Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (Cass Series on the Soviet (Russian) Study of War)

Rating:
Summary: Excellent data, little context
Review: As its title implies, this book is primarily a collection and presentation of data - hard numbers - about the battle of Kursk. Zetterling and Frankson do an impressive job of compiling orders of battle, unit strengths (particularly on all sorts of armored vehicles, and not just tanks), casualties, air sorties, equipment losses, ammunition expenditures, and the like. Unit structures for both the Germans and Soviets are presented in detail. An entire chapter is devoted to airpower and its effects on the battle. With the all the data, the authors present a relatively brief chronology and overview of the battle, limited to a re-telling of the facts. This drives home the point the authors are trying to make: we can better understand how the Battle of Kursk went through data on the forces involved and what happened to those forces.

This book is incredibly useful to those wishing to reconstruct opposing forces, for those who study combat via empirical methodology, and for those looking to test other authors' assertions and conclusions of the battle. By itself, however, the book is not particularly valuable. Zetterling and Frankson choose to mostly let the numbers speak for themselves. As such the book is devoid of analysis of German and Soviet planning, decision making, leadership, or tactics. These, of course, are the factors that drive the generation of the statistics presented by the authors. Casualties, ammunition expenditures, equipment losses, etc. are the direct result of planning, decision making, leadership, and tactics. Furthermore, historians search for the meaning and implications of these statistics. They ask and try to answer the question of "so what"? Numbers rarely speak for themselves. Thus, Zetterling and Frankson's book is quite valuable, but not as a stand-alone, and only as a companion to other material (e.g. Glantz and House). Wargamers will also find the book useful, as detailed tables of organization and equipment along with very thorough orders of battle are plentiful.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent data, little context
Review: As its title implies, this book is primarily a collection and presentation of data - hard numbers - about the battle of Kursk. Zetterling and Frankson do an impressive job of compiling orders of battle, unit strengths (particularly on all sorts of armored vehicles, and not just tanks), casualties, air sorties, equipment losses, ammunition expenditures, and the like. Unit structures for both the Germans and Soviets are presented in detail. An entire chapter is devoted to airpower and its effects on the battle. With the all the data, the authors present a relatively brief chronology and overview of the battle, limited to a re-telling of the facts. This drives home the point the authors are trying to make: we can better understand how the Battle of Kursk went through data on the forces involved and what happened to those forces.

This book is incredibly useful to those wishing to reconstruct opposing forces, for those who study combat via empirical methodology, and for those looking to test other authors' assertions and conclusions of the battle. By itself, however, the book is not particularly valuable. Zetterling and Frankson choose to mostly let the numbers speak for themselves. As such the book is devoid of analysis of German and Soviet planning, decision making, leadership, or tactics. These, of course, are the factors that drive the generation of the statistics presented by the authors. Casualties, ammunition expenditures, equipment losses, etc. are the direct result of planning, decision making, leadership, and tactics. Furthermore, historians search for the meaning and implications of these statistics. They ask and try to answer the question of "so what"? Numbers rarely speak for themselves. Thus, Zetterling and Frankson's book is quite valuable, but not as a stand-alone, and only as a companion to other material (e.g. Glantz and House). Wargamers will also find the book useful, as detailed tables of organization and equipment along with very thorough orders of battle are plentiful.

Rating:
Summary: Correcting Jon Gawne's Review
Review: I feel I have to make some serious correction about Mr. Gawne's review. This book has NOTHING TO DO with the German Army in Normandy. Rather, it is a statistical analysis of the battle between the German and Soviet armies in the region of Kursk (Western Russia) in the summer of 1943.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent statistical analysis
Review: I found this to be an excellent compilation of hard data on the July,1943 Battle of Kursk. Huge amounts of data is presented in a manner that makes it easy(relatively speaking)to understand the largest tank battle of WW2. The author begins by presenting a concise background that allows the reader to understand the overall strategic situation on the Eastern Front in the spring of 1943. He then presents an astonishing amount of material that shows in great detail the manner in which the opposing forces were organized,the structure of the units involved (both Soviet and German),the types of tanks and assault guns employed by both armies,a chapter on the impact of both combatants air forces on the battle ,and a chronology of the battle,including a seperate chapter on the armored clash at Prokhorovka.The final three chapters of the book are devoted to the costs and consequences of the battle and an analysis of the battle. Each of these chapters is extensively footnoted. Finally,there are 16 appendices covering just about every conceivable facet of Operation Zitadelle including what may be the most detailed order of battle ever presented on this battle. There are also a large number of tables and figures that further illuminate the size and composition of the opposing forces. I am very impressed by this book and can heartily recommend it.

