Rating: 
Summary: Unsound Analysis
Review: Adrian Goldsworthy, a classical scholar, initially wrote this book as a thesis at Oxford University. Goldsworthy felt that, "both the popular and scholarly view of the Roman army is at best highly misleading, and in most cases utterly false." By employing the method introduced by John Keegan in the Face of Battle, Goldsworthy seeks to use classical literary sources to demonstrate how the Roman army actually fought on campaign. The author relies heavily on the standard ancient sources - Caesar, Tacitus, Polybius, Plutarch, Josephus - and synthesizes them in an effort to pain a collective portrait of the Roman army in action. As a scholarly revisionist work, this book does provide an interesting synthesis of material from diverse sources. Yet a sober analysis of this book reveals that it does not merit universal acclaim because it neither breaks significant new ground nor possesses sound analysis. Readers familiar with the classics of ancient history may be dismayed by the manner in which the author weaves together disparate anecdotes from more than 300 years of Roman military history in an attempt to validate his theories. Examples from different centuries, different theaters of war and different types of war are thrown together into a bouillabaisse that is confusing and misleading. Using examples so disparate in space or time - and with significant gaps in sources - to develop a general theory is intellectually dangerous. Imagine attempting to develop a general theory on how the French army fought between 1640 and 1940 based upon a sprinkling of memoirs from the early 18th Century, the Napoleonic era, and the First World War and the problem should be apparent. It is also noteworthy that the author criticizes other author's for using anachronistic sources in analyzing the Roman army, and then proceeds to do exactly that himself. The author's choice of odd post-classical military references, such as out-dated Victorian military manuals, is particularly odd. Unfortunately, the author fails to provide much that is really new, and the little that is new is overly generalized and dubious. Goldsworthy concludes that, "the army's organization was not characterized by its rigidness, but, quite the contrary, by its great flexibility. Its units adapted to the local situation." And, "the strategy adopted by many Roman armies on campaign was anything but methodical." The author's main intent is to discredit the monolithic, automaton perception of the Roman army and replace it with a more complex view that encompasses innovation and human motivations. Certainly taken against eighty-year old assessments such as J F C Fuller's, Goldsworthy's text appears more modern. While using outdated ideas as fodder for a revisionist graduate school thesis makes sense, it does not make sense to re-cast this effort as a crusade to correct all other interpretations of Roman military methods. As in Keegan's Face of Battle, the author attempts to dissect the mechanics of Roman battle. Critical to Goldsworthy's analysis is his unquestioned faith in S L A Marshall's assertion that only 25% of soldiers actively participate in combat. Never mind that Marshall fudged much of his research or that US troops in Korea did not fight in close-order lines as the Romans did, Goldsworthy believes that this 25% figure was germane to the Roman army as well. According to Goldsworthy, Roman infantry tactics were geared toward achieving a penetration in the enemy "line" and thereby collapse their morale, but if this did not immediately occur, the battle could ebb and flow until one side broke. This is nonsense on many levels. First, any subaltern knows that you cannot achieve a tactical penetration without local superiority, and a thin Roman double-line formation could not hope to achieve this against the typical dense-pack formations of most of its opponents. Even if a small penetration were achieved, the Roman soldiers would be quickly enveloped and annihilated once outside the protection of their own battle line. Goldsworthy does raise three important issues, but fails to exploit them: the Roman preference for large reserves, the Roman knowledge that troops in close combat became exhausted after about 15 minutes and the stabbing tactics of the gladius sword. Modern armies typically maintain 1/9th of their forces in reserve to meet unexpected situations in battle, but the Romans kept a much higher percentage - about one-third. There is no reason to believe that the Romans relied on the unpredictability of winning battles by the extra-aggressive behavior of only 25% of their infantry, but rather, far more plausible theories suggest that the Romans won by well-timed use of reserves. It is likely that against Barbarians, the Romans expected their first two lines merely to hold off and exhaust the enemy for about 15 minutes. At the decisive moment, the Roman general would commit his reserve and this third line would literally massacre the front-rank of the exhausted enemy, who usually lacked the discipline or command and control to employ a tactical reserve properly. As Goldsworthy notes, the Barbarian "wedge" formations usually resulted in the tribal leadership out front and these were the men killed by the Roman reserves; without leadership, the rest of the enemy usually broke and ran. The key question here, is how exactly did the Romans deploy their reserve through the first two lines. However it was done, it required a high degree of training and discipline - both Roman strong points. As for the gladius, Goldsworthy fails to note that stabbing tactics were essentially defensive and far less tiring than the wild, offensive slashing tactics employed by Rome's enemies. Thus, Goldsworthy's depiction of Roman battle tactics is fundamentally flawed, although he does make some interesting observations.
