Rating: 
Summary: Use with extreme caution
Review: Anyone approaching this book and the topic in general should be aware that there is a sharp division in opinion on the subject. As with anything critical of the U.S. government, and particularly its conduct during World War II, the debate is emotionally charged.Readers should be aware of the background of Lowman's involvement in this debate. In the early 1980s, the US Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians conducted an inquiry into the causes and consequences of the evacuation of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast in 1942. As part of this process, hearings were held amidst significant publicity in several cities, particularly on the West Coast and in Hawaii. By 1983, the CWRIC had finished its investigation and published a historical summary and recommendations for government action, including financial redress, in Personal Justice Denied. Later in 1983, David Lowman and others published articles in a variety of newspapers attacking the CWRIC and its conclusions for having not considered intelligence gathered through the MAGIC program. While it is true that the CWRIC did not consider MAGIC in its investigation, they did hear testimony from a variety of officials of the period, including John McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War most directly concerned with the issue. McCloy had access to at least the intelligence resulting from MAGIC but chose not to mention it in his testimony. Lowman also did not avail himself of the opportunity to testify at the Honolulu CWRIC hearings. As the Publisher's Weekly review notes, this work suffers from a loss of focus. There are other and better sources on the MAGIC program as a whole. And the attack on redress and compensation is tedious at best. Lowman's narrative style is grating at times and the book could have been better edited. The primary difficulty with the work is that the source material does not support Lowman's central thesis. In particular, none of the officials involved in the decision to evacuate cited MAGIC as a source of intelligence that influenced them, even in classified documents where such mention would have been allowable. Even the President does not appear to have relied on information from MAGIC but instead upon his own understanding of the situation, preconceptions and biased information emanating from the Pacific Coast. Where Lowman does refer to material directly from the MAGIC decryptions, he either misquotes, misrepresents or misinterprets what was written. In particular, he implies that information on armaments and industrial production were gathered through espionage, when in fact that precise information had been gleaned from newspaper stories. In general, Lowman's claims are refuted in John Herzig's "Japanese Americans and MAGIC," Amerasia Journal 11:2 (1984). A more recent discussion of this subject can be found in Greg Robinson's "By Order of the President," Harvard University Press, 2001. ISBN: 0674006399.
Rating: 
Summary: Great Book!
Review: First of all, Ron Takaki's material isn't based on historical evidence. It's based on his pro-reparations stance and the headway the reparations movement has made in disinforming the American people on this history.... Interned Japanese-Americans were not allowed to register for the draft. Relocated Japanese-Americans were allowed to register becuase the government from the beginning was aware that not all Japanese-Americans were disloyal. As Col. Karl Bendetsen stated in his 1972 interview, long before this event was politicized.... "I think I should introduce at this point for the first time some reference to the establishment of the famous regimental combat team of Japanese-Americans. This idea was born during discussions which I had initiated and held with Mr. McCloy, and he in turn with General Marshall long before I left for England. I had a very deep conviction that the Army should make use of the opportunity to find individuals who wished to give a good account of themselves not only as interpreters for the forces in the Pacific. This was already underway. I was convinced however that an opportunity should be extended to volunteers among the Japanese-American evacuees (the Nisei), to join one of more organized combat units to take part in the campaign in Europe. HESS: Did that plan meet very much opposition initially? BENDETSEN: No, I do not believe that it encountered any significant opposition. It was carefully considered. Many problems could have arisen if the selection process had been faulty or inept. A regimental combat team composed of such volunteers had already been recruited and organized and was undergoing intensive training before I returned from England. Nevertheless, while I was at Tule Lake, I conferred with the leaders of the militants and advised them that if they wished for a chance to prove themselves and volunteer for special service if another combat team were to be organized, I would recommend them for consideration. A