Rating: 
Summary: Pioneering Introduction; Still Very Good
Review: Despite the huge literature on WWI, there is little available on the Eastern Front. Published 25 years ago, this pioneering effort is still an excellent overview and as far as I know, the only readily accessible book on this subject. In one crucial respect, this book is head and shoulders above most overviews. Stone set out not only to describe the conflict on the Eastern Front but also to analyze the spectacular failure of the Russian war effort, leading ultimately to the Russian Revolution. Stone does a very good job of providing the important basic narrative and analyzing the causes of Russian failure. Prior to Stone's work, the leading hypothesis for Russian failure was the backwardness of the Russian economy. Stone makes a very strong case that the Russian economy was capable of supporting the war. He sees the Russian state as unable to provide the military, political, and economic leadership necessary to prosecute the war, leading to military failure and economic disaster. In the strictly military history aspects of the book, the recurring theme is the remarkable incompetence of the Russian military leadership. Stone wrote before the end of the Soviet state and this restricted his access to important sources. It is very likely that some of his specific points will be found to be wrong and corrected. On the other hand, it is not likely that his fundamental assessments are wrong.
Rating:
Summary: The Other Front
Review: For most Americans, the First World War conjures up a single, brutal image: trench warfare along the western front in France. Tangles of barbed wire, machine gun nests, pockmarked no-man's-land, gas masks, stacks of mutilated cadavers, and mountains of expended artillery shells. The names Ypres, Flanders, Somme and Verdun are synonymous with horrifying and senseless slaughter of attrition. However, the western front and its "marquee" battles are just part of the story of the Great War.Norman Stone's "The Eastern Front, 1914-1917" shines the light of history on the "other front," a theater of battle that is still somewhat shrouded in mystery over 80 years after the last gun fell silent. What is perhaps most striking about the eastern front is how dissimilar it was from the engagements in the west. Although it consumed as many lives as the conflagration in the west, the primary military failure in the east wasn't the failure to recognize and leverage the strength of a defensive posture, but rather a failure to effectively exploit the offensive. Whilst the French, British and Germans settled into a defensive war of attrition, the Germans, Austrians and Russians continued in a war of maneuver. The eastern front was twice as long as that in the west with about half the artillery and poor railway networks to efficiently shift reserves to threatened areas. The great battles of the east (today familiar only to those with a keen interest in military history) such as Tannenberg, Lodz, Riga, Gorlice-Tarnow, and the Brusilov offensive, were largely offensive victories. The attrition in the east was caused by inadequate transportation and exhausted troops trying to fully exploit the offensive opportunities, not the attrition of withering firepower experienced in the west. It should be noted that the title (and cover) of this book is a bit misleading. This is a history of Tsarist Russia at war; it is not a history of the entire eastern theater. Major operations such as the central powers drive to crush Serbia in 1915, the multiple battles around Isonzo on the Italian/Austrian front, and the Entente's beach head at Salonika (to name just a few) are touched upon only tangentially. The narrative is delivered almost entirely from the Russian perspective. Stone's central argument is that Russia was much better equipped to fight the First World War than it is traditionally given credit for. Its decisive weaknesses were not an inability to produce artillery shells in large numbers, the ineffectiveness of its peasant soldiers, or the economic backwardness of the nation as a whole. Rather, these explanations are simply "hard luck" stories created by the Russian military officers themselves to hide the real source of failure: incompetence and poor organization. The Tsarist army, Stone says, was crippled by a political schism in its officer corps. There were two mutually exclusive camps in the Russian Army: those officers (mostly of middle class origin) who sided with the reform-minded War Minister Sukhomlinov, and all those who opposed him (mostly the old aristocracy and cavalry elites). Stone notes that many Sukhomlinovite commanding generals would have anti-Sukhomnilov chiefs of staff with whom they were not on speaking terms. Or, in the case of Tannenberg, one general would be a Sukhomlinovite (Samsonov) and the other a bitter Sukhomlinov opponent (Rennenkampf). Under such conditions, Stone concludes, it was easier to blame Russian failures on material shortages and poor frontline soldier morale than their own incompetence and the acute political and organizational crisis gripping the army. In closing, Stone's work offers a unique and authoritative perspective on a largely forgotten aspect of what has been called the defining experience of the 20th century. No World War I library is complete without "The Eastern Front."
