Rating: 
Summary: one in a million
Review: Books like these are really one in a million. What a waste of paper.
By the time the GIs were in Germany what they were up against was just some veterans from the Russian front and soldiers from other units put together in a hurry. I don't see how a comparison could be made. This subject can be turned however you want, there is really little to argue: no supplies no winner. That's a fact, it's history! That's how you achieve the " triumph ". The Germans soldier, in the last year of war scavenged dead GIs body for some decent gear, boots etc. But it all started earlier on, in North Africa when Italian and German troops had to do with as little as 1% of their supplies making it through. Italian airborne infantry units had to infiltrate behind enemy lines just to get some rations. Compare that! Sure US infantry showed to be very professional ( specially airborne units and Rangers) but lets admit that all the odds were on their favor.
Bottom line, the book deserve one star if not less, as it tries to make cheesy comparisons, one sided, and way too redundant. For anybody interested in unbiased WW2 History avoid this book like the plague.
Rating: 
Summary: An important analysis of the US Army in WW II
Review: For the serious student, this book should be read along with [similuar book]Both deal with the same topic, but there is surprisingly little overlap.I agree with most in the review ...but I think that he and other reviewers exagerate the degree of degeneration of the German army that the US faced in France. The Germans were unsurpassed trainers of soldiers and industry was still turning out sufficient quantities of weapons of all sorts. It was only after D-Day in France that tatical airpower began to make itself felt. Until then the main contribution of strategic air was the "transportation plan" which was designed to knockout the French transporation network in order to limit the ability of the Germans to bring reinforcements to the invasion site. It was quite successful. The soldiers that the U.S. Army faced were as good as any the Germans produced in most cases. (There were some "ground-holding" divisions of overage or semi-invalid men.) Equipment had improved since 1941 and many tactical lessons had been learned. But there was no doubt that the western allies could produce overwhelming force, and if properly applied, victory was certain. The catch is: if properly applied. It was by no means inevitable that force would be properly applied. The British outnumbered Rommel in tanks in the North Afican desert on many occasions but managed to lose. Rommel said to one captured British officer that it did not matter if he was outnumbered 2 to 1 in tanks overall if at the point of attack he outnumbered the British 2 to 1. If we had fought as badly as the British did before Montgomery took over, we would have lost. To win required learning from our mistakes, a willingness to improvise, inititive at all levels down to private and, of course, great courage. Our soldiers had what it took.
Rating:
Summary: Dispells many myths
Review: Mr. Mansoor points out in a very clear and educated manner that the popular belief the US Army won World War II because it had more men, tanks, cannons etc, than the Germans did is false. Mansoor examines the US Army in a very fair and precise manner, from its leadership, to its training, right down to the infantryman himself. At times his observations are not flattering but, they are accurate, and based on well documented facts which dispell many of the current beliefs held today about the performance of the American infantryman during World War II.
Rating: 
Summary: Solid history but a disappointing finish
Review: Peter Mansoor treaded some ground that many have ignored or bypassed, and he successfully highlighted US Army Operations not portrayed by Hollywood hits like "Patton" and "Saving Private Ryan." He painted a fascinating picture about just how good the greatest generation was at adapting to harsh environments, a determined foe, and an impersonal military system. The book's greatest weakness is that it failed to exploit a provacative angle: that of GI military effectiveness. The definition offered in the introduction really sounds more like military efficiency, and Mansoor convincingly stated his case that the US Army was certainly more efficient than the tired out German Army. And that is the point. The GIs took on the already exhausted if not still tactically potent Wehrmacht. Although there were some tense moments, the end result was assured, it was only a matter of time. The Americans knew their business, and they exploited every advantage over the Germans.
Rating:
Summary: G.I's Win in Europe!
