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Rating: 
Summary: Excellent book.
Review: As an amateur military historian I found this book very enlightening and informative. It has provided me with a more balanced view of the Luftwaffe than I had previously. In a couple of instances I felt that he glossed over the downside to some of the Luftwaffe's interwar decision making, but otherwise found the book balanced and interesting. I plan on reading more of Corum's books.
Rating: 
Summary: Groundbreaking
Review: In a severely overcrowded field of books on WW2, this book is a shining jewel. Revolutionary, concise, and clear, this book explodes the commonly accepted myths about the Luftwaffe, while revealing the truly innovative minds at work in the Reich Luftministerium and the General staff in the interwar years. Thought provoking and generally excellent scholarship abounds in this single volume about the critically important doctrinal development of air-power theory, not only in Germany, but in all major combatant nations before world war two. One way to understand this books's value is that by reading this one book anyone can clearly understand the basics of air-power doctrine and the way it evolved in the Luftwaffe. I eagerly anticipate reading the necessary follow-up volume from J. Corum which will complete the groundbreaking work begun in this book.
Rating:
Summary: Groundbreaking
Review: In a severely overcrowded field of books on WW2, this book is a shining jewel. Revolutionary, concise, and clear, this book explodes the commonly accepted myths about the Luftwaffe, while revealing the truly innovative minds at work in the Reich Luftministerium and the General staff in the interwar years. Thought provoking and generally excellent scholarship abounds in this single volume about the critically important doctrinal development of air-power theory, not only in Germany, but in all major combatant nations before world war two. One way to understand this books's value is that by reading this one book anyone can clearly understand the basics of air-power doctrine and the way it evolved in the Luftwaffe. I eagerly anticipate reading the necessary follow-up volume from J. Corum which will complete the groundbreaking work begun in this book.
Rating:
Summary: THE MAKING OF THE LUFTWAFFE
Review: James S. Corum has written a scholarly study of German air power ideas and operational doctrine in a well-researched history of the German air power from 1918-1940. In addition, the text provides an understanding of the human dimension in the development of the Luftwaffe beyond the usual stories of Herman Goring and the Nazis. The author notes, "In the years immediately following World War I, it looked to the world as if Germany had been completely disarmed as an air power. On the surface, this was so. Yet, in the long-term view, the Allied powers failed miserably in their effort to disarm Germany." While their air power was disarmed, the Germans could not be stopped from thinking and studying. The text narrates how "General Hans von Seeckt and his small group of airmen succeeded in keeping air power as a central aspect of warfare." After WWI, a select group of German officers made a detailed analyzed of WWI army and air power experience. Foreign air power developments and doctrine were also studied with foreign articles and manuscripts on air power translated into German. Corum notes "Although Germany was denied an air force, it was not denied civil aviation or aviation technology by the Versailles Treaty. This gave the Germans an inherent advantage in the air, for Germany in the interwar period was a world leader in aircraft design and technology." By 1925 German air power operational doctrine was well advanced so that aircrew training and aircraft developed was needed. Most interesting was the text's description of the formation of the "Shadow Luftwaffe." In 1925, under a 1922 treaty with Russia, a German air base was built at Lipetsk, Russia. From 1929-1933, several hundred officers, NCOs, and civilian employees were there as students, instructors, ground staff and test pilots. Airmen at Lipetsk would test tactics and doctrine by dropping live bombs on simulated targets. Fifty modern fighter aircraft were smuggled in from the Fokker factory in Holland. The text notes that an advantage of the Shadow Luftwaffe was the close and effective cooperation between those who developed doctrine for the aerial war, those who developed and built weapons and prototypes and finally the actual producers of the weaponry. When the Nazi party came to power on 30 January 1933 and rearmament openly began, the text notes, "a new group of air leaders came to the fore" and inheriting "a sound foundation and built on it." The author states, "the years 1933-1936 were of foundation-building. Several major personalities dominated the Luftwaffe organization and played vital roles in creating new concepts of air power..." The text narrates the discussions of air power philosophy and doctrine. By 1934 an effective operational doctrine for a small to medium-sized German air force was developed. Contrary to Post-WWII Allied historians, the Luftwaffe was not limited to being "merely a tactical air force geared to army support operations." On page-139, the author states "Regaining control of the air by defeating the enemy air forces was the primary objective" and Lieutenant-General Wever, Luftwaffe chief of staff, stated "Only the nation with strong bomber forces at its disposal can expect decisive action by its air force." Lack of