Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement

Rating:
Summary: Clausen sheds light on flaws in intelligence system
Review: First of all, it should be stated what this book isn't: it isn't a detailed account of the attack or an introduction to the subject matter of the Pearl Harbor. It does not touch upon the Japanese planning, strategic thinking, or preparations. Nor is it a comprehensive account of all the errors which contributed to the disaster. For this reason, it would not be a good choice for a first read on the subject of Pearl Harbor. It requires some background, and familiarity with the events and characters involved.

For those who have read several books on the subject, it is an invaluable source for information regarding the attack, and an intelligent and honest assessment of blame for US unpreparedness to meet the challenge. This book sheds light on, and reveals facts and circumstances previously unpublished. Clausen was in a unique position in history, appointed by Secretary of War Stimson to investigate the causes of the defeat, and make recommendations to prevent its repetition. Empowered with broad orders commanding all officers to fully cooperate with his investigation, Clausen was able to conduct interviews and take affadavits of any commander he chose. Many of his witnesses testified before no other investigation. He also had access to documents, orders and correspondence which other histories do not mention.

For example, in assessing Gen. Short's performance, he includes excerpts of correspondence in early 1941 from Marshall specifically touching upon the danger of a Japanese air or submarine strike against Oahu, reminding Short that his primary task was to defend against these dangers. If the assessments contained in the Martin-Bellinger report were not enough to wake Short up, surely letters from the Chief of Staff should have been. Clausen also details the blunt assessment of Gen. Herron, Short's predecessor, as to Short's disinterest, lack of preparedness and poor performance in the job.

Clausen's assessments are frank and sometimes brutal. Contrary to suggestions that this book has an apologist bent toward the Army, Clausen spreads blame towards Marshall, Gerow, and the rest of the top brass, particularly within the intelligence apparatus. He similarly faults the Navy, for mishandling or in some cases hoarding intelligence. He casts a pox on both houses in Oahu, for failing to meaningfully liason and discuss the implications of the rapidly deteriorating US-Japanese relations, and the import of the warnings and information those commands had at their disposal.

Possessed of keen analytic skill, Clausen's work, sources and insights demolish currently-published conspiracy theories as both venal and banal, based on false information, incomplete understanding, and in some cases even perjured testimony. As detailed in this book, the flaws in the system of handling and interpreting intelligence, coupled with the human flaws in command, are more than enough explanation without relying on an intellectually vapid pablum of deceit and simplistic bogeymen.

Rating:
Summary: Clausen sheds light on flaws in intelligence system
Review: First of all, it should be stated what this book isn't: it isn't a detailed account of the attack or an introduction to the subject matter of the Pearl Harbor. It does not touch upon the Japanese planning, strategic thinking, or preparations. Nor is it a comprehensive account of all the errors which contributed to the disaster. For this reason, it would not be a good choice for a first read on the subject of Pearl Harbor. It requires some background, and familiarity with the events and characters involved.

For those who have read several books on the subject, it is an invaluable source for information regarding the attack, and an intelligent and honest assessment of blame for US unpreparedness to meet the challenge. This book sheds light on, and reveals facts and circumstances previously unpublished. Clausen was in a unique position in history, appointed by Secretary of War Stimson to investigate the causes of the defeat, and make recommendations to prevent its repetition. Empowered with broad orders commanding all officers to fully cooperate with his investigation, Clausen was able to conduct interviews and take affadavits of any commander he chose. Many of his witnesses testified before no other investigation. He also had access to documents, orders and correspondence which other histories do not mention.

For example, in assessing Gen. Short's performance, he includes excerpts of correspondence in early 1941 from Marshall specifically touching upon the danger of a Japanese air or submarine strike against Oahu, reminding Short that his primary task was to defend against these dangers. If the assessments contained in the Martin-Bellinger report were not enough to wake Short up, surely letters from the Chief of Staff should have been. Clausen also details the blunt assessment of Gen. Herron, Short's predecessor, as to Short's disinterest, lack of preparedness and poor performance in the job.