second group was not organized but some of the militants did serve as interpreters overseas and as instructors at the Army Language School successfully. HESS: What was their reaction? BENDETSEN: Very good. HESS: When the units were first proposed, what was the reception of the Japanese at that time, the men who ultimately became members of those units? BENDETSEN: Well, it varied. However, those who ultimately went through the process were very enthusiastic about the opportunity from the beginning." That said, only 4% of Japanese-American men of fighting age enlisted. The other 96% didn't. The Japanese believed is was more than a race war, but a religious war as well. Japan, like the Nazis, saw itself as the master race who by destiny was meant to rule over the lesser races. One needs to study the concepts of hakko-ichiu and the kokutai and understand that these beliefs were popular in ethnic Japanese enclaves throughout the world, including the United States. Read "Kokutai no Hongi" and "Shimmin no Michi", two books that were regular curriculum as Japanese "language schools" worldwide. As for the quote, "A Jap's a Jap", it had been used before it was attributed to DeWitt. Justifying the relocation to the general public without compromising the reason for the decision was given to Commander of the West Defense Command and Fourth Army, General John L. DeWitt. His response was a document titled, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942. The report was meant for American public consumption as well Japanese consumption. The government needed to provide the public with justification for the evacuation without providing MAGIC intelligence as the source. That was the purpose of DeWitt's report. The fears of the American people had been justified. Better yet, the document drew no suspicion from the Empire of Japan - only outrage. As far as the government of Japan was concerned, most ethnic Japanese living abroad would stay loyal. Today, of course the reparations movment has taken DeWitt's report as face value while totally ignoring the historical context in which it was written. I've seen no evidence that DeWitt opposed enlisting Japanese-Americans. In fact his bosses approved of the idea. The whole point of the loyalty oath was to determine who was and was not trustworthy. Admitedly it wasn't a perfect process, but along with background checks it was the best the government could provide. In fact disloyal Japanese-Americans could easily have lied and enlisted or leave the Relocation Centers. As for Daniel Inoue, his own biography discusses the curriculum being taught at the Japanese "Language Schools". Quote, "You must remember that only a trick of fate has brought you so far from your homeland, but there must be no question of your loyalty. When Japan calls, you must know that it is Japanese blood that flows in your viens." This curriculum was taught in Japanese colonies throughout the world... As for the barbershop incident, racism exists everywhere, in America and Japan. To state the Inoue's experience at a barbershop somehow provides evidence of racism for the government mandated evacuation is absurd....
Rating:
Summary: Original documents don't lie...
Review: I like how the book persents the documents and allows for the reader to decide for themselves. I thought the photos of internment camp life were astounding, as well. I highly suggest this book for any who want to avoid the political hype often associated with Japanese-American internment issues.
Rating:
Summary: Casting Aspersions...
Review: I will respectfully disagree with Mr. Graham. The cases presented by Mr. Herzig and Mr. Robinson are the documents that should be used cautiously, for both authors go to great lengths to create eloquent straw men. The fact that the CWRIC heard testimony on but did not read or even address the Magic intercepts in an indictment to the very integrity of the CWRIC. Magic was the main evidentiary basis behind Executive Order 9066, and every individual who (at the time) had read the intercepts supported the order. Mr. Lowman did make himself available for the Honolulu hearings, he was not asked (or allowed - as some cynics might suggest) to testify. And given the reception he most likely would have received, it's probably just as well. And it should be mentioned that during his testimony before the Japanese/American Relocation Commission Hearing on June 21, 1984 John McCloy did mention Magic, "Proof that the Commission did not conduct an investigation worthy of the name is demonstrated by the fact that it never identified the existence of "Magic" as evidence of Japanese intent to subvert the security of the country through disloyal residence here in the event of an attack by Japan."
Mr. McCloy then goes on to describe the hostile ("boos and catcalls") heaped upon any who dared to present the President's case. I found Mr. Lowman's style just fine, he let's the evidence speak for itself. And the evidence paints a much different picture than you get from the CWRIC white wash.