a German air force in the 1920s pushed "German military personnel and civilians to seriously consider how one might conduct a passive defense that would minimize the effect of a strategic bombing campaign..." As WWII Allied bomber crews would sadly learn, flak would "become the core of German homeland defense". Effective flak artillery was developed with flak battalions placed under Luftwaffe command. Civil defense was also a part of air defense doctrine with civil defense drills being conducted as early as 1936. However, the core of the Luftwaffe's air defense doctrine remained an offensive air campaign in order that home defenses would not be put to the test. The book's account of the Luftwaffe's 1936-1939 involvement in the Spanish Civil War is fascinating noting "For a relatively modest investment, the German high command reaped some substantial strategic gains from its involvement in Spain." For example, they learned that even in circumstances of general air superiority bombers must be escorted by fighters; a lesson that the Eight Air Force learned at great cost in 1942-1943. Also in Spain, "Air power strategy, tactics and doctrine were tested and corrected so that when WWII began, the Luftwaffe was better prepared for war than any other major air force. Interestingly, while widely covered and reported in the press, France, Britain and America paid little attention to the lessons Germany was learning in Spain. The book states in the early years, "Goring let the seasoned professionals do their job, while he provided an inexhaustible supply of fund." However, in the late 1930s politics became prevalent resulting in some poor appointments such as Jeschonnek, 1939-1943 air chief of staff, who overemphasized the dive-bomber at the expense of developing the heavy bomber and strategic air warfare. Equally disastrous was the appointment of Ernest Udet chief of the Luftwaffe Technical Office and who was totally unqualified for his position. Author Corum notes "Rather than being a weakness, the Luftwaffe's doctrine of war developed painstakingly during the interwar period was one of the strengths of the Wehrmacht." The text closes stating "Despite the failure to develop a naval air doctrine and the poor guidance of Hans Jeschonnek, the Germans were able to gain the aerial advantage over the Allied powers in the first years of the World War II not because they had overwhelming numbers of aircraft, but because their conception of a future air war and the training and equipment required for such a war was far more accurate than their opponents' air power vision." Students of military history will enjoy the text. However, today's military planners should consider the basis lessons from how the Luftwaffe was developed 1918-1940.
Rating:
Summary: A Thorough Analysis of Luftwaffe Doctrinal Development
Review: The focus of this book is on the interwar development of German air operational doctrine. Corum demonstrates that the Luftwaffe was not just a ground support air force but capable of strategic operations, including air transport (Franco's troops in 1936) and airborne assaults. In fact, he points out that Anglo-American obsession with strategic bombardment hindered their operational doctrines until 1942-3. Corum points out the biggest German deficiencies as lack of a true naval air arm that could have been decisive in fighting Britain, Udet's obsession with dive-bombers that delayed the deployment of the He-177 and the Ju-88 and strategic misdirection from Goering/Hitler. There are two interesting chapters on lessons from the First World War and the Spanish Civil War. Also interesting is discussion of how the Germans were able to develop not only doctrine, but new fighter and bomber designs under the noses of the Allied occupation forces. The one area in which the Allies succeeded in inhibiting the Luftwaffe was in limiting the German civil aviation industry's engine development programs; when the Luftwaffe went public there were very few engines to choose from and these were less-advanced than Allied models. Weak engines plagued a number of German aircraft designs. There are no maps.
Rating:
Summary: A Thorough Analysis of Luftwaffe Doctrinal Development
Review: The focus of this book is on the interwar development of German air operational doctrine. Corum demonstrates that the Luftwaffe was not just a ground support air force but capable of strategic operations, including air transport (Franco's troops in 1936) and airborne assaults. In fact, he points out that Anglo-American obsession with strategic bombardment hindered their operational doctrines until 1942-3. Corum points out the biggest German deficiencies as lack of a true naval air arm that could have been decisive in fighting Britain, Udet's obsession with dive-bombers that delayed the deployment of the He-177 and the Ju-88 and strategic misdirection from Goering/Hitler. There are two interesting chapters on lessons from the First World War and the Spanish Civil War. Also interesting is discussion of how the Germans were able to develop not only doctrine, but new fighter and bomber designs under the noses of the Allied occupation forces. The one area in which the Allies succeeded in inhibiting the Luftwaffe was in limiting the German civil aviation industry's engine development programs; when the Luftwaffe went public there were very few engines to choose from and these were less-advanced than Allied models. Weak engines plagued a number of German aircraft designs. There are no maps.
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