The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy

Rating:
Summary: A Questionable Perspective on this Infamous Incident
Review: As a former Navy spook who served in the Korean Theater during 1969-71, I hoped this book, published on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo, would provide useful new insights into this infamous incident. Unfortunately it does not. More or less consistent accounts of the details surrounding the ship's capture and the crew's imprisonment, and the policy and operational shortcomings up to the senior levels of the US Navy and the National Security Agency, have been published elsewhere over the years. This account adds little of significance in this area.

Instead, Professor Lerner focuses on the "failure of American policy" and the notion that the "Cold War mentality directing (United States) policy decisions" caused the United States to incorrectly focus on the Pueblo seizure as part of the international communist conspiracy. Professor Lerner assets, unconvincingly in my opinion, that North Korea's attack on the Pueblo was motivated solely by an indigenous ideological concept called "juche", an extreme form of "self-reliance" which Lerner says North Korea espoused from 1955 onward.

In other words, the attack on the Pueblo was just North Korea's way of asking to be left alone so they could build a peoples' paradise based on "having an attitude of a master toward the revolution and construction of one's own country"(??). Professor Lerner further asserts that despite the Pueblo attack occurring just eight days before the launch of the Tet offensive in Vietnam, any notion that North Korea ever participated in a concerted effort to support North Vietnam's imposition of totalitarian socialism on South Vietnam was just the result of a tendency by the United States' military to see pro-North Vietnamese adversaries behind every tree. "Other evidence (none of which Professor Lerner specifically cites) suggests a lack of cooperation between (North Korea) and Vietnam." Also, Professor Lerner argues that the Russians certainly had no involvement because a former KGB officer told him so in an interview (!) and "Soviet complicity might also have threatened ... superpower rapprochement" that was allegedly occurring. Finally, he says North Koreans would never act in concert with other totalitarian socialist regimes because such an action might backfire and result in "strengthening the position of American 'hawks'".

The arguments and theories in The Pueblo Incident - A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy are unconvincing.

First, Korea practiced "juche" for hundreds of years as evidenced by the 19th Century characterization of Korea as the "Hermit Kingdom" for its tendency to attack foreign ships that entered its harbors as well as execute shipwrecked sailors who washed ashore. So what? South Korean society evolved from their isolationist tradition, and even socialist states like Albania and Romania practiced forms of "juche" from the 1950s through 1990s without attacking, everyone who ventured near their borders. "Juche" doesn't explain the North Korean need to attack and murder 31 men on a US Navy plane more than 90 miles off their coast in April 1969, their large-scale commando raid on a South Korean island hundreds of miles south of the DMZ, stepped up North Korean aggression that caused more than a 1,000 U.S. and South Korean casualties along the DMZ from 1967 -69, etc. etc.

Second, North Koreans have publicly and proudly announced that they collaborated with the North Vietnamese in the 1960s. Their most significant involvement was sending North Korean pilots to fly MIG jet fighters in opposition to American pilots in Vietnam, just as Russians had flown against American pilots in Korea 15 years earlier. There really is evidence to refute assertions of non-involvement by North Korea in Vietnam.

Third, no doubt North Korea was something of a renegade to the Soviets and the Russians probably did not know in advance about the attack on the Pueblo. Nevertheless, supporting North Korea was clearly an element of Soviet policy. When the U.S. Navy assembled carrier battle groups in the Sea of Japan the USSR positioned 16 of its surface warships between the US fleet and the North Korean coast, as well as deployed a number of submarines in the area.

Yes, the record shows that in many instances the United States misjudged the intention and capability and motivation of our Cold War adversaries (as they did ours). In the aftermath of the attack on the Pueblo the United States assembled a large naval task force and deployed additional Air Force units in the Korean theater which was a prudent response given our commitment to protecting South Korea and Japan and the fact that a state of war still existed in Korea. Once it was determined the Pueblo attack was not a prelude to greater hostilities, the United States withdrew most of those forces and patiently sought the crew's release through diplomacy and negotiation. Was that a foreign policy failure?

This book has a few interesting photographs I hadn't seen before. I recommend it to people interested in the Cold War and the ongoing Korean conflict history as long as they consult other sources to get a more balanced and complete view of the incident.

Rating:
Summary: The Story of the USS Pueblo!
Review: I decided to read this book after I saw the author on a Fox News special about the Pueblo. I had been stationed in Osan, South Korea, a few years after the incident, so I knew a little bit about the Pueblo, but not very much. This book answered all my questions, and more. I think anyone with an interest in American foreign policy should read it.