Rating:
Summary: Other Information left out of Mr. Lowman's book
Review: In the May 5, 2004, book review Bob said "I'm still waiting for the concrete evidence that led to the CWIRC's conclusions of "racism, wartime hysteria and lack of political will". Well here is one example: If you read the book Strangers From A Different Shore by Ronald Takaki, page 397, it states that in February 1943, President Roosevelt actually AUTHORIZED that INTERNED Japanese Americans be allowed to register for the draft by just answering "yes" to serving in combat and swearing to unqualified allegiance to the U.S. on loyalty questionnaires. President Roosevelt did this in order to neutralize Japanese propaganda that tried to insist that WW II was a race war, so his was ACTUALLY willing to allow these interned Japanese American men to sign up for the draft JUST because it made great publicity and counter propaganda for the U.S. war effort! The loyalty questionnaires were handed out in the detention camps even though military commanders like General John Dewitt, one of the major planners of the Japanese-American evacuation and commander of the Western Defense Command, tried to oppose it. As the author Ms. Ellen Levine points out in her book A Fence Away From Freedom, on page 117 and 133, that General Dewitt made it VERY clear his opinion of allowing ANY of these Japanese Americans to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces: "A Jap's a Jap. They are a dangerous element, whether loyal or not. There is no way to determine their loyalty...It makes no difference whether he is an American. Theoretically he is still a Japanese, and you can't change him." Ms. Levine on page 133 of her book noted that General Dewitt and his associates WERE afraid that drafting these young Japanese-American internees would UNDERMINE the justification for putting in detention camps: If the President of the U.S. actually APPROVE of the recruiting of these internees, then why did the U.S. government spend all that time and effort putting them INTO detention camps to begin with? If the internees are suppose to be disloyal, then how would the U.S. government know exactly WHICH one of them is suppose to be trustworthy enough to be drafted into the U.S. Armed Forces? They ONLY had to answer "yes" to serving in combat in and to unqualified allegiance to the U.S. on the loyalty questionnaire in order to be ELIGIBLE for the draft! Another sad example is listed in page 403 of Mr. Takaki's book that points out that Captain Daniel Inouye, who served with the Japanese-American 100th Battalion and 442nd Regiment and who lost his RIGHT arm when it was torn off by a German rifle grenade, was trying to get a hair cut in San Francisco. Entering the barbershop with his empty right sleeve pinned to his army jacket covered with ribbons and medals for his military heroism , Captain Inouye was told: "We don't serve Japs here." And to show how inconsistent the U.S. Government was in dealing with the Japanese Americans, here is another fact you should know: If you read the book A Fence Away from Freedom by Ellen Levine (pages 134-137, 231-240), the author notes that in February 1943, President Roosevelt authorized to allow Japanese-American men to register for the draft by signing loyalty documents. Several young Japanese-American men at the Tule Lake detention center protested about the unfairness of being interned inside detention centers AND being asked to register for the draft by NOT showing up for Army physical exams. These Tule Lake internees were actually INDICTED for trying to resist the draft registration! But on July 29, 1944, Federal Judge Louis E. Goodman dismissed indictments against 26 Tule Lake draft resisters and declared: "It is shocking to the conscience that an American citizen be confined on the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in the armed forces, or be prosecuted for not yielding to such compulsion." One should keep all of the above information in mind when people try to claim that Japanese Americans were treated "fairly" before, during, and after the war. You can also read other books like Strangers From A Different Shore by Ronald Takaki, Years Of Infamy by Michi Weglyn, Personal Justice Denied and etc. that lists MANY other examples of racial prejudice and discrimination that Japanese Americans had to deal with before World War II. Can anyone truly say that racial prejudice toward Japanese Americans did NOT influence the way they were treated?
Rating:
Summary: Other Information left out of Mr. Lowman's book
Review: In the May 5, 2004, book review Bob said "I'm still waiting for the concrete evidence that led to the CWIRC's conclusions of "racism, wartime hysteria and lack of political will". Well here is one example: If you read the book Strangers From A Different Shore by Ronald Takaki, page 397, it states that in February 1943, President Roosevelt actually AUTHORIZED that INTERNED Japanese Americans be allowed to register for the draft by just answering "yes" to serving in combat and swearing to unqualified allegiance to the U.S. on loyalty questionnaires. President Roosevelt did this in order to neutralize Japanese propaganda that tried to insist that WW II was a race war, so his was ACTUALLY willing to allow these interned Japanese American men to sign up for the draft JUST because it made great publicity and counter propaganda for the U.S. war effort! The loyalty questionnaires were handed out in the detention camps even though military commanders like General