History and Strategy

Rating:
Summary: Writing History in New Directions
Review: _History and Strategy_ is a rare work for a historian. This is because Marc Trachtenberg takes into account major arguments from the political science field of international relations. He addresses questions like crisis stability, nuclear massive retaliation, and the effect of offensive doctrines on the outbreak of war. He does so in several somewhat distinct chapters, including ones on the outbreak of the First World War, American nuclear strategy, the Berlin Crisis, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Although hardly a revisionist work, Trachtenberg challenges certain popular arguments and addresses certain important questions in the international relations literature. For example, he shows that offensive doctrines cannot be considered the primary factor behind the outbreak of the First World War. As another example, he explains why Eisenhower never used America's great nuclear superiority against the USSR in the 1950s.

_History and Strategy_ is a very strong work that demonstrates how historical analysis can be used very effectively in the field of international relations. By doing so, he gives history greater purpose while providing the historical substance so often lacking in international relations texts.

Rating:
Summary: Writing History in New Directions
Review: _History and Strategy_ is a rare work for a historian. This is because Marc Trachtenberg takes into account major arguments from the political science field of international relations. He addresses questions like crisis stability, nuclear massive retaliation, and the effect of offensive doctrines on the outbreak of war. He does so in several somewhat distinct chapters, including ones on the outbreak of the First World War, American nuclear strategy, the Berlin Crisis, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Although hardly a revisionist work, Trachtenberg challenges certain popular arguments and addresses certain important questions in the international relations literature. For example, he shows that offensive doctrines cannot be considered the primary factor behind the outbreak of the First World War. As another example, he explains why Eisenhower never used America's great nuclear superiority against the USSR in the 1950s.

_History and Strategy_ is a very strong work that demonstrates how historical analysis can be used very effectively in the field of international relations. By doing so, he gives history greater purpose while providing the historical substance so often lacking in international relations texts.