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Rating: 
Summary: Last Chance for Victory is my Last Choice
Review: After reading some of the "hit reviews" about this book on this site, I'm reminded why so many critics either don't read what it is that they are criticizing, or simply are unable to process the detailed discussions presented by these authors. The "hit reviews" of this book are proof positive why uncritically thinking Civil War "buffs" love popularist histories, and how they do not like books that offer critically thinking analysis. "Last Chance for Victory" is a mind-bender, because it challenges almost every incorrect and oft-repeated nonsense about Lee at Gettysburg that has ever been published. And the authors do not excuse Lee for his faults. Instead, they examine the Confederate general and other Southern leaders in a way that exposes the popcorn-chomping, sophomoric approach that wrongly dipicts General Lee and others in the campaign. And while I still have some issues with a couple of the arguments within the book that I may not full agree with, I can never remember a better historical treatment of Robert E. Lee and the explanations of command issues facing the Confederate general on July 1 AND July 2; the three chapters that deal with these days are alone are worth much more than the price of the book. And as for Dennis Callaghan's "hit review"---why don't you try to find a better criticism of "Last Chance for Victory" than by lifting almost verbatim Sears' words from his incredibly mediocre history (which are entirely off-base and incorrect)? By using Sears' words, and passing them off as your own, along with admitting you did not read the book, tells everyone all they need to know.
Rating:
Summary: Don't waste your time or money
Review: I work in a bookstore and luckily was able to read through this book before purchasing it. I thought that this was going to be a new and exciting perspective on Lee's actions during the Gettysburg Campaign.
Boy, was I wrong. This is still the same old deification of Lee that misinformed "scholars" use to deflect blame from the general.
Lee was one of the best soldiers in either army, and one of the things that made him so endearing was his ability to accept blame for things that he perceived as his fault. Gettysburg was one of these. It's too bad that decendents of his generation can't respect this legacy that he left and understand that great men also make mistakes.
Don't waste money on another book that places Lee on a pedestal. Douglas Southall Freeman died awhile back and there's no need to revive his views in another whitewash of history.
Rating: 
Summary: A Thoughtful Consideration of the Battle of Gettysburg
Review: It is instructive to read Bowden and Ward's study, "Last Chance for Victory," because the book takes issue with much recent scholarship about the Battle of Gettysburg and of the factors which led to Southern defeat. Many students attribute the result of the battle to Southern overconfidence and to mistakes in judgment by the Confederate high command, particularly Robert E.Lee. Bowden and Ward draw a basic distinction in their study between command decisions on the one hand and the execution of these decisions on the other hand. They conclude that Lee was actively involved in the Battle of Gettysburg, on both the first and the second day, and that the failures on these days were failures of execution by Lee's subordinates. For example, Jeb Stuart's disobedience to Lee's orders early in the campaign, Richard Ewell's failure to take Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill, A.P. Hill's failure to timely advance his divisions on July 2 as part of Lee's en echelon plan of attack. Bowden and Ward exonerate James Longstreet, in agreement with most recent studies of Gettysburg, of dilatoriness on the second day of the battle. But they are highly critical of Longstreet's performance on July 3 and come too close to accusing Longstreet of responsiblity for the failure of Pickett's charge. Bowden and Ward also criticize Lee for delegating too much responsiblity to Longstreet on day 3, particularly when he knew that Longstreet opposed the frontal assault, and for failing to assume direct control of the charge himself. The aim of the study is polemical, in good part. The book is longer than it needs to be and many sections are too argumentative. Some of the argument I found unconvincing, which is not necessarily a bad thing in a book on a subject as controversial and difficult as the Battle of Gettysburg. The book has some outstanding virtues. The writing is clear (although the book is marred by many typos). When Bowden and Ward get down to explaining the specifics of the battle, the writing is informative, consise, and not overly bogged-down in detail. After reading the account of the fighting on July 1 and July 2, I thought I understood the confusing action of these days better than I had before. The maps in the book are helpful. The authors do a good job relating Lee's military strategy at Gettysburg to military theory, particularly as developed in the Napoleonic campaigns. This is not the only book a student of the Battle of Gettysburg should read because Bowden and Ward write from a standpoint presupposing some familiarity in the reader with recent accounts of the Battle. One of the cardinal virtues of the book is that it serves to remind the reader that there are many sides to a story. In any kind of serious study, it is good to learn to withhold judgment until one has considered a variety of points of view. This is a lesson in studying Gettysburg or in any serious study and the book teaches it well. I learned a great deal from this book but came away not entirely convinced. The main difficulty I have with Bowden and Ward's argument is that they try to separate too sharply the orders that Lee gave and his battle plan from the execution of these plans by his subordinates. The plan and the execution were closely related at many critical points of the battle. The shortcomings in execution by Lee's subordinates cannot be sharply distinguished from Lee's orders. In spite of what Bowden and Ward argue, many of these orders were ambiguous and were so viewed by those to whom they were directed. Further Lee had the opportunity to rectify many of the dilatory actions of his subordinates (or many of their actions which perhaps did not accord with his orders) but did not do so. For example, Lee could have been much more explicit with Ewell about capturing Cemetry Hill to remove any grounds for doubt and could have followed-up agressively with him. Lee had the opportunity to tell A.P. Hill to correct his formations on July 2 and to have his (Hill's) subordinate commanders move more decisively following the actions of Longstreet's Corps. He did not do so. There was a great deal of difficulty to go around in the Confederate battle plan and in its execution in these three momentous days. In addition, as Bowden and Ward realize, there was the Union Army. When these factors are considered, Bowden and Hill can be read as modifying but not radically changing scholarly consideration of the Battle of Gettysburg. Bowden and Ward try to foist responsiblity for the failure of "Pickett's Charge" on July 3 on Longstreet. There is nothing in their brief treatment of day 3 of the battle that convinces me that Pickett's charge had much chance of success or that Longsteet was to blame for the conception of the attack or for its execution. I don't understand that Bowden and Ward contend that the attack would likely have succeeded if it had been executed as they claim Lee had planned. I think the treatment of the third day of the battle is the weakest portion of this book. This book will help the student rethink the Battle of Gettysburg and to learn the value of deliberation before one draws overly firm and dogmatic conclusions about a difficult matter.
