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Rating: 
Summary: A Useful Synthesis but Flawed Synthesis
Review: While realizing the 95-page space limitation of the Osprey Campaign series, this volume on the initial British offensive in North Africa could have been much better. Jon Latimer, the author, is a serving officer with the Royal Welch Fusiliers (TA). Latimer brings military experience to this volume, which is useful, but it is not enough. He has culled together the best available references to produce a useful synthesis, but he does not go far enough. Latimer is to be applauded for mentioning the roles of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy, the Reggia Aeoronautica (Italian Air Force), intelligence and various aspects of equipment. Some of his information, such as the high quality of British intelligence versus the poor quality of Italian intelligence is very contentious. Despite valuable signals intelligence, the British were actually quite weak in tactical reconnaissance and they knew it; thus they began to form the Long Range Desert Groups in late 1940. A few months later, Rommel and the Afrika Korps would amply demonstrate how weak the British really were in reconnaissance. The biggest flaw in this volume are the maps. First, all three of the 3-D maps are presented "upside down" with south pointing to the top of the page. This is disconcerting to readers familiar with North African terrain and odd for an army officer. Second, there are not enough maps to fully support the Battle of the Camps and the attack on Bardia. Oddly, the author neglects the main commanders Wavell and O'Connor (there is only one very poor photo of O'connor in the volume, but a better shot of Wilson, who had no command role in the campaign). Operation Compass was O'Connor's show and he deserves better treatment, even in a short volume. The author might have mentioned that O'Connor had quite a lot of experience with the Italians, having served in Italy in the First World War (where he was decorated for valor). Nor does the author mention that O'Connor was captured by Rommel's vanguard just two months after his great victory at Beda Fomm. Field Marshal Wavell is also slighted, no mention of losing an eye in the First World War, extensive staff experience in Russia and the Mideast, etc. There are some egregious editing problems in this volume as well. The photo on page 61, supposedly of the Italian cruiser San Giorgio, is actually a well-known photo of the burning German pocket battleship Graph Spee. The author's tendency to use modern military vernacular, referring to units as "3 and 7H" instead of 3rd and 8th Hussars, should have been curbed. There are also odd word choices such as "scudding rain" and awkward sentences. This volume is a good introduction to Operation Compass, but it certainly could have packed in more detail. The author frequently mentions logistic problems but never clarifies. In the section on opposing armies, the author might have explained how much motor transport was available and the difficulty of desert logistics. Finally, it amazes me that a military author would not attempt a bit more analysis of the classic victory at Beda Fomm. Perhaps because the victory was so complete, the author feels that no analysis is necessary. Perhaps, because Italian performance was so terrible, analysis also seems moot. However given the rather poor performance of British desert operations in the remainder of 1941, the author might have tried to answer: what did the British learn from this campaign and more important, what did they retain? Is it possible that lacking serious resistance from the Italians, the British gained an exaggerated opinion of their own capabilities which would work against them once the Afrika Korps arrived? This questions might at least have been raised for thought, if not for answer.
Rating:
Summary: A Useful Synthesis but Flawed Synthesis
Review: While realizing the 95-page space limitation of the Osprey Campaign series, this volume on the initial British offensive in North Africa could have been much better. Jon Latimer, the author, is a serving officer with the Royal Welch Fusiliers (TA). Latimer brings military experience to this volume, which is useful, but it is not enough. He has culled together the best available references to produce a useful synthesis, but he does not go far enough. Latimer is to be applauded for mentioning the roles of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy, the Reggia Aeoronautica (Italian Air Force), intelligence and various aspects of equipment. Some of his information, such as the high quality of British intelligence versus the poor quality of Italian intelligence is very contentious. Despite valuable signals intelligence, the British were actually quite weak in tactical reconnaissance and they knew it; thus they began to form the Long Range Desert Groups in late 1940. A few months later, Rommel and the Afrika Korps would amply demonstrate how weak the British really were in reconnaissance. The biggest flaw in this volume are the maps. First, all three of the 3-D maps are presented "upside down" with south pointing to the top of the page. This is disconcerting to readers familiar with North African terrain and odd for an army officer. Second, there are not enough maps to fully support the Battle of the Camps and the attack on Bardia. Oddly, the author neglects the main commanders Wavell and O'Connor (there is only one very poor photo of O'connor in the volume, but a better shot of Wilson, who had no command role in the campaign). Operation Compass was O'Connor's show and he deserves better treatment, even in a short volume. The author might have mentioned that O'Connor had quite a lot of experience with the Italians, having served in Italy in the First World War (where he was decorated for valor). Nor does the author mention that O'Connor was captured by Rommel's vanguard just two months after his great victory at Beda Fomm. Field Marshal Wavell is also slighted, no mention of losing an eye in the First World War, extensive staff experience in Russia and the Mideast, etc. There are some egregious editing problems in this volume as well. The photo on page 61, supposedly of the Italian cruiser San Giorgio, is actually a well-known photo of the burning German pocket battleship Graph Spee. The author's tendency to use modern military vernacular, referring to units as "3 and 7H" instead of 3rd and 8th Hussars, should have been curbed. There are also odd word choices such as "scudding rain" and awkward sentences. This volume is a good introduction to Operation Compass, but it certainly could have packed in more detail. The author frequently mentions logistic problems but never clarifies. In the section on opposing armies, the author might have explained how much motor transport was available and the difficulty of desert logistics. Finally, it amazes me that a military author would not attempt a bit more analysis of the classic victory at Beda Fomm. Perhaps because the victory was so complete, the author feels that no analysis is necessary. Perhaps, because Italian performance was so terrible, analysis also seems moot. However given the rather poor performance of British desert operations in the remainder of 1941, the author might have tried to answer: what did the British learn from this campaign and more important, what did they retain? Is it possible that lacking serious resistance from the Italians, the British gained an exaggerated opinion of their own capabilities which would work against them once the Afrika Korps arrived? This questions might at least have been raised for thought, if not for answer.
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