Prompt and Utter Destruction: President Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan

Rating:
Summary: Most Informative book on A-Bombs that I have ever read
Review: Are you looking for a good book on A-Bombs then well this is definitely the book that you have to read. It is informative and interesting in everyway. All the way from the making of the bomb to when it was dropped to now with even stronger bombs. It is a very good book.

Rating:
Summary: This was a very informative book
Review: I thought that this book was very informative in every way. It was precise on everything about the A-Bomb. It was 400 pages of some of the best written material that I have ever read in my life. If you are looking for a book about A-bombs please check out this book because it just might be the best book on A-Bombs you ever read

Rating:
Summary: Was it such a hard decision?
Review: They were suddenly heroes to a grateful nation. Scientists, normally accustomed to a life of quiet research, were suddenly, by virtue of their invention of the atom bomb, the saviors of their country. Likewise, the crew of the Enola Gay, surely one of the best-known airplane names in history, became military larger-than-life figures of honor and fame. It was nearly universally accepted that the atom bomb had saved America from a long, bloody, and otherwise pointless invasion of the Japanese mainland. Truman, the man who gave the go-ahead, was mostly relieved that the war was finally over, and no further American lives need be lost. To morally praise him for his decision to drop the device would have been superfluous, like congratulating someone for deciding to save a drowning child. What other decision could there have been? And yet, there were other options for him. Realistic options? Perhaps, in light of sixty more years of history. Or perhaps not, hindsight notwithstanding. The questioning of his motives began in the sixties, and by the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the twin bombings came about there was a loud chorus of voices condemning Truman's decision. Wouldn't a demonstration on a desert island have been better? Why kill so many innocents? Surely it was just racism, wasn't it? Oh, he was trying to scare the Russians, that's it. No president could possibly have wanted to save the lives of the soldiers entrusted to his care. Unlike some controversies, I've never found this one compelling. The case in Truman's favor seems obvious, with only very minor questions to detract from the main problem Truman faced: how to end the war quickly. I tend to think this is also the same conclusion J. Samuel Walker reached before publishing Prompt & Utter Destruction, a short and compelling overview of the decisions Truman faced and how he resolved them.

The thesis is simple. A knowingly unprepared Truman became President in the waning days of the war and had to make momentous decisions. Knowing his own limitations, he kept on hand most of Roosevelt's advisors and maintained Roosevelt's policies. This included, foremost, a desire to minimize American casualties. This is given right from the start, and remains the deciding factor in the end. Most of the book shows the situation Truman faced, including an analysis of what he knew and when. How many casualties would the U.S. face in an invasion? When would the Soviets join? How long would Japan hold out? How would the nation's economy hold up in a protracted war? At hand were figures showing the casualty rates at the time. The battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa had been horrific, and they were just smallish islands. Even in the absence of major battles, a few thousand a month were dying in skirmishes at sea, including the ill-fated crew of the cruiser USS Indianapolis. Some old myths Walker dispenses with. The oft cited figure of one million casualties in an invasion is probably not one Truman ever saw, and does not square well with other significant, but much lower numbers. In fact, Walker points out that estimates at the time, including the Soviet entry, show that Japan would have capitulated within months of an invasion, if indeed one were ever needed. Whether this is true or not is left to the imagination, as history shows there was no invasion and the war ended when it did. But Truman did not face enormous crippling casualty rates of the sort that plagued the other major countries in the war.

There are factors that have helped advance the claim that Truman had ulterior motives. The day after the successful Trinity test, he did indeed dominate the Potsdam conference where he was meeting with Churchill and Stalin. And Truman's disdain for communists was well known. The thing is, Truman was no idiot. Of course he knew the nuclear weapons gave him a bargaining chip. This can hardly be disputed, as is also true of many other accusations that are at least partially true but not so relevant. The Manhattan project was not, however, started up just to give the president a way to bully Russians. The bombs were earmarked for Germany the whole time, and would have ended up exploding over Berlin or some other city had not Germany cheated and lost the war first. This fact should clear up the question of racist motives. Undoubtedly Truman didn't like the Japanese. This is what happens in a war. Certainly there was racist feeling towards them in the country. But a military decision does not become invalid because its maker really, really dislikes the enemy.

