<< 1 >>
Rating: 
Summary: Very good!
Review: This is a tightly organized book covering primarily the Eastern Roman Empire during the years indicated in the title of the book and using the standard format for this series. I'm quite familiar with this period, and found nothing essential left out--an amazing amount of material is covered in a minimum number of pages in a very readable manner. As indicated, the main focus of the book is the eastern empire, but the western empire is covered as relevant though the German successor kingdoms are not covered in detail. Highly recommended if you have any interest in this period at all.
Rating: 
Summary: Ten Pounds of Data poured into a Five Pound Bag
Review: Trying to summarize four very turbulent centuries that witnessed the decline of one of history's greatest empires into a short 90-page volume is a daunting task. In Osprey's Essential Histories #21, Rome at War Ad 293 - 696, British Professor Michael Whitby tries to compress a huge amount of material into this thin volume with mixed results. On the one hand, the author succeeds in summarizing most - but not all - of the main points about Imperial Rome's decline, yet the summarization is forced to exclude so much pertinent data that it reduces the overall value of this volume. Ultimately, even the novice Roman reader will be forced to consult other sources; it would have been better for Professor Whitby to cover two centuries in greater detail than four centuries in little more than outline format. Professor Whitby begins Rome at War AD 293-696 with a short 3-page introduction; the author's underlying thesis is unclear although it appears to be an opposition to the "decline and fall" model that suggests that the disintegration of Roman hegemony was inevitable. Instead, Whitby suggests that Roman decline was not inevitable - at times it was even reversed - and that a complex variety of factors "undermined the fiscal and military structures which permitted the imperial machine to function". The section on background to war addresses Roman frontiers, taxes and trade. The section on opposing sides, which discusses the late Roman army, the Persians and the various Barbarian enemies, is quite good for its size. The main narrative is obviously constrained, having to cover four centuries in only 40 pages. The eleven maps supporting the text are: Roman provinces in AD 200-700; movement of Goths across Europe; Eastern frontier in the 4th Century; the battles of Argentoratum and Adrianople; Hunnic raids; Disintegration of the West; Eastern campaigns in the 6th Century; invasion of the Balkans in the 6th Century; Islamic conquests; and the Post-Roman West. A major disappointment is that there are no maps depicting the campaigns of Belisarius or Narses in the West, which were critical in salvaging something from the wreckage of the Western Empire. The 2-page bibliography is also decent, although hardly comprehensive. Although the author disputes the inevitability of Roman decline, he fails to outline the main theories about the "decline and fall" model, such as the "barbarization" of the Roman army. While the author notes correctly that the Romans were able to "hold their own, partly through superior organization and training, partly through strong defenses, but above all by the strategy of trying to avoid simultaneous conflict on different frontiers," he never fully explains why the Romans lost these advantages over time. To be sure, the rise of very large Barbarian federations, such as the Huns and the Avars, made it difficult for the Romans to use their preferred "divide and conquer" tactics. However, the Romans had suffered far worse defeats at the hands of the Carthaginians and various Germanic tribes and recovered - Rome probably had greater ability to recover from disaster than any other state in history. Also, while the author makes clear that various factors combined to erode the Roman tax base and urban areas upon which Imperial power rested, it is not really clear how great this erosion was (the author should have used Susan Mattern's Rome and the Enemy, which discussed Roman budgets and its impact on the military at length). The author spends a fair amount of time discussing the role of Christianity in the late Empire, and it is interesting to see that Christianity was adopted by Roman leaders because they viewed it as useful to the state. Certainly, Whitby's assessment about whether or not Christianity hurt the empire (he suggests it may have helped revive it) does not follow the thesis set by Edward Gibbon more than two centuries ago. However, for readers who seek greater detail about the military or even political aspects of the decline of the West Roman Empire, this volume fairs to deliver. It is particularly disappointing to see how little detail there is on Belisarius, one of the great captains in military history, major battles like Chalons, or major political figures like Justinian. Although Professor Whitby probably gets the broad nuances of Rome's decline in these pages, he lacked the space to fully develop these themes into a coherent narrative that explains why this decline occurred.
Rating:
Summary: Ten Pounds of Data poured into a Five Pound Bag
Review: Trying to summarize four very turbulent centuries that witnessed the decline of one of history's greatest empires into a short 90-page volume is a daunting task. In Osprey's Essential Histories #21, Rome at War Ad 293 - 696, British Professor Michael Whitby tries to compress a huge amount of material into this thin volume with mixed results. On the one hand, the author succeeds in summarizing most - but not all - of the main points about Imperial Rome's decline, yet the summarization is forced to exclude so much pertinent data that it reduces the overall value of this volume. Ultimately, even the novice Roman reader will be forced to consult other sources; it would have been better for Professor Whitby to cover two centuries in greater detail than four centuries in little more than outline format. Professor Whitby begins Rome at War AD 293-696 with a short 3-page introduction; the author's underlying thesis is unclear although it appears to be an opposition to the "decline and fall" model that suggests that the disintegration of Roman hegemony was inevitable. Instead, Whitby suggests that Roman decline was not inevitable - at times it was even reversed - and that a complex variety of factors "undermined the fiscal and military structures which permitted the imperial machine to function". The section on background to war addresses Roman frontiers, taxes and trade. The section on opposing sides, which discusses the late Roman army, the Persians and the various Barbarian enemies, is quite good for its size. The main narrative is obviously constrained, having to cover four centuries in only 40 pages. The eleven maps supporting the text are: Roman provinces in AD 200-700; movement of Goths across Europe; Eastern frontier in the 4th Century; the battles of Argentoratum and Adrianople; Hunnic raids; Disintegration of the West; Eastern campaigns in the 6th Century; invasion of the Balkans in the 6th Century; Islamic conquests; and the Post-Roman West. A major disappointment is that there are no maps depicting the campaigns of Belisarius or Narses in the West, which were critical in salvaging something from the wreckage of the Western Empire. The 2-page bibliography is also decent, although hardly comprehensive. Although the author disputes the inevitability of Roman decline, he fails to outline the main theories about the "decline and fall" model, such as the "barbarization" of the Roman army. While the author notes correctly that the Romans were able to "hold their own, partly through superior organization and training, partly through strong defenses, but above all by the strategy of trying to avoid simultaneous conflict on different frontiers," he never fully explains why the Romans lost these advantages over time. To be sure, the rise of very large Barbarian federations, such as the Huns and the Avars, made it difficult for the Romans to use their preferred "divide and conquer" tactics. However, the Romans had suffered far worse defeats at the hands of the Carthaginians and various Germanic tribes and recovered - Rome probably had greater ability to recover from disaster than any other state in history. Also, while the author makes clear that various factors combined to erode the Roman tax base and urban areas upon which Imperial power rested, it is not really clear how great this erosion was (the author should have used Susan Mattern's Rome and the Enemy, which discussed Roman budgets and its impact on the military at length). The author spends a fair amount of time discussing the role of Christianity in the late Empire, and it is interesting to see that Christianity was adopted by Roman leaders because they viewed it as useful to the state. Certainly, Whitby's assessment about whether or not Christianity hurt the empire (he suggests it may have helped revive it) does not follow the thesis set by Edward Gibbon more than two centuries ago. However, for readers who seek greater detail about the military or even political aspects of the decline of the West Roman Empire, this volume fairs to deliver. It is particularly disappointing to see how little detail there is on Belisarius, one of the great captains in military history, major battles like Chalons, or major political figures like Justinian. Although Professor Whitby probably gets the broad nuances of Rome's decline in these pages, he lacked the space to fully develop these themes into a coherent narrative that explains why this decline occurred.
<< 1 >>
|
