Rating: 
Summary: A Must book for historians - but dont' agree with conclusion
Review: A short note. A good book and a must read on the eastern front historian. I disagree with the thesis, but it seems correct that August 1941's decisions brought Axis closest to victory. Closest but not close enough as soviet matieral uncovered in the 90's show Russia would have fought on with the US. I believe the bigger victory in the East the Axis succeeded, the more likely it would have suffered catastrophic defeats like Moscow in 41 or Stalingrad in 42. But a good book to buy and read.
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Summary: No War in a Vacuum, please
Review: Almost alone of all WWII historians, Stolfi takes up the cause of the German Army's tactical and operational abilities, and by inference their faults (see M. Cooper, THE GERMAN ARMY for the best argument). He also clearly demonstrates what few arm chair strategists and many military members fail to grasp: no military operation EVER takes place in a political vacuum. The German style of fighting, effective as it was, was completely incompatible with Hitler's political/strategic thinking. That is why this book is so important to fairly evaluate Hitler's interference in the conduct of military operations. Fortunately for Humanity, he did, and was one of the Allies' greatest assets. But that obscures the point that the German Army knew its business in conducting war winning battles and campaigns. Contrary to conventional belief, the Germans did not attack Russia to get to Britian, they did not underestimate the magnitude of Soviet military power, they did not neglect the logistical matters of decisive campaigning, and they did not fall prey to superior tanks. On the contrary, the German Army from 22 June 41 until the end of Sep of the same year demonstrated that they had the ability to go the distance and win the battle at the gates of Moscow. Whether that would have been enough to win the war, given Hitler's penchant to fight everyone, is cause for another book.There are some weaknesses to keep in mind. The author states that he has relied on German sources; upon contemplation, this sort of makes sense since he is evaluating the victorious Wehrmacht, not the one that lost. It is doubtful that Soviet materials would shed much light on operations during the first few weeks of combat. In some cases by the time the Russians figured it out, the Germans were 60 miles past. The author does assume a "monolithic" panzer mentality in the German Army. With the exception of Guderian, Hoth, and Rommel, no one above the rank of Colonel in 1941 KNEW what to do with a tank. Manstein is taken to task for failure to exploit a tank victory, but the author ascribes no other but local significance to this. This assumption is important, because those mentioned above were not calling the shots at OKH or OKW. Further, as stated in other review, the case for final collapse is not there. The author attempts to show that hundreds of thousands of Russians would surrender when they figured out that the Germans wouldn't shoot them on capture. What is not mentioned, is that the fate of a Russian POW was not that heartening anyway. Finally, the author fails to give credit to the Soviet tactical response of attacking wherever in contact. This was the correct response to the German blitz tactics. Anything that would cost time and wear and tear was bound to have some influence on German decision makers. The Americans did it in the Bulge. Imagine if the French had adopted the same attitude. Things would have turned out different In balance, though, it is a very good read. It presents a different perspective, a "what-if", and some good analysis of military power and its relationship to the political master.
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Summary: More Elementary Errors
Review: I've already offered criticism of this book on both substantive and stylistic grounds. However, I cannot help but mention another factual error that undermines the credibility of this work. On p. 53, the author refers to German General Erich Hoepner: "Writing after the war on the campaign in the Baltic, Hoepner does not mention the opportunity presented the Germans at Dvinsk, commenting only that 'the first intermediate operational target' of the panzer group had been reached for the time being at an important point and that a great river barrier had been overcome." Stolfi offers no citation for this reference to what Hoepner supposedly wrote "after the war." It would be most interesting if there were such a reference, because Hoepner did not survive the war. He was implicated in the July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler, and was executed thereafter.
Rating: 
Summary: A Great Book Simply For The Analysis
Review: One may differ with the author's conclusion, but one cannot deny the book is a fascinating analysis of the Barbarossa blitzkrieg campaign in Russia. For example, the author superimposes a map of the French campaign upon a map of the Russian campaign area to give a sense of comparative scale. Excellent 'rate-of-advance' maps are also included, showing the progression of the German offensive by the week. By viewing these, one gets a sense of the true German intention as well as areas of strong Russian resistance. An astute reader can draw many conclusions on the mechanics of motorized war and the Barbarossa Campaign. To reject the entire work simply because one disagrees with the author's opinion is folly. It is an insightful work as far as close analysis of the 'blitzkrieg' technique is concerned.
Rating:
Summary: A Great Book Simply For The Analysis
Review: One may differ with the author's conclusion, but one cannot deny the book is a fascinating analysis of the Barbarossa blitzkrieg campaign in Russia. For example, the author superimposes a map of the French campaign upon a map of the Russian campaign area to give a sense of comparative scale. Excellent 'rate-of-advance' maps are also included, showing the progression of the German offensive by the week. By viewing these, one gets a sense of the true German intention as well as areas of strong Russian resistance. An astute reader can draw many conclusions on the mechanics of motorized war and the Barbarossa Campaign. To reject the entire work simply because one disagrees with the author's opinion is folly. It is an insightful work as far as close analysis of the 'blitzkrieg' technique is concerned.
