To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966™1973

Rating:
Summary: The Rebirth of American Airpower During Vietnam
Review: A poorly trained and ill-equipped Air Force was unable to shed its nuclear trappings or its political constraints to fight effectively during the Rolling Thunder campaign. However, by the Linebacker campaigns, an improved Air Force was ready with better training and equipment to exploit the lifting of political constraints, culminating in the most successful air effort of the Vietnam War-and setting the stage for the continual success of airpower. This is the central theme of Wayne Thompson's new book, To Hanoi and Back.

Thompson spent a number of years painstakingly preparing this book-and it shows. Using personal interviews, unit histories and numerous other primary sources-including many previously classified documents and transcripts-Thompson provides much more than a mere chronology of events in Vietnam. He tells the story of what happened, who did it, and why. The book is as much about politicians and policy-making in Washington as it is about the bomb dropping in Vietnam. Instead of approaching the civil-military relationship as a rivalry, as several authors on Vietnam have done, Thompson treats the two as parts of the same puzzle.

In the opening chapters, the author describes the Air Force that fought Rolling Thunder as hobbled by inappropriate equipment, poor training, inter- and intraservice rivalries, and a Johnson administration set on a strategy of gradualism. Thompson blames these problems on the fixation of U.S. policy on nuclear deterrence and preparing to fight the Soviets in the era before Vietnam. Because of this policy, the Air Force had essentially let its conventional capabilities whither to irrelevancy. This may explain why the Navy, who had kept its focus on conventional warfare, outperformed the Air Force in Rolling Thunder. In fact, Thompson argues the only capability setting the Air Force apart from naval aviation was the long-range, all-weather, high altitude radar bombing capability of the B-52 force.

Unfortunately, political constraints early in the war prevented the B-52s from performing strikes against vital centers in North Vietnam that the Air Force considered important. Instead, the bombing of North Vietnam was restricted to politically approved targets designed to "send signals" to the North Vietnamese. Thompson contests the wisdom of the strategy of gradualism employed by the White House during Rolling Thunder. He claims that it gave the enemy time to adapt to the pattern of bombing, to relocate vital supplies and infrastructure away from the bombing, and to build defenses. In a chapter entitled, "Gradualism on Trial," the author introduces the reader to the pressures placed upon President Johnson. Johnson believed gradualism was prudent in order to avert Chinese or Soviet intervention. Other pressures included the need to preserve the impression in the minds of Congress and the American people that the war was not escalating, but was well in hand. In the end, Thompson concludes, "American airmen paid a high price for gradualism." He may be too harsh on gradualism, given the concerns of the president. Certainly, Thomas Schelling makes an excellent case for gradualism.

The author argues that the Air Force that fought the Linebacker campaigns was very different from the one that started Rolling Thunder. By the time Linebacker came about, airmen had already implemented fixes to many of the problems that Rolling Thunder helped them identify. These changes included reinstalling guns on fighter aircraft, the introduction of laser-guided precision munitions, improved aircrew training from the Fighter Weapons Schools and Red Flag exercises, and a new president ready to authorize deep strikes with B-52s. To Hanoi and Back concludes with a brief chapter that credits the success of American airpower in Desert Storm, and later operations, to the lessons learned in Vietnam-particularly in the failures of Rolling Thunder. The air commanders in Desert Storm were Vietnam veterans, and President Bush was careful to avoid micromanaging tactical affairs. Airpower was centralized under a single commander, and precision-guided standoff weapons were fully employed. Moreover, airmen could "go downtown" on opening night. All of these elements were missing in Rolling Thunder, but were present in Linebacker-and Desert Storm. The weakest part of Thompson's book is his strong advocacy that B-52s used in an unrestricted fashion against North Vietnam at the outset of Rolling Thunder might have hastened the war's end, if not an outright victory. Such an argument is counterfactual and does not take into account airpower's inability to affect the independent insurgency fought by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, other than interdicting supplies. Moreover, there is little historical evidence that suggests that airpower can execute a decisive decapitation strategy. Thompson's writing style is highly appealing and reminiscent of some of Tom Clancy's works. He is not only writing a history, he is also telling a story. Over the course of the book, Thompson introduces his readers to several people; politicians, generals, and airmen. He takes the time to provide short biographies of each person he introduces. This helps set the context for the events he discusses, plus adds compelling human interest stories along the way, but none more interesting than the harrowing saga of American prisoners of war. Not only is their story important in its own right, but the author provides insight into the political maneuvering that secured their release.