The book really has 3 parts. In the first section, Lerner looks at the background of this intelligence program (operation clickbeetle), the history of the program, the specific preparation of this ship and mission, the background of the men who operated the ship, and the situation in Korea. Then, in the next part, he looks at the mission itself, focusing mostly on the events the day that North Korea captured the Pueblo on the high seas, and what that meant for the US and the Cold War. Finally, he looks at the way the Lyndon Johnson administration decided to turn to diplomacy rather than a military response, and how that developed over a year of negotiations, until the men were finally released just before Christmas in a somewhat bizarre solution in which the US signed an apology letter that they had already publicly denounced. The ship, shockingly, still is in North Korea, serving as a tourist attraction.

This is really a good book. First of all, Lerner writes beautifully. This book reads so smoothly, and the story is so intense, that you almost can't put it down. His research is also very impressive. It looks like he has been to every archive, and talked to every person, related to the event. And he looks at every aspect of the incident. There is a look at the military side of the story, a lot about the diplomacy, a chapter about the public reaction in the US, details about the treatment of the men in captivity (one year in North Korean prisons--just brutal stuff), even a discussion of the intelligence loss involved here.

There are a few things that I liked particularly. He brings North Korea into the picture, showing how they were not simply taking orders from the Soviets but were a nation struggling with their own problems, and in order to distract the people from his failed communist leadership, Kim Il Sung tried to show them how tough he was by going after America. Lerner also shows how Americans everywhere: in the government, in the military, in the general population, in congress, saw this as part of the cold war, and refused to recognize that North Korea mattered. So I was shocked to see how Johnson immediately tried to solve the problem by going to the USSR, and the UN and China, but not to North Korea. He also does a good job showing how the Navy let the men down, and then tried to scapegoat the officers by blaming them for not going down with the ship, when Lerner shows that the Navy had let the men down on so many support levels. For example, the condition of the ship was horrible, it didn't even have a reliable steering system or a good self-destruct system or a working communication system, the Pueblo was slow and unstable, had bad navigation equipment, and almost no guns. Pre-mission trials showed this to everyone in the Navy, but still, they ignored the commander's requests to fix anything. Finally, as a former soldier, I was really impressed by his discussion of the crew. He shows how the Navy let them down by not giving them the right support, training, and information. He also shows how they hung together in North Korea, despite some pretty rough times.

There are a few problems I should mention. Some maps would have been helpful. The military details were fine for me, but people without a military background might find some of it tough reading. And I did wonder if Lerner could have told us more about the views of the common soldier who was wondering if we were going to go to war over this, especially the grunts in Vietnam. Still, this is overall a really, really, good book. It shows how the US during the Cold War sometimes overlooked the complexity of the world, and just looked for easy answers that saw everything as part of a Soviet conspiracy. I would recommend it highly to anyone.

Rating:
Summary: Very Many Factual and Unfortunate Errors in this Work
Review: It is always discouraging to eagerly open a newly purchased book, only to find it contains errors of fact which, from personal experience, one immediately identifies. I have no idea of the authors expertise as an historian or university professor at a minor campus of a land grant university, but it is clear, from the first chapter, that he has no experience, and little understanding of the world of electronic information gathering as practiced in the 1960s.

He begnis, early on, to lament the failures of the "KW-7 Transmitter". True enough...the KW-7 was a dog, but it was a dog of an encryption system, not a transmitter. One would indeed be hard pressed to raise a shore station on a KW-7! The '7 encrypyed radio teletype signals which only then were fed to a transmitter...on Pueblo, a AN/URT-32, manufactured by Collins Radio in Texas. He later refers to a crew member as a "Seaman First Class"....a rate which was disestablished in the late 1940's. You can be a seaman recruit, seaman apprentice or a seaman, but no seaman first class sailed on Pueblo, or any ship in the Vietnam era. There are many other errors, both describing procedure and policy, which are cause for disappointment.

And here's the rub. I'd be willing to give any author the benefit of the doubt on areas I've never experienced personally...say, the policy making, geopolitical or even historical factors surrounding Pueblo's capture. (I was working at Navcomsta Guam that afternoon, by the way, so my interest is more than casual). But, if he gets basic things, which I DO understand, wrong, how could I believe the other arguments he makes? Too bad. Lots of brave guys suffered when Pueblo was taken....and the skipper, XO and NavSecGru guys have all written pretty darn good books about the event...perhaps this "historian and college professor" might do well to go back and check out the primary source data before talking about things about which he obviously knows little.