John Dewitt, one of the major planners of the Japanese-American evacuation and commander of the Western Defense Command, tried to oppose it. As the author Ms. Ellen Levine points out in her book A Fence Away From Freedom, on page 117 and 133, that General Dewitt made it VERY clear his opinion of allowing ANY of these Japanese Americans to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces: "A Jap's a Jap. They are a dangerous element, whether loyal or not. There is no way to determine their loyalty...It makes no difference whether he is an American. Theoretically he is still a Japanese, and you can't change him." Ms. Levine on page 133 of her book noted that General Dewitt and his associates WERE afraid that drafting these young Japanese-American internees would UNDERMINE the justification for putting in detention camps: If the President of the U.S. actually APPROVE of the recruiting of these internees, then why did the U.S. government spend all that time and effort putting them INTO detention camps to begin with? If the internees are suppose to be disloyal, then how would the U.S. government know exactly WHICH one of them is suppose to be trustworthy enough to be drafted into the U.S. Armed Forces? They ONLY had to answer "yes" to serving in combat in and to unqualified allegiance to the U.S. on the loyalty questionnaire in order to be ELIGIBLE for the draft! Another sad example is listed in page 403 of Mr. Takaki's book that points out that Captain Daniel Inouye, who served with the Japanese-American 100th Battalion and 442nd Regiment and who lost his RIGHT arm when it was torn off by a German rifle grenade, was trying to get a hair cut in San Francisco. Entering the barbershop with his empty right sleeve pinned to his army jacket covered with ribbons and medals for his military heroism , Captain Inouye was told: "We don't serve Japs here." And to show how inconsistent the U.S. Government was in dealing with the Japanese Americans, here is another fact you should know: If you read the book A Fence Away from Freedom by Ellen Levine (pages 134-137, 231-240), the author notes that in February 1943, President Roosevelt authorized to allow Japanese-American men to register for the draft by signing loyalty documents. Several young Japanese-American men at the Tule Lake detention center protested about the unfairness of being interned inside detention centers AND being asked to register for the draft by NOT showing up for Army physical exams. These Tule Lake internees were actually INDICTED for trying to resist the draft registration! But on July 29, 1944, Federal Judge Louis E. Goodman dismissed indictments against 26 Tule Lake draft resisters and declared: "It is shocking to the conscience that an American citizen be confined on the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in the armed forces, or be prosecuted for not yielding to such compulsion." One should keep all of the above information in mind when people try to claim that Japanese Americans were treated "fairly" before, during, and after the war. You can also read other books like Strangers From A Different Shore by Ronald Takaki, Years Of Infamy by Michi Weglyn, Personal Justice Denied and etc. that lists MANY other examples of racial prejudice and discrimination that Japanese Americans had to deal with before World War II. Can anyone truly say that racial prejudice toward Japanese Americans did NOT influence the way they were treated?
Rating:
Summary: A historical reference book marred by inaccuracies Updated
Review: In this book the author Mr. David Lowman presents the general history of MAGIC, the secret U.S. intelligence project run by U.S. cryptanalysts. In 1940 they were able to break the Japanese government's code and ciphers and read the encrypted diplomatic messages. Mr. Lowman tries to show that the MAGIC code played a major role in the U.S. government decision to incarcerate the entire West Coast Japanese-American community in 1942 because of U.S. military and security concerns of Japanese-American espionage & sabotage. In 1980 Congress established the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) to investigate the World War II incident. In 1983 the Commission's findings were presented to Congress without any reference to MAGIC and its relationship to the evacuation. Unfortunately Mr. Lowman's book should only be read to get more information and details about the MAGIC intelligent project. The notion that the MAGIC code was the reason why the West Coast Japanese Community was detained is refuted in an article by John Herzig ("Japanese Americans and MAGIC" from the AMERASIA Journal, Fall/Winter 1984 issue, pages 47-65). Mr. Herzig is a retired lieutenant colonel who served as a counterintelligence officer for the U.S. Department of the Army in Japan and Europe. Here are just SOME of the inaccuracies and inconsistencies that Mr. Herzig points out in Mr. Lowman's book: * U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 set up his OWN personal intelligence and research apparatus outside existing departmental intelligence machinery and employed his OWN investigators, which included Curtis B. Munson. Mr. Munson sent a report entitled Japanese on the West Coast on November 7, 1941, and stated that Japanese Americans would be NO more disloyal than any other racial group with whom we went to war! These investigators' reports fill 18 boxes in the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidential library in Hyde Park, New York. * Some information in