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Rating: 
Summary: A new perspective of the Napoleonic Wars
Review: Epstein believes it was greater combat effectiveness of Napoleon's adversaries and not the decline of the French army that led to the fall of Napoleon. In his book, Epstein writes about how the Austrians copied the French corps system that allowed greater personal intiative on the battlefield. This also permitted the Austrian army to retreat in detail rather than being surrounded in whole. As a result, unlike Austerlitz, Napoleon was unable to destroy the Austrain army at Wargam in 1809. I would reccomend this book to anyone who wants a new perspective of the closing phases of the Napoleonic Wars.
Rating:
Summary: Army Corps, Operational Doctrine, and Modern Warfare
Review: Epstein's thesis is thought-provoking and admirably supported. He convincingly argues that the start of modern warfare occurred in 1809 during the Franco-Austrian War when, for the first time in history, two armies met in battle, each utilizing the new doctrine of independent army corps at the new operational level of war. His research sheds new light on the military history of the nineteenth century by challenging the popular wisdom that Napoleon won battles through tactical genius and force of personality alone. Rather, the author demonstrates that Napoleon's genius was primarily manifested in his creation of a new system of warfare based on interdependent action of individual army corps at the operational level of war to achieve strategic objectives. This was a major shift from the tactical-strategic paradigm of eighteenth century warfare (i.e. the ancien regime). Although Napoleon's ideas were based on those of prior theorists, he was the first commander to fully implement this new style of warfare. The result was a doctrinal asymmetry between Napoleon's army and those of his enemies that enabled him to achieve his astounding victories at Ulm, Austerlizt, and Jena-Auerstadt in 1805-1806.After 1806, however, the other European powers began to organize their own armies according to this corps system. Although they generally lacked Napoleon's mastery of command and control at the operational level, this development ended Napoleon's doctrinal monopoly and restored operational balance to the battlefields of Europe. It was this restoration of doctrinal symmetry at the operational levels of war that account for Napoleon's inability to achieve another Austerlizt in 1809 or thereafter. He strongly suggests that Napoleon himself was unaware of the dynamics of this doctrinal paradigm. Epstein's thesis argues against the possibility of a Lee or Jackson, or for that matter Napoleon himself, capitalizing on this imbalance again. He also argues against the idea that Napoleon had lost his personal edge and was in decline starting in 1809. Rather, the decline of Napoleon's battlefield fortunes resulted from his enemies learning the lessons he himself had taught them in 1805-1806. While the book is essentially about the developement of the corps system and the emergence of the operational level of war, it is also an excellent operational history of the Franco-Austrian War of 1809. His descriptions of the significant battles, especially Wagram, are thorough, detailed, and readable. The uninitiated reader in the field of military history may suffer from information overload when reading his descriptions and maps, but the detail is greatly appreciated by serious students of the subject. Nonetheless, the general reader will still greatly benefit from learning how warfare fundamentally and irreversably changed in the year 1809. Students of the U.S. Civil War will also benefit from his thesis in that it greatly effects how one weighs the roles of doctrine, technology, and personality during that war as it relates to Napoleon's development of the corps system and the operational level of war.
Rating:
Summary: Army Corps, Operational Doctrine, and Modern Warfare
Review: Epstein's thesis is thought-provoking and admirably supported. He convincingly argues that the start of modern warfare occurred in 1809 during the Franco-Austrian War when, for the first time in history, two armies met in battle, each utilizing the new doctrine of independent army corps at the new operational level of war. His research sheds new light on the military history of the nineteenth century by challenging the popular wisdom that Napoleon won battles through tactical genius and force of personality alone. Rather, the author demonstrates that Napoleon's genius was primarily manifested in his creation of a new system of warfare based on interdependent action of individual army corps at the operational level of war to achieve strategic objectives. This was a major shift from the tactical-strategic paradigm of eighteenth century warfare (i.e. the ancien regime). Although Napoleon's ideas were based on those of prior theorists, he was the first commander to fully implement this new style of warfare. The result was a doctrinal asymmetry between Napoleon's army and those of his enemies that enabled him to achieve his astounding victories at Ulm, Austerlizt, and Jena-Auerstadt in 1805-1806. After 1806, however, the other European powers began to organize their own armies according to this corps system. Although they generally lacked Napoleon's mastery of command and control at the operational level, this development ended Napoleon's doctrinal monopoly and restored operational balance to the battlefields of Europe. It was this restoration of doctrinal symmetry at the operational levels of war that account for Napoleon's inability to achieve another Austerlizt in 1809 or thereafter. He strongly suggests that Napoleon himself was unaware of the dynamics of this doctrinal paradigm. Epstein's thesis argues against the possibility of a Lee or Jackson, or for that matter Napoleon himself, capitalizing on this imbalance again. He also argues against the idea that Napoleon had lost his personal edge and was in decline starting in 1809. Rather, the decline of Napoleon's battlefield fortunes resulted from his enemies learning the lessons he himself had taught them in 1805-1806. While the book is essentially about the developement of the corps system and the emergence of the operational level of war, it is also an excellent operational history of the Franco-Austrian War of 1809. His descriptions of the significant battles, especially Wagram, are thorough, detailed, and readable. The uninitiated reader in the field of military history may suffer from information overload when reading his descriptions and maps, but the detail is greatly appreciated by serious students of the subject. Nonetheless, the general reader will still greatly benefit from learning how warfare fundamentally and irreversably changed in the year 1809. Students of the U.S. Civil War will also benefit from his thesis in that it greatly effects how one weighs the roles of doctrine, technology, and personality during that war as it relates to Napoleon's development of the corps system and the operational level of war.
Rating:
Summary: Thought provoking military history
Review: If you are interested in the development of war, this is an excellent read, otherwise turn away. The author shows how Napoleon's decline began as his enemies fought like he did, in a modern fashion. He makes the case that war as we understand it today began in 1809. The maps are wonderful, although the level of operational detail was a bit much.
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