The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality

Rating:
Summary: A tad dry, but dispels the myths nonetheless
Review: I found The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality to be a good, detailed overview of the events that transpired in Britain from August-October, 1941.

What the book lacks is much in the way of personal details. The pilots who served in the RAF, and the challenge they faced, aren't covered in much detail. Rather, we're given statistics about how many were shot down during such and such a time and how many planes Britain was able to produce during the conflict.

The author, Richard Overy, makes it quite clear, however, that he's not attempting to tell the comprehensive story of the Battle. Rather, he simply wants to dispel the myths surrounding this battle. "The few" to whom Winston Churchill attributed so much national gratitude, were actually fairly evenly matched with their enemy, the Nazi Luftwaffe. Overy doesn't dispel the notion that the British defense of their homeland was any less valiant, but he does make certain to point out discrepancies between the reality and the mythical proportions that the Battle of Britain have acquired in the years since the Blitz.

In summary, if you're looking for a good, honest description of the Battle of Britain, this book will meet your needs. For a more detailed description of the events and people involved, you will have to find a more comprehensive book.

Rating:
Summary: The Rest of the Story !
Review: Movies, books and articles have narrated the Battle of Britain. Most limited their narrative to the
heroic efforts of the RAF pilots, crews and commanders. Richard Overy gives the 'rest of the
story' in this book providing insight into the total picture. He notes that for the British people
'The Battle' meant one thing, the Battle of Britain which was the epic contest between the British
and German air forces in the late summer and autumn of 1940.

Chapter 1 observes that during the 1930s, Britain envisioned Germany delivering an airborne 'knock-out blow' for which there was no defense. In response, between 1937 through 1939,millions were spent on an airborne defensive shield and an expanded Bomber Command if required for retaliation. The German strategy was to use air power in combined operations with the army to impose a decisive defeat of enemy ground forces. Britain was unprepared to meet this type of warfare. Therefore when France was attacked, Britain could supply little effective air support to aid the French. At this point, the British were not united. The author narrates the policy debates over whether to
appease or fight Germany. However, the fall of France and Dunkirk shocked the country and British morale was revived to fight on. Hitler, the author notes, regarded invasion as 'very
hazardous' and hoped for a political settlement. Hitler made a peace offer in a July 1940 speech which Britain promptly rejected in a radio address. Britain now faced the air power type of conflict it had been preparing for since the 1930s.

Chapter 2 evaluates the two forces noting that 'The military confrontation in the autumn of 1940 became a test of strength between two rival air forces.' The text notes both armies trained for the coming battle; but '....none of this mattered as long as the German air Force had not won mastery of the air over southern Britain.' Command structures are described noting that Herman Goering was both air minister and air force commander while the British had an Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair, with separate commanders for fighters and for bombers. To Sir Hugh Dowding, of Fighter Command, fell the task of creating an effective defense shield. The author writes 'Sinclair epitomized that British elite of dignified public servants so much despised and ridiculed in German propaganda. Goering, on the hand, was everything Sinclair was not.' The text notes that 'on 10 August 1940, The German single-engine fighters assigned to the battle over Britain was 1011, slightly fewer than Fighter Command' thus destroying an enduring myth of the few against the many. The book compares fighter production, performance and armament noting that early in the battle there was rough parity in fighter number, but in the last weeks the British had the edge. Another myth is the shortage of trained RAF fighter pilots. The number of RAF pilots increased by one third between June and August 1940. The Germans could cope with pilot shortages because of a lower loss rate. The author writes 'If Fighter command were the 'few', German pilots were fewer.' The British air defense system, set up to counter the enemy bombing offensive, is described and it was adjusted in the summer of 1940 to meet an invasion threat.