Rating: 
Summary: Could Hitler have won? You can't tell by this book!
Review: R.H.S. Stolfi is here to tell you that Hitler lost World War II with one blunder in August, 1941. Stolfi argues that an immediate, all-out drive by the German Army Group Center against Moscow on the eighth week of Hitler's massive invasion of Soviet Russia (Operation Barbarossa) would ultimately have destroyed the Red Army. Instead, Hitler halted Army Group Center in August and ordered Guderian's 2nd Armored Group southward toward Kiev, losing the opportunity to take Moscow, and with it the war. Had Moscow fallen, Stolfi believes that Germany would inevitably have conquered Russia. His thesis is that the Leningrad and Kiev fronts would have been isolated and annihilated, a decisive portion of Soviet industry would have fallen into German hands, and the Wehrmacht would have driven on to Gorki and the Volga by December, forcing Stalin's government to surrender or else be overthrown by a populace unwilling to keep fighting a lost war. Stolfi's thesis is interesting and provocative, but he argues it ineptly. His research is impressive in its depth, but far too limited in scope. While he has done excellent work with the German primary sources, he has ignored the vast majority of the Soviet sources. While the German sources suffice to support many of Stolfi's points, it is inexcusable to rely exclusively on German intelligence (Abwehr) reports to evaluate the Soviets' losses, armed strength, plans and intentions. Stolfi also ludicrously relies on postwar statistics to judge how much Soviet industrial capacity Germany could have captured. The thesis that the Wehrmacht could have taken Moscow rings true. Given that Operation Typhoon (October 2, 1941) did in fact carry the Germans into the suburbs of Moscow against fierce resistance, encircling and destroying vast Soviet forces at Vyasma and Bryansk, one may plausibly suppose that an earlier German attack against less prepared defenses, in the more favorable weather conditions of August, could have taken the capital. Also convincing is Stolfi's claim that Hitler's decision to send Guderian southward reflected the German tyrant's inability to understand the blitzkrieg method, and that Hitler as a military leader had a siege mentality rather than a blitz mentality. But Stolfi is not nearly so persuasive in arguing that the fall of Moscow would inexorably entail the fall of Soviet Russia. The author consistently analogizes the campaign in Russia to Germany's earlier campaign in France, concluding that Russia was "no more than a bigger cat in a bigger bag." A fundamental difference between the two campaigns appears to have escaped him; the Germans' crushing victory over the French and British in May 1940 was accomplished in the absence of any Allied strategic reserve. Once the Germans broke through at Sedan, the Western Allies had no uncommitted forces to throw at Guderian's armored corps as it raced to the sea, and thus could only hurl uncoordinated piecemeal attacks at him with whatever units they could pry loose as he trapped their armies in Flanders. In contrast, the Soviets had a strategic reserve vastly larger than the Abwehr realized. And Stolfi, dependent on German sources, appears no more cognizant than the Abwehr of those reserves' size. Total Red Army strength with reserves at the start of Barbarossa is estimated at 12 million, but Stolfi suggests that his hypothetical assault on Moscow, by causing an additional 1 million casualties beyond those the Russians actually incurred historically, would have destroyed Soviet Russia's strategic reserve. In reality, the Soviet reserve was large enough to fight on. Stolfi also posits the likely political collapse of Stalin's government had Moscow fallen. This is possible, but a corresponding collapse of the Russian will to fight is unlikely. The Russians were confronted with an invader whose words and deeds plainly proclaimed its intention to enslave all Russians to the "master race." Whoever might have replaced Stalin at the helm, he would certainly be chosen above all for his determination to drive the enemy from Mother Russia. Stolfi also argues, unpersuasively, that the Germans had accurately assessed the rigors of war in Russia, citing a few accurate Abwehr estimates of Russian numbers in certain arms, and claiming that the Germans, out of respect for Russian strength, massed as much strength as practical against the enemy. This is not true. Germany left 51 divisions in the western theater, 22 of which could easily have been used in Barbarossa, the Western Allies being in no condition to invade Europe in 1941. The Abwehr's gross underestimation of Soviet air strength is not mentioned. Even by Stolfi's own calculations, the campaign would have lasted through December had Moscow fallen, yet Stolfi claims the Wehrmacht was right not to burden its supply system by providing winter clothing to the troops. Accepting Stolfi's own appraisal of the ultimate progress of the Wehrmacht after taking Moscow, one notes that the predicted final advance is still well short of the line Archangelsk-Kotlas-Gorki-the Volga-Astrakhan, which Barbarossa proposed to achieve. I accept Guderian's verdict over Stolfi's: "We have severely underestimated the Russians, the extent of the country and the treachery of the climate. This is the revenge of reality." So could Operation Barbarossa have succeeded? Maybe, but Stolfi has not proven it. Illogical argument, selective evidence, and research tunnel-vision make for an unconvincing final thesis. At best, Stolfi has established that, if Germany ever had a chance, it was likelier by taking Moscow in 1941 than Stalingrad in 1942. But too often Stolfi's strident insistence that the blitzkrieg war machine was literally unstoppable by anything other than Hitler himself dredges up bad memories of the World War I cult of the offensive, which killed millions pointlessly with its vapid nostrum that imprudence assures victory, and the enemy's capabilities do not matter.
