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Rating: 
Summary: Once More, Over the Same Ground
Review: In 1992, Osprey's Campaign Series #14 entitled Zulu War 1879 by Ian Knight and Ian Castle, covered the dramatic Battle of Isandlwana. Ten years later, Ian Knight thought it would be a good idea to cover virtually the same ground in the new Osprey Campaign Series #111, entitled Isandlwana 1879. Granted, the focus is narrower than in the earlier volume and the graphic quality of the maps is superior, but this book essentially covers much of the same ground that the first book did. While the original title only spent 30% of its length on the Battle of Isandlwana, this new volume spends 55%. Overall, Isandlwana 1879 is a decent if not very original summary of that British military disaster, but it certainly lacks any real value-added quality over the original. Isandlwana 1879 begins in standard Osprey format with the usual short sections on origins of the conflict, a campaign chronology, opposing commanders, opposing armies, and opening moves. Readers will certainly be impressed with the author's in-depth knowledge of Zulu leaders and units, but might have benefited from a short pronunciation guide on how to handle names like "iNgobamakhosi" or "uKhandempemvu" or just what the heck these names mean. At times, Knight seems to have the zealot's assumption that everyone in conversant in African tribal terms and hence, further clarification is unnecessary. Overall, these sections get the job done but in somewhat boilerplate fashion, as if Knight merely dusted off material from his other books. Readers familiar with the classic, "Washing of the Spears," will doubt that Knight is making a real effort to be incisive. The volume includes six 2-D maps (the war in Zululand, the attack on Sihayo's Homestead, Isandlwana Camp, initial dispositions, the British collapse, Chelmsford's movements and the British withdrawals), three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (British movements around Isandlwana, climax of the battle and the British collapse) and three battle scenes (Durnford's auxiliaries stumble on the Zulu army, the British collapse and the final stages of the battle). Knight notes that none of the Zulu commanders had any experience fighting British regulars and that, "a practical ignorance of the destructive potential of the modern weapons they [the British] possessed, had led to a dangerous over-confidence at the middle and lower levels of command." On the other hand, the British commander Lord Chelmsford was influenced by preconceptions gained in previous frontier warfare in Africa. Knight notes that in Chelmsford's earlier campaign against the Xhosa tribe that he, "faced only an elusive foe who showed a marked reluctance to engage in decisive combat." This sounds remarkably like the preconceived tactical mindset that influenced Custer three years earlier at the Little Bighorn. Yet if both sides were over-confident and didn't appreciate their enemy's strengths - as Knight claims - why was Isandlwana such a lop-sided battle? The battle narrative comprises the bulk of the book and it also gets the job done, but with much effort to address the reasons for the British defeat. While Knight makes it clear that British pre-battle reconnaissance was a bit sloppy and based on too many false assumptions, he fails to address issues like faulty British tactical dispositions or ammunition resupply problems. Based on what happened elsewhere in the war, it is clear that the Zulus could not defeat British regulars who were defending in square or behind obstacles. The only enlightenment that Knight adds about the battle concerns the final moments of the British infantry, which he deduced from participation in an archaeological dig on the battlefield in the 1990s. Knight demonstrates that clumps of British infantry survived the overrunning of the camp and slowly tried to fight their way back to the border, but were overwhelmed enroute. Modern military professionals could use this volume as an excellent starting point for a study of regular forces fighting less well-developed opponents, and might see parallels with contemporary operations in Afghanistan or Somalia. It is interesting to discern how over 1,300 British troops - including the battle-experienced 1st Battalion/24th Infantry - could be annihilated in the space of four hours by an opponent that was regarded as hopelessly inferior. The root cause of the defeat at Isandlwana was the same as at the Little Bighorn in 1876 or Mogadishu in 1993 (or Bunker Hill in 1775): professional soldier arrogance. While the Zulus were ultimately defeated - at much greater cost in resources and time than the British had bargained for - they did demonstrate that not all indigenous military forces merely sit around waiting to be picked off like clay pigeons by superior military technology.