Keven Memori, RMCM USN (retired)

Rating:
Summary: Very Many Factual and Unfortunate Errors in this Work
Review: It is always discouraging to eagerly open a newly purchased book, only to find it contains errors of fact which, from personal experience, one immediately identifies. I have no idea of the authors expertise as an historian or university professor at a minor campus of a land grant university, but it is clear, from the first chapter, that he has no experience, and little understanding of the world of electronic information gathering as practiced in the 1960s.

He begnis, early on, to lament the failures of the "KW-7 Transmitter". True enough...the KW-7 was a dog, but it was a dog of an encryption system, not a transmitter. One would indeed be hard pressed to raise a shore station on a KW-7! The '7 encrypyed radio teletype signals which only then were fed to a transmitter...on Pueblo, a AN/URT-32, manufactured by Collins Radio in Texas. He later refers to a crew member as a "Seaman First Class"....a rate which was disestablished in the late 1940's. You can be a seaman recruit, seaman apprentice or a seaman, but no seaman first class sailed on Pueblo, or any ship in the Vietnam era. There are many other errors, both describing procedure and policy, which are cause for disappointment.

And here's the rub. I'd be willing to give any author the benefit of the doubt on areas I've never experienced personally...say, the policy making, geopolitical or even historical factors surrounding Pueblo's capture. (I was working at Navcomsta Guam that afternoon, by the way, so my interest is more than casual). But, if he gets basic things, which I DO understand, wrong, how could I believe the other arguments he makes? Too bad. Lots of brave guys suffered when Pueblo was taken....and the skipper, XO and NavSecGru guys have all written pretty darn good books about the event...perhaps this "historian and college professor" might do well to go back and check out the primary source data before talking about things about which he obviously knows little.

Keven Memori, RMCM USN (retired)

Rating:
Summary: Impressive Debut
Review: Mitch Lerner has written an impressive debut work on the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo that reads like a spy novel. This book is even better, because it really happened and is no boring academic treatise. Lerner is a gifted writer and is able to bring his subject alive.

As someone who has lived and traveled to Korea many times, I am amazed at how ignorant Americans are about that country. In 1950 two regimes went to war to determine which one of them would be the sole government of the entire nation. The Korean War was a civil war that settled nothing. To this day, both capitals claim to be the only government of Korea, want unification on their terms, and are still willing to use force to reach their goals. Lerner shows that policy makers in the 1960s were ignorant of these basic facts and looked at Korea from the perspective of the American-Soviet confrontation that was the Cold War. Simply put, Americans looked at North Korea as a Soviet puppet rather than as a free agent that might take actions without telling their "friends" in Moscow.

Lerner gives the reader an even-handed account of the various players that influenced the course of events. He gives President Lyndon Johnson good marks for handling a difficult crisis in which he had a weak hand and the North Koreans held all the aces. He explains the North Korean perspective without offering apologies for the nasty fellows that govern the northern half of the peninsula. He also does justice to the crew of the Pueblo, recounting the beatings and torture they endured at the tender hands of their hands.

Many people in the U.S. Navy will not like this book. The Pueblo was sent out on a fool's errand. The Navy provided no escorts or air cover to protect this ship. The admirals expected that as long as the ship stayed in international waters, the North Koreans would respect the unwritten rules of the Cold War that allowed the Soviets to send "fishing boats" to sail off the coast of Florida and Virginia. The only problem was that the North Koreans were not the Soviets. In the two years before the Pueblo sailed, North Korea was waging an undeclared border war with the South, attacking and killing American and South Korean soldiers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Korea a war zone and were giving out hero medals for combat engagements with the enemy. The Navy apparently thought nothing of this little war and sent the Pueblo out without any protection. In a covering exercise, the Navy tried to court martial the captain of the ship to cover up the fact that the service had failed to provide any protection or even any means to destroy all the sensitive material on board. Lerner stays balanced as he covers this disgraceful period and refuses to blast the high command of the Navy for its shameful treatment of the crew. Still, there is no hiding who the heroes are in this story. Read this book; it is a good story; it is an important story.

Rating:
Summary: Impressive Debut
Review: Mitch Lerner has written an impressive debut work on the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo that reads like a spy novel. This book is even better, because it really happened and is no boring academic treatise. Lerner is a gifted writer and is able to bring his subject alive.

