Yanks : The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I

Rating:
Summary: Eisenhower Does It Again
Review: "Yanks" is the fourth book by General Eisenhower I've read in the past two years. I find him to be an accomplished military historian, with a clear, concise writing style, and a unique talent for making complex military operations understandable to the layman.

Eisenhower has succeeded once again with "Yanks," his account of the organization of the American Expeditionery Force and its performance during World War I. While a previous reviewer bemoans a surfeit of books on this topic, in my mind, World War I has been eclipsed by the continuing explosion of popular books on World War II. Thus, Eisehower's book is a welcome change of pace.

Eisenhower observes that the 20th century's two world wars can actually be understood as two phases of the same war, with a continuum existing between the doughboys of 1918 and the G.I.'s of 1942. Indeed, Eisenhower shows the surprising degree to which the army organized by General Pershing formed the basis for the U.S. army structure in World War II (commanded by the author's father).

I found particularly incisive Eisenhower's assertion that the second world war might have been avoided had the political leaders of 1918-19 heeded the wisdom of General Pershing. It was Pershing's view that no armistice should be granted while the Germans still occupied French and Belgian soil. However, the objective of unconditional surrender was anathema to the French and British, who had no stomach for prolonging hostilities after five years of horrific losses. Had the German army been annhilated completely and its homeland occupied (ie., the approach of the allies in World War II), Germany may have been deprived of the means of instigating war some 20 years later.

If you are as fond of "Yanks" as I am, I would enthusiastically recommend any of the following Eisenhower titles to you: "A Bitter Wood" (Battle of the Bulge); "So Far From God" (the U.S.-Mexican War) and "Agent of Destiny" (biography of General Winfield Scott, the first and only five-star general between Washington and Grant).

Rating:
Summary: Limited scope, but a good read
Review: After reading several Stephen Ambrose books on World War II, I wanted to learn more about WWI and picked this one off of the shelf. It is definitely not a broad overview of the entire war; likewise, it is not a story about the front-line men in the vein of Ambrose. 'Yanks' focuses primarily on Pershing's role in the conflict.

I found the book interesting and accessible. Eisenhower does not go into great detail about the battles themselves, though he does include some representative stories. Instead, Eisenhower describes much of the political and logistical pressure that Pershing faced in building and commanding the AEF.

The book addresses many of the criticisms of Pershing and the U.S., but the book acknowledges the limits of the AEF's contributions as well.

I'd recommend this book for people with a basic knowledge of WWI looking for specifics on U.S. involvement, or for people concerned *only* with U.S. involvement. Readers wanting a broad picture of the war should look elsewhere.

Rating:
Summary: Not a very good book
Review: I felt this book was thrown together from secondary sources, and not well-written. Rather than read this book, I suggest you read The Defeat of Imperial Germany 1917-1918, by Rod Paschall. I found it a much better book, still resonating in my memory over ten years after I finished reading it on 6 April 1991. Unless you are really interested in the various units fighting, the account of those units' various actions and inactions is a drag for one who had no relative in the AEF or is not a wargamer. Incidentally, on page 10 Eisenhower says that on April 6, 1917 the USA was at war with Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But I find that the USA did not declare war on Austia-Hungary until Dec 7, 1917. I am curious as to why war was declared on that country at that particular time, and would like to know more about the reason for that particular timing. Since Eisenhower thinks we declared war on Austria-Hungary on Apr 6, you won't find anything about it in this book

Rating:
Summary: Yanks : The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I
Review: In the perfect match of subject and author, John S. D. Eisenhower, a noted military historian, presents the definitive account of the birth of the modern Amer- ican army and its decisive role in World War I. With the help of his wife Joanne, Eisenhower captures the viewpoints of the actual participants, blending a narrative told from the perspective of top officers with the stories of average soldiers. Drawing on diaries and memoirs, he brings each engagement to life, from the initial planning to the actual battlefield experiences of soldiers whose exploits at Belleau Woods and along the Meuse-Argonne would become the stuff of legend. Along the way, he shows how General Pershing and other leaders -- including George Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, George Patton, Billy Mitchell, and Peyton March -- transformed the American Expeditionary Force from a small, underequipped force into a strong, efficient, and effective army. Fast-paced, lively, and engaging, Yanks illuminates the central role of the American army in turning the tide in the biggest war the world had ever known.

Rating:
Summary: oh boy
Review: john, in your book you mention the "battle" of wounded knee. i'm pretty sure they call that infamous blot on the 7th cavalry, and on the american military in general, the "massacre" of wounded knee. and also, you didn't mention anything about the fact that the american military in WWI was horribly racist. the US army was so racist in fact that a crack outfit of black troops from harlem (harlem hellfighters ring a bell?) had to be outfitted in FRENCH GEAR before they were allowed to fight!!!

when i read a book, i like to get all sides of an issue...the good AND the bad. perhaps you'll keep these suggestions in mind for the 2nd printing.