Rating:
Summary: Once More, Over the Same Ground
Review: In 1992, Osprey's Campaign Series #14 entitled Zulu War 1879 by Ian Knight and Ian Castle, covered the dramatic Battle of Isandlwana. Ten years later, Ian Knight thought it would be a good idea to cover virtually the same ground in the new Osprey Campaign Series #111, entitled Isandlwana 1879. Granted, the focus is narrower than in the earlier volume and the graphic quality of the maps is superior, but this book essentially covers much of the same ground that the first book did. While the original title only spent 30% of its length on the Battle of Isandlwana, this new volume spends 55%. Overall, Isandlwana 1879 is a decent if not very original summary of that British military disaster, but it certainly lacks any real value-added quality over the original. Isandlwana 1879 begins in standard Osprey format with the usual short sections on origins of the conflict, a campaign chronology, opposing commanders, opposing armies, and opening moves. Readers will certainly be impressed with the author's in-depth knowledge of Zulu leaders and units, but might have benefited from a short pronunciation guide on how to handle names like "iNgobamakhosi" or "uKhandempemvu" or just what the heck these names mean. At times, Knight seems to have the zealot's assumption that everyone in conversant in African tribal terms and hence, further clarification is unnecessary. Overall, these sections get the job done but in somewhat boilerplate fashion, as if Knight merely dusted off material from his other books. Readers familiar with the classic, "Washing of the Spears," will doubt that Knight is making a real effort to be incisive. The volume includes six 2-D maps (the war in Zululand, the attack on Sihayo's Homestead, Isandlwana Camp, initial dispositions, the British collapse, Chelmsford's movements and the British withdrawals), three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (British movements around Isandlwana, climax of the battle and the British collapse) and three battle scenes (Durnford's auxiliaries stumble on the Zulu army, the British collapse and the final stages of the battle). Knight notes that none of the Zulu commanders had any experience fighting British regulars and that, "a practical ignorance of the destructive potential of the modern weapons they [the British] possessed, had led to a dangerous over-confidence at the middle and lower levels of command." On the other hand, the British commander Lord Chelmsford was influenced by preconceptions gained in previous frontier warfare in Africa. Knight notes that in Chelmsford's earlier campaign against the Xhosa tribe that he, "faced only an elusive foe who showed a marked reluctance to engage in decisive combat." This sounds remarkably like the preconceived tactical mindset that influenced Custer three years earlier at the Little Bighorn. Yet if both sides were over-confident and didn't appreciate their enemy's strengths - as Knight claims - why was Isandlwana such a lop-sided battle? The battle narrative comprises the bulk of the book and it also gets the job done, but with much effort to address the reasons for the British defeat. While Knight makes it clear that British pre-battle reconnaissance was a bit sloppy and based on too many false assumptions, he fails to address issues like faulty British tactical dispositions or ammunition resupply problems. Based on what happened elsewhere in the war, it is clear that the Zulus could not defeat British regulars who were defending in square or behind obstacles. The only enlightenment that Knight adds about the battle concerns the final moments of the British infantry, which he deduced from participation in an archaeological dig on the battlefield in the 1990s. Knight demonstrates that clumps of British infantry survived the overrunning of the camp and slowly tried to fight their way back to the border, but were overwhelmed enroute. Modern military professionals could use this volume as an excellent starting point for a study of regular forces fighting less well-developed opponents, and might see parallels with contemporary operations in Afghanistan or Somalia. It is interesting to discern how over 1,300 British troops - including the battle-experienced 1st Battalion/24th Infantry - could be annihilated in the space of four hours by an opponent that was regarded as hopelessly inferior. The root cause of the defeat at Isandlwana was the same as at the Little Bighorn in 1876 or Mogadishu in 1993 (or Bunker Hill in 1775): professional soldier arrogance. While the Zulus were ultimately defeated - at much greater cost in resources and time than the British had bargained for - they did demonstrate that not all indigenous military forces merely sit around waiting to be picked off like clay pigeons by superior military technology.
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