Rating:
Summary: Unsound Analysis
Review: Adrian Goldsworthy, a classical scholar, initially wrote this book as a thesis at Oxford University. Goldsworthy felt that, "both the popular and scholarly view of the Roman army is at best highly misleading, and in most cases utterly false." By employing the method introduced by John Keegan in the Face of Battle, Goldsworthy seeks to use classical literary sources to demonstrate how the Roman army actually fought on campaign. The author relies heavily on the standard ancient sources - Caesar, Tacitus, Polybius, Plutarch, Josephus - and synthesizes them in an effort to pain a collective portrait of the Roman army in action. As a scholarly revisionist work, this book does provide an interesting synthesis of material from diverse sources. Yet a sober analysis of this book reveals that it does not merit universal acclaim because it neither breaks significant new ground nor possesses sound analysis. Readers familiar with the classics of ancient history may be dismayed by the manner in which the author weaves together disparate anecdotes from more than 300 years of Roman military history in an attempt to validate his theories. Examples from different centuries, different theaters of war and different types of war are thrown together into a bouillabaisse that is confusing and misleading. Using examples so disparate in space or time - and with significant gaps in sources - to develop a general theory is intellectually dangerous. Imagine attempting to develop a general theory on how the French army fought between 1640 and 1940 based upon a sprinkling of memoirs from the early 18th Century, the Napoleonic era, and the First World War and the problem should be apparent. It is also noteworthy that the author criticizes other author's for using anachronistic sources in analyzing the Roman army, and then proceeds to do exactly that himself. The author's choice of odd post-classical military references, such as out-dated Victorian military manuals, is particularly odd. Unfortunately, the author fails to provide much that is really new, and the little that is new is overly generalized and dubious. Goldsworthy concludes that, "the army's organization was not characterized by its rigidness, but, quite the contrary, by its great flexibility. Its units adapted to the local situation." And, "the strategy adopted by many Roman armies on campaign was anything but methodical." The author's main intent is to discredit the monolithic, automaton perception of the Roman army and replace it with a more complex view that encompasses innovation and human motivations. Certainly taken against eighty-year old assessments such as J F C Fuller's, Goldsworthy's text appears more modern. While using outdated ideas as fodder for a revisionist graduate school thesis makes sense, it does not make sense to re-cast this effort as a crusade to correct all other interpretations of Roman military methods. As in Keegan's Face of Battle, the author attempts to dissect the mechanics of Roman battle. Critical to Goldsworthy's analysis is his unquestioned faith in S L A Marshall's assertion that only 25% of soldiers actively participate in combat. Never mind that Marshall fudged much of his research or that US troops in Korea did not fight in close-order lines as the Romans did, Goldsworthy believes that this 25% figure was germane to the Roman army as well. According to Goldsworthy, Roman infantry tactics were geared toward achieving a penetration in the enemy "line" and thereby collapse their morale, but if this did not immediately occur, the battle could ebb and flow until one side broke. This is nonsense on many levels. First, any subaltern knows that you cannot achieve a tactical penetration without local superiority, and a thin Roman double-line formation could not hope to achieve this against the typical dense-pack formations of most of its opponents. Even if a small penetration were achieved, the Roman soldiers would be quickly enveloped and annihilated once outside the protection of their own battle line. Goldsworthy does raise three important issues, but fails to exploit them: the Roman preference for large reserves, the Roman knowledge that troops in close combat became exhausted after about 15 minutes and the stabbing tactics of the gladius sword. Modern armies typically maintain 1/9th of their forces in reserve to meet unexpected situations in battle, but the Romans kept a much higher percentage - about one-third. There is no reason to believe that the Romans relied on the unpredictability of winning battles by the extra-aggressive behavior of only 25% of their infantry, but rather, far more plausible theories suggest that the Romans won by well-timed use of reserves. It is likely that against Barbarians, the Romans expected their first two lines merely to hold off and exhaust the enemy for about 15 minutes. At the decisive moment, the Roman general would commit his reserve and this third line would literally massacre the front-rank of the exhausted enemy, who usually lacked the discipline or command and control to employ a tactical reserve properly. As Goldsworthy notes, the Barbarian "wedge" formations usually resulted in the tribal leadership out front and these were the men killed by the Roman reserves; without leadership, the rest of the enemy usually broke and ran. The key question here, is how exactly did the Romans deploy their reserve through the first two lines. However it was done, it required a high degree of training and discipline - both Roman strong points. As for the gladius, Goldsworthy fails to note that stabbing tactics were essentially defensive and far less tiring than the wild, offensive slashing tactics employed by Rome's enemies. Thus, Goldsworthy's depiction of Roman battle tactics is fundamentally flawed, although he does make some interesting observations.
