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Rating: 
Summary: What Really Went Wrong?
Review: Col Summers wrote the seminal book on what really happened to America in its involvement in the Viet Nam War. He clearly explains why we could not win it as we fought it and why we were constrained from fighting it to win. He ties these insights to the great philosophers of war (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz). This book was written in the late 1970s and served to greatly becalm the internal turmoil in the US military structure. Instead of "What happened" or "Who betrayed us;" talk turned to agreeing or disagreeing with the different parts of his theory. Most found it to be on the mark.If you want to know why we went in, read "The Pentagon Papers." If you want to know why we were doomed to fail when we did, read this. Well written, not dry or tedious, but complete.
Rating:
Summary: What Really Went Wrong?
Review: Col Summers wrote the seminal book on what really happened to America in its involvement in the Viet Nam War. He clearly explains why we could not win it as we fought it and why we were constrained from fighting it to win. He ties these insights to the great philosophers of war (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz). This book was written in the late 1970s and served to greatly becalm the internal turmoil in the US military structure. Instead of "What happened" or "Who betrayed us;" talk turned to agreeing or disagreeing with the different parts of his theory. Most found it to be on the mark. If you want to know why we went in, read "The Pentagon Papers." If you want to know why we were doomed to fail when we did, read this. Well written, not dry or tedious, but complete.
Rating: 
Summary: Rolling Thunder
Review: Col. Summers' ON STRATEGY is a fine work. It suffers, however, from two glaring flaws. The first is that it differs little from the many other books on Vietnam consumed with hand-wringing and finger-pointing. Summers, in my judgment, slips too easily into the Praetorian Critique which blames the government hamstringing the military for our loss in S.E. Asia. The other flaw is that Summers clings too closely to Clausewitz's classic ON WAR as the thematic skeleton for his conclusion of America's military defeat in Vietnam. It appears that Summers concludes what he sets out to prove; namely, that we lost in Vietnam because the American armed forces didn't follow the military strategy set out by a book on war written 150 years ago. This gives the reader the impression that Summers' argument is circular. ON STRATEGY is helpful and brief. However, our defeat in S.E. Asia was more complex than Summers presents it.
Rating:
Summary: Reply to the "reader from Griffin, Georgia"
Review: I agree that solving the problems underlying insurgencies is better than resorting to force alone. That said, the Vietnamese insurgents, i.e. the VC, were largely dead following Tet, 1968. The main opponent for the remainder of the war was the NVA regular. The 1972 Easter Offensive and the 1975 offensive leading to Saigon's fall were conducted by conventional NVA military forces crossing the borders. American military asistance defeated the Easter Offensive. We'll never know if the same could have been said about the 1975 campaign. Returning to the underlying conditions.I believe North Vietnam intended to unify the country. It was only a question of when. Could the Saigon government develop the support of the people to prevent this? Apparently not in the time that they had to do it. I believe that maintaining a friendly government in Saigon meant maintaining a friendly government in Hanoi. We would not accept the Hanoi government, so the only way of achieving a friendly government in Vietnam would have required defeating, occupying, and "engineering" North Vietnam. As we did in Japan. I think we had capability, but I do not think we had the will. Perhaps rightly so. Would it have been worth the candle?
Rating:
Summary: The TRUE Failure of the Vietnam War
Review: I have recently been asked to write a paper on the poor strategic planning by the U.S. during the Vietnam War. When I was searching through different sources of information, I ran across this book. This book was filled with large amount of information that discused the U.S. failure of planing strategys and how the strategys that where already implemented didn't work. It discusses theories that date back to master theoretician Carl Von Clausewitz and desribe the U.S. principles of War. Even if your not writing a paper on the subject, it will surely expand your knowledge on U.S. failure during the Vietnam War, and soon, if not already be required reading in U.S. Military Academy.