Rating:
Summary: General Pershing,The AEF and The Modern U.S. Army
Review: The author notes that the United States entered WWI in 1917 with only 200,000 men in the Army. The U.S. Army had to be multiplied many times to be of any value in Europe, where the Allies had nearly four million men on the Western Front and the Germans about 2.5 million. Politics early became a factor in America's entry into WWI; French Marshall Joffre supported a separate American army in France while the British appealed for Americans to fill up combat depleted British units.

Major General Pershing was selected to command American forces in France, left for Europe with his staff in May 1917 and began the gargantuan task of organizing the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), covering a multitude of requirements, including arrival ports, rail transportation, communications, equipment, supplies and most important the training of American troops in modern warfare. The text notes that Pershing and his chief-of-staff Harbord in France "were inventing the General Staff in the modern sense...."

The text describes the development of the AEF noting the general staff organization Pershing created was derived from observations he made as an attaché to the Japanese army in Manchuria in 1905. American officers, assisted by British and French officers, trained AEF divisions in modern warfare. In their first combat, American troops performed well in October 1917 at Seicheprey. However, the French command made sure that the American troops participated strictly under French control. Eisenhower outlines the political problems the AEF and Pershing faced throughout the war. The British continued to want the AEF to be replacements within their ranks while the French wanted American divisions to be under French command.

The book's emphasis is on the problems of command and organization. Unified command of British and French troops was not attained until March 1918 with Ferdinand Foch appointed Supreme Commander. Pershing believed the intent of the unified command was to maintain Allied units using American troops as replacements. However, Pershing with President Wilson's support, preserved the AEF as a separate command.

The text outlines the AEF's battles, as American troops became a major factor in the war. The AEF performed well and the 3rd Division earned the nickname "The rock of the Marne." In July 1918 Pershing organized the AEF 1st Army, with the 1st Army being assigned the task of reducing the St. Mihiel salient. After a second AEF Army was organized with Pershing in command of both armies, Pershing was on a level with his French and British counterparts. The Argonne became the critical battle for the AEF as the defeat of Germany became eminent while bloody combat continued.

President Wilson rejected Germany's first peace feeler refusing to deal with the Kaiser or speak for the Allies. With combat continuing, the book outlines the events that ultimately lead to an Armistice. Eisenhower writes that Pershing felt "There can be no conclusion to this war until Germany is brought to her knees." The author observes "History would seem to have vindicated General Pershing in his protests against granting Germany an armistice...." However, "The governments of France, Britain and Italy, aware of the feelings in their respective countries, would never condone continuing the fighting any longer than necessary." Politics prevailed and the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918. With the war ended the AEF was demobilized.

The text observes, "The creation, training, supplying and employment of the AEF had been a remarkable feat. From a force of only 200,000 officers and men.... In 1917, American had raised an army of over four million, of whom half had crossed the Atlantic." The book observes "Pershing's AEF was the first modern Army the United States ever fielded, and the Army of the Second World War was less different from the AEF than the AEF was from the Army that preceded it." The book further notes "Perhaps even more important in the development of a modern army was Pershing's creation of a vast and elaborate supply system that was called Services of Supply in 1917-1918 and Communications Zone (Com-Z) in 1944-1945.

The text relates that George Patton and the AEF developed modern tank warfare doctrine, and notes "The airplane was no longer a novelty; it made a real difference whether one side or the other enjoyed air supremacy in a given sector." Also important, service in the AEF trained many future American WWII senior officers such as George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur and George Patton.

The author notes, "One question is still debated: how important was the AEF to winning of the First World War? It is generally agreed that the threat of the growing power of the AEF, projected into 1919, was critical in convincing the German high command that the war could not be won." In conclusion, Eisenhower makes the interesting assertion "If the United States had not entered the war-or had elected not to send an expeditionary force abroad-there would never have been a Second World War, Germany would have won the first one."

This book will appeal to those interested in 20th century history.

Rating:
Summary: A Profesional's View of the War
Review: The author provides a view of US participation in WWI from the standpoint of a profesional staff officer. There is very little action/blood and guts. Instead the author concentrates on the performance of the Army leaders - what they did and why they did it. It is a history of the AEF from a mature perspective.

I personally found the book refreshing as it gave me a new view of the personalities involved with the AEF and ultimately with the leadership of the US Army in WWII. It provides a background of the organization of the US Army from WWI through to the present time.

Rating:
Summary: A Missing Piece
Review: While history can often make for dry reading material, John D. Eisenhower, does an admirable job of making the story of the United States Army in World War I readable. The author provides numerous details that flesh out the bare skeleton provided by other authors. He covers the buildup of forces, including a generous section on the logistics of moving to Europe and supplying it once it arrived. Eisenhower, also, offers valuable information and insights on the American Expeditionary Force, from senior figures like Pershing and Harbord to early views of Patton and MacArthur. Eisenhower's coverage of the battles and conflicts involving the US Army are not comprehensive, and you have to wonder if they were really meant to be, or meant as examples from which the reader can infer the details of other battles not covered. The coverage of the political/command battles provides another facet of the US involvement missed by many other books.