Clausen's assessments are frank and sometimes brutal. Contrary to suggestions that this book has an apologist bent toward the Army, Clausen spreads blame towards Marshall, Gerow, and the rest of the top brass, particularly within the intelligence apparatus. He similarly faults the Navy, for mishandling or in some cases hoarding intelligence. He casts a pox on both houses in Oahu, for failing to meaningfully liason and discuss the implications of the rapidly deteriorating US-Japanese relations, and the import of the warnings and information those commands had at their disposal.

Possessed of keen analytic skill, Clausen's work, sources and insights demolish currently-published conspiracy theories as both venal and banal, based on false information, incomplete understanding, and in some cases even perjured testimony. As detailed in this book, the flaws in the system of handling and interpreting intelligence, coupled with the human flaws in command, are more than enough explanation without relying on an intellectually vapid pablum of deceit and simplistic bogeymen.

Rating:
Summary: A man with too much to lose
Review: Henry C. Clausen was a special investigator for Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson during World War II, with authority to question anyone, anywhere, to get to the bottom of what happened at Pearl Harbor ... and, more specifically, to determine whether any military officials lied to the various Congressional investigations of the attack. He presented his boss with an 800-page report, later published as Volume 35 of the official government report on the attack. Five decades later (this book was first published in 1992), Clausen is still defending the approved, government-issue-circa-1946 interpretation of events.

Clausen himself identifies what's wrong with his book in his Foreword: 'In writing the behind-the-scenes story of my investigations at Pearl Harbor, I do so not as a historian but as an insider. I also do so as a lawyer... Facts are the nails that the prosecutor uses to seal his case for the jury.'

It's precisely because Clausen is (was?) an attorney and an insider that he believes he can render a 'Final Judgement' about the attack. Historians, on the other hand, recognize that history is never 'sealed.' Like any prosecutor -- especially a self-proclaimed insider -- Clausen's goal is to represent his employer, the government. This is particularly evident in the zeal with which he defends the government's decades long fingering of Admiral Kimmel and General Short as the men primarily responsible for the disaster on December 7.

Clausen's objectivity is also brought into question by his frequent praise of his boss Secretary Stimson ('one of the greatest public servants in the history of America' [p. 238]). How clear-sighted is Clausen likely to be when pronouncing 'final judgment' on circumstances where his mentor and friend played a key role and arguably bears a share of guilt?

To give credit where it's due, Clausen is a skilled attorney. The first-person story of his investigations is an interesting one, and a useful addition to Pearl Harbor historiography. Add his contributions to the larger picture of the attack, but don't let him convince you that he's come anywhere near a 'final judgment.'

Rating:
Summary: Sheds New Light on Who Was Responsible for Pearl Harbor
Review: I originally read this book about eight years ago, but I recently finished reading it for the second time, and I got much more out of it than the first time through. Henry C. Clausen, a San Francisco lawyer with his own practice, was appointed by Secretary of War Henry Stimson to conduct a thorough investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster after it was discovered that there may have been some tainted testimony with the recently completed Army Pearl Harbor Board investigation. Armed with "Magic" decrypts in a "bomb pouch" which Clausen was to detonate if captured, he set off to take affidavits from the key personnel involved in the Pearl Harbor disaster.

According to the book, from November, 1944 to September, 1945, Clausen traveled more than 55,000 miles and interviewed over one hundred U.S. and British Army, Navy, and civilian personnel. Clausen had the authority from Stimson to go anywhere and interview anyone under oath from enlisted personnel up to General George C. Marshall. After completing his investigation, Clausen presented an 800 page report which revealed a massive failure by the United States to use the intelligence obtained months before the Pearl Harbor attack.

