The Confederate War

Rating:
Summary: Bold and persuasive
Review: Among historians, the dominant view of the Confederacy since the 1960s was the "lack-of-will" thesis, which offers the vision of a failed CSA collapsing under the weight of its own internal contradictions. A Southern government abandoned by its people, rejected and repudiated by every non-slaveholding white person, fighting with an army of disgruntled draftees: That is some people's estimation of the CSA.

Since the early 1990s, however, this fixation with Southern "lack of will" has been questioned by some of the most active and able historians, who believe we have replaced one unbalanced view (the old "Lost Cause" thesis) with another.

Such questioning invites a charge of "neo-Confederate," or worse, from people who have some political or personal investment in the prevailing paradigm. Yet this questioning is not the work of "moonlight-and-magnolia" sentimentalists. Many of them are not Southern-born; many have no ancestors who fought the war.

Gary W. Gallagher is among them. This handsome little book, engagingly written, summarized the work that has been done to date in correcting the historical view of the South's war effort.

Gallagher, in an interview, has said, "Common sense should play more of a role in historical evaluation than it often does. To be able to wage war, the Confederacy was willing to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of its young men and suffer the destruction of its economy. In terms of military casualties, Confederates sacrificed far more than any other generation of white Americans in U.S. history. Yet the South still fought. This would suggest broad popular support for the war."

Among the points he makes: The battle losses the South took would translate into six million U.S. battle casualties in World War II (instead of 961,977, the actual figure); nearly a million in Vietnam, instead of 201,000. Yet the "lack-of-will" partisans call the Confederacy a failed society. Gallagher points out that there's a danger of circular reasoning in this, because it sets the bar of "commitment to the cause" awfully high. Is total victory or total annihilation the only proof of "commitment"? Half of the Confederate soldiers were killed or wounded. How many more would have had to take a bullet to qualify as "commitment"?

Rating:
Summary: An outstanding contribution to Civil War studies
Review: Gallagher's THE CONFEDERATE WAR stirs controversy with its revisonist thesis that the South lost the Civil War for the obvious reason: it was beaten on the battlefield. Gallagher has taken some flak for this argument, which may be more of a testament to the current domination of the academic social sciences by statistic-obsessed behavorialists and aging neo-Marxists than any flaw in Gallagher's work. In this it does the same duty for the Civil War as Arthur Ferrill's THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE did for Roman studies. Neither Gallagher not Ferrill discount the presence of social or economic causes in each conflict - it's just that they weren't decisive or central in explaining the collapse of either polity. Gallagher is incisive and assembles an impressive array of evidence in suggesting that a failure of focus is responsible for such misconceptions. Just as Roman historians have far too often failed to take a broader view and ask why the Eastern Empire survived for a millenium after 476 AD despite sharing most of the same weaknesses of the Western Empire, Gallagher rightly points out that Northern society itself was deeply riven by many social and economic cleavages (he points out the tens of thousands of Northern men who fled to Canada to avoid the draft and the 1863 New York draft riots, to name but two examples).

That aside, Gallagher is on to something in asking how an agrarian society with virtually no infrastructure, and at the short end of 3 to 1 population odds and a tenth of the industrial capacity of the North managed to prolong the war for four hard years without a staggering dedication and willingness to sacrifice on the part of Southerners, whatever we may think of their devotion to an abhorent institution. And it's difficult to deny such dedication (however misplaced) in the face of the vast array of often touching first hand accounts of the war that Gallagher weaves into his text. Sometimes the obvious answer is the right answer, and Gallagher has done yeoman work in THE CONFEDERATE WAR to make just this point: the South was, in the final analysis, beaten by the Union on the battlefield. The only weakness (and I almost hesitate to mention it) is the sometimes workmanlike and academic prose, an almost unavoidable defect given the polemic nature of the work, but one which might be offputting to those accustomed to the novelistic style of, say, Foote or Maury. On its own terms, however, THE CONFEDERATE BOOK is an outstanding read. This is must reading for all Civil War students - whatever their perspective.

Rating:
Summary: Cutting edge and superb.
Review: Gary Gallagher has written an excellent and insightful book that presents novel interpretations and raises insightful questions; this book should be required reading for all Civil War historians.