As any serious reader of history knows, you cannot get the whole story from any one book or author. In order to get a balanced and comprehensive view of history, the reader must look to multiple sources. This book makes an excellent companion to John Keegan's The First World War, providing a missing piece. It provides a source of balance and detail that Keegan neglects. However, it is not the be all and end all of the story; there are still plenty of missing pieces.
P-)

Rating:
Summary: More like 2.5 stars
Review: While this book is informing and interesting in some areas. It dragged on in some areas as well. Eisenhower does an excellent job of informing us on the early careers of Patton and MacArthur. When in drifts to the escapades of the French it kinda trails off though.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting but Superficial Account of AEF
Review: Yanks is an interesting, well-written account of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France during the First World War. Eisenhower, a retired brigadier general and son of the president, provides a broad-brush summary of American participation in the war that will certainly satisfy the general reader. However, given the number of other books on this same subject, Yanks offers nothing of unique value. The author adds nothing to his "epic story" that distinguishes it from other books on this subject. The narrative is far too generalized for readers with greater background in the First World War, and omits too much to classify as a comprehensive history of even its own subject, the AEF.

Yanks consists of three major sections that cover the creation of the AEF, the AEF's initial battles in France and the AEF's independent operations. The narrative itself consists of 23 short chapters, which are well supported by 16 maps. A brief appendix on US mobilization, notes and bibliography conclude the volume. The author has invested considerable research in this work and there are no significant historical errors. Much of the author's focus is on General Pershing, commander of the AEF, and in fact this book might have been called, "General Pershings' War." Most of the narrative focuses on high-level leaders and operations, although the author takes the time to point out the contributions of fighting men like Alvin C. York and Sam Woodfill. Eisenhower's descriptions of the St Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations are succinct but accurate.

The biggest problem with Yanks - and one that greatly reduces its value - is that it really only covers the American divisions that fought directly under General Pershing's command. While the author acknowledges that ten US divisions fought under Allied control, he says virtually nothing about their contributions. The list of omitted units in this account of the AEF is incredible. The US 2nd Corps (27th and 30th Divisions), which spent the entire war under British command in Flanders and the Somme while suffering 16,000 combat casualties, is only briefly mentioned in one sentence. The American 37th and 91st Divisions, which fought with the Franco-Belgian army, are also barely mentioned. The capture of Blanc Mont by the US 2nd and 36th Divisions while assigned to the French 4th Army (and suffered 7,800 casualties) is only mentioned in a terse footnote. Furthermore, the author tends to over-focus on regular units like the 1st Infantry Division and fails to mention some National Guard units that participated in the final Meuse-Argonne offensive; the 29th Division is never mentioned once in these even though it was in the battle. Nor is US participation in other theaters mentioned; the operations of the 332nd Infantry Regiment in Italy in July-November 1918 and the 339th Infantry Regiment in Russia in September 1918 are never mentioned. Furthermore, the author omits virtually all mention of the contributions of supporting arms, such as artillery, engineers, signal, chemical and aviation. Based on this account, the reader would not be aware that there were 42 American artillery brigades in France by the end of the war. While the author includes photos of American aces Eddie Rickenbacker and Frank Luke, neither their accomplishments nor units are mentioned in the narrative. Indeed, brief mention of Patton and Billy Mitchell suffices for the author's coverage of the tank and air corps in the AEF. Due to these numerous omissions, Yanks only scratches the surface in its coverage of the AEF.

Another big problem with Yanks is that the author never spends much effort detailing important aspects of the US war effort that directly affected the build-up of the AEF. For example, the issue of armaments production is glossed over but the US failure to produce any significant quantities of artillery, tanks or aircraft was a major impediment. While the author notes Pershing's disdain that the British used only 9 weeks for basic training for their own troops, he fails to detail US training methods or explain how many virtually untrained troops were committed to battle in the Meuse-Argonne. A book like this desperately needs appendices covering order of battle, dates units arrived in France, a more detailed break-down of casualties, etc. Unfortunately, Yanks is about 50% shorter than it needs to be and the author should have made a greater effort to cover more than just the highlights of the AEF.

Finally, Yanks is rather weak on analysis. Major questions, like how great was the role of the AEF in the final victory, are barely addressed. The author might have mentioned that US troops held 83 miles of the Western Front at the armistice - less than the French but more than the Commonwealth armies. The author should also have mentioned that the ten US divisions that served under Allied command were spearheading the final Allied offensives in Champagne and Flanders. Europeans who want to minimize the AEF's role by suggesting that the St Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations were sideshows should not be allowed to ignore all these other operations that Eisenhower allows to slip through the cracks of his broad-brush. The author tends to make some odd generalized linkages between the First and Second World War, particularly when he suggests that if the Allies had listened to Pershing and refused an armistice in November 1918 that the Second World War might have been avoided. This is patently absurd. If Pershing had gotten his way, the war would have extended well into 1919 with an invasion of Germany, with the result still an Allied victory. It is hard to see how more casualties with the same result could have prevented the rise of the Nazis in a defeated Germany. Finally, the whole issue of independent American formations versus coalition operations is never really addressed, but is still relevant today.