Coastal Command played a difficult, costly and critical role twice daily conducting reconnaissance of German controlled ports. Bomber Commands role was to wear down German resistance by
bombardment of vital objectives. The author notes that 'The one field of battle where British preparations proved at least equal to the task in 1940 was fighter defense and it was for that
reason alone that German air fleets concentrated on destroying Fighter Command' using fighter sweeps in a war of attrition. German daylight bombing of London began on 7 September when
350 bombers raided the east dock area and the text notes 'The air battles in the week between 7 September and 15 September were decisive in turning the tide of the battle. During that week the German Air force lost 298 aircraft. Fighter Command lost 120, against 99 enemy fighters.' Another myth that Richard Overy debunks is that Hitler never seriously planned an invasion,writing that 'There need be no doubt that under the right circumstances Hitler was serious about
invading Britain in 1940....' but that by the end of September Hitler concluded that air superiority had not been achieved and indefinitely postponed an invasion. Lacking daylight bombing success, the Germans shifted to night bombing thereby creating a problem as aircraft were very difficult to shoot down at night from the air or from the ground until new detection equipment was
developed. Overy states that though the Germans never formally adopted terror bombing, the tactics they employed caused widespread civilian casualties resulting in the death of 40,000 people during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz.

The Battle of Britain did not seriously weaken Germany and her allies, but the contest was not a draw. German air fleets did not gain air supremacy over southern Britain. The author observes
that 'In a great many respects, however, the two forces were remarkably matched. Both commanded a small group of committed, highly trained and courageous pilots, both forces responded with considerable tactical ingenuity to sudden changes of direction in the course of the battle; both exploited fighter aircraft at the cutting edge of aviation technology; both forces fought
the battle with operations commanders of real distinction.'

Finally, this was not a traditional battle in that it did not have a clear-cut beginning nor a defined ending. However, the author concludes that like Trafalgar, the Battle of Britain was critical to the British people in that an invasion scare subsided and the nation could now get on with the task of
winning the war.

Rating:
Summary: The Rest of the Story !
Review: Movies, books and articles have narrated the Battle of Britain. Most limited their narrative to the
heroic efforts of the RAF pilots, crews and commanders. Richard Overy gives the �rest of the
story� in this book providing insight into the total picture. He notes that for the British people
�The Battle� meant one thing, the Battle of Britain which was the epic contest between the British
and German air forces in the late summer and autumn of 1940.

Chapter 1 observes that during the 1930s, Britain envisioned Germany delivering an airborne �knock-out blow� for which there was no defense. In response, between 1937 through 1939,millions were spent on an airborne defensive shield and an expanded Bomber Command if required for retaliation. The German strategy was to use air power in combined operations with the army to impose a decisive defeat of enemy ground forces. Britain was unprepared to meet this type of warfare. Therefore when France was attacked, Britain could supply little effective air support to aid the French. At this point, the British were not united. The author narrates the policy debates over whether to
appease or fight Germany. However, the fall of France and Dunkirk shocked the country and British morale was revived to fight on. Hitler, the author notes, regarded invasion as �very
hazardous� and hoped for a political settlement. Hitler made a peace offer in a July 1940 speech which Britain promptly rejected in a radio address. Britain now faced the air power type of conflict it had been preparing for since the 1930s.

Chapter 2 evaluates the two forces noting that �The military confrontation in the autumn of 1940 became a test of strength between two rival air forces.� The text notes both armies trained for the coming battle; but �....none of this mattered as long as the German air Force had not won mastery of the air over southern Britain.� Command structures are described noting that Herman Goering was both air minister and air force commander while the British had an Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair, with separate commanders for fighters and for bombers. To Sir Hugh Dowding, of Fighter Command, fell the task of creating an effective defense shield. The author writes �Sinclair epitomized that British elite of dignified public servants so much despised and ridiculed in German propaganda. Goering, on the hand, was everything Sinclair was not.� The text notes that �on 10 August 1940, The German single-engine fighters assigned to the battle over Britain was 1011, slightly fewer than Fighter Command� thus destroying an enduring myth of the few against the many. The book compares fighter production, performance and armament noting that early in the battle there was rough parity in fighter number, but in the last weeks the British had the edge. Another myth is the shortage of trained RAF fighter pilots. The number of RAF pilots increased by one third between June and August 1940. The Germans could cope with pilot shortages because of a lower loss rate. The author writes �If Fighter command were the �few�, German pilots were fewer.� The British air defense system, set up to counter the enemy bombing offensive, is described and it was adjusted in the summer of 1940 to meet an invasion threat.