Rating: 
Summary: Good History, Great Read
Review: First, I must address some of Goldworthy's detractors who cite his reliance on ancient authors, irrelevant comparisons, and failure to tell us how the Roman soldier actually perceived battle. Their criticisms would have more validity had they actually explained any one of their conclusions rather than setting up questions and stating their own opinions as fact. Goldsworthy does a very good job of comparing all the ancients he relies on and even drawing in analytical tools from more modern writers. He never suggests that ony one writer or idea is definitive. His style is much more of a synthesis of ideas. Perhaps this is what one reviewer thought was a deceptive style intended to trick us into believing him. I was much taken by this book - especially the last chapter. Goldsworthy never indicates that his thoughts on the subject of the Roman soldier in combat are definitive. He readily acknowledges the weakness of sources and the fact that Roman soldiers were illiterate and almost never left their written recollections. But, the author does pull together what is known about them in a rational, plausible explanation. I have twenty years of military service with the US Army and, while reading the last chapter, I often thought that much of Goldsworthy's analysis about vexillations, motivations, etc. would easily apply to the modern army. Perhaps some things in military life never change. Finally, a word about how the Roman Army was led. Goldsworthy's main contention here is that Roman commanders were flexible. They adapted their strategies, tactics, formations, and personal leadership styles to the situation. This is THE key to success in any army at any time. You can train and you can plan but a commander must be able to change with battlefield surprises. The army that does everything the same all the time will be beaten all the time. For setting the record straight on this point alone Goldsworthy deserves much credit.
Rating:
Summary: Good History, Great Read
Review: First, I must address some of Goldworthy's detractors who cite his reliance on ancient authors, irrelevant comparisons, and failure to tell us how the Roman soldier actually perceived battle. Their criticisms would have more validity had they actually explained any one of their conclusions rather than setting up questions and stating their own opinions as fact. Goldsworthy does a very good job of comparing all the ancients he relies on and even drawing in analytical tools from more modern writers. He never suggests that ony one writer or idea is definitive. His style is much more of a synthesis of ideas. Perhaps this is what one reviewer thought was a deceptive style intended to trick us into believing him. I was much taken by this book - especially the last chapter. Goldsworthy never indicates that his thoughts on the subject of the Roman soldier in combat are definitive. He readily acknowledges the weakness of sources and the fact that Roman soldiers were illiterate and almost never left their written recollections. But, the author does pull together what is known about them in a rational, plausible explanation. I have twenty years of military service with the US Army and, while reading the last chapter, I often thought that much of Goldsworthy's analysis about vexillations, motivations, etc. would easily apply to the modern army. Perhaps some things in military life never change. Finally, a word about how the Roman Army was led. Goldsworthy's main contention here is that Roman commanders were flexible. They adapted their strategies, tactics, formations, and personal leadership styles to the situation. This is THE key to success in any army at any time. You can train and you can plan but a commander must be able to change with battlefield surprises. The army that does everything the same all the time will be beaten all the time. For setting the record straight on this point alone Goldsworthy deserves much credit.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent work
Review: I was more than glad to have the chance to read again and again the book of a person who was a very good friend of mine during my university years in Cardiff, i.e. Dr. Adrian Goldsworthy. I am using this opportunity to congratulate him for this splendid work and also for his other books...and wish him to have always a successful career in the world of writing historical books.