Review: Peter Mansoor's book is a well written and well researched statement on how the US Army achieved ultimate victory in the European Theater. The volume is expensive as are most university press publications, however, worth the price as it pulls together numerous primary and secondary sources to make its argument (the book is most likely based upon Mansoor's PhD thesis). And that argument is that the victory of the US Army in the ETO suffers from a number of misconceptions, misstatements, and outright fabrications of the evidence (the latter case in point being the refutation of S.L.A. Marshall's statement that the GI infantryman only fired his weapon 25% of the time in combat). Mansoor attacks the myth that American infantrymen were less effective than their German adversaries, that the replacement system was a disaster (per Stephen Ambrose), and that the US Army won the war on the basis of an overwhelming amount of material resources or airpower which the Germans lacked, thereby beating the superior Wehrmacht through attrition of resources rather than superior fighting capability (one need only look at the American Army's greatest challenge, the Battle of the Bulge, wherein it had neither superior resources or airpower, to find evidence of the fighting capability of the GI). Mansoor proves that once American infantry divisions gained combat experience, they were an effective fighting force. Superior fire support from artillery battalions, attached armor support, superior communications and logistical support all worked to mold the infantry division into an winning fighting unit. As Mansoor so aptly demonstrates, it was at the Corps level and above that strategic decision making was wanting (the debacle at Anzio, the failure to trap the German army at Falaise, and the idiocy of the Huertgen Forest). If one is looking for a well-grounded study of the American army in Europe, detailing both the faults and successes of the US Army, this book cannot be surpassed.
Rating:
Summary: Essential GI ETO Reference...
Review: Since the appearance in 1980 of Russel Weigley's Eisenhower's Lieutenants, many books, critical of the U.S. Army's performance in the ETO have appeared. Martin VanCreveld's Fighting Power, whose thesis was that the German units were better than the American, Max Hasting's Overlord, which practically ignored the GIs. The one main theme was not only were the German units superior, but that the Allies used their air superiority and their numerical superiority on the ground to grind down the German units, thus achieving victory.
Now, since the 1990s, another school has been emerging. Most of this school are professional soldiers writing and supporting their own theses. Michael Doubler, Robert Sterling Rush and of course, Colonel Mansoor.
His book focuses on the US infantry divisions, not on the airborne or other such elite outfits. His view is also comprehensive, focusing not only on the ETO, but North Africa and Italy as well and now American infantry divisions eventually surpassed their German counterparts in efficiency and fighting ability. The ETO, starting on 6 June, is where the schooling in Italy and North Africa and their lessons came into play and was used most effectively in France and Belgium.
He does criticize certain portions of Army policy, calling into question the replacement system and never rotating units out of the line to rest and refit as well as the 90 division limit. Still on the whole, Mansoor believes and shows credible evidence that the American infantry divisions performed better than not only their German opponents, but that of their Allies as well.
Mansoor should also get credit in that his book is always engaging and never dull, especially when tossing figures and facts around, you run the risk of writing a really dull book, but Mansoor's a good writer and you stay with him. This is a good analysis and a broad overview of the GI and his magnificent triumph against not only the enemy to his front, but those from behind as well.
Rating:
Summary: An awesome Analysis of the American GI in World War II
Review: This book is an extremely thoroughly researched study of the legendary American GI in the European Theater of World War II. Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, a Battalion Commander in the US Army and former professor of history at the United States Military Academy, offers a fascinating and a quasi-reformist look at the way in which the army's basic fighting unit was recruited, trained, mobilized, , deployed and commanded throughout the long four years that America fought in Europe. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 is not only a beautifully crafted book, but more importantly it is a perpetuating addition to the latest revisionist rave where historians have claimed that the GI in World War II was better trained, equipped, and, most importantly, better led than their foe; Hitler's vaunted and often overly hailed Wermarcht. Mansoor's premise is that the American soldiers proved their capabilities in battle, which he correctly claims is the ultimate test for an army and a nation. "A fashionable argument in the past two decades has been that the Allies won World War II only through the sheer weight of material they threw at the Wermarcht in a relatively unskilled manner." Mansoor refutes this argument in this book first by dissecting the variables encompassed in the "combat effectiveness" formula and then quantifies the human, organizational, and technical capabilities of the opposing forces that fought in Europe. In the end Mansoor concludes that one of the most critical factors attributed to the American GI was his high level of endurance once engaged in combat. Referring to works by the likes of Bonn, Dupuy, van Crevald, and SLAM Marshall, Mansoor accomplishes where most of these great thinkers have marginally succeed; proving that the American GI in World War II was indeed superior to his foe. Mansoor achieves proving this thesis with an analysis that will most likely be used for years to come as THE single source to refer to when searching for a balanced comparison of the Allied GI and Wermarcht soldier. Dense with details and statistics, the book is written in an academic style, but in the same light, highly readable. He brings the reader comprehensively through each stage of the war, from mobilization through pre-combat training, and then to the beaches of Normandy and beyond. He leaves no stone unturned in this complete analysis. This book was no doubt a major undertaking and Mansoor's hard work and focussed approach will undoubtedly " provide fodder for historians of the war for years to come." The GI Offensive in Europe should be shelved alongside the best historians of World War II. Academician's and military leaders must read this book for it proves that the superior training, organization, and execution of doctrine by the American Military units is what accounted for the unprecedented success of the US in 1945 and will continue to do so in the future.