The crux of Clausen's investigation centered on the failure of the Army and Navy to share intelligence. It was the Navy's responsibility to share their intelligence with the Army, but, according to Clausen's investigation, this did not happen. Clausen also faulted Admiral Kimmel and General Short for failing to correctly interpret Washington's war warning message dated November 27, 1941. Among the other charges leveled by Clausen against Kimmel and Short were Kimmel's failure to share intelligence with the Army and his own staff, while Short was charged with failing to defend the fleet, failing to adequately prepare to assume command in Hawaii, failing to alert his forces of the probability of a surprise attack, failing to conduct reconnaissance, and failing to communicate effectively with Kimmel.

Clausen names others who were responsible in his investigation, from Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner's attempt to take over Naval intelligence and assuming that Pearl Harbor had a "Purple" machine, to Fleet Intelligence Officer Edwin Layton, who failed to keep the Army abreast of intelligence developments by not following Kimmel's directive to deliver intelligence to the Army in person. Others are listed as well, but these four men, especially Kimmel and Short, bear much of the responsibility for Pearl Harbor, according to Clausen.

Clausen was called as a witness before the Congressional hearings to testify about his findings. He did a masterful job of handling the committee's questions, and managed to sway the thinking of several of the committee members.

I highly recommend this fine book. Written in the first person by Clausen himself, he takes the reader on an incredible journey that uncovered many falsehoods and half-truths while, in my opinion, accurately identifying the persons directly responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. The only part of the book where I felt Clausen spent too much time on was the "Winds" message. He admitted himself that he devoted perhaps too much time to this one issue, but this is a minor point which does not take anything away from the book. Colonel Clausen did his country a remarkable service by completing such a fine investigation. His methods were precise and produced the desired results. I believe that Clausen's report accurately identifed who was to blame for the attack. There is an excellent appendix section in the book which contains many of the "Magic" intercepts which Clausen used in his investigation. Read this excellent work of history and find out who was responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Rating:
Summary: Simple truths vice wild imaginings.
Review: This book is misnamed, but otherwise an outstanding and essential work regrading the causes of and responsibility for the Pearl Harbor debacle. It sinks outright the majority of the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories, and destroys most of the supports for the remainder.

Henry Clausen, at the time a major in the Army JAG corps, was appointed by Secretary of War Stimson in 1944 to reinvestigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor when it became apparent that the Army Board investigating Pearl Harbor received tainted testimony designed to prevent disclosure of the secret of Magic. Magic--information gained by breaking Japanese codes--was considered absolutely vital to the war effort and false testimony was given to prevent its disclosure. When it became apparent that these measures were distorting the proper evaluation of what took place at Pearl Harbor, Stimson ordered a new investigation by Clausen.

In order to circumvent the veil of secrecy around Magic, Clausen was granted access to Magic and permitted to carry certain pertinent Magic documents in an incendiary pouch to aid in deposing witnesses in his investigation. Presentation of the documents as Clausen's bona fides of being in on Magic club permitted witnesses to speak freely to him. But Clausen found not only lies designed to protect Magic, but to cover up individual failings.

What Clausen does best in this narrative of his investigation and testimony before the Congressional Pearl Harbor investigation is explain why General Short and Admiral Kimmel lack any semblance of a legitimate defense. Having had access to Magic, as well as War and Navy Department communications logs, Clausen lays out in sequence the warnings that Short and Kimmel received from their superiors, but later claimed they had lacked. He clearly draws an analogy between their performance of their duties and those of a sentry asleep at his post. This very effectively yanks the rug out from under the growing sympathy campaign for these two historical figures.

Clausen then goes farther and identifies twelve more individuals who contributed to the debacle, uncovering some little-known details of certain persons' roles and actions. He is on target in these evaluations which set on edge a number of revisionist "truths" that have come to light in recent years. The credibility of the late Rear Admiral Layton is particularly damaged.