Rating:
Summary: Mr. Joe Gawne's review
Review: I guess the book that Mr. Gwane reviewed is "Normandy 1944", another book written by Niklas Z. and published by J.J. Fedorowicz in 2000.

I like both "Kursk 1943" and "Normandy 1944". This is the first time I can read data generated from systematically statistic analyses on the strength and losses of involved forces in WWII. The result of the statistics, rather than personal opinions or recollections, tells the truth of these campaigns. These books clarified many long-standing errors and misconceptions, though readers should still keep in mind that the authors could make mistake or use unreliable reference too. Highly recommended.

Rating:
Summary: Mr. Joe Gawne's review
Review: I guess the book that Mr. Gwane reviewed is "Normandy 1944", another book written by Niklas Z. and published by J.J. Fedorowicz in 2000.

I like both "Kursk 1943" and "Normandy 1944". This is the first time I can read data generated from systematically statistic analyses on the strength and losses of involved forces in WWII. The result of the statistics, rather than personal opinions or recollections, tells the truth of these campaigns. These books clarified many long-standing errors and misconceptions, though readers should still keep in mind that the authors could make mistake or use unreliable reference too. Highly recommended.

Rating:
Summary: A decent and scholarly book on the German Army in Normandy.
Review: Thank God - a decent and scholarly book on the German Army in Normandy. About tinme!

This is an interesting book. For people like me, that need to know correct facts about the war, it is quite valuable. I would; however, point out is more of a reference book than something for the casual reader. If you "really like" Steven Ambrose books this is not your cup of tea.

If you want good details about the actual organization and strength of German units in Normandy it is invaluable. I am SO happy the author has done all this work, as it means I no longer have to squint at tiny, poorly copies microfilms. For that he has my endless thanks.

Now, there are a few other reason why serious military historians will talk about this book. He makes some very interesting claims about the German Army in Normandy. These range from more accurate casualties rates, to a very surprising claim (that I agree with) about losses to Allied air power. For the serious type, the book will make you think. Most of the arguments are well thought out and logical.

He also attempts to add a new chapter to the argument that the German soldier is/is not superior to the Allied Soldier. This is long standing argument that has entered the realm of statistical analysis. While I think those involved in the argument are starting to get a bit too personal, and thus might have a harder time seeing the facts clearly, his claims at least make some interesting points. I do not agree with all of them, but they are certainly something worth considering.

So to recap: this not a big picture book of the super human German Army. It is a wonderful reference book about the German forces in Normandy. Every 'serious' student of the campaign needs to read through it. I suggest taking the statistical arguments with a grain of salt, and use them as what they are best for: a basis for an ongoing discussion and exploration into what happened in WW2.

Rating:
Summary: Re-evaluation of history's greatest armour battle
Review: What the author try to tell in this book is that it was the heavy German losses at Kursk that turned the tide in the east against the Germans - it was the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviets and there ability to absorb losses both in men and materiel due to supply of manpower and western allied material help that turned the tide. Despite the forward warning of the German attack and a meticulous planning by the Stavka the Germans made good headway and suffered light losses compared to the Soviets. Instead, it was the Soviet couterattacks at other sectors of the front that forced the Germans to break of the offensive. The Germans simply did not posses the manpower necessary to attack on one sector and defend against massive Soviet attacks on another.
There is a companion volume, unfortunately in Swedish only still, that deals exhaustively with their re-evaluation of the battle on the basis of the statistics. Their conclusion is that the German more flexible organisation and command system was far superior to the Soviet system, but with the numbers turning against them it did not help.