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Rating: 
Summary: First Act of a Three Act Tragedy
Review: As I write this review, the United States and its coalition partners have recently deposed Saddam Hussein. It looks as though a long occupation is about to begin and I wanted to learn more about Iraq and its recent history. I turned to this Osprey Essential History of the Iran Iraq War because I wanted a quick overview of this conflict.The book is 91 pages and is the typical Osprey sized paperback with plenty of pictures and maps. Without the maps and photos, the book is about 50-60 pages long and it took me about two hours to read. The War was approximately 8 years long and there were a million or more casualties. That is a lot of history to cram into this slim volume. To be able to do this, the author had to take the grand strategic view of the War. For those looking for nitty gritty of the War, this is not the book for you. There are no Angus McBride illustrations of T-72's or Iranian uniforms. This book tells its story from the lofty height of senior leaders and nation states. This book reminds me of one of those intense articles on history, economics and politics that one can find in a great magazine like the Economist. I own more than a 100 Osprey books and this is the best writing that I have ever come across in one of their books. Karsh's prose is economical and thought provoking. Having finished this book, I had to re-evaluate my understanding of both Saddam Hussein and the Ayatollah Khomeini. They are both much more complex characters than I had understood. This is an introductory book on the War and it has inspired me to go out and learn more about the conflict. Highly recommended and very timely.
Rating:
Summary: First Act of a Three Act Tragedy
Review: As I write this review, the United States and its coalition partners have recently deposed Saddam Hussein. It looks as though a long occupation is about to begin and I wanted to learn more about Iraq and its recent history. I turned to this Osprey Essential History of the Iran Iraq War because I wanted a quick overview of this conflict. The book is 91 pages and is the typical Osprey sized paperback with plenty of pictures and maps. Without the maps and photos, the book is about 50-60 pages long and it took me about two hours to read. The War was approximately 8 years long and there were a million or more casualties. That is a lot of history to cram into this slim volume. To be able to do this, the author had to take the grand strategic view of the War. For those looking for nitty gritty of the War, this is not the book for you. There are no Angus McBride illustrations of T-72's or Iranian uniforms. This book tells its story from the lofty height of senior leaders and nation states. This book reminds me of one of those intense articles on history, economics and politics that one can find in a great magazine like the Economist. I own more than a 100 Osprey books and this is the best writing that I have ever come across in one of their books. Karsh's prose is economical and thought provoking. Having finished this book, I had to re-evaluate my understanding of both Saddam Hussein and the Ayatollah Khomeini. They are both much more complex characters than I had understood. This is an introductory book on the War and it has inspired me to go out and learn more about the conflict. Highly recommended and very timely.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent introduction to a nearly unheard of war
Review: I bought this book when it first came out before the current occupation of Iraq. Not only does it help explain some of the current situations now faced in Iraq, but it is perhaps one of the best Essential Histories written. Explaining in depth in the reasons for the war, and up to the use of childern by Iran in suicide offensives, the author is able to keep the reader interested and informed without overwhelming one with information.
Osprey shows that one of its many talents is covering obscure wars (in this case for those of us in the west) for those who want a deeper understanding of how such seemingly unheard of conflicts affect the modern world.