In The Confederate War, Gallagher discusses the historiography and different interpretations of important themes in Confederate history--popular will, nationalism, military strategy, and ultimately defeat. One of Gallagher's main contentions develops the idea that Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia were the rallying point for nationalism and the support of the Confederate people, yeomen and slaveholder alike: he writes, "As the war progressed, Confederate citizens increasingly relied on their armies rather than on their central government to boost morale, and Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia eventually became the most important national institution." Gallagher also contends that the Southern people had a strong sense of nationalism prior to the war, and he cites numerous letters, diaries, and other written documents of the time to illustrate this Southern concept and identity. In addition, by presenting evidence of Southern support from the home front throughout the war and the unique problems surrounding Confederate desertion (fear of Yankee threats to loved ones at home and not lack of support for the war effort), Gallagher masterfully illustrates that the war was not lost because of internal divisiveness or strife within the Confederacy. He says that the Confederacy "waged a determined struggle for independence," and argues that the South could have won the war. Working from the beginning of the war, and not backwards from the defeat, Gallagher argues the Confederacy lost because of a flawed military strategy. He discusses the issues of supplies and men, as well as guerrilla warfare tactics and conventional tactics, which proved too costly for the Confederacy. Gallagher ends his book by discussing the defeat, and restating that "the Confederacy capitulated in the spring of 1865 because northern armies had demonstrated their ability to crush organized southern military resistance." Continuing, he comments, "persevering despite great adversity, they surrendered only when their pool of manpower had been ravaged, Union armies stood poised to smash opposing Confederate forces, and much of their country literally lay in ruins."

This book is an excellent read and should be included in every Civil War historian's library.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting Attempt
Review: Gary Gallagher is one of the most argumentative Civil War historians writing today. Practically every piece that he writes is controversial in at least one way. The Confederate War is no exception.

His principal thesis is to determine, not why the CSA lost the war, but "Why did so many Confederates fight for so long?" He attempts to answer this question by examining Southern feelings of nationalism, popular will, and the CSA's military strategy.

This work is primarily an apoligist's response to recent criticism of the CSA war effort, and some of the commonly held assumptions about why the war was concluded in the manner that it was. Many of Gallagher's assertions are intriguing, and occasionally refreshing. Unfortunately, he is so determined to prove that the CSA has been slandered that he frequently contradicts himself. Let me provide you with one example.

In the second section he attempts to prove that Southerners did have nationalist feelings about the CSA. As evidence of this he claims that towards the end of the war the CSA was considering arming slaves. Gallagher cites letters from soldiers that make referrence to this possibility and embrace it. In the third part, though, which analyzes CSA military strategy, he claims that the fear of slave rebellions made conducting a guerilla war impossible, and that historians who claim that having done so would have secured their independence are not looking at the situation properly. There are several other instances in which Gallagher uses an example to make a point, and then uses the counter example to make another.

This waffling does detract from the scholarly quality of the book, but it should not deter you from giving it a read. Gallagher is one of the most widely respected Civil War historians, and for good reason. The emotional nature of this book should not tarnish that reputation; in many ways it makes the book all the more interesting.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting!
Review: Gary W. Gallagher's The Confederate War is an examination of the Confederate nation during the Civil War. Gallagher believes that rather than answer the question, "Why did the Confederacy lose?", historians should be answering the question, "How did the Confederacy take so long to lose?". In four succinct chapters, he examines the "Popular Will", "Nationalism", "Military Strategy", and "Defeat" of the Confederacy. In part, Gallagher seeks to counter the popular notion that most white Confederates were unwilling to make significant sacrifices their fight for freedom. Gallagher relies heavily on statistics to demonstrate that approximately 75% of white Southern males of draft age ultimately served in the Confederate Army and, that despite the fact that one-third of these men died during the conflict, they did not desert in significantly higher numbers than their Northern counterparts. This unique examination of the Confederate nation is recommended for all those interested in the Civil War.

Rating:
Summary: Gallagher's views on the Confederate War experience
Review: If there is one thing I like about Gary Gallagher it is that he is determined to try and get things right when he discusses the Civil War. Unlike some other historians, he is not afraid to use a blend of perspectives (battlefield, cultural, political, etc.) when trying to explain or discover what happened, or more importantly, why things turned out a certain way in the Civil War. This book represents his attempt to discuss the Confederate war experience as it unfolded.

This book is classic Gallagher in that he uses a series of essays to really dig deep into many Confederate issues like: Why did the Confederates lose the war? How did they make it last so long? Was the Confederacy doomed from the start? Did most Southerners support the War, and/or believe in the cause? He augments his arguments with statistical analysis, passages from letters, and other supporting documents. Overall, he does a solid job of supporting his theory that historians should focus more energy into the question of How did the South make the war last so long instead of why did the South lose the war.

Some may find this book a bit dry since Gallagher spends many pages discussing other historians works. But, if you are interested in trying to see the war from the Southern perspective, then you will most likely enjoy this book. It is an interesting array of material from one of today's best Civil War scholars.

