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Rating: 
Summary: A must
Review: Having read Kolin I hoped Simon Millar's next book would be on the same lines. I was not to be diappointed, Rossbach and Leuthen will give the entusiastic military historian a clear and accurate insight into the two battles. I have heard that too little time is given to Rossbach, however I think that there is enough for a battle that was not as big or important as Leuthen which is where Simon Millar's full attention is directed. I found the orders of battle for both armies to be very informative. I do feel that another 3-D map on Leuthen would not have gone amiss. However as per usual there were a large amount of photos of the battlefield that helped me to understand its layout. I was rather annoyed when one of the uniform plates of the Franco-Bavarian army was not shown in colour, but that has more to do with Osprey rather than Simon Millar.
I have also read certain people talking rather badly about the book and rewriting and even correcting it in their reviews, thinking they know better. Maybe they should write their own version instead of picking apart another one in this way.
Rating:
Summary: A must
Review: I was hoping that Simon Millar's latest Osprey Campaign series title, Rossbach & Leuthen 1757, would be as good as his previous title, Kolin 1757. Alas, it is not. Whereas Kolin 1757 offered incisive military analysis of why Frederick the Great suffered his first defeat, Rossbach & Leuthen 1757 has much less to offer. Osprey Campaign titles are intended to be stand-alone volumes, but Millar has short-changed the readers of this volume in regards to background material, analysis and maps. The author's writing style is also far more plodding and passionless than in his previous volume; for example, Leuthen is presented as a bland recitation of units marching and firing, rather than a desperate winter battle (was there not a single eyewitness account that might have been incorporated?). Rossbach & Leuthen 1757 begins with a short section on the origins of the campaign, a chronology and a section on opposing commanders. Unfortunately, there is no section on opposing plans as is normal in the Campaign series and the section on opposing armies is woefully inadequate. The author states that, "I am not going to discuss the uniforms, equipment or typical tactical formations of the combatants at Rossbach and Leuthen" since these subjects are detailed in various Osprey Men-at-Arms titles (11 other volumes to be exact). Instead, the author offers brief blurbs on the Prussian Guard, the Imperial Army, and Frederick's oblique order. Frankly, this was the first time that I ever felt cheated by an Osprey Campaign series title. The author partly redresses these omissions with two detailed order of battle tables for both battles. It is also highly questionable whether two battles separated by a month and 150 miles can be efficiently packed into the thin space of an Osprey title. Indeed, the campaign narrative appears to suffer from trying to cover too much; the author spends only 17 pages on the Rossbach campaign and 47 on Leuthen. The volume includes three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps (one on Rossbach, two on Leuthen) and only four 2-D maps (Invasion of Hanover & Prussia, the road to Rossbach, the campaign in Silesia, the flank march at Leuthen). At least the three battle scenes included are good: the French and Prussian firing lines at Rossbach, the initial Prussian attack at Leuthen and Driesen's cavalry charge at Leuthen. The bibliography is also a bit disappointing since 50% of the sources listed are either Christopher Duffy's various titles (which are good but tend to recycle the same information) or Osprey Men-at-Arms titles. The crux of both these battles comes down to Frederick's favorite tactic, the oblique attack. Unfortunately, the author fails to mention that this tactic required an excellent tactical picture of the enemy's disposition, convenient screening terrain and a fairly incompetent enemy commander; when Frederick held these advantages, the tactic worked. The author has little to say about the Battle of Rossbach. The French and Imperial forces were unprepared for mobile warfare and attempted a lethargic effort to flank Frederick's smaller army, but which blundered directly into the Prussian "kill sac." Millar blames the Austrian defeat at Leuthen primarily on faulty leadership, noting that, "once again the direction of the Austrian forces in the field would be decided by dynastic interests and pride, rather than ability." Certainly one major factor in the Austrian defeat was the premature commitment of virtually their entire reserve force to the wrong flank, in response to Prussian feints. Commitment of the reserves when the enemy's intentions are not yet clear is certainly an egregious error, but it doesn't suffice as the sole reason for the Austrian defeat. Other factors include the early defeat of the Austrian cavalry covering force, the low quality of the Imperial German troops that caught the brunt of the initial Prussian attack, the sluggish tactical response of the Austrian commanders and the collapse of Austrian morale. However, Napoleon's dictum that in war the morale is to the material as three is to one must surely have derived from his study of both these battles (Napoleon was much enamored of Leuthen), since Frederick was badly out-numbered in both battles but still won handily. Frederick's tactics were successful in both battles because he was able to disrupt his enemy's deployment (defensively at Rossbach and offensively at Leuthen) and this knocked his foes off-balance, but these same methods were much less effective against foes like the Russians who simply stood their ground even if flanked. One could say that Frederick's tactics were meant to take advantage of the faint-of-heart. Nor was Frederick particularly effective at exploiting his victories and pursuing a defeated enemy to destruction, since his style was geared toward highly centralized war making. The author also fails to mention that Rossbach and Leuthen, while victories, did not lead to any long-term advantages for encircled Prussia.