The final answer is that Truman did know of other options, but they weren't important. He did worry a bit about the long-term implications, but there were immediate problems to deal with. In keeping with a policy he held even before learning of the atom bomb, Truman wanted to minimize casualties and end the war sooner rather than later. As commander-in-chief, not to mention as a combat veteran, he was obligated to take this stand. The number of casualties avoided is almost certainly not close to a million, but it could easily have been in the tens of thousands. There are enough conflicting accounts from that era to make at least plausible the case that there were other major factors, but they don't stand up. In fact, Truman's decision was straightforward. Walker does good by clearing up some of the persistent myths, on both sides of the question. But, and not to take away from Walker's effort, this isn't that hard a question (perhaps this is why the book is so short). To see the situation mapped out for history, here is the source to read.


Rating:
Summary: very good overview
Review: This book gives a good overview but just that - an overview. The events and circumstances surrounding the use of the A-bomb simply must be addressed in greater depth for one who wishes to become truly knowledgable on the subject. However, its brevity is also a strength in that for one just getting into the subject it serves as a fabulous introduction and for those already familiar with the subject, it sums things up into a nice recap. Contrary to some reviews of the book, the author does NOT ever say or even imply that the bomb should not have been dropped. Quite the opposite, he provides compelling reasons why the decision to use the bomb was sound and wise militarily, politically, diplomatically, and morally. Nor is this book any where near a "one-stop-shop" on the subject. So while not the final say, this book would be a good addition to a collection for the reasons mentioned above. The research is credible and the arguments are as a whole very sound. Highly recommended.

Rating:
Summary: very good overview
Review: This book gives a good overview but just that - an overview. The events and circumstances surrounding the use of the A-bomb simply must be addressed in greater depth for one who wishes to become truly knowledgable on the subject. However, its brevity is also a strength in that for one just getting into the subject it serves as a fabulous introduction and for those already familiar with the subject, it sums things up into a nice recap. Contrary to some reviews of the book, the author does NOT ever say or even imply that the bomb should not have been dropped. Quite the opposite, he provides compelling reasons why the decision to use the bomb was sound and wise militarily, politically, diplomatically, and morally. Nor is this book any where near a "one-stop-shop" on the subject. So while not the final say, this book would be a good addition to a collection for the reasons mentioned above. The research is credible and the arguments are as a whole very sound. Highly recommended.

Rating:
Summary: Probably the final say on the subject
Review: This book is an important contribution to the ongoing (and seemingly never-ending) debate on the reasons why the U.S. chose to drop two atomic bombs on Japan. The author took it upon himself to clearly determine whether the bomb was militarily necessary - as has been suggested by many U.S. historians writing before J. Samuel Walker - or whether it might have been used for purely political reasons such as intimidating the Soviet Union.

The results he comes up with are in many ways quite remarkable. For instance it becomes evident that then president Harry S. Truman was never confronted with the categorical choice between using the bomb and invading the Japanese main islands (which might have involved heavy U.S. losses). Indeed, by the beginning of summer 1945 Japan was believed to be so weak that the war was expected to come to an end before an invasion began, and even if it had been necessary to proceed with an invasion, the resulting casualties were supposed to be much fewer than Truman and his top-level advisers claimed after the war. However, Walker demonstrates rather convincingly that whichever alternatives might have existed, the bomb nevertheless proved to be the best means to win a decisive victory at the lowest cost in American casualties. Taking into account the element of time, one begins to understand how great the temptation must have been for Truman and his cabinet to drop the bombs and thereby finish the war with a clean stroke. Although other reasons, too, played an important part in the ultimate decision, the finding that using the bomb simply provided the president and his advisers with the most convenient measure to end the war is a compelling one and without doubt the book's most valuable message.

J. Samuel Walker has to be applauded for presenting the reader with this highly readable account of the line of reasoning behind the U.S. decision to use atomic bombs against Japan. The book is both concise and completely free of any emotion otherwise detrimental to a scholarly approach to this debate: a truly outstanding work - and probably the final say on the subject!

Rating:
Summary: The Myth of Decision
Review: This is a jewel of a book on the end of World War II. There have been many myths about Truman's decision to drop the bomb-he even made a brief film explaining how he made the decision, but this clears the air. Truman never actually decided. Everyone involved simply assumed, and correctly so, that once it was completed, it would be used. The author points to many reasons why the atomic bomb should not have been dropped on Japan, most of them valid and discussed previously in historical circles. However, there is a very interesting tidbit about Stalin and some other surprises. It is well worth reading.