Rating: 
Summary: A Fascinating "What If...." Book and Analysis
Review: R.H.S. Stolfi's "Hitler's Panzers East" is a great read. The central thesis of the book is that had Hitler not stopped his armed forces -- specifically, Army Group Center under Bock -- by diverting them, they could have captured Moscow and quite possibly won World War II. Ultimately, the German armed forces reached the outskirts of Moscow with winter approaching. It is important to remember that there were 3 separate thrusts by the German army into the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa. Army Group North led by General Leeb was heading towards St. Petersburg (Leningrad); Army Group Center under General Bock was headed for Moscow; and Army Group South under General Von Rundstedt was driving for Stalingrad/Caucasus Mountains.
The central point: did Adolf Hitler's decision to divert Army Group Center in August 1941 southward (to take Kiev and assist Army Group South) prevent and delay Army Group Center's ability to seize Moscow? Stolfi makes a very convincing case that the answer is most assuredly YES. Relying on many German Army documents, German general's books/biographies, Stolfi makes a convincing case that Hitler's one chance to defeat the Soviet Union was in 1941, not 1942 or 1943.
The book meticulously goes into detail regarding battle strengths of the competing Soviet and German armies. During the early months of Barbarossa, the ratio of Soviet-to-Germans killed or wounded ranged from between 10:1 and 20:1. The Russians were taking on very heavy losses, and the German pincher movements were engulfing massive amounts of captured Soviet POW's, including 600,000 at Vyasma-Bryansk. The pincher movements employed by the German armies resulted in the biggest series of captured POW's in the history of warfare. By comparison, when the Nazi's surrendered Stalingrad in 1943, the 6th Army was just over 90,000 men.
Stolfi goes into detail on the competing war mentalities of "siege" and "blitzkrieg" with the former being more closely aligned with Hitler. Stolfi uses many examples to show that whereas the Army had the blitzkrieg mentality, Hitler repeatedly got scared and worried about going too far too fast, evidence of a siege strategy. I thought this was an interesting concept, but not one that needed to be continually revisited throughout the book.
One wonders if any recently de-classified Russian archival material would have influenced Stolfi's analysis. However, given the inaccuracy and propaganda and Communist Party-driven edge to Soviet historical analyses and even 1st-source documents (many deliberately wrong so as to cover up Party errors), I am not sure that Stolfi would have gotten a different picture of competing Soviet vs. German strength if he had access to information other than from the Germans and U.S./British. I have attempted to reach Professor Stolfi on this, but have been unsuccessful to date.
"Hitler's Panzers East" is a very good story that will cause you to really think about what might have been. Could Hitler have really captured most of the Soviet Union, and would this have meant the end of communism decades earlier? Would Hitler then have turned his attention to Winston Churchill and Great Britain? Would Churchill and the British armies/navies flee for Canada (as was being planned) to fight the war from the US-North American continent? Would the US have entered World War II if Hitler had conquered the Soviet Union and Japan did NOT attack Pearl Harbor a few months later? Finally, is it possible that if Barbarossa had succeeded, that the Cold War might have been not between Western democracies and Communism, but between Western democracies and a global Nazism promoted by Hitler and Nazi Germany?
These questions today came alot closer to being relevant than one might suppose based on the analysis in Stolfi's book.
Rating:
Summary: A comprehensice and exhaustively researched work.
Review: R.H.S. Stolfi's work, Hitler's Panzers East shows, definitively how the German army was capable of defeating Soviet Russia and its vast armed forces. Stolfi supports this viewpoint with carefully researched data from German intelligence services (Soviet sources have been distorted by propaganda)depicting how the Wermacht looked at a Russian campaign with foreboding and dread. Stolfi's data accurately depicts how the strength of Soviet forces was gauged with great accuracy by German intelligence, often corretly on or even overestimating Soviet resources and armed forces.
