Rating: 
Summary: Magnificient!
Review: This is one of the very best book on the Luftwaffe by serious, academic historian, and possibly the only one to date to give credit and recognition to one of the best tactical minds of he Luftwaffe, GFM von Richtofen.
While justifiably lambasting the Luftwaffe (and Hitler too) on its short sightedness in forgoing the development of a strategic, heavy bomber in favour of tactical, short range fighters and light payload bombers, Hayward does remind us the indispensable role of the Luftwaffe as the Heer's flying artillery and its role in her battlefield successes.
The fact that the Luftwaffe was staffed mainly by transferees from the Heer may be a determining factor in shaping its mission as a tactical, close support airforce, and its reluctance to develop, acqueisce or sustain a naval air arm for the tonnage battle in the Atlantic (same can be said of Raeder's and Dönitz's strategic shortcomings, both concentrating on their respective favourites, battleships and U-boats, while paying little heed to the crucial role of air cover for naval actions) may stem from the tradtional rivalry during the Kaiser's times between the senior service, Army and the Kaiser's favourite, the Kriegsmarine, which in the Great War proved to be a less than war winning tool, and a dtermining factor (with her mutinies) in the dissolution of the Reich.
It is amazing that nobody in the top echelons of the Luftwaffe had articulated a strategic vision for the role of the service in war. Same with the Krigesmarine with its focus and fetish on battleships and U boats.
Bearing in mind that Germany was flanked by her traditional enemies in Europe, and the need for the avoidance of the nightmarish 2 front war like the last war, which stretched Germany to her limits as a middling power battling the superpowers (Britain, Russia and USA), the much vaunted General Staff as well as OKW, OKH. OKM. OKL had not seen the need for a strategic airforce of long range fighters and high altitude heavy bombers (plus aircraft carriers for the inevitable last fight with the US after mastery of Europe) that will serve as a deterrent in any enforced peace with Britain and USSR, or as an indisepnsable deep penetrating tool for crippling her enemies' military-political-industrial complexes, the cross-Channel invasion of Britain, the strangling of trans-Atlantic trade between Britian and her Dminions as well as her banker, the US.
Inter-service rivalry will see the Luftwaffe refusing to build up a naval air arm, or let the Kriegamrine to have one, nor did the latter, with its uni-dimensional focus on the war at sea, see the need for aircover and aircraft carriers ( all because of the myopic expedient that for the same amount of steel, you can build 20 U boats in a shorter time) for her naval units. This led to the loss of aircover over her bases, and drove the U boats underwater (thus limiting her striking power as they fought on the surface!) and her surface units immobilised in hideouts in France and Norway.
Without a strategic airforce, and with the loss of air supremacy at home and above the battelfields, Germany suffred from the vicious cycle of loss of aircover, then devastated industries, then even less aircrafts, arms and munitions to fight off her enemies on all fronts,and so on. In the end, the Luftwaffe was no more than the Heer's last mobile artiller and machine gun battalions (most of the Heer's artillery was horse drawn) and the Kreigsmarine an impotent coast guard.
It would be interesting to see if, like the Generalstab, most of the Heer transferees were artillerists ( the most technical proficient branch and thus uniquely suited to the technically most demanding service), who with their mindset would predisposed them to a tactical, close support vision of the Luftwaffe
Rating:
Summary: Lessons for Leaders
Review: Wonderful book on the most pivotal year in the Barbarossa campaign, but lessons exist here for people today regarding leadership and goalsetting. Hayward description of events clearly indicates that the German 1942 campaign would have been successful if the German leadership (from the General Staff on up) had created operational focus and maintained it throughout the campaign.The lesson for us today is that, in our age of limited resources, failure to followthrough and focus our resources on the important goals, in the order that those goals must be achieved is the most important requirement for success. I would recommend this, not just to history buffs, but to business leaders of all types.
Rating:
Summary: Brilliant blend of narration and operational explanation!!!
Review: You'll have to search hard to find any book that better interweaves a rollicking good narrative with top-notch scholarly analysis of tactics, operational art and strategy. Added to that are good clear maps, a helpful glossary, thorough source and footnote details and a full index. This book initially upset a lot of buffs by slaying several sacred cows, yet Hayward's interpretations have not only survived, but they have been widely accepted by scholars and Stalingrad enthusiasts alike. This has indeed, as another reviewer noted, become a necessary "standard work" on Stalingrad.
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