I strongly recommend To Hanoi and Back to anyone interested in the air war over Vietnam-or politics during this timeframe. It is a marvelous telling of a history that teaches many lessons. This book is particularly fascinating because it discusses the frustrations that airmen faced at the operational and strategic levels of warfare-averted in Desert Storm, but repeated in Allied Force. For those who are interested, also consider adding Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence, Mark Clodfelter's The Limits of Airpower, Robert Pape's Bombing to Win, John Warden's The Air Campaign, and Ben Lambeth's The Transformation of American Airpower. These books will present arguments and counter-arguments that will help round out an understanding of the issues surrounding modern airpower.

Rating:
Summary: First rate analysis of the air campaign over North Vietman
Review: Having flown combat missions over North Vietnam in 1968-1969, I was especially interested in this book. One of the great strengths of the American Air Force is that it has a history office with well qualified historians who are committed to pursuing the truth even though this often means criticizing the Air Force. Hallion and Thompson have both worked in this office for many years. They are truly experts and whatever they say or write you can take to the bank. I salute them for writing a first rate book. Mandatory reading for anyone interested in the evolution of combat airpower.

Rating:
Summary: First rate analysis of the air campaign over North Vietman
Review: Having flown combat missions over North Vietnam in 1968-1969, I was especially interested in this book. One of the great strengths of the American Air Force is that it has a history office with well qualified historians who are committed to pursuing the truth even though this often means criticizing the Air Force. Hallion and Thompson have both worked in this office for many years. They are truly experts and whatever they say or write you can take to the bank. I salute them for writing a first rate book. Mandatory reading for anyone interested in the evolution of combat airpower.

Rating:
Summary: GREAT AIRPOWER HISTORY
Review: The book, as its title suggests, is a history of the United States Air Force in Vietnam during these years, but it offers the reader much more than an operational narrative. It is written chronologically during the seven years that encompassed Operations Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and Linebacker II, as well as the many other minor operations during and in between the larger ones. The real value of the book though, for the airpower strategist, is the skill with which Dr. Thompson weaves the contextual elements that ultimately decided how effective airpower could be during this period. As each operation unfolds we are given not only the details of the air campaign itself, but also the personalities and relationships among the various three and four star flag officers charged with planning and implementing the strategies. The political considerations and the lenses through which the president and key cabinet members viewed the conflict are important factors that affected operations down to the tactical employment of individual units and aircraft. Dr. Thompson smoothly transitions between the macro and micro view of how these pieces are related.

Dr. Thompson amply illustrates the political, technological and geographical constraints which have an often-underestimated effect upon airpower employment. The goal of precision engagement of ground targets from aircraft has a long history. Billy Mitchell described it in his Provisional Manual of Operations of 1918. Army Air Force planners in World War II hoped to achieve unprecedented bombing accuracy with the Norden bombsight. In Vietnam, as today, the goal of accurately bombing the desired target was also highly sought after but the right technology had not yet emerged. Thompson traces the parallel development of Navy and Air Force weapons systems, from the Navy's TV guided Walleye bomb, to the use of LORAN to guide aircraft to their bomb release points, to the final employment of Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) with warheads large enough to take down the bridges that helped supply Hanoi with materials from the north. But perhaps more than any other factor, Dr. Thompson clearly shows us the enormous effect that weather had on the effectiveness of the air campaign over North Vietnam. Planners on both sides understood the affects of the large block of time lost during the monsoon season. Thompson even states that, "the most effective North Vietnamese air defense had always been weather" (pg. 244). This is an operational reality that can easily derail even the most elegant air strategy and can preclude political leaders from effectively controlling the application of force they require to achieve their stated objectives as well.