As someone who has lived and traveled to Korea many times, I am amazed at how ignorant Americans are about that country. In 1950 two regimes went to war to determine which one of them would be the sole government of the entire nation. The Korean War was a civil war that settled nothing. To this day, both capitals claim to be the only government of Korea, want unification on their terms, and are still willing to use force to reach their goals. Lerner shows that policy makers in the 1960s were ignorant of these basic facts and looked at Korea from the perspective of the American-Soviet confrontation that was the Cold War. Simply put, Americans looked at North Korea as a Soviet puppet rather than as a free agent that might take actions without telling their "friends" in Moscow.

Lerner gives the reader an even-handed account of the various players that influenced the course of events. He gives President Lyndon Johnson good marks for handling a difficult crisis in which he had a weak hand and the North Koreans held all the aces. He explains the North Korean perspective without offering apologies for the nasty fellows that govern the northern half of the peninsula. He also does justice to the crew of the Pueblo, recounting the beatings and torture they endured at the tender hands of their hands.

Many people in the U.S. Navy will not like this book. The Pueblo was sent out on a fool's errand. The Navy provided no escorts or air cover to protect this ship. The admirals expected that as long as the ship stayed in international waters, the North Koreans would respect the unwritten rules of the Cold War that allowed the Soviets to send "fishing boats" to sail off the coast of Florida and Virginia. The only problem was that the North Koreans were not the Soviets. In the two years before the Pueblo sailed, North Korea was waging an undeclared border war with the South, attacking and killing American and South Korean soldiers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Korea a war zone and were giving out hero medals for combat engagements with the enemy. The Navy apparently thought nothing of this little war and sent the Pueblo out without any protection. In a covering exercise, the Navy tried to court martial the captain of the ship to cover up the fact that the service had failed to provide any protection or even any means to destroy all the sensitive material on board. Lerner stays balanced as he covers this disgraceful period and refuses to blast the high command of the Navy for its shameful treatment of the crew. Still, there is no hiding who the heroes are in this story. Read this book; it is a good story; it is an important story.

Rating:
Summary: The Story of the USS Pueblo!
Review: This book is well wide of the mark in its attempt to argue that the loss of the USS Pueblo was a result of a failed US foreign policy.

Prof. Lerner has made some useful contributions to our understanding of the Pueblo incident. In addition, he has proven to be both a careful researcher and presents a most convincing case that Pueblo was ill suited for both the open sea and for a hazardous mission in hostile waters.

The central thesis of this work, however, is badly flawed. Lerner argues that the Pueblo's loss can be attributed to US myopia during the Cold War, a vision that saw a Soviet conspiracy behind the action of every communist nation. "In designing the Pueblo's mission," Lerner writes, "preparing the ship for launch, and attempting to resolve the crisis, American policy makers consistently failed to treat the North Koreans as North Koreans, instead viewing them as one cog in a greater communist conspiracy that consisted or virtually interchangeable parts . . . . they clung to this comfortable worldview that reduced complex events to simplistic shades of black and white and saw everything as a zero-sum contest for world domination."

As such, Lerner argues that the loss of the ship and the imprisonment of the crew represented a foreign policy failure.

Unfortunately, Lerner has made a jumble of grand strategy, policy, operations, strategy and tactics. American grand strategy during the Cold War era, and arguably a successful strategy, was one of Containment. Regardless of the American perceptions of the Soviet Union that shaped the strategy, its implementation resulted in the adoption of several foreign policies. One of those pollicies was to collect foreign intelligence information on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Bloc and on communist nations. This policy was made operational with the use of intelligence collection aircraft and ships.

One strategy for the operation was to outfit nondescript ships for signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions. The Pueblo, its SIGINT refit, and mission, was simply the tactical implementation of that strategy.

Pueblo's loss was attributable to flawed risk assessments of the mission and a now classic case of an intelligence warning failure. In short, Pueblo was lost -- not because of a massive failure of US foreign policy -- but because of tactical errors made in attempting to implement a sound strategy.

There are other shortcomings in this book, too. Lerner's discussion and assessment of the loss of Pueblo's intelligence gear and publications is limited to five paragraphs. He fails to probe and examine the severity and consequences of the loss in the detail really required or offer any new assessments. The chapter devoted to an terribly out-of-place discussion of American culture in the 1960s - replete with its meandering references to the Beatles, Broadway plays, and Star Trek episodes - should have been excised to make room for an insightful analysis of the severity of the intelligence losses from the incident.