Mont Pincon: August 1944 (Battleground Europe Normandy)

Rating:
Summary: Not Up to Snuff
Review: Most of Pen & Sword's Battleground Europe series are excellent campaign narratives as well as handy battlefield guides. Unfortunately, a few sub-standard volumes have snuck through the editorial cracks and one of these is Mont Pinçon by Eric Hunt. While a few readers - probably most English readers who had relatives in the campaign - might find this volume interesting or useful, the general military reader will not. The biggest flaw in the volume is the lack of any material on the German side; indeed, it is the provision of detailed information from "the other side of the hill" which has made most of the other volumes in the series so useful. Furthermore, the author overlaps too much material from the earlier volume by Ian Daglish on Operation Bluecoat - a volume that was far superior. Some of the other features that normally appear in the series, such as detailed orders of battle and detailed tactical maps, are missing or inadequate in this volume. Overall, Mont Pinçon is inadequate as military history.

Readers will probably grow suspicious about the quality of this volume after looking at the rather long 16-page introduction, which serves as a brief overview of the units and weapons involved in the Battle of Mont Pinçon. Instead of providing the kind of detail most military readers desire (e.g. composition, disposition, tactics, leadership, etc), the author chooses to use quotes from veterans about various weapon systems like mortars. Many of the veterans' ranks and units are not identified and it is unclear if these men were qualified observers or merely someone whose anecdotes were handy. After a brief run-down of the American Operation Cobra and the British Operation Bluecoat, Hunt then launches into his campaign narrative, with fully half the volume events occurring before the attack on Mont Pinçon; readers will note that too much material is derived from Field Marshal Montgomery's memoirs. Readers of the previous volume of Operation Bluecoat will see much of the same material replicated herein, although with less detail. Once Hunt gets us to the slopes of Mont Pinçon on page 94, the lack of any real information on the German defenses or plans renders most of what follows inexplicable. Since Hunt never explains what German forces were defending this supposedly key piece of terrain or their mission (delay? Hasty defense? Deliberate defense? Withdrawal?) it makes it very difficult to evaluate the British attack.

The British 43rd (Wessex) Division was ordered by Montgomery on 5 August 1944 to seize Mont Pinçon - the highest piece of ground in Normandy. The division was already exhausted by the first six days of fighting in Operation Bluecoat, and by the time it reached Mont Pinçon the forward combat units were probably at 50-70% strength (although the author makes little effort to clarify this). The 129th Brigade from the 43rd Division, consisting of three depleted infantry battalions and one attached armor battalion (Sherman tanks), was tasked to conduct a frontal assault on Mont Pinçon, while another brigade provided a weak feint on the northern flank. Hunt clearly put his main effort into narrating the difficult and costly British effort to breach the German defenses around Mont Pinçon (apparently mostly mines covered by machinegun positions, backed up by a few AT guns), and this is the only part of the volume that offers value. It is clear from Hunt's description that the British army had still not learned some lessons and it is distressing to read about poorly-supported infantry attacks uphill in broad daylight against dug-in German positions. The initial British attacks on Mont Pinçon were clumsy and unimaginative - the type made by tired commanders in a hurry - and were accordingly repulsed.

Based upon what Hunt tells us, Mont Pinçon should have been a defensive success for the Germans, despite their own heavy losses. However, for reasons never explained here, at a crucial moment the German defense fumbled their clear lead. After the main British attack had been stopped, a column of seven British tanks boldly moved up a rough trail discovered on the mountain. The British tanks advanced without infantry support (they did use smoke) and normally an attack like this would quickly fall prey to German AT gunners. Fortunately, the smoke and dust from the earlier fighting obscured the British tank penetration and the Germans were unaware for some time that these tanks had made it to the crest of the hill. The tanks quickly called for their infantry to climb up the hill, although only a few companies reached the crest that night. The Germans compounded their mistake by not counterattacking immediately and once they did, it was too little and too late. The British had seized the highest mountain in Normandy after less than 48 hours fighting and at the cost of a few hundred casualties - not much compared to earlier fighting around Hill 112.

Hunt's lack of insight into the German defense or the British tactical orders make it difficult to evaluate the fighting on Mont Pinçon based on this account. It does appear that the British commanders sent inadequate forces to seize a piece of terrain regarded as "key" and that they fumbled the initial attacks. However, British mistakes appear to have been retrieved by German mistakes and the fog of war. Therefore, Hunt's volume could be considered a stumbling effort to depict how fatigue and confusion can lead to unexpected outcomes on the battlefield.