By August of 1941, the Germans had indeed defeated eight of nine Soviet field armies opposing Army Group Centre. The last remaining army and any reserves were grouped by the Soviets directly in front of Moscow. These units were relatively well-equipped, but poorly trained and led. Considering the speed with which the Germans had tackled Soviet defenses and attacks, it would seem safe to say that, considering the conditions, the units in front of Moscow would be desposed of in record time, even for Army Group Centre. Assuming Moscow is captured, the Soviet Northwestern Front would have been forced to fight on reversed fronts, so, as a result, Leningrad would fall, a huge blow to morale for the Soviets. Those forces opposing Field Marshal Rundstendt's Army Group South would be forced to withdraw behind the Volga to avoid destruction, as Stofli rightly concludes that after Army Group North was freed up it would slowly take the current position of AG Centre while AG Centre would wheel south to cut off the escape route of the powerful Russian forces retreating east. Odds are, that most of the Russian forces would be cut off and destroyed. The Soviet government would retreat probably to Molotov where it would eke out an existence with less than 30% of its armed forces against German troups in winter positions on the Western side of the Volga.
The only thing keeping the Germans from attaining this lofty goal was Hitler's meglomania and belief that Moscow was purely a geographical target. With this in mind, he ordered most of the mobile units of AG Centre to assist AG South in the capture of Kiev. It was with this ill-fated decision that the Germans gave up almost certain victory, thereafter, the possibilities of winning the war or even achieving a stalemate rapidly diminished.
This is by far, one of the most difinitive works on the possibilities of World War II and should be read by all those who have learned in their history classes that the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 could not have succeeded.
Rating:
Summary: A comprehensice and exhaustively researched work.
Review: R.H.S. Stolfi's work, Hitler's Panzers East shows, definitively how the German army was capable of defeating Soviet Russia and its vast armed forces. Stolfi supports this viewpoint with carefully researched data from German intelligence services (Soviet sources have been distorted by propaganda)depicting how the Wermacht looked at a Russian campaign with foreboding and dread. Stolfi's data accurately depicts how the strength of Soviet forces was gauged with great accuracy by German intelligence, often corretly on or even overestimating Soviet resources and armed forces.
By August of 1941, the Germans had indeed defeated eight of nine Soviet field armies opposing Army Group Centre. The last remaining army and any reserves were grouped by the Soviets directly in front of Moscow. These units were relatively well-equipped, but poorly trained and led. Considering the speed with which the Germans had tackled Soviet defenses and attacks, it would seem safe to say that, considering the conditions, the units in front of Moscow would be desposed of in record time, even for Army Group Centre. Assuming Moscow is captured, the Soviet Northwestern Front would have been forced to fight on reversed fronts, so, as a result, Leningrad would fall, a huge blow to morale for the Soviets. Those forces opposing Field Marshal Rundstendt's Army Group South would be forced to withdraw behind the Volga to avoid destruction, as Stofli rightly concludes that after Army Group North was freed up it would slowly take the current position of AG Centre while AG Centre would wheel south to cut off the escape route of the powerful Russian forces retreating east. Odds are, that most of the Russian forces would be cut off and destroyed. The Soviet government would retreat probably to Molotov where it would eke out an existence with less than 30% of its armed forces against German troups in winter positions on the Western side of the Volga.
The only thing keeping the Germans from attaining this lofty goal was Hitler's meglomania and belief that Moscow was purely a geographical target. With this in mind, he ordered most of the mobile units of AG Centre to assist AG South in the capture of Kiev. It was with this ill-fated decision that the Germans gave up almost certain victory, thereafter, the possibilities of winning the war or even achieving a stalemate rapidly diminished.
This is by far, one of the most difinitive works on the possibilities of World War II and should be read by all those who have learned in their history classes that the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 could not have succeeded.
Rating:
Summary: Flies in the Face of Traditional History of Barbarossa
Review: Stolfi's book defies conventional historical wisdon when he makes a convincing argument that the Wehrmacht could have won in the Soviet Union in July/August 1941. Germany's Army Group Center was poised for the final offensive against Moscow at the end of July 41 when Hitler vacillated and turned attention toward economic objectives. Yes, this book reinforces the beliefs of former generals that the loss of WW2 was Hitler's fault, but Stolfi presents an interesting study of the Fuehrer's dual nature, one of siege mentality during military campaigns, after being able to make brilliant political decisions to attack in the first place. The author makes an excellent point that Germans were excellent at winning the initial battles and therefore brought campaigns to quick conclusions in their country's favor. When unable to quickly force opening decisive battles, the Wehrmacht did not fare so well. I would highly recommend this book even though it is based entirely on German resources. Most of traditional history of this campaign has come from a Soviet regime with a political agenda of its own. It is a point of view worth considering.
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