Rating:
Summary: The Other Front
Review: For most Americans, the First World War conjures up a single, brutal image: trench warfare along the western front in France. Tangles of barbed wire, machine gun nests, pockmarked no-man's-land, gas masks, stacks of mutilated cadavers, and mountains of expended artillery shells. The names Ypres, Flanders, Somme and Verdun are synonymous with horrifying and senseless slaughter of attrition. However, the western front and its "marquee" battles are just part of the story of the Great War. Norman Stone's "The Eastern Front, 1914-1917" shines the light of history on the "other front," a theater of battle that is still somewhat shrouded in mystery over 80 years after the last gun fell silent. What is perhaps most striking about the eastern front is how dissimilar it was from the engagements in the west. Although it consumed as many lives as the conflagration in the west, the primary military failure in the east wasn't the failure to recognize and leverage the strength of a defensive posture, but rather a failure to effectively exploit the offensive. Whilst the French, British and Germans settled into a defensive war of attrition, the Germans, Austrians and Russians continued in a war of maneuver. The eastern front was twice as long as that in the west with about half the artillery and poor railway networks to efficiently shift reserves to threatened areas. The great battles of the east (today familiar only to those with a keen interest in military history) such as Tannenberg, Lodz, Riga, Gorlice-Tarnow, and the Brusilov offensive, were largely offensive victories. The attrition in the east was caused by inadequate transportation and exhausted troops trying to fully exploit the offensive opportunities, not the attrition of withering firepower experienced in the west. It should be noted that the title (and cover) of this book is a bit misleading. This is a history of Tsarist Russia at war; it is not a history of the entire eastern theater. Major operations such as the central powers drive to crush Serbia in 1915, the multiple battles around Isonzo on the Italian/Austrian front, and the Entente's beach head at Salonika (to name just a few) are touched upon only tangentially. The narrative is delivered almost entirely from the Russian perspective. Stone's central argument is that Russia was much better equipped to fight the First World War than it is traditionally given credit for. Its decisive weaknesses were not an inability to produce artillery shells in large numbers, the ineffectiveness of its peasant soldiers, or the economic backwardness of the nation as a whole. Rather, these explanations are simply "hard luck" stories created by the Russian military officers themselves to hide the real source of failure: incompetence and poor organization. The Tsarist army, Stone says, was crippled by a political schism in its officer corps. There were two mutually exclusive camps in the Russian Army: those officers (mostly of middle class origin) who sided with the reform-minded War Minister Sukhomlinov, and all those who opposed him (mostly the old aristocracy and cavalry elites). Stone notes that many Sukhomlinovite commanding generals would have anti-Sukhomnilov chiefs of staff with whom they were not on speaking terms. Or, in the case of Tannenberg, one general would be a Sukhomlinovite (Samsonov) and the other a bitter Sukhomlinov opponent (Rennenkampf). Under such conditions, Stone concludes, it was easier to blame Russian failures on material shortages and poor frontline soldier morale than their own incompetence and the acute political and organizational crisis gripping the army. In closing, Stone's work offers a unique and authoritative perspective on a largely forgotten aspect of what has been called the defining experience of the 20th century. No World War I library is complete without "The Eastern Front."
Rating: 
Summary: Disjointed To The Point of Utter Confusion
Review: Indeed, as another reviewer points out, there are few books on the market today which deal with the largely unknown Eastern and Romanian Fronts of World War One. This one is factual. But it is also monumentally confusing as it jumps back and forth within each chapter to battles past and not yet fought, and not always explaining the changes in army command for either side. The War Maps are, generally speaking, well laid out and, for the most part, provide the names of army commanders. But it would have been nice, for example, to know the names of Corps commanders on the Lodz, 1914 and Carpathian Battle [early 1915] maps. Also, the one depicting the "Central Powers' triple offensive of 1915 and the Russian retreat" leaves you guessing as to who was in charge of some their armies at that time, and absolutely nothing regarding those in charge of the retreating Russian Armies. Indeed, even what armies were involved. For the Brusilov Campaign map we see that the First Austro-Hungarian Army was under the command of "Puhallo" - but there is nothing in the text to tell you that this is Major-General Paul Puhallo von Brlog. First names and ranks of the senior general involved would also have been welcomed, as would a little more detail on the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Turkish commanders who led their armies/corps/divisions in the battle surrounding Romania [which was, after all, a major component of the Eastern Front].
Rating:
Summary: Still THE book on WWI's neglected Eastern Front
Review: It's hard to believe that after over a quarter of a century, Stone's book remains the sole "big picture" reference on the Russian end of WWI. Showalter's Tannenberg concentrates on that campaign and few, if any, authors have ventured to say much new about the mobile war far to the east of the Franco-Belgian trench lines. Stone did not take the opportunity to update his classic for this Penguin re-issue. The book's structure could be more rigorous, as it tends to be a bit fragmented. However, Stone's analysis is penetrating. He doesn't simply hop from battle to battle but provides good coverage of economic and industrial factors underlying the campaigns. Thus, this book is still well worth consulting. It looks as though Hew Strachan's new three-volume treatment of the War will pay more attention to the East, but the first volume only runs to the end of 1914 and it may be some time before we see the succeeding entries. For the price, Stone provides plenty of data, backed by solid footnotes (though he didn't have access to ex-Soviet archives now available).
Rating: 
Summary: History at its analytical best.