Rating:
Summary: Five Stars for Colonel Summers
Review: One of the enduring ironies of military history--and the history of military thought--is that the most profound analysis, clearest insights, and most enduring illumination of the principles and practice of warfare has been accomplished by military professionals of relatively modest rank. To the distinguished list of Colonel Clausewitz, Captain Mahan, and Captain Hart, add Colonel Harry Summers. ON STRATEGY is certainly the most important book on military theory to appear since WWII and is perhaps the most important work of this century. Potential purchasers need have no fear that this book will be out-of-print for the foreseeable future; the presses will keep running because ON STRATEGY will be required reading in every military academy in the world for many decades. ON STRATEGY is "about" the Vietnam War in much the same way that Clausewitz is "about" the Napoloenic Wars or that Mahan is "about" 18th-century naval struggles between France and England. That is, Summers uses the Vietnam War as a vehicle for analysis and illustration of principles of war that apply universally. Aside from the clarity of his thought, Summers' most remarkable achievement is his writing style: For all of its subtlety, this book is accessible and valuable for readers who may have little background in military affairs. At the end of WW II, the United States created special five-star ranks to honor it most senior commanders for their contributions to victory. A book review is a poor substitute for a richly-deserved star to reward extraordinary service to the nation. But for his brilliant analysis and articulate writing, pin Five Stars on Harry Summars' collar. - - - - - - - - - The reviewer is a former military intelligence analyst.
Rating:
Summary: Tactical Victory -- Strategic Defeat
Review: Summers recounts an exchange between himself and a former NVA officer some years after the war. It went something like this Summers: "You never defeated us in the field." NVA Officer: "That is true. It is also irrelevant." I recently saw this bumper sticker on a Vietnam veteran's car: "I don't know what happened. When I left we were winning." To find out what happened, read this book. Summers gives an insightful critique of the strategic failure using the Nine Principles of War and the doctrine of Clausewitz. I read this book a few years before the Gulf War, and as I watched that war unfold, I kept "On Strategy's" teachings in mind. It seemed to me at the time that those charged with the conduct of the Gulf War effort were applying "On Strategy's" doctrine chapter and verse. Read the book and review the Gulf War effort, and see if you don't agree.
Rating:
Summary: Great book
Review: There is no circular reasoning or any other distinguishing flaws of critical thinking in this book, nor is it a simplistic approach (unless simplification is a coping factor for a lack of ability to comprehend what you read). The point of using Clausewitz is to show that certain lessons regarding the use of military force had already been learned, and that the failure to apply certain fundamental rules and guidelines eminating from those lessons were ignored in Vietnam. Why those failures took place is an area of debate, but the reasons presented in the book are the most coherent I've read or heard, and reconcile with the established facts well. The only thing I have a hard time with, is the easy way out it gives the American media for its lack of honor and integrity. That elite capitalist liberal media with its own agenda is something that Clausewitz didn't have to contend with.
Rating:
Summary: classic book about necessity of political support for war
Review: This book should be required reading for all field grade colonels on up. In meticulous detail it details the failing of military strategy in Vietnam because clear goals were not identified and political support obtained for same. It correctly identifies the limitations of military power, which cannot "win hearts and minds" but only bury them. The best tribute to this book is that every Americal military leader fighting a war after this book was published has followed the the letter and tenor of the recommendations set forth in the book. Summers should have recieved numerous decorations for the contributions to military strategy this book contains. Instead he was shunned by the military establishment who nevertheless reads and follows his book, because he had the ordacity in his book to name names and criticize those in power who failed to follow even the most basic military tenets in conducting the Vietnam War. However, long after those leaders are long forgotten, this book will still be required reading for American Military Leaders who do not wish to repeat the mistakes made in the Vietnam War.
Rating:
Summary: the Vietnam War book to read first
Review: This is the best and primary work on what went wrong with the
U.S. military effort in Vietnam. Its biggest shortcoming is
that it does not indicate clearly its origin and importance.
This was the U.S. Army War College's commissioned study of
what lessons should be learned from the Vietnam conflict. It
became the standard text, and the basis for the course, on the
subject, not only at the War College but also at its Navy and
Air Force counterparts. These are the institutions where those selected as prospective generals and admirals are trained in the principles of flag-level command. (The book's
history and importance are described at some length in Summers'
sequel, _On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War_.)
Following Clausewitz' classic overview, Summers meticulously shows how the U.S. failed to follow established principles of warfare and how these failures led to the bad result.
The book's history as a War College study also explains some
biases and omissions. U.S. doctrine emphasized the defeat
of the enemy's military, as Clausewitz did; Summers had no
choice but to follow Clausewitz and dismiss or ignore such
writers as Sun Tzu and B. H. Liddell Hart, who argued for winning by attacking the enemy's will to fight. Yet his opening quote from the NVA colonel, and his selective use of
Clausewitz (he quotes Clausewitz extensively on matching
goals to available means, but not on defeating the main body
of the enemy), put the real message there plainly enough,
if between the lines: the U.S. paid too little attention
to the aspects of war that take place off the battlefield.
This book will repay careful study. It certainly did for
the U.S. military, as the Gulf War attests.
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