Operation Goodwood: The Great Tank Charge, July 1944 (Battleground Europe - Normandy)

Rating:
Summary: An Excellent Account of the "Apparent Failure"
Review: For most American military history readers, Operation "Goodwood" was merely the largest of a string of British failures to seize Caen in Normandy in July 1944. Since most US histories of the Normandy campaign focus on the breakout with Operation Cobra, the "apparent failure" of Operation "Goodwood" as General Eisenhower referred to it, gets little scrutiny. Thanks to Pen & Sword's excellent Battleground Europe series on the Normandy campaign, American readers can now begin to correct some of those misconceptions about this important operation. Ian Daglish provides a first-rate military evaluation of the operation, complete with British and German perspectives.

Daglish begins the volume by describing "Goodwood" as the "biggest tank battle the British army fought in World War Two." However, this is incorrect since there were nine British tank battalions used in "Goodwood" with about 1,000 tanks, but the British army had used eighteen tank battalions with 1,000 tanks at El Alamein in 1942. The author notes the manpower crisis in the British army affected their conduct in Normandy; they could afford to lose tanks but not infantry. With the fighting deadlocked around Caen, the British had to develop a plan that would minimize their own infantry losses while offering a reasonable chance to expand the bridgehead. Operation "Goodwood" was originally conceived by Field Marshal Montgomery as an attrition attack that would gain some ground and wear down German armor reserves. However, General Dempsey - the commander of British 2nd Army - modified the plan as a potential breakthrough attack. As Daglish notes, "Eisenhower became convinced that Goodwood was to deliver a major breakthrough, effectively a left hook through the German lines to mirror the right cross of Operation Cobra."

One of the strengths of this volume is the space that Daglish devotes to describing the opposing forces in detail (although unfortunately, there is no order of battle). General Richard O'Connor's British 8th Corps was to spearhead the attack with three armored divisions (7th, 11th and Guards). The British plan was to precede the attack with a saturation bombing, followed by artillery prep fire, then to attack in echelon down a one kilometer-wide "penetration corridor." Facing this mass of armor was the depleted German 21st Panzer Division, which was deployed in depth but lacking in infantry. However, the British had to get their three armored divisions across the Orne River and their assembly areas were so cramped that that most of the artillery was too far back. The operation started well, with the heavy bombings delivering one of the most effective carpet bombings of the war: 6,500 tons of bombs were dropped and much of it landed on the German armor deployed in the forward areas. The German front-line defenders were effectively suppressed by the combination of bombing and artillery barrage, allowing the British first wave - two reinforced armor task forces - to penetrate several kilometers into the German defensive zone.

The majority of this volume focuses on the lead British armor division - the 11th Armored Division - and the German response to its advance. Although the British bombing and artillery had suppressed most of the defenders in the path of the attack, the British chose to bypass a number of villages held by the Germans, assuming that follow-on forces would reduce these obstructions later. British intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) was poor and this came back to haunt them as they encountered unforeseen obstacles and more extensive enemy defenses. The Germans recovered from their initial shock and a battery of four 88mm guns destroyed 15 tanks in one of the lead battalions. British actions on contact were faulty - attempting to drive past German antitank guns rather than methodically eliminating them - and caused heavy casualties. Essentially, the British lead elements were almost halted due to the railway embankments at the southern end of the corridor, and the bunched-up vehicles behind them were catching direct and indirect fire from both east and west. Very quickly, the British 11th Armored Division lost the initiative and was merely trying to hang on for survival, while the follow-on divisions could barely deploy. Daglish exaggerates the significance of the narrowness of the British attack corridor; one kilometer wide was sufficient to move all the British armor they needed through the German main line of resistance. The problem was not width of corridor but reconnaissance, observation and security.

Much of this volume also focuses on the reaction of the 21st Panzer Division - energized by Colonel Hans von Luck - to "Goodwood." Despite heavy losses, Luck was able to cobble together a defense from remnants until German reinforcements could arrive. Readers should carefully note the author's description of two counterattacks by German Tiger tanks; both attacks failed miserably and demonstrate that the reputation of the Tiger has been exaggerated. Daglish fails to note that the Germans also under-estimated the obstacle posed by the railway embankments, since the handful of underpasses were not covered by obstacles or fire.

My only disappointment with this volume is the lack of sufficient detail on casualties. While Daglish mentions that the 11th Armored Division lost 126 tanks on the first day of "Goodwood," it is not clear what total British armor and infantry losses were like. Detailed data on casualties is critical in assessing whether or not Goodwood was a failure, or worthwhile. Clearly, the British lost the equivalent of one armor division to write-off most of the German 21st Panzer Division, but the bulk of the SS armor was not badly depleted in the Goodwood fighting. Although Caen fell shortly after "Goodwood", it was due more to Canadian infantry attacks than British tank charges. Thus, "Goodwood" apparently failed to either achieve a breakthrough or seriously degrade the German armor in Normandy. Yet "Goodwood" did give the British some "elbow room" on the east side of Caen that would give them valuable jump-off points later.