Review: Norman Stone writes with gravitas and wit. This book is refreshing in its analysis and narrative,, and sometimes startles the reader with its razor- sharp insights. The Eastern Front during WW1 is often given second place, if any place at all, in histories of WW1. This book will cause any reader who has relied on "Dr Zhivago" and Marxist nonsense for an interpretation of the events in Eastern Europe between 1914 and 1917 to do a "volte face". Aside from content and style, the book is well worth reading just to receive instruction in thinking from Professor Stone. This is the kind of professor you wish you'd had for all of your university classes. I finished this book hoping that PRofessor Stone would apply his interests to many other areas of history, such as the American Civil War and WW2.
Rating:
Summary: Important Economic History of the Great War's Eastern Front
Review: Norman Stone's "Eastern Front" was an extremely important contribution to the history of the much-neglected Eastern Front. As with other great events such as the French Revolution or the Vietnam War, much of "conventional wisdom" is completely misplaced: Russia was NOT on the verge of economic ruin at the time of the revolution, rather, its economy was rapidly strengthening. Also contrary to popular belief, the Russian Army was NOT tottering on the edge of defeat in 1917: it had recovered from the Masurian Lakes and Tannenberg and was well capable of standing its ground. Indeed, the Russians had earlier scored a number of smashing victories against the Austrians. So the revolutions of October 1917 were by no means historical inevitabilities; rather, they have to be understood as a series of successful political transitions in times of relatively dynamic economic growth. Such is the message of Stone's "Eastern Front" - if you want a detailed battle history or a running narrative of the war's key events, this is not the book, but as economic history it is very interesting indeed.
Rating:
Summary: Tsarist Russians against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.
Review: Prof. Stone has a great book on the war in the east durning
World War I. Since this book was written in 1974, it might not
take in all the current details coming out of the former Soviet Union. In the book, Stone refutes some of the common perceptions
of this war. The ultimate reason for their defeat was not an
unwillingness to fight the war, but the incompetent leadership-
both political and military- in the waging of the war. In some
cases sush as Brusilov, the leadership was very good and nearly suceeded in knocking the Austro-Hungarians out of the war. This is probably the only book so far on this part of the war.
Rating:
Summary: Tsarist Russians against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.
Review: Prof. Stone has a great book on the war in the east durning
World War I. Since this book was written in 1974, it might not
take in all the current details coming out of the former Soviet Union. In the book, Stone refutes some of the common perceptions
of this war. The ultimate reason for their defeat was not an
unwillingness to fight the war, but the incompetent leadership-
both political and military- in the waging of the war. In some
cases sush as Brusilov, the leadership was very good and nearly suceeded in knocking the Austro-Hungarians out of the war. This is probably the only book so far on this part of the war.
Rating:
Summary: Clearly a Work of Love by the Author
Review: The book is written by a Cambridge and Oxford history scholar and professor Norman Stone and is perhaps the best single book on the Eastern Front during WWI. From reading the book it is easy to understand the author's enthusiasm for the subject when we see his degree of knowledge on the subject and all the details. Clearly the book was a work of love by the author.
Although the book is just a 300 page paperback it is not a quick light read. There are 300 pages of main text and 20 pages of sources notes on four basic subjects, i.e.; introduction to the politics and war preparation, the military battles (which is the majority of the book), Russian economics, and finally a short section on the Russian revolution of 1917. As I said it is not a quick read; it took me over three weeks to read and some parts I had to read twice. Some parts were excellent for inducing sleep - especially all those Polish names and Russian Generals. Having said that some parts are slow, one can say that it is an excellent book.
The crux of the author's arguments is that fate of the war on the Eastern Front was decided by poor Russian management of its economic resources along with a highly fractured and disorganized armed forces, not by and fundamental negative Russian economic factors. This poor Russian effort was further complicated by a weak infrastructure - especially railroads - in an otherwise fast growing Russian economy. Also, the Russians failed to recruit in large numbers, failed to keep pace with modern military developments, lacked officers in numbers, had poor training, and failed to develop good leadership, wasted many available resources, suffered from poor moral especially among the lower ranks, and in general failed to coordinate and properly plan military actions as for example between ground troops and artillery.
We learn of the Russian General Brusilov and his many brilliant victories against German and Austrian troops, a sort of WWI Moshe Dyan but without tanks. In general both sides have mixed results, but the more powerful Russians are sent into a retreat by the better managed but smaller German army supported by their excellent rail system.
The book covers a lot of detail from 1900 to 1917. He includes a final chapter that covers the lead up to the 1917 revolution mainly from an economics perspective, and then the author summarizes the take over of power by the Bolsheviks in late 1917 as the revolution of early 1917 leaves a power vacuum.
All in all an excellent read and impressive summary of this part of the war, especially on the economics, and he covers each and every battle.
Recommend highly 5 stars.
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