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Rating: 
Summary: Why Research when you can synthesize?
Review: It is difficult to see why a retired British army colonel would want to write this book, which is a summarized history of the French and Indian War (1755-1763). There is little new to offer in this account, since the author relies heavily on timeworn secondary sources such as Parkman from 1884 and Fortescque from the 1920s. A professional military officer might have added value through in-depth analysis, but this is sacrificed for brevity. Adding insult to injury, the book is poorly-written and in particular, the author should be cited for excessive use of the exclamation point (usually a bad sign in a history book). Throughout the book, Williams displays a casual attitude toward historical fact and statistics. For example, the author writes that in 1754, [Governor] Dinwiddie...selected [George] Washington, now a colonel, with 300 men from his militia to attack Fort Duquesne.." However, Washington's mission was defensive - to construct forts on the Virginia frontier - and he had only 160 Virginia provincial troops (who were not militia). In the 1758 Louisburg campaign, after the surrender of the fortress, Williams claims that, "one thousand of their comrades [the French] lay dead among the ruins". In fact, French army losses in the Siege of Louisburg were 102 killed. In the 1758 Ticonderoga Campaign, Williams also fumbles on the description of the key skirmish at Bernetz Brook on 6 July, writing that, "in the skirmish which followed, Howe, shot through the heart, was killed instantly, with 300 of his companions". In fact, British losses in this skirmish were fewer than 100, but French losses were about 300 killed, wounded and captured. These examples demonstrate how error-prone and unreliable this account is and also the author's failure to properly research his subject.
Rating:
Summary: Why Research when you can synthesize?
Review: It is difficult to see why a retired British army colonel would want to write this book, which is a summarized history of the French and Indian War (1755-1763). There is little new to offer in this account, since the author relies heavily on timeworn secondary sources such as Parkman from 1884 and Fortescque from the 1920s. A professional military officer might have added value through in-depth analysis, but this is sacrificed for brevity. Adding insult to injury, the book is poorly-written and in particular, the author should be cited for excessive use of the exclamation point (usually a bad sign in a history book). Throughout the book, Williams displays a casual attitude toward historical fact and statistics. For example, the author writes that in 1754, [Governor] Dinwiddie...selected [George] Washington, now a colonel, with 300 men from his militia to attack Fort Duquesne.." However, Washington's mission was defensive - to construct forts on the Virginia frontier - and he had only 160 Virginia provincial troops (who were not militia). In the 1758 Louisburg campaign, after the surrender of the fortress, Williams claims that, "one thousand of their comrades [the French] lay dead among the ruins". In fact, French army losses in the Siege of Louisburg were 102 killed. In the 1758 Ticonderoga Campaign, Williams also fumbles on the description of the key skirmish at Bernetz Brook on 6 July, writing that, "in the skirmish which followed, Howe, shot through the heart, was killed instantly, with 300 of his companions". In fact, British losses in this skirmish were fewer than 100, but French losses were about 300 killed, wounded and captured. These examples demonstrate how error-prone and unreliable this account is and also the author's failure to properly research his subject.
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