MAGIC messages was also reported in newspapers such as the LOS ANGELES TIMES, so anyone could JUST read the newspapers and send the information back to the German or Japanese governments. * Statement before CWRIC by former government officials, who in 1942 were responsible for creating and implementing the Japanese-American exclusion and incarceration program, indicate that the MAGIC intercepts did NOT play a role in the government's decision to take the drastic action that it did against this minority group. * Testimony by representatives of the Department of Army, Navy, State, and Justice shows that there was NO evidence of espionage, sabotage, sedition, fifth column activities, other subversive acts on the part of Japanese Americans, and that NO such information appeared in MAGIC intercepts, in finished intelligence or counterintelligence reports. * Mr. Lowman claims the FBI Director Edgar Hoover was NEVER informed about the MAGIC evidence even though President Roosevelt in 1939 AUTHORIZED the FBI with the responsibility of investigating espionage and sabotage by U.S. civilians. Was there a good reason for the FBI Director to be NOT informed about MAGIC? * It is true that between February-May 1942 the FBI raided homes and businesses of Japanese-Americans and found guns, ammunition, dynamite, cameras, etc. However it is NOT mentioned that Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General during World War II, states in his autobiography In Brief Authority (pages 215-221) that he sent a memorandum, May 1942, about the FBI raids to President Roosevelt: "We have not uncovered through these searches any dangerous persons that we could not otherwise have known about.. We have not found among all the sticks of dynamite and gunpowder any evidence that any of it was to be used in a manner helpful to our enemies. We have not found a camera which we have reason to believe was for use in espionage." So the confiscated items were NOT considered evidence of sabotage or espionage because they were USED for personal or business tasks (e.g. guns used for hunting and self-protection, dynamite used on farms to destroy tree stumps, etc.) * As for the assertion that Japanese Americans were sending radio messages to Japanese submarines and ships before and after the Pearl Harbor attack, Mr. Biddle states in his book, pages 221-222, that the FBI Director Hoover could NOT find any evidence to confirm this allegation. And there is another IMPORTANT fact that is also not mentioned: Interned Japanese Americans did volunteer to serve in 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team during World War II. If you read the book Strangers From A Different Shore by Ronald Takaki, pages 379-405, it tells about the bravery of one of the MOST decorated combat unit in the U.S. Army. At least 600 of them were killed in action in Italy and Western Europe. At least 1200 came from mainland U.S. concentration camps and rest came from Hawaii, where Executive Order 9066 to intern the West Coast Japanese-American community did not apply. And Mr. Takaki's book states at least 33,000 Japanese-Americans served in the U.S. Armed Forces. They also served in the Pacific front as translators, reconnaissance, etc. and General Charles Willoughby, chief of intelligence in the Pacific, estimated that Japanese-American intelligence work help shorten the Pacific war by 2 years. So if the MAGIC information is suppose to show that Japanese-Americans were involved with espionage, then why were they allowed to join the U.S. Armed Forces? Well in Mr. Takaki's book on page 397 it states that President Roosevelt wanted to neutralize Japanese propaganda about WW II being a race war, and so Japanese-Americans, including those INTERNED in detention camps such as Tule Lake in California, were allowed to register for the draft by signing loyalty questionnaires in which they simply answer "yes" to unqualified allegiance to the U.S. President Roosevelt in February 1943 authorized the draft even though the Selective Service in 1942 had classified ALL Japanese-Americans as IV-C - enemy aliens - because there was no sure way to verify their true LOYALTY and therefore were ALL barred or segregated from the ranks of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Rating:
Summary: This is a great book
Review: John Wong fails to mention that John Herzig is the husband of Aiko Herzig, an ethnic Japanese who worked for the Commission as a "researcher". Both are ardent pro-reparations activists. This blatant conflict of interest is just another example of the circus-like atmosphere of the Commission hearings as a whole. Not to mention when John Herzig testified before the Commission, he was raked over the coals by House Judiciary Committee chair, Sam Hall, a Democrat from Texas. Herzig spent much of the testimony attempting to blast author Lowman's testimony. Herzig's summary was "no one who has testified thus far has mentioned MAGIC intelligence, therefore it must not be important". Obviously the commission had no knowledge of MAGIC after their "exhaustive research" so how could they ask questions regarding it? More to the point, why would they want to, as it would throw a wrench in their already decided upon conclusions of "hysterical racism". It's all in the book. The statements before the commission never said MAGIC was not important, but rather MAGIC was never mentioned. The Commission should have known about MAGIC and asked questions about it. They didn't, another detriment to the credibility of