Rating:
Summary: Energizes the dull field of Roman military studies
Review: Most books on the Roman military are either overly concerned with the actions of the commanders, relegating the troops to mere cogs in their well-oiled battle plans, or so incredibly boring and badly organized you wonder how people actually got paid to write it. Although some of the reviews here are critical of his methodology and statements, I find it amusing that they attack his ancient sources, as if there was a hidden cache of writings that Goldsworthy ignored that show how it really happened. He does attempt to use more modern research to buttress some of his points and put the ancient writings in context (many are propaganda in the first place), probably because he believes (rightly so IMO) that they have lessons that can be applied to antiquity -- just as modern writings on Roman logistics have to use army manuals as reference. The attacks on his references to SLA Marshall are equally puzzling, did they read the same book I did? In the sections where he references those studies it's talking about archers (not the infantry as the reviews would imply) or the psychology of soldiers and the importance of unit comrades in keeping you going despite the fear (which is obvious to most people with a military background). If you've grown tired and bored of Roman military studies written by academic armchair legates then this book may have the sort of fresh ideas and perspective that you need to get energized again.
Rating: 
Summary: Goldsworthy Does Not Deliver - Keegan, He Is Not
Review: The Roman Army at War by Adrian Goldsworty
Goldsworthy Does Not Dliever - Keegan, He Is Not.
By Anne Kelly S.
Candidate for Master's Diplomacy and Military Studies >>>>Previous literature on the Roman Army concentrated on peacetime activities, its recruitment of soldiers and career patterns, its uniforms, weapons, and rituals, and its role in and effect on society. How the Roman Army actually waged war was not addressed, except in military manuals. The author's primary goal in this book is to show how war was actually waged by using the technique pioneered by John Keegan in The Face of Battle (1976). This, Goldsworthy did not accomplish.>>> >>>Goldsworthy purports to analyze 300 years of Roman military history through the perspective of the Roman soldier (the General and officers, the unit and the individual combatant). He relies on data collected from standard ancient sources - Caesar, Tacitus, Polybius, Plutarch and Josephus. There are several serious defects in the book: (1) reliability of sources, (2) irrelevant comparisons, and (3) contradictions. The result is a confusing medley of analysis, leaving this reviewer with no clear idea of what exactly the author had established or where Keegan's approach was employed.>>> >>>Goldsworthy reliance on S.L.A. Marshall goes to issues of both reliability and relevance. Marshall claimed that only 25% of US soldiers hit their targets during the Korean and Second World War. Setting aside the question among military history scholars of the validity of Marshall's statistics, the relevance of the Korean and Second World Wars, to Roman battles is not clear. Certainly, it is not remotely possible that statistics concerning modern battles, using firearms and air support, even if they were accurate, can be extrapolated to apply to hand-to-hand, close-in, ancient Roman battles.>>> >>>Goldsworthy also relies heavily on Josephus, who generally has been painted throughout Roman literature as a "master of exaggeration." Furthermore, his reliance on Victorian era military manuals and non-military, literary references to support his arguments is odd, to say the least.>>> >>>Goldsworthy frequently contradicts himself in the course of his analysis. In addressing the impact of equipment upon the Roman Army's enemies, he states:> >>>The fighting technique and equipment of the individual warrior may tell us much about the way in which he fought during a battle, although I shall argue later that this was not the most important factor even in this. [fn.] However, the equipment of an individual will tell us nothing about how an army fought a war. (Chapter 2 - The Opposition, p. 40; emphasis added.)>> >>>Yet, in reference to the impact of equipment to the Roman Army itself, he states:> >>>A combat between two units became inevitably a collection of fights between individual soldiers in the opposing front ranks. To understand these we must look at the behavior and equipment of the individual solder. We shall begin by examining in some detail the defensive and offensive equipment of the Roman soldier. (Chapter 5, The Unit's Battle, p. 209; emphasis added.)