Rating: 
Summary: Pro-Iraqi Bias
Review: One of the most difficult subjects for any historian to deal with - and one that many suggest should not even be undertaken - is recent history. Writing about recent history has far more risk of bias and lacks the documentary evidence that that the fullness of time tends to bring forth. In the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, Mideast scholar Dr. Efraim Karsh attempts to summarize the main points of this brutal, but ultimately indecisive, contest of nations. The result of Dr. Karsh's study is interesting, but may well disappoint many readers. First, the military details and analysis are rather sparse, which is not unexpected given the closed nature of both Iraqi and Iranian sources. Second, Dr. Karsh clearly has a pro-Iraqi bias that tends to skew his analysis of political motives and intentions. Overall, this volume succeeds in delivering a useful summary of the Iran-Iraq War, but readers will probably not be as satisfied as they would reading an Osprey Essential History on the First or Second World Wars. The Iran-Iraq War begins with an introduction, a chronology, a short background to the war, and a brief synopsis of the warring sides. The actual military campaigns are covered in two chapters totaling 40 pages. The author then uses several short chapters to cover selected topics: Iran's use of boy soldiers, the Iraqi and Iranian national war efforts, the campaign against the Kurds and how the war ended. The author's conclusion is entitled, "a costly exercise in futility," which tends to sum up his opinion of the war. There are a total of 9 maps (the Mideast in 1980, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, Iran's recapture of Khuzestan, the deployment of the Iraqi corps in 1982, Iran's Dawn Offensives, Iran's capture of Fao, the tanker war, Operation Karbala 5, and Iraq's final offensives in 1988). Unlike most Osprey titles, these maps are not very useful since they don't convey very much information. Nor are the photographs very exceptional; few are actually related to the fighting and most depict only rather bland images. Finally, the bibliography does not list any primary sources or even Iraqi or Iranian periodicals (presumably the author is conversant in regional languages) and lists rather standard secondary sources like Anthony Cordesman. While Cordesman is a good source on this subject, it is not clear that the author did much original research. Considering that there are officer émigrés (such as at least one Iraqi corps commander) from both nations now in the west, the author might have included some interviews with these individuals. While the author covers all the major battles of the war, the coverage appears little deeper than what one could glean from contemporary newspaper accounts. Not one military unit on either side is even mentioned by name, nor are any military leaders other than Iraqi general Rashid mentioned. This account is of a war of faceless, nameless ciphers. Given that some information is available in the west on some of the early armor battles and on the Republican Guard, the author seems to have done little to enrich the military side of this account. The brief section on opposing armies really only addresses the relative forces in quantitative terms, without even touching doctrine or tactics. The Iranian army, having been trained by the US, was far more dependent on air support and artillery than the tank-heavy Soviet-trained Iraqi army. The author's pro-Iraqi bias is hard to swallow. In Dr. Karsh's view, Saddam Hussein had little choice but to invade Iran in 1980 since the Revolutionary regime was a threat to his own political survival. Furthermore, the author views Hussein's main mistake as opting for overly-limited objectives, instead of really crippling Iran's military power by going for a full-scale invasion. While the author concedes that Hussein does perpetuate a personality cult and did kill thousands of Kurdish civilians with poison gas, the Iraqi leader is consistently presented as an essentially normal leader. In the conclusion, the author again paints Iraq as being "forced to" invade Kuwait in 1990. Wait a minute! No choice but to invade? Saddam Hussein presented as a normal leader? How about the far more realistic assessment that Saddam Hussein was (is) a criminal dictator who seized the opportunity to seize some oil-rich areas in Iran when the Iranian Revolutionary had disrupted Iran's military defenses. The Shatt-al-Arab waterway dispute that the author mentions was only the Iraqi cassus belli, but he fails to mention that the Iraqi drives toward Ahvaz and Abadan were designed to grab major oil producing areas, not just remove threats to Iraqi transshipment routes. Had the Iraqi aggression succeeded, Saddam Hussein would have increased his control over the Mideast oil supply by grabbing important Iranian oil fields. He tried the same thing in 1990 in Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's motives and intentions are clear: use force to grab oil resources from weakly defended areas. Readers should also note the omission of certain Iraqi provocative acts, in particular the 1987 "accidental" missile attack on the USS Stark (but the author does mention the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts by the Iranians). If this account is to be believed, Iraq "saved" the other Gulf States from Iranian aggression and had been forced into a difficult position from which military force was the only answer. This type of bias, combined with inadequate coverage of the military aspects of the war, reduces the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 to the second tier of secondary sources.