Rating: 
Summary: Poor analysis
Review: This book is intended to portray the US infantry divisions fighting in north west Europe 1944-5. Had the author written only about the US divisions, the book might have been better. However, he makes several comparisons with the German units and also occasionally with British units. These sections display poor analysis, exhibit sweeping but unsubstantiated statements and faulty use of sources. Had he refrained from this and dealt only with the US divisions, the book might have deserved a higher rating, but these errors display poor scholarship.
Rating: 
Summary: American Infantry - Queen of Battle
Review: This is a rather comprehensive survey of the performance of American infantry divisions in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) in World War II, by a military professional still on Active Duty. His thesis is that the American Army (i.e., the Army of the United States) became better than the German Wehrmacht and defeated the Wehrmacht on those terms. Not taking away anything from the quality of the American GI and the American Army in general, or of the overall quality of his book, LTC Mansoor does not really make his case.
He refutes conventional wisdom, arising from a series of post-War interviews of senior German officers, that the American Army relied on the weight of materiel more than, in their view, the relatively poor fighting quality of the American GI to win the war. He discounts the materiel argument, but not convincingly. For example, see pages 214 and 237 for references, among others, to the dwindling quality of the Wehrmacht in the latter stages of the war. And while he acknowledges the improving quality and techniques and the USAAF ground support, he is virtually silent on the impact to Wehrmacht operations of Allied air supremacy after D-Day.
I think it's clear that the Wehrmacht (along with the Waffen SS, the Luftwaffe, etc.) were worn to a frazzle by the time of D-Day. Combine that with Ultra, and I think it's a tribute to the quality of the German soldier and the German military machine that they were able to carry on effectively at all until May 1945. The Wehrmacht of 1944-1945 was not the Wehrmacht of 1940-1941. There had been too many materiel and human losses, too many fronts, too much battering from the sky.
This is not to discount the positive attributes of the American fighting man and woman that he brings out. The American GI is the equal of the best this planet has to offer - always has been. Rather, the reason for the American Army's victory in Europe is a combination of both of these arguments.
I enjoyed his description of how General Marshall arrived at the decision for a 90-division Army. I also liked his description of the Mobilization Training Program, although I would have preferred more detail. The description of the many problems of scale (e.g., stripping divisions still in training of officers and men to be used as cadre for new divisions, problems encountered during POM (preparation for overseas movement), while not a new argument, are covered well. Discussion of these issues provide the beginning of understanding of the magnitude of the task facing the small, pre-1940 professional Army - the task of preparing to wage world war and achieve a victory as rapidly as possible. This was a humongous undertaking, to say the least. Despite the Monday morning quarterbacking, our senior military leadership on balance did an excellent job.