Rating: 
Summary: A Cold Disappointment
Review: I was hoping that Simon Millar's latest Osprey Campaign series title, Rossbach & Leuthen 1757, would be as good as his previous title, Kolin 1757. Alas, it is not. Whereas Kolin 1757 offered incisive military analysis of why Frederick the Great suffered his first defeat, Rossbach & Leuthen 1757 has much less to offer. Osprey Campaign titles are intended to be stand-alone volumes, but Millar has short-changed the readers of this volume in regards to background material, analysis and maps. The author's writing style is also far more plodding and passionless than in his previous volume; for example, Leuthen is presented as a bland recitation of units marching and firing, rather than a desperate winter battle (was there not a single eyewitness account that might have been incorporated?). Rossbach & Leuthen 1757 begins with a short section on the origins of the campaign, a chronology and a section on opposing commanders. Unfortunately, there is no section on opposing plans as is normal in the Campaign series and the section on opposing armies is woefully inadequate. The author states that, "I am not going to discuss the uniforms, equipment or typical tactical formations of the combatants at Rossbach and Leuthen" since these subjects are detailed in various Osprey Men-at-Arms titles (11 other volumes to be exact). Instead, the author offers brief blurbs on the Prussian Guard, the Imperial Army, and Frederick's oblique order. Frankly, this was the first time that I ever felt cheated by an Osprey Campaign series title. The author partly redresses these omissions with two detailed order of battle tables for both battles. It is also highly questionable whether two battles separated by a month and 150 miles can be efficiently packed into the thin space of an Osprey title. Indeed, the campaign narrative appears to suffer from trying to cover too much; the author spends only 17 pages on the Rossbach campaign and 47 on Leuthen. The volume includes three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps (one on Rossbach, two on Leuthen) and only four 2-D maps (Invasion of Hanover & Prussia, the road to Rossbach, the campaign in Silesia, the flank march at Leuthen). At least the three battle scenes included are good: the French and Prussian firing lines at Rossbach, the initial Prussian attack at Leuthen and Driesen's cavalry charge at Leuthen. The bibliography is also a bit disappointing since 50% of the sources listed are either Christopher Duffy's various titles (which are good but tend to recycle the same information) or Osprey Men-at-Arms titles. The crux of both these battles comes down to Frederick's favorite tactic, the oblique attack. Unfortunately, the author fails to mention that this tactic required an excellent tactical picture of the enemy's disposition, convenient screening terrain and a fairly incompetent enemy commander; when Frederick held these advantages, the tactic worked. The author has little to say about the Battle of Rossbach. The French and Imperial forces were unprepared for mobile warfare and attempted a lethargic effort to flank Frederick's smaller army, but which blundered directly into the Prussian "kill sac." Millar blames the Austrian defeat at Leuthen primarily on faulty leadership, noting that, "once again the direction of the Austrian forces in the field would be decided by dynastic interests and pride, rather than ability." Certainly one major factor in the Austrian defeat was the premature commitment of virtually their entire reserve force to the wrong flank, in response to Prussian feints. Commitment of the reserves when the enemy's intentions are not yet clear is certainly an egregious error, but it doesn't suffice as the sole reason for the Austrian defeat. Other factors include the early defeat of the Austrian cavalry covering force, the low quality of the Imperial German troops that caught the brunt of the initial Prussian attack, the sluggish tactical response of the Austrian commanders and the collapse of Austrian morale. However, Napoleon's dictum that in war the morale is to the material as three is to one must surely have derived from his study of both these battles (Napoleon was much enamored of Leuthen), since Frederick was badly out-numbered in both battles but still won handily. Frederick's tactics were successful in both battles because he was able to disrupt his enemy's deployment (defensively at Rossbach and offensively at Leuthen) and this knocked his foes off-balance, but these same methods were much less effective against foes like the Russians who simply stood their ground even if flanked. One could say that Frederick's tactics were meant to take advantage of the faint-of-heart. Nor was Frederick particularly effective at exploiting his victories and pursuing a defeated enemy to destruction, since his style was geared toward highly centralized war making. The author also fails to mention that Rossbach and Leuthen, while victories, did not lead to any long-term advantages for encircled Prussia.
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