>>> >>>The author's most interesting effort is his attempt to debunk the previously held notion that the Roman Army was a monolithic "war machine," comprised of a body of professional soldiers following orders without questioning. This war machine view is rooted in the writings of Flavius Vegetius Ranatus, who, in the late fourth century, A.D., composed the Epitome of Military Science for the Roman emperor, Theodosius the Great. In this manual, Vegetius attributes the former invincibility of the Roman Army to the soldiers "act[ing] with one mind and equal commitment ... and conquer[ing] as many enemies as either it wished or the nature of the world permitted." Quoted in William J. Bowers, Legion Lessons for Today's Marines, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, November 2001.>>> >>>In refuting this war machine theory, Goldsworthy cites the actions of individual Roman soldiers, as well as the lack of leadership, for Gallus's defeat in Judaea. Given the low educational level of the general population and the sheer size of the Roman Army, Goldsworthy's conclusion probably has some merit. Unfortunately he reaches his conclusion by such confusing methods, including by irrelevant comparison to modern wars, that the reader can just as easily conclude that the Roman Army might have been a modern, well-oiled war machine!>>> >>>Goldsworthy has a clever way of writing that gives the reader an impression of accuracy...This, of course, inaccurately assumes the evidentiary sources were accurate.>>> >>>As for whether the author presented a new, Keeganesque look at studying Roman Wars, as he set out to do, the answer is a resounding negative. This reviewer still has no idea how the actual waging of a Roman war was perceived through the eyes of the Roman soldier.>>> >>>>Keegan, Goldsworthy is not.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting but Inaccurate
Review: The Roman Army at War by Adrian K. Goldsworthy [G.] contains a sweeping look at most aspects of the Roman Army as it existed between the years of 100BC and AD200. Throughout the book, G. stipulates that the majority of the Roman military success was due to its army's organization, discipline and morale.
The Roman Army at War is divided into seven basic sections: the organization of the Roman Army, enemy strategy and tactics, the Roman campaign, the role of the Roman general, the roles of the various army units, the duties and mentality of the individual soldier, and a brief appendix addressing logistics. The first portion of the text (the organization of the Roman army) is laid out in a straightforward way, first explaining the hierarchy of units and officers, then moving on to each unit's particular role in the makeup of the entire army. An attempt is made to elaborate on the history of the Roman military structure, the graduation from the Greek phalanx, the change from maniples to cohorts and the need for the first cohort of each legion to be expanded in size. G. then proceeds to illustrate the composition of the enemies of the Roman state (between 100BC and AD200). Three enemies are addressed; the Germans (specifically the Chatti and the Cimbri), the Gauls (under Vercingetorix), and the Parthians (with particular emphasis on the battle of Carrhae). Sections one and two of The Roman Army at War lay a foundation so the reader can better interpret the remainder of the book.
The Roman campaign is classified as one of three types: conquest, the suppression of insurrection, or punitive action. Caesar's wars with the Belgic tribes and [Cestius] Gallus' march on Jerusalem are cited as examples. Repeated throughout is the idea of `first strike', gaining the initiative by attacking before one's enemy (even with inferior numbers). According to the author, "When the Roman army abandoned the offensive...it was a sign that things had gone badly wrong" (Goldsworthy 114). The role of the commander was broken into fragments: the gathering of intelligence, the `council of war', the general on the battlefield, and management of the troops after victory. As demonstrated with the example of Caesar's wars with the Belgic tribes, a general might gather intelligence firsthand. The general is portrayed as directing reserves (which G. proposes as a gigantic 50 per cent or more of the total force) and riding about to raise morale, or fighting with his men. The combat of the unit was greatly affected by its commander; the discipline instilled on it is recounted in the section on `the unit's battle'. The unit's composition and purpose are revealed in the aforementioned section, along with tactics to make them more imposing since (according to G.) most (or sometimes all) of the battle depended on intimidation of the enemy force. The job of the individual soldier as well as details of his equipment are explained (weapons, armor, siege or camp tools) along with his willingness to fight. G. insists that only 25 per cent of soldiers actually fought with the idea of killing the enemy (rather than self preservation). This is the basis for almost his entire argument on the arrangement of units and the soldier's disciplinary training. After completing the analysis of military combat, G. launches into the logistics of the Roman army. This section might have served better attached to the `Organization' portion of the text.