Rating:
Summary: Pro-Iraqi Bias
Review: One of the most difficult subjects for any historian to deal with - and one that many suggest should not even be undertaken - is recent history. Writing about recent history has far more risk of bias and lacks the documentary evidence that that the fullness of time tends to bring forth. In the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, Mideast scholar Dr. Efraim Karsh attempts to summarize the main points of this brutal, but ultimately indecisive, contest of nations. The result of Dr. Karsh's study is interesting, but may well disappoint many readers. First, the military details and analysis are rather sparse, which is not unexpected given the closed nature of both Iraqi and Iranian sources. Second, Dr. Karsh clearly has a pro-Iraqi bias that tends to skew his analysis of political motives and intentions. Overall, this volume succeeds in delivering a useful summary of the Iran-Iraq War, but readers will probably not be as satisfied as they would reading an Osprey Essential History on the First or Second World Wars. The Iran-Iraq War begins with an introduction, a chronology, a short background to the war, and a brief synopsis of the warring sides. The actual military campaigns are covered in two chapters totaling 40 pages. The author then uses several short chapters to cover selected topics: Iran's use of boy soldiers, the Iraqi and Iranian national war efforts, the campaign against the Kurds and how the war ended. The author's conclusion is entitled, "a costly exercise in futility," which tends to sum up his opinion of the war. There are a total of 9 maps (the Mideast in 1980, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, Iran's recapture of Khuzestan, the deployment of the Iraqi corps in 1982, Iran's Dawn Offensives, Iran's capture of Fao, the tanker war, Operation Karbala 5, and Iraq's final offensives in 1988). Unlike most Osprey titles, these maps are not very useful since they don't convey very much information. Nor are the photographs very exceptional; few are actually related to the fighting and most depict only rather bland images. Finally, the bibliography does not list any primary sources or even Iraqi or Iranian periodicals (presumably the author is conversant in regional languages) and lists rather standard secondary sources like Anthony Cordesman. While Cordesman is a good source on this subject, it is not clear that the author did much original research. Considering that there are officer émigrés (such as at least one Iraqi corps commander) from both nations now in the west, the author might have included some interviews with these individuals. While the author covers all the major battles of the war, the coverage appears little deeper than what one could glean from contemporary newspaper accounts. Not one military unit on either side is even mentioned by name, nor are any military leaders other than Iraqi general Rashid mentioned. This account is of a war of faceless, nameless ciphers. Given that some information is available in the west on some of the early armor battles and on the Republican Guard, the author seems to have done little to enrich the military side of this account. The brief section on opposing armies really only addresses the relative forces in quantitative terms, without even touching doctrine or tactics. The Iranian army, having been trained by the US, was far more dependent on air support and artillery than the tank-heavy Soviet-trained Iraqi army. The author's pro-Iraqi bias is hard to swallow. In Dr. Karsh's view, Saddam Hussein had little choice but to invade Iran in 1980 since the Revolutionary regime was a threat to his own political survival. Furthermore, the author views Hussein's main mistake as opting for overly-limited objectives, instead of really crippling Iran's military power by going for a full-scale invasion. While the author concedes that Hussein does perpetuate a personality cult and did kill thousands of Kurdish civilians with poison gas, the Iraqi leader is consistently presented as an essentially normal leader. In the conclusion, the author again paints Iraq as being "forced to" invade Kuwait in 1990. Wait a minute! No choice but to invade? Saddam Hussein presented as a normal leader? How about the far more realistic assessment that Saddam Hussein was (is) a criminal dictator who seized the opportunity to seize some oil-rich areas in Iran when the Iranian Revolutionary had disrupted Iran's military defenses. The Shatt-al-Arab waterway dispute that the author mentions was only the Iraqi cassus belli, but he fails to mention that the Iraqi drives toward Ahvaz and Abadan were designed to grab major oil producing areas, not just remove threats to Iraqi transshipment routes. Had the Iraqi aggression succeeded, Saddam Hussein would have increased his control over the Mideast oil supply by grabbing important Iranian oil fields. He tried the same thing in 1990 in Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's motives and intentions are clear: use force to grab oil resources from weakly defended areas. Readers should also note the omission of certain Iraqi provocative acts, in particular the 1987 "accidental" missile attack on the USS Stark (but the author does mention the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts by the Iranians). If this account is to be believed, Iraq "saved" the other Gulf States from Iranian aggression and had been forced into a difficult position from which military force was the only answer. This type of bias, combined with inadequate coverage of the military aspects of the war, reduces the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 to the second tier of secondary sources.
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