Meiktila 1945: The Battle to Liberate Burma (Campaign, 136)

Rating:
Summary: A Classic Set-Piece Attack on an Isolated Foe
Review: Edward M. Young, an aviation history, provides an excellent summary of the little-known Meiktila campaign in Burma in 1945 in Osprey's campaign series #136. Indeed, this volume is well suited for study by professional officers and military academics in regard to a classic set piece operational-level offensive. Young's narrative is crisp and workmanlike, and well supported by maps and illustrations. However, readers should be aware that the author is attempting to summarize six months of operations over a large theater into only 96 pages, and this reduces some of the detail that might shed greater light on facets of the campaign. Furthermore, the author has not provided much detail on the crucial role of logistics, which undermines his campaign narrative in certain areas. Nevertheless, Meiktila 1945 is certainly worth having for anyone interested in analyzing operational level combat in the Second World War. Young begins with a rather lengthy introduction that sets the strategic background to the campaign. While Young views the US and British differences over Burma as essentially related to the Chinese, this leaves out the very important consideration that the Americans felt that Burma was a waste of resources and that the British were pressing to reconquer Burma for parochial reasons. While the British army in Europe was running out of infantry, General Slim was committing 24 British battalions to reconquer Burma; these troops could have done more good in Europe than the Burmese jungles. Furthermore, if the land routes to China were no longer threatened after the failure of the Japanese offensive against Imphal-Kohima in March-June 1944, why reconquer Burma? A key fact that Young omits in this strategic debate is the logistical fragility of Slim's entire plan of operation - the entire plan would be anemic at best. Why take this strategic risk when Burma was nothing more than a strategic buffer for the Japanese empire? Capture of Rangoon would not render any immediate advantage to the Allies. Young's sections on opposing commanders and opposing plans are quite good, although the idea that the Meiktila campaign was an exploitation of the Imphal-Kohima victories overlooks the fact that the British gave the Japanese over six months to retreat into Burma and lick their wounds - hardly a pursuit. The section on opposing armies is decent, although a bit vague in some important areas. While noting that the Japanese were weak in armor and airpower, and that their infantry and artillery were at only 50% strength, Young doesn't seem to appreciate that the Japanese army in Burma was effectively isolated by February 1945 due to the US submarine campaign and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Indeed, the Japanese army in Burma received no replacements after November 1944; with Macarthur and Nimitz approaching the Japanese home islands, Burma was effectively written off. While Young claims that the "decisive weapon in the Meiktila battles proved to be the tank," it would be fair to say that the Allied "center of gravity" was air transport, of which 85% was American. Without his C-47s to provide air supply, Slim would never have crossed the Irrawaddy River. Young mentions that Allied edge in air power but fails to specify that they actually had a better than 13-1 superiority over the Japanese in Burma. Thus, Allied air supremacy enabled air resupply that allowed for operational maneuver, while the Japanese were effectively unable to replace their losses or maneuver much. The result of all these converging factors was an "overmatch" campaign where the Japanese had few viable options, which is important to keep in mind when reading Young's narrative (if Japanese intelligence had deduced Allied intent to seize Meiktila, could they have stopped it?). Meiktila 1945 includes six 2-D Maps (the Burma Front on 1 November 1944; Operation "Extended Capital"; IV and XXXIII Corps crossings of the Irrawaddy River; the armored thrust to Meiktila; the defense of Meiktila; the advance on Rangoon) and three 3-D Birds-Eye View maps (7th Division crosses the Irrawaddy; the Battle for Meiktila; the defense of Meiktila). There are also three color battle scenes: crossing the Irrawaddy; fighting in Meiktila; and clearing Wetlet. There is no doubt that General Slim planned and executed an excellent set-piece campaign in reconquering Burma in early 1945; but the British were also beneficiaries of good luck. Young notes that the British crossing of the Irrawaddy River fortuitously struck the boundary between the two Japanese armies and that Japanese C³I was abysmal. The fact that the Japanese failed to detect British road-building efforts through the jungle indicate incredible incompetence. Slim was able to get his 7th Division across the Irrawaddy with some difficulty and it is interesting that he took 13 days from crossing the river to reaching the main objective at Meiktila. While Slim's concept of an "armored dash" to Meiktila was sound, the fact that it took nearly two weeks to cover 80-odd miles indicates that it was no "blitzkrieg". Yet, if the British had dropped all or part of the Indian 50th Airborne brigade on the approaches to Meiktila, this might have prevented the Japanese rear area troops from establishing roadblocks. Once Meiktila was captured in March 1945, Slim was in the strongest position in warfare: a strategic offensive with a tactical defense. Since the British were sitting on their supply lines, the Japanese were forced to counterattack at Meiktila but the effort was piece-meal and they ruined two divisions in the process. Young fails to mention that Slim's 14th Army was experiencing significant logistical shortfalls at this point and the British were rapidly approaching a culminating point if the Japanese did not fold in central Burma. Perhaps the only viable Japanese strategy in Burma would have been to stay on the defense until the rainy season stopped the British in their tracks, but this would have violated the offensive spirit of Japanese doctrine.