However, although he cites Colonel Bratton for his failure to ensure that his deputy, Colonel Dusenbury, performed properly, Clausen fails to take the point far enough and misses a few contributory players. This might be a result of Clausen's freely admitted status as "a civilian lawyer in uniform" with no military officer training. As a result he misses the larger application of the principle he applies to Bratton, in which officers at higher levels of organization bear responsibility for the proper organization of subordinate levels.

Thus, General Marshall, General Miles, Admiral Stark, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Wilkinson, and Admiral Bloch escape Clausen's list of parties whose contributory negligence helped make the disaster through poor organization of the War and Navy Departments for war, and more particularly the poor organization of their Intelligence, Communications and War Plans divisions. However, he does successfully demonstrate that General Marshall and Admiral Stark were not guilty of any criminal negligence in the fashion of Short and Kimmel, both officers having transmitted appropriate warnings to their subordinates in Hawaii.

Hence, Clausen's work cannot be the "Final Judgement" claimed in the title.

It does, however, admit a breeze to clear away some of the smoke that obscures the truth about Pearl Harbor and permits conspiracy theories to thrive. It graphically demostrates that Pearl Harbor resulted from a systemic gaffe, personal failings and mundane events. By ordering and condensing the information received by Short and Kimmel, it becomes readily apparent exactly what they received in the way of warnings. By including previous correspondence discussing the hazard of air attack on Pearl Harbor, and anxiety about the issue,from the War and Navy Secretaries down to the Hawaiian commanders, Clausen dispels the notion that such an attack was inconceivable to the American leadership. Rather, it was a foremost concern.

Clausen also brings out the essential irrelevance of the "Winds Code Messages" by revealing that they governed a contingency that did not occur: disruption of communications with Japanese diplomatic posts before the onset of hostilities. Thus, looking for the Winds Code activation message as a precursor for war was faulty logic. Communications with Japanese diplomatic posts were not disrupted before hostilities and therefor there was no need to transmit the activation message. This did not, however, prevent US command and intelligence personnel from fooling themselves into looking for said message as an essential precursor to war.

Clausen also exposes the awkward arrangements made for decoding intercepted messages and the even more amateurish method of their distribution, tracking and routine destruction for security reasons. He further reveals the extent of stove-piping in the Army and Navy Intelligence divisions and the inter-service politics and rivalries that impeded the proper sharing and dissemination of priceless Magic-derived information.

Clausen's work is an essential one for understanding what happened to make Pearl Harbor an easy target. Do not be put off by its seeming Army-bias at times (Clausen's actually very fair if you read him impassively), or Clausen's causal and almost flip narrative, or Lee's imperfect editorial effort: pay attention to the facts being laid out and the conclusions being drawn. Then ask yourself if they make sense. I suspect after reading this work, you won't give a Pearl Harbor conspiracy theorist the time of day.

Also recommended: Prange's "At Dawn We Slept" and supporting volumes by Prange and his research staff, as well as Lord's more poetic narrative "Day of Infamy" and Layton's sometimes self-serving insider perspective "And I was there..." Toland's "Infamy" can be read for familiarity with the underpinnings of the conspiracy theories. ....

Rating:
Summary: Simple truths vice wild imaginings.
Review: This book, though informative, takes a very biased view of whom is to blame for the compounded blunders that led to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The author, one of the original investigators, take a very warm and cozy look at the US Army's responsibility, while blasting the US Navy almost as severely as did the Japanese. Much of his "story" is anecdotal. It has some inaccuracies, though not very material to the overall content. Obviously Clausen is protecting General George Marshall at the expense of Admirals Kimmel and Bloch. Additionally, he casts a dark shadow upon the Magic intellegence personnel (Layton, for one), and does ignore other influences that led to the attack on Dec. 7th. Gordon W. Prange's (et al) books would be a better choice for those just starting to read about the Pearl Harbor attack than this one. Clausen takes too much of a subjective view (as opposed to objective). Quick to blame Kimmel and Short for the attack, it seems that there is personal annimosity against the navy and Admiral Kimmel, as well as General Short.