Coastal Command played a difficult, costly and critical role twice daily conducting reconnaissance of German controlled ports. Bomber Commands role was to wear down German resistance by
bombardment of vital objectives. The author notes that �The one field of battle where British preparations proved at least equal to the task in 1940 was fighter defense and it was for that
reason alone that German air fleets concentrated on destroying Fighter Command� using fighter sweeps in a war of attrition. German daylight bombing of London began on 7 September when
350 bombers raided the east dock area and the text notes �The air battles in the week between 7 September and 15 September were decisive in turning the tide of the battle. During that week the German Air force lost 298 aircraft. Fighter Command lost 120, against 99 enemy fighters.� Another myth that Richard Overy debunks is that Hitler never seriously planned an invasion,writing that �There need be no doubt that under the right circumstances Hitler was serious about
invading Britain in 1940....� but that by the end of September Hitler concluded that air superiority had not been achieved and indefinitely postponed an invasion. Lacking daylight bombing success, the Germans shifted to night bombing thereby creating a problem as aircraft were very difficult to shoot down at night from the air or from the ground until new detection equipment was
developed. Overy states that though the Germans never formally adopted terror bombing, the tactics they employed caused widespread civilian casualties resulting in the death of 40,000 people during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz.

The Battle of Britain did not seriously weaken Germany and her allies, but the contest was not a draw. German air fleets did not gain air supremacy over southern Britain. The author observes
that �In a great many respects, however, the two forces were remarkably matched. Both commanded a small group of committed, highly trained and courageous pilots, both forces responded with considerable tactical ingenuity to sudden changes of direction in the course of the battle; both exploited fighter aircraft at the cutting edge of aviation technology; both forces fought
the battle with operations commanders of real distinction.�

Finally, this was not a traditional battle in that it did not have a clear-cut beginning nor a defined ending. However, the author concludes that like Trafalgar, the Battle of Britain was critical to the British people in that an invasion scare subsided and the nation could now get on with the task of
winning the war.

Rating:
Summary: Terrific Exploration of The History of TheBattle Of Britain
Review: One of the most controversial and yet simply disarming facts about the short-lived but furiously fought air battle over the skies of England in the summer and early fall of 1940 , according to famed British historian Richard Overy in this diverting and captivating study of the now-fabled Battle Of Britain is that it was in reality not so much the marvelous and unequivocal victory as it is now regarded much as it was a stalemate. A wondrous, unlikely and fateful stalemate, to be sure, one on which the future of the so-called free world hung in the balance, but in reality it was also much more a war of perceptions and brinksmanship than has been commonly acknowledged or understood.

In matter of fact, according to Overy, the air battle over Britain was never likely to have been followed by a Nazi invasion force, for the German forces lacked all the necessary marine transportation and logistics support to prosecute such an attempt to invade Britain. As William Shirer pointed out long ago in "The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich", Hitler never had much stomach for a cross-channel invasion, and the German General Staff never ordered all the necessary shipbuilding needed to mount a serious invasion attempt. In addition, the forces of the British realm were never so badly outnumbered as was previously believed, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) in fact had superior fighters and better logistics support that did their German opponents, not to mention the limited battle time for German pilots who had to ferry themselves back over the channel after doing battle, which provided the RAF with a key tactical advantage.

Yet Overy's purpose here is clearly not intended to denigrate or downplay the outright heroism, courage, and sacrifice of the RAF in its service to the English people over the skies of Britain that fateful year, but rather to celebrate the actual, fact-based history of those fateful events. Here in the Battle of Britain we find the first signs that the famed "unstoppable" Nazi juggernaut was not infallible, that it could be met on its own terms and defeated, plane by plane, raid by raid, and campaign by campaign, and denied its aggressive objectives by a determined and resourceful opponent. Also, by denying the Nazis the complete victory over its western European rivals it desired, the British forced Hitler into making a fatal blunder by opening up a two-front war with the invasion of the Soviet Union the next spring, forcing him to leave millions of troops along the western wall he could have otherwise used against the Russians in Operation Barbarossa.

Also, as Overy illustrates so convincingly, the British actions in the skies over their homeland convinced many in the American Government to take up Britain's cause, and this too had fateful consequences for the eventual outcome of the war. Finally, he argues that the consequences of turning back the attempts by the Nazis to gain air superiority over the skies of Britain galvanized and energized the British people with a new sense of vigor and purpose, and this was tremendously important in helping them to stay the course during a very difficult and trying period of time following the end of the battle of Britain itself. This is a great addition to the volumes of material already available on the Battle Of Britain, and presents the facts in a new and interesting way that makes it an important work which acts to clarify and modify what we already know about the events of 1940. I recommend this book, and hope you enjoy it as much as I did.

