Rating: 
Summary: Triple cross theology
Review: This reads like a guidebook, sort of a secret Bible of things to do so everyone involved in global politics will think that you can do exactly what they are doing. There is an index, but it does not have a listing for triple cross thinking (covered mainly at the end of the "Going North" Chapter). The index is more helpful on the Counterinsurgency, Counterintelligence, Covert action, Covert operations, and Covert paramilitary campaign (listed topics) thinking which finally produced the triple cross operation. Without trying to explain how numerous officials in the United States were supposed to approve everything that was being done to create the kind of revolution which superpower thinking truly wanted, in their effort to make the people with power in North Vietnam think that an internal Sacred Sword of the Patriots League considered itself to be potentially more popular than the government of North Vietnam, a more recent approach to understanding this guide might consider how well this guide would work as a plan for triple cross activities, possibly including elections, elected officials, and the courts, to convince people in the United States that a Sacred Sword of the Patriots League had successfully taken over government operations in the United States of America. Specific comments in this book about the triple cross:Could SOG create a triple-cross system to convince Hanoi that, in fact, it had uncovered only part of a much larger and more intricate subversion operation inside its borders? (p. 93). The triple cross was not just against Hanoi but also "against our compatriots," noted the chief of OP 34, who was convinced that the STD was infiltrated by enemy intelligence. (p. 114). "Of course, we were setting these guys up because there was no team to contact." (p. 115). "We might also provide information about corrupt government officials who we claimed we learned about from messages sent back from agent teams inserted by us." (p. 115). To make Project Oodles believable, different false radio messages were sent from OP 34 to each phantom team. (p. 119). Finally, radios that sent messages out from these fake teams were air-dropped into North Vietnam. This completed the communications loop. Messages were coming in and answers were being sent out. (p. 120). In effect, it was real evidence of spy commandos, as Hanoi referred to them. (pp. 122-3). Finally, in November 1968, when the United States was going to have an election, MACVSOG was called by Washington, D. C., and told, "we are going to publicly say that we have no activities north of the parallel." (p. 124). Teams in North Vietnam had to get out immediately. Some people (and candidate Richard Nixon did not actually say this) were still thinking, "Just deny that you're engaged in MACVSOG operations and then crank them up. This was the way the operators saw things." (p. 126). I think about triple cross operations when I see a lot of political advertising on TV, but some of the Americans who created such operations might be engaged in other occupations today, and it would be extremely difficult to convince me that they aren't.
Rating:
Summary: Triple cross theology
Review: This reads like a guidebook, sort of a secret Bible of things to do so everyone involved in global politics will think that you can do exactly what they are doing. There is an index, but it does not have a listing for triple cross thinking (covered mainly at the end of the "Going North" Chapter). The index is more helpful on the Counterinsurgency, Counterintelligence, Covert action, Covert operations, and Covert paramilitary campaign (listed topics) thinking which finally produced the triple cross operation. Without trying to explain how numerous officials in the United States were supposed to approve everything that was being done to create the kind of revolution which superpower thinking truly wanted, in their effort to make the people with power in North Vietnam think that an internal Sacred Sword of the Patriots League considered itself to be potentially more popular than the government of North Vietnam, a more recent approach to understanding this guide might consider how well this guide would work as a plan for triple cross activities, possibly including elections, elected officials, and the courts, to convince people in the United States that a Sacred Sword of the Patriots League had successfully taken over government operations in the United States of America. Specific comments in this book about the triple cross: Could SOG create a triple-cross system to convince Hanoi that, in fact, it had uncovered only part of a much larger and more intricate subversion operation inside its borders? (p. 93). The triple cross was not just against Hanoi but also "against our compatriots," noted the chief of OP 34, who was convinced that the STD was infiltrated by enemy intelligence. (p. 114). "Of course, we were setting these guys up because there was no team to contact." (p. 115). "We might also provide information about corrupt government officials who we claimed we learned about from messages sent back from agent teams inserted by us." (p. 115). To make Project Oodles believable, different false radio messages were sent from OP 34 to each phantom team. (p. 119). Finally, radios that sent messages out from these fake teams were air-dropped into North Vietnam. This completed the communications loop. Messages were coming in and answers were being sent out. (p. 120). In effect, it was real evidence of spy commandos, as Hanoi referred to them. (pp. 122-3). Finally, in November 1968, when the United States was going to have an election, MACVSOG was called by Washington, D. C., and told, "we are going to publicly say that we have no activities north of the parallel." (p. 124). Teams in North Vietnam had to get out immediately. Some people (and candidate Richard Nixon did not actually say this) were still thinking, "Just deny that you're engaged in MACVSOG operations and then crank them up. This was the way the operators saw things." (p. 126). I think about triple cross operations when I see a lot of political advertising on TV, but some of the Americans who created such operations might be engaged in other occupations today, and it would be extremely difficult to convince me that they aren't.
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