceptional book, absolutely required reading for the history of the Vietnam War since 1950 but also for the foreign policy decisionmaking process in general. A classic! Reinforces those who thought the war a tragic waste of human lives and resources--who opposed the war.

Rating:
Summary: ONE OF THE VERY BEST BOOKS ON VIETNAM
Review: This is an exceptional book, absolutely required reading for the history of the Vietnam War since 1950 but also for the foreign policy decisionmaking process in general. A classic! Reinforces those who thought the war a tragic waste of human lives and resources--who opposed the war.