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Rating: 
Summary: Everything Is A Conspiracy These Days
Review: I bristle at the suggestion that perhaps Roosevelt knew of the attack but did nothing to stop it, as if a repulsed sneak attack would not have convinced America to go to war. The conspiracy theory holds that Roosevelt had the carriers shipped out of Pearl, leaving the obsolete battleships to be destroyed in the attack. The one glaring problem with this theory (actually there are several problems, but I consider this the most compelling) can be summarized in a single word: oil. A HUGE amount of oil was stored at Pearl, such a huge amount in fact that the carriers and subs would have been out of action probably for an entire year, if the oil had been destroyed. The value of that oil was tremendous, and Roosevelt would have been absolutely demented to risk it. It was pure luck that the Japanese did not target it (they actually planned to hit it on the aborted third run). Additionally, Roosevelt was a former Navy Secretary who referred to the Army as "them" and the Navy as "us". It is way beyond belief that he would have sacrificed the battleships and their crews, much less the oil. It's always sooooo simple to monday morning quarterback, a lesson to keep in mind today regarding Iraqi WMD.
Rating:
Summary: Everything Is A Conspiracy These Days
Review: I bristle at the suggestion that perhaps Roosevelt knew of the attack but did nothing to stop it, as if a repulsed sneak attack would not have convinced America to go to war. The conspiracy theory holds that Roosevelt had the carriers shipped out of Pearl, leaving the obsolete battleships to be destroyed in the attack. The one glaring problem with this theory (actually there are several problems, but I consider this the most compelling) can be summarized in a single word: oil. A HUGE amount of oil was stored at Pearl, such a huge amount in fact that the carriers and subs would have been out of action probably for an entire year, if the oil had been destroyed. The value of that oil was tremendous, and Roosevelt would have been absolutely demented to risk it. It was pure luck that the Japanese did not target it (they actually planned to hit it on the aborted third run). Additionally, Roosevelt was a former Navy Secretary who referred to the Army as "them" and the Navy as "us". It is way beyond belief that he would have sacrificed the battleships and their crews, much less the oil. It's always sooooo simple to monday morning quarterback, a lesson to keep in mind today regarding Iraqi WMD.
Rating: 
Summary: A Hearty Perennial
Review: The first two (petulant) reviews here rather miss the point. Wohlstetter's "Pearl Harbor" is a venerable classic which is still read and quoted from more than 40 years after publication. (It is, for example, referred to by historian and strategist John Lewis Gaddis in the lead article of the Jan/Feb 2005 issue of "Foreign Affairs.")
If you haven't read "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision," then you really aren't prepared for serious discussions with well-informed people about such things as "pre-emptive" and "preventive" wars.
Rating:
Summary: Tedious and Useless
Review: The simple fact about US intelligence before Pearl Harbor in the Pacific is that we had cracked their diplomatic (Purple)code, but that was of little use in understanding what their military was up to. Practically no one in Japan except those involved at a high level, was in on Operation Hawaii, certainly
not Japan's diplomats, with the exception of what the Hawaiian
consul could figure out from requests for ship info. Only late in the game was the request made of that office asking about barrage balloons and torpedo nets,etc., which, had it been sent earlier, would have given the game away. You can look at the
Japanese message traffic all you want during the period preceding Pearl harbor, and you'll find nothing to indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor, even with the benefit of hindsight. At Dawn We Slept and The Verdict of History provide all of this info
and a whole lot more, and should be read first and probably only
for info about what was known or was thought was known before the attack from message traffic and other means of intelligence.
Rating:
Summary: Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision
Review: This work is the definitive analysis of the intelligence failures leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. It is not an historical account of the attack, but is rather a concise analysis of the mistakes made by naval intelligence authorities in Hawaii and the U.S. during the months leading up to the attack. The book offers a unique analysis of the attack, and doesn't pull any punches. Human failures are analyzed, as well as bureaucratic failures, which were many. The reader comes away with a better understanding of the attitudes prevelant among intelligence authorities of the time, as well as an insight into their workings. This is not a book for those just beginning their studies of the attack. It is more appropriate for someone who already has a good understanding of the historical timelines of the attack, the Japanese perspective of U.S. military policy at the time, and the military and civilian authorities involved in the attack and their roles. The only negative comment regarding the book is that it offers rather tedious reading at times. But to serious researchers this is more than offset by the volumes of information gleaned from it. This is a "must-have" book for serious Pearl Harbor researchers.
Rating:
Summary: Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision
Review: This work is the definitive analysis of the intelligence failures leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. It is not an historical account of the attack, but is rather a concise analysis of the mistakes made by naval intelligence authorities in Hawaii and the U.S. during the months leading up to the attack. The book offers a unique analysis of the attack, and doesn't pull any punches. Human failures are analyzed, as well as bureaucratic failures, which were many. The reader comes away with a better understanding of the attitudes prevelant among intelligence authorities of the time, as well as an insight into their workings. This is not a book for those just beginning their studies of the attack. It is more appropriate for someone who already has a good understanding of the historical timelines of the attack, the Japanese perspective of U.S. military policy at the time, and the military and civilian authorities involved in the attack and their roles. The only negative comment regarding the book is that it offers rather tedious reading at times. But to serious researchers this is more than offset by the volumes of information gleaned from it. This is a "must-have" book for serious Pearl Harbor researchers.
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