Now, he is critical of the "90-division gamble," particularly in the ETO, believing that it led to excessive casualties in battle since it left an insufficient number of divisions to rotate them out of the line for rest, refit, and effective introduction of replacements. This was exacerbated by our not adhering to the "Germany first" strategy. I thought we had, but he looks at the operations in the China-Burma-India Theater, and the Southwest and Central Pacific Theaters as demonstrating otherwise. Add to this the large number of men in the Army's service establishments, and, he argues, the American GI in ETO came up short.
This book is a gold mine of information, especially when read in conjunction with The Unsinkable Fleet. He has excellent coverage of the Army Mobilization Program (with which he has problems): its plans, constraints, problems, errors, and chaos. He discusses the stateside training program (individual and unit), and the constant turnover of personnel due to having to provide cadre for new divisions and replacements for divisions already deployed in combat. There was a common weeding out of ineffective commanders and staff at all levels during training (which unfortunately continued in every division in the early stages of combat). The replacement system was virtually counterproductive early on, with soldiers losing their training edge as they languished in replacement depots en route to their divisions. This improved as time went on, and he touts the end result of keeping divisions at full strength throughout the war. "The individual replacement system had its flaws, but these flaws stemmed from poor administration of the system rather than an inherent flaw in the concept." (pg. 255) (I'm not not sure Stephen Ambrose would agree with this.)
He paints a picture of arrogance and confusion at the highest levels of command in the planning for D-Day. He reminds us that when all is said and done, no matter the extent and quality of planning, fire support, and logistics, success on the battlefield rests with individual soldiers, small units (platoons and squads), and, most importantly, their leadership. He also reminded me of how D-Day was a close-run thing, with victory wrested from the Wehrmacht by American infantrymen (with some fortuitous help from a few US Navy destroyer captains).
In fact, he is not very flattering of the Army's senior leadership at all. He feels they were not proficient at the operational level and too conservative at the strategic level. He uses as examples Montgomery's failure to open Antwerp earlier as a critical failure second only to the Allies' failure to close the Falaise Gap earlier. He also points to the Huertgen Forest debacle and the ensuing campaign to take Aachen, Eisenhower ordering Devers' Sixth Army Group to turn north when it closed to the Rhine rather than proceeding across it, and Eisenhower's and Bradley's failure to destroy more of the Wehrmacht forces in the Ardennes after they had stopped the German offensive. His criticisms certainly are valid up to a point, but I think it's easy to criticize these decisions after the fact. (The Huertgen Forest campaign, however, does deserve all the criticism that can be heaped upon it.)
The end of the book brought an interesting surprise, as well. He debunks S.L.A. Marshall's Men Against Fire and Marshall's conclusion that only about 10% of American riflemen actually fired their weapons at the enemy. I wasn't aware of this controversy, but apparently it's been building for a decade or so. He provides compelling arguments against Marshall.
Without question, this is an outstanding book, chock full of well-researched detail. A good read. Dock him one star for not supporting his thesis better.
Rating:
Summary: American Infantry - Queen of Battle
Review: This is a rather comprehensive survey of the performance of American infantry divisions in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) in World War II, by a military professional still on Active Duty. His thesis is that the American Army (i.e., the Army of the United States) became better than the German Wehrmacht and defeated the Wehrmacht on those terms. Not taking away anything from the quality of the American GI and the American Army in general, or of the overall quality of his book, LTC Mansoor does not really make his case.
He refutes conventional wisdom, arising from a series of post-War interviews of senior German officers, that the American Army relied on the weight of materiel more than, in their view, the relatively poor fighting quality of the American GI to win the war. He discounts the materiel argument, but not convincingly. For example, see pages 214 and 237 for references, among others, to the dwindling quality of the Wehrmacht in the latter stages of the war. And while he acknowledges the improving quality and techniques and the USAAF ground support, he is virtually silent on the impact to Wehrmacht operations of Allied air supremacy after D-Day.
I think it's clear that the Wehrmacht (along with the Waffen SS, the Luftwaffe, etc.) were worn to a frazzle by the time of D-Day. Combine that with Ultra, and I think it's a tribute to the quality of the German soldier and the German military machine that they were able to carry on effectively at all until May 1945. The Wehrmacht of 1944-1945 was not the Wehrmacht of 1940-1941. There had been too many materiel and human losses, too many fronts, too much battering from the sky.