the Commission. "Testimony before the Commission" doesn't mean evidence doesn't exist. FBI Files regarding raids in February, 1942 prove evidence does exist. MAGIC intercepts prove evidence exists. In fact, IT'S IN LOWMAN'S BOOK! Why did the Commission ignore this? As for names, go study Japanese-American Tomoya Kawakita's brutal treatment of POWs and a Mr. Harada on the island of Niihau, a Japanese-Hawaiin who aided a Japanese pilot immediately after Pearl Harbor and assisted in taking over the island for a week. Read "Japan's Longest Day" and learn about the Japanese-American translators who worked intelligence in the Imperial War Ministry in Ichigaya, Tokyo. How about the 18,000 Japanese-Filipinos in the city of Davao? They had lived there as long as Japanese-Americans on the West Coast. On December 20, 1941 when the Japanese Imperial Army arrived, how many Japanese-Filipinos took up arms against them? Zero. In fact they went out of their way to prove their loyalty by acting as translators and scouts for the invading forces. Given the evidence, including MAGIC intercepts stating as such, it is ludicrous to suggest that ethnic Japanese on the West Coast, indoctrinated with Japanese facism, didn't harbor the same feelings. No one is denying innocent Japanese-Americans suffered hardships because of the Japanese facists amongst them, but to say the evacuation was based on "hysterical racism" is not true and an outrage. Regarding Japanese-Americans being the most decorated units, that's not true. The publisher of "MAGIC" and his congressman provided the evidence to the Smithsonian and the Smithsonian corrected the exibit. Read about it here http://www.athenapressinc.com/smithsonian/ . Of ethnic Japanese-Americans of fighting age, roughly 4% volunteered to serve during WW2. Suffice to say it wasn't this 4% that concerened the government. To state that loyal Japanese-Americans who supported the war effort and fought bravely somehow reduces the threat of those facist Japanese-Americans who chose to support and assist Japan is absurd. A far greater percentage of Japanese-Americans, over 14,000, chose to renounce their American citizenship and be expatriated to Japan. Over 5,000 such applications had been processed by 1945.
Rating:
Summary: For scholars and military buffs alike
Review: The United States Signal Intelligence Service broke Japan's highest level diplomatic code toward the end of 1940 and then constructed a machine that was an analog of the one used by the Japanese. That meant that during the entire Pacific Campaign of World War II, America could read all Japan's diplomatic traffic. This intelligence operation was code named "Magic" because it seemed to be the product of legerdemain when among the decoded messages of 1941 were a number detailing espionage planning and operations involving Japanese-Americans along the West Cost. This resulted in President Roosevelt authorizing the evacuation and incarceration into relocation camps in February 1942. In Magic: The Untold Story Of U.S. Intelligence And The Evacuation Of Japanese Residents From The West Coast During WWII, David D. Lowman draws upon declassified Army, Navy, and FBI reports to reveal the real reasons for the evacuation of Japanese-Americans, demonstrating that their relocation into camps was not the result of mere racism, war hysteria, or a lack of political will, but the result of superior military intelligence gathering. Magic is a unique and invaluable addition to the growing library of World War II materials for scholars and military buffs alike.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent Book
Review: Using Article 1, Section 9 of the United States Constitution as their guide, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the evacuation was constitutional in three seperate wartime cases that stand to this day. Is it not the Supreme Court that determines was in and is not constitutional? The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the consitutionality of the evacuation/relocation in Korematsu v. U.S., 1944 term. In summing up for the 6-3 majority, Justice Black wrote: "There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot -- by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight -- now say that at the time these actions were unjustified." That decision has never been reversed and stands to this day. As stated by Chief Justice Stone: "THE ALTERNATIVE WHICH APPELLANT INSISTS MUST BE ACCEPTED IS FOR THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO IMPOSE THE CURFEW ON ALL CITIZENS WITHIN THE MILITARY AREA, OR ON NONE. IN A CASE OF THREATENED DANGER REQUIRING PROMPT ACTION, IT IS A CHOICE BETWEEN INFLICTING OBVIOUSLY NEEDLESS HARDSHIP ON THE MANY, OR SITTING PASSIVE AND UNRESISTING IN THE PRESENCE OF THE THREAT. WE THINK THAT CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN TIME OF WAR, IS NOT SO POWERLESS AND DOES NOT COMPEL SO HARD A CHOICE IF THOSE CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE HAVE REASONABLE GROUND FOR BELIEVING THAT THE THREAT IS REAL." That's why the Constitution allows the suspension of Habeas Corpus in times of crisis. To use words like, "nationalistic", "racist" and "fanatic" to describe this book and those that support its evidence is common, and the result of a lack of any concrete evidence to refute it. I'm still waiting for the concrete evidence that led to the CWIRC's conclusions of "racism, wartime hysteria and lack of political will".
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