Rating:
Summary: Not Up to Snuff
Review: Most of Pen & Sword's Battleground Europe series are excellent campaign narratives as well as handy battlefield guides. Unfortunately, a few sub-standard volumes have snuck through the editorial cracks and one of these is Mont Pinçon by Eric Hunt. While a few readers - probably most English readers who had relatives in the campaign - might find this volume interesting or useful, the general military reader will not. The biggest flaw in the volume is the lack of any material on the German side; indeed, it is the provision of detailed information from "the other side of the hill" which has made most of the other volumes in the series so useful. Furthermore, the author overlaps too much material from the earlier volume by Ian Daglish on Operation Bluecoat - a volume that was far superior. Some of the other features that normally appear in the series, such as detailed orders of battle and detailed tactical maps, are missing or inadequate in this volume. Overall, Mont Pinçon is inadequate as military history.

Readers will probably grow suspicious about the quality of this volume after looking at the rather long 16-page introduction, which serves as a brief overview of the units and weapons involved in the Battle of Mont Pinçon. Instead of providing the kind of detail most military readers desire (e.g. composition, disposition, tactics, leadership, etc), the author chooses to use quotes from veterans about various weapon systems like mortars. Many of the veterans' ranks and units are not identified and it is unclear if these men were qualified observers or merely someone whose anecdotes were handy. After a brief run-down of the American Operation Cobra and the British Operation Bluecoat, Hunt then launches into his campaign narrative, with fully half the volume events occurring before the attack on Mont Pinçon; readers will note that too much material is derived from Field Marshal Montgomery's memoirs. Readers of the previous volume of Operation Bluecoat will see much of the same material replicated herein, although with less detail. Once Hunt gets us to the slopes of Mont Pinçon on page 94, the lack of any real information on the German defenses or plans renders most of what follows inexplicable. Since Hunt never explains what German forces were defending this supposedly key piece of terrain or their mission (delay? Hasty defense? Deliberate defense? Withdrawal?) it makes it very difficult to evaluate the British attack.

The British 43rd (Wessex) Division was ordered by Montgomery on 5 August 1944 to seize Mont Pinçon - the highest piece of ground in Normandy. The division was already exhausted by the first six days of fighting in Operation Bluecoat, and by the time it reached Mont Pinçon the forward combat units were probably at 50-70% strength (although the author makes little effort to clarify this). The 129th Brigade from the 43rd Division, consisting of three depleted infantry battalions and one attached armor battalion (Sherman tanks), was tasked to conduct a frontal assault on Mont Pinçon, while another brigade provided a weak feint on the northern flank. Hunt clearly put his main effort into narrating the difficult and costly British effort to breach the German defenses around Mont Pinçon (apparently mostly mines covered by machinegun positions, backed up by a few AT guns), and this is the only part of the volume that offers value. It is clear from Hunt's description that the British army had still not learned some lessons and it is distressing to read about poorly-supported infantry attacks uphill in broad daylight against dug-in German positions. The initial British attacks on Mont Pinçon were clumsy and unimaginative - the type made by tired commanders in a hurry - and were accordingly repulsed.

Based upon what Hunt tells us, Mont Pinçon should have been a defensive success for the Germans, despite their own heavy losses. However, for reasons never explained here, at a crucial moment the German defense fumbled their clear lead. After the main British attack had been stopped, a column of seven British tanks boldly moved up a rough trail discovered on the mountain. The British tanks advanced without infantry support (they did use smoke) and normally an attack like this would quickly fall prey to German AT gunners. Fortunately, the smoke and dust from the earlier fighting obscured the British tank penetration and the Germans were unaware for some time that these tanks had made it to the crest of the hill. The tanks quickly called for their infantry to climb up the hill, although only a few companies reached the crest that night. The Germans compounded their mistake by not counterattacking immediately and once they did, it was too little and too late. The British had seized the highest mountain in Normandy after less than 48 hours fighting and at the cost of a few hundred casualties - not much compared to earlier fighting around Hill 112.

Hunt's lack of insight into the German defense or the British tactical orders make it difficult to evaluate the fighting on Mont Pinçon based on this account. It does appear that the British commanders sent inadequate forces to seize a piece of terrain regarded as "key" and that they fumbled the initial attacks. However, British mistakes appear to have been retrieved by German mistakes and the fog of war. Therefore, Hunt's volume could be considered a stumbling effort to depict how fatigue and confusion can lead to unexpected outcomes on the battlefield.