This is not to discount the positive attributes of the American fighting man and woman that he brings out. The American GI is the equal of the best this planet has to offer - always has been. Rather, the reason for the American Army's victory in Europe is a combination of both of these arguments.
I enjoyed his description of how General Marshall arrived at the decision for a 90-division Army. I also liked his description of the Mobilization Training Program, although I would have preferred more detail. The description of the many problems of scale (e.g., stripping divisions still in training of officers and men to be used as cadre for new divisions, problems encountered during POM (preparation for overseas movement), while not a new argument, are covered well. Discussion of these issues provide the beginning of understanding of the magnitude of the task facing the small, pre-1940 professional Army - the task of preparing to wage world war and achieve a victory as rapidly as possible. This was a humongous undertaking, to say the least. Despite the Monday morning quarterbacking, our senior military leadership on balance did an excellent job.
Now, he is critical of the "90-division gamble," particularly in the ETO, believing that it led to excessive casualties in battle since it left an insufficient number of divisions to rotate them out of the line for rest, refit, and effective introduction of replacements. This was exacerbated by our not adhering to the "Germany first" strategy. I thought we had, but he looks at the operations in the China-Burma-India Theater, and the Southwest and Central Pacific Theaters as demonstrating otherwise. Add to this the large number of men in the Army's service establishments, and, he argues, the American GI in ETO came up short.
This book is a gold mine of information, especially when read in conjunction with The Unsinkable Fleet. He has excellent coverage of the Army Mobilization Program (with which he has problems): its plans, constraints, problems, errors, and chaos. He discusses the stateside training program (individual and unit), and the constant turnover of personnel due to having to provide cadre for new divisions and replacements for divisions already deployed in combat. There was a common weeding out of ineffective commanders and staff at all levels during training (which unfortunately continued in every division in the early stages of combat). The replacement system was virtually counterproductive early on, with soldiers losing their training edge as they languished in replacement depots en route to their divisions. This improved as time went on, and he touts the end result of keeping divisions at full strength throughout the war. "The individual replacement system had its flaws, but these flaws stemmed from poor administration of the system rather than an inherent flaw in the concept." (pg. 255) (I'm not not sure Stephen Ambrose would agree with this.)
He paints a picture of arrogance and confusion at the highest levels of command in the planning for D-Day. He reminds us that when all is said and done, no matter the extent and quality of planning, fire support, and logistics, success on the battlefield rests with individual soldiers, small units (platoons and squads), and, most importantly, their leadership. He also reminded me of how D-Day was a close-run thing, with victory wrested from the Wehrmacht by American infantrymen (with some fortuitous help from a few US Navy destroyer captains).
In fact, he is not very flattering of the Army's senior leadership at all. He feels they were not proficient at the operational level and too conservative at the strategic level. He uses as examples Montgomery's failure to open Antwerp earlier as a critical failure second only to the Allies' failure to close the Falaise Gap earlier. He also points to the Huertgen Forest debacle and the ensuing campaign to take Aachen, Eisenhower ordering Devers' Sixth Army Group to turn north when it closed to the Rhine rather than proceeding across it, and Eisenhower's and Bradley's failure to destroy more of the Wehrmacht forces in the Ardennes after they had stopped the German offensive. His criticisms certainly are valid up to a point, but I think it's easy to criticize these decisions after the fact. (The Huertgen Forest campaign, however, does deserve all the criticism that can be heaped upon it.)
The end of the book brought an interesting surprise, as well. He debunks S.L.A. Marshall's Men Against Fire and Marshall's conclusion that only about 10% of American riflemen actually fired their weapons at the enemy. I wasn't aware of this controversy, but apparently it's been building for a decade or so. He provides compelling arguments against Marshall.
Without question, this is an outstanding book, chock full of well-researched detail. A good read. Dock him one star for not supporting his thesis better.
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