Overall To Hanoi and Back is a very well researched and documented history, composed in a very readable style. It is written with the operator in mind, giving future air strategists, planners, and users a very comprehensive view of not only the restraints under which one must operate in a war of limited objectives, but also in an environment where, although airpower's effectiveness may not be optimal, it is still the main instrument chosen to deliver the message we wish to send our adversary. The only possible improvement a reader could wish for would be more maps and charts in the text to visualize the many battlefields and data that an average operator needs to appreciate the area of operations. Even so, this is an excellent book that every professional should add to their personal library.

Rating:
Summary: GREAT AIRPOWER HISTORY
Review: The book, as its title suggests, is a history of the United States Air Force in Vietnam during these years, but it offers the reader much more than an operational narrative. It is written chronologically during the seven years that encompassed Operations Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and Linebacker II, as well as the many other minor operations during and in between the larger ones. The real value of the book though, for the airpower strategist, is the skill with which Dr. Thompson weaves the contextual elements that ultimately decided how effective airpower could be during this period. As each operation unfolds we are given not only the details of the air campaign itself, but also the personalities and relationships among the various three and four star flag officers charged with planning and implementing the strategies. The political considerations and the lenses through which the president and key cabinet members viewed the conflict are important factors that affected operations down to the tactical employment of individual units and aircraft. Dr. Thompson smoothly transitions between the macro and micro view of how these pieces are related.

Dr. Thompson amply illustrates the political, technological and geographical constraints which have an often-underestimated effect upon airpower employment. The goal of precision engagement of ground targets from aircraft has a long history. Billy Mitchell described it in his Provisional Manual of Operations of 1918. Army Air Force planners in World War II hoped to achieve unprecedented bombing accuracy with the Norden bombsight. In Vietnam, as today, the goal of accurately bombing the desired target was also highly sought after but the right technology had not yet emerged. Thompson traces the parallel development of Navy and Air Force weapons systems, from the Navy's TV guided Walleye bomb, to the use of LORAN to guide aircraft to their bomb release points, to the final employment of Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) with warheads large enough to take down the bridges that helped supply Hanoi with materials from the north. But perhaps more than any other factor, Dr. Thompson clearly shows us the enormous effect that weather had on the effectiveness of the air campaign over North Vietnam. Planners on both sides understood the affects of the large block of time lost during the monsoon season. Thompson even states that, "the most effective North Vietnamese air defense had always been weather" (pg. 244). This is an operational reality that can easily derail even the most elegant air strategy and can preclude political leaders from effectively controlling the application of force they require to achieve their stated objectives as well.

Overall To Hanoi and Back is a very well researched and documented history, composed in a very readable style. It is written with the operator in mind, giving future air strategists, planners, and users a very comprehensive view of not only the restraints under which one must operate in a war of limited objectives, but also in an environment where, although airpower's effectiveness may not be optimal, it is still the main instrument chosen to deliver the message we wish to send our adversary. The only possible improvement a reader could wish for would be more maps and charts in the text to visualize the many battlefields and data that an average operator needs to appreciate the area of operations. Even so, this is an excellent book that every professional should add to their personal library.

Rating:
Summary: Serious Readers Only
Review: This is a very comprehesive account of the air campaign during America's involvement in vietnam. VERY comprehensive- covers operational, deployment and political details for a very indepth look into this period. This is a great resource but it is not for the casual reader and even for serious research not something to read from cover to cover in one sitting. A great book to read if you are interested and you have the time to spare. Earlier reviews have already covered much of its contents very well- not much more to add there except for my own reading "experience"