Rating:
Summary: Vital for a Civil War Collection
Review: In this short but very important work, Gallagher challenges the notion that the Confederacy did not develop a sense of nationalism and also many of the notions of the "lost cause" theory as well as a notion that the Confederacy was "stabbed in the back" by extensive internal tension among the populace as well as desertions. Gallagher uses many diaries and letters to bring home his points that the citizens of the CSA did in fact develop an extensive sense of nationalism and supported their cause right up until the end at Appomattox and even beyond. Gallagher also proves that while there were extensive disertions among some troops during many points in the war, many of those same troops rejoined their units after taking care of affairs at home. He also shows that rather than encouraging disertion because of problems at home, many Confederate women encouraged their men to stay with the army and not shirk their responsibilities to the CSA. Many historians also have recently concluded the CSA would have been better served to adopt a strategy of guerilla warfare against Union troops, Gallagher shows why this strategy would have been detrimental to southern society and the slave holding republic it wished to establish and therefore many recent historians miss the mark in asserting this strategy would have been proper and acceptable to the southern populace which wanted victories over Union forces.
My only gripe with this book is that it is really a compliation of several lectures by Dr. Gallagher that have been footnoted and extended. Therefore they really don't form an interconnected narrative and read like seperate small books. Had Dr. Gallagher attempted to form a more complete narrative with each of his sections of the book it would have been much better. However this is still an outstanding book and necessary for any serious student of the Civil War.

Rating:
Summary: Vital for a Civil War Collection
Review: In this short but very important work, Gallagher challenges the notion that the Confederacy did not develop a sense of nationalism and also many of the notions of the "lost cause" theory as well as a notion that the Confederacy was "stabbed in the back" by extensive internal tension among the populace as well as desertions. Gallagher uses many diaries and letters to bring home his points that the citizens of the CSA did in fact develop an extensive sense of nationalism and supported their cause right up until the end at Appomattox and even beyond. Gallagher also proves that while there were extensive disertions among some troops during many points in the war, many of those same troops rejoined their units after taking care of affairs at home. He also shows that rather than encouraging disertion because of problems at home, many Confederate women encouraged their men to stay with the army and not shirk their responsibilities to the CSA. Many historians also have recently concluded the CSA would have been better served to adopt a strategy of guerilla warfare against Union troops, Gallagher shows why this strategy would have been detrimental to southern society and the slave holding republic it wished to establish and therefore many recent historians miss the mark in asserting this strategy would have been proper and acceptable to the southern populace which wanted victories over Union forces.
My only gripe with this book is that it is really a compliation of several lectures by Dr. Gallagher that have been footnoted and extended. Therefore they really don't form an interconnected narrative and read like seperate small books. Had Dr. Gallagher attempted to form a more complete narrative with each of his sections of the book it would have been much better. However this is still an outstanding book and necessary for any serious student of the Civil War.

Rating:
Summary: The Confederate War
Review: One thing I enjoy about Gallagher - His volumes are an easy, yet fact-filled and stimulating read - This book is no exception. Where others have placed the demise of the Conferacy on a multitude of issues, Gallagher's basic premise is that the South lost the war due to it's armies failures to provide enough victories. He also provides powerful evidence that contrary to modern thinking, the Confederate populace did indeed have the morale and stamina to prosecute the war. Only with the defeat of the Army of Northern Virginia did the population "give up the ghost."

The most interesting issue presented in this volume is the perspective that historians should, instead of concentrating on why the South lost, look at why and how did the South last so long and fight so hard.

Overall a thought provoking book and a must for the Civil War affecianado.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting but incomplete
Review: Professor Gallagher's book, which really a series of lectures, expanded, illustrated, and footnoted, takes aim at the notion that the Confederates did not support their government enough (i.e. that the armies were "stabbed in the back" aka WWI Germany) and that the Confederacy developed little or insufficient "nationalism", however that is defined. These ideas are prevelant in both academic scholarship which likes to study everything except military history by looking for evidences of class and gender conflicts, and certain military historians, especially Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, & Still's Why the South Lost the Civil War who believed the South lost its "will to fight" rather early in the war. He makes a pretty good argument that the Rebels, both civilian and military, sustained their morale throughout the war and that there was no "stab in the back" and the Confederates were defeated the old fashioned way, on the battlefield. He also argues, rather effectively I think, that the North had the more brittle morale and could not have withstood nearly the abuse the South did without crumbling, although his statement that Northern morale was on the verge of collapse no less than four times is a bit much. He ignores some potential counterarguments, such as pro-Union Southerners, but many of his points are well made. Gallagher also agrues that alternative strategies, such as a more defensive Joe Johnston-type defensive or outright guerilla warfare, could not and would not have worked at all, but he failed to convince me that the strategy adopted, which defended Richmond at all costs while allowing the rest of the South to be overrun with bluecoats, was the best one possible.

My biggest beef with this book is that it is not much of a book at all, just four lectures beefed up on steroids, and as such is over-hyped and over-priced. I enjoyed his points of view but was rather dissappointed by its brevity and incompleteness.