Rating:
Summary: Short and to the point: well done.
Review: This book is not a dramatic retelling of the battle. It is concerned with what went on behind the scenes. It discusses the reasoning of the German commanders concerning an invasion of England and their plans behind the air attack. It's pretty enlightening to see how each side was pretty mistaken about what the other side thought or would do. There are quite a bit of authorities quoted for the author's premises. The newest thing to me was the fact that not all Brits pulled together about resisting the German aggression. The documentation about that reads about like the way people do now in both Britain and the U.S. This is an inside look at the entire campaign of the Battle of Britain and the events leading up to it. There are some things that were new to me and I think would be new to most readers. It's a good writing job and a good research job.

Rating:
Summary: Concise, Informative, and Overpriced
Review: This is an interesting essay by Richard Overy, the author of a number of excellent books on WWII, notably the outstanding Why the Allies Won. In this book, Overy provides an insightful analysis of The Battle of Britain. Overy provides a dispassionate view of the Battle of Britain, dispelling many of the common myths surrounding the Battle of Britain and also rebutting recent revisionist attempts to downgrade the importance of the Battle of Britain. Overy places the Battle of Britain in the context of the entire war and pre-war policy choices made by the British government.

Potential readers should be aware that is an analytical essay, not a narrative. This book presupposes familiarity with the history of WWII. This book is also very short, some 135 pages with relatively large font and wide line spacing. While very good, this brief book is not worth the retail price. The introduction mentions that this book was prepared for Penguin books in Britain. I suspect it was issued as a short paperback and not designed as a conventional monograph. This pricy hardcover version is an attempt to take advantage of readers.

Rating:
Summary: Short, sweet and to the point.
Review: This little -- less than 140 pages of large type and wide margins -- book is less 'revisionist' than its subtitle might lead you to expect. Based largely, it seems, on reports and statistics from government archives, Overy in fact deflates many of the recent revisionist interpretations of the Battle of Britain. At the same time, arguing as Thomas Fleming does in 'The New Dealers' War' that 'memory is not history,' Overy also challenges the rose-colored conventional wisdom that has accreted around the Battle in the years and decades since.

The Battle of Britain, Overy argues, had no clear beginning and no clear end; the dates chosen by the government seem purely arbitrary. By and large, neither the British public nor the British leadership was aware they were fighting an epic battle while it was going on. There was no clear winner, and it was not in any sense a turning point in the war. '[T]he Battle of Britain did not seriously weaken Germany and her allies, nor did it much reduce the scale of the threat facing Britain (and the Commonwealth) in 1940/41 ...' (p. 113). At the same time, however, the battle was not a draw: the failure of the German air force to knock out the RAF or terror-bomb the population into capitulation directly deterred or prevented Hitler's planned Operation Sealion, the invasion of southern England.

Countering the 'revisionists,' Overy argues that Sealion was a real strategic plan, not a diversion to cover for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Similarly, he shows that the Nazi shift from targeting RAF bases and personnel to deliberate bombing of civilian targets was not Hitler's vengeance-crazed demand following the Allied bombing of Berlin, but was actually part of the Sealion strategic plan, and happened well *before* bombs fell on the German capital.

One of the most interesting aspects of this study is Overy's discussion, not only of the myths that have grown up since the end of the Battle of Britain, but also the myths that both sides were laboring under while the Battle was being fought. The RAF, for example, consistently overestimated -- in a huge way -- the number of enemy pilots and planes they faced (contrary to the modern myth of 'the Few,' RAF fighter pilots outnumbered their German counterparts throughout the Battle). For their part, German planners grossly exaggerated the RAF's losses of planes and pilots, and overestimated the damage they had caused to Britain's airfields and industrial production.

In all, Overy rejects modern arguments that Britain would have been better off had she negotiated peace before the Battle and the Blitz began. Overy's short essay demonstrates that Churchill was right when he stated that although it might not always have been clear what Britain was fighting for, if the British were to stop fighting, they (and the world) would soon find out.