Much of The Roman Army at War relies on a group of period sources such as: Josephus, Polybius, Vegetius, Caesar, and Plutarch. There is also a group of more modern authors whom G. has chosen to build his theses around, particularly J. Keegan (author of The Face of Battle and The Mask of Command), N.J.E. Austin, N.B. Rankov, T. Cornell, and S.L.A. Marshall. Throughout the book, G. contrasts the paper (or ideal) strength of the Roman legions with their actual practical or physical strength. He continually references detachments of troops sent to undertake mundane jobs and its weakening effect on the army as a whole. What is not certain is precisely how much of the Roman army was involved in these tasks; G. claims that up to 40 per cent of troops may be utilized in such matters at any given time, this is absolutely untenable. To send away such a large number of troops would leave barely enough to make effective battle. In addition to this, G. accepts the studies of S.L.A. Marshall as dogma. Much of the text is devoted to the idea that only a very small fraction of the army was involved in actual combat, and only for a span of fifteen minutes or so. All of the armies training and maneuvers are centered on the limitations imposed by these characteristics. What G. does not recognize is that the evidence Marshall provides in his study is incompatible with the time-period addressed in The Roman Army at War.
The Roman Army at War does an excellent job of convincing the reader of most of G.'s theories; he employs all manner of entertaining stories, references, and quotations to push across his ideas. When compared to a similar text, such as that of J. Fuller, The Roman Army at War seems far more relatable (if only for its more modern origins). For a reader accustomed to Gibbons or translations of Josephus, G. is much more pleasant to read. The Roman Army at War will suffice to explain the basic workings of the Roman army to a person unschooled in history. It facilitates the understanding of one of the most important aspects of Roman life and can lead to a better understanding of Roman civilization. To an adept historian, the book is a quagmire of poorly contextualized evidence and flawed reasoning. It is fairly short (about three hundred pages) and a majority of the more basic information is acceptable (since it is re-stated from others works) but the new ideas of the work are quite untenable.
Rating: 
Summary: Nice attempt at examining the experience of ancient warfare.
Review: This book is an excellent addition to the history student's library. Goldsworthy does not rely solely on secondary sources for his examination, rather he uses primary sources such as Caesar, Plutarch and Tacitus, to name a few. However, a problem about relying too heavily on primary sources from the ancients themselves is that there are many factors that need to be taken into account when analyzing their importance and validity. Such as the time when they were written, why they were written, what their purpose was, etc. Overall, however, I feel that this is an authoritative and concise description of the Roman army at war, the secrets of Roman military success and the battle experience of the commanders, units and soldiers. Unfortunately, there are many works on the organization and structure of the Roman army, and it is clear from the introduction of this work that Goldsworthy had intended to emulate Keegan's Face of Battle technique and look at the experience of battle. However, due to the lack of sources from the individual soldier, it is somewhat impossible to demonstrate what the experience of battle was like for the individual combat soldier. Nice try though...
Rating:
Summary: Not Goldsworthy's best work
Review: This book is somewhat scholarly and therefore, dry. He is not very clear on what he is trying to convey to the reader. However, the author does raise a few interesting insights into ancient warfare. His latest work: Cannae is much better. He expands on his thesis of the conditions in ancient warfare which is quite interesting. He manages to get into the psyche of the ancient soldier. However, in the Roman Army at War, he does not deliver.
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