Rating: 
Summary: A Noun is the Name of a Thing
Review: Like several other reviewers, I am troubled by the treatment of Lee's so-called discretionary order to Ewell. The authors are wrong-headed in the face of the very materials they examine. I'd like to focus on the passage they cite by Col. Walter Taylor of Lee's staff that includes the following: "In the exercise of that discretion . . . General Ewell deemed it unwise to make a pursuit." It's 100% clear that Taylor, who delivered the order to Ewell, viewed the "discretion" Lee gave Ewell as the discretion to pursue or not pursue, to act or not act. Lee's discretion was absolutely not about leaving the tactical details up to Ewell; it was a matter of whether to press "those people" or not. The fact is Ewell was not weighing options about how to attack, he was weighing whether to attack at all, and he chose not to because, for among other reasons, Lee gave him the latitude to make this choice. Again turning to Taylor, he states that Lee wanted Ewell "to secure posession of the heights, and that, if possible, he wished him to do this." The two key words "if possible" admit discretion, or make the order discretionary, whether used as a noun, an adjective, or whatever--a semantic disctinction which fascinates the authors but adds no value to their analysis. Clearly, Lee gave Ewell an option. Ewell exercised the option. Thus the fault cannot rest solely with Ewell, as the authors assert on p. 206. The fault must, at least in part, be shared by Lee. Thus the 2nd most important point in the authors' "Reflections," p. 514, is seriously undercut, that Ewell alone was responsible for "Ewell's failure to pursue with the Second Corps on July 1." The apotheosis of Lee is a fruitless objective at this point in Civil War scholarship. Freeman and Dowdey have already checked that box. To resurect this cause is a burden that, regrettably, has undermined many of the valuable insights the authors provide. I'm reminded of the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Rating: 
Summary: Best treatment ever of Lee and the Gettysburg campaign
Review: There are numerous reasons why this book is superb, and why it has been named as part of the curriculum at the School of Advanced Military Studies at the United Stated Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1) The description of Lee's art of war, and the explanation of what Lee believed had to be done in order to give the Confederates the best chance to win is rooted in the lessons of the Great Captains, and has never before been presented this clearly; 2) Lee's vision of victory and how he could accomplish same through his operational objectives for the campaign, along with the military, logistical and political forces at work that combined to influence his decision to transfer the defense of Richmond out of Virginia and into the North, and how these continued to bear upon his decisions once the battle was underway, are laid out clearly; 3) The Lee-Stuart controversary is dealt with in unprecedented clarity. Bowden and Ward's presentation of the facts and analysis provides, for the first time, a clear understanding of what all the principals involved knew and understood at that time, and how Stuart, once he reached Haymarket, made a decision that violated Lee's restraining orders and resulted in him compromising his command and the trust placed in him by Lee; 4) The entire issue of how and why Lee concentrated the Confederate army in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area is explained in
detail. The timeline provided by the authors concerning when and where Lee received information, his resulting orders and more, demonstrate the continued implimentation of his operational plan and goals; 5) Thank goodness, that for the first time ever, we have two authors that have deleved into thoroughly and explained properly Lee's role in the July 1 fighting. What's more, Bowden and Ward present, for the first time, the entirety of all the issues---and there are many of them---involved with Lee's pursuit orders to Richard Ewell following the battle that day. Further, the authors demonstrate, conclusively in my military opinion, why so many past and present writers. along with so-called students of the battle, are confused over this issue. These are just some of the reasons that the chapter dealing with July 1 is impressive; 6) As impressive as the book is up to the battle of July 2, it is my belief that the best part of LAST CHANCE FOR VICTORY are the two chapters that deal with Lee's initial plan of battle, and the actual fighting on July 2. In spite of all that has been previously written about Gettysburg, Bowden and Ward are the first authors I know of that PROPERLY explain Lee's initial plan of action, AND how and why it was modified to the en echelon mode of attack once the Federals realigned their positions on the South end of the field. Lee was present to scout the enemy positions, ascertain those changes, and issue a change of orders accordingly that took into consideration the new relative positions of the armies that was consistent with the best way to accomplish the mission for that day. Moreover, the description of the fighting on July 2, COUPLED WITH the explanation of how the en echelon plan of attack was being implemented and how and why it broke down and what that meant to the detriment of the Confederate cause, can only be described as just superb; 7) Lee's plans for July 3, how these had to be modified, and how the attack that did take place that afternoon did not materialize as had been planned, are covered in a succinct manner that helps the reader identify how the attack failed and the multiply people responsible for its failure (including Lee); 8) The summary of the book ("Reflections") provides additional insight (including more analysis than what has already been given) to the most important issues that contributed to Lee's defeat. It is a powerful conclusion to a hard-hitting book. Are there any drawbacks to the book? Yes, given the reality of today's short-attention span public, and those with their minds already made up, there are. And after reading two recent so-called "reviews," I am more convinced than ever. THIS IS NOT A BOOK THAT CAN BE ABSORBED BY "BROWSING THROUGH" AT A BOOK STORE. THIS IS NOT A BOOK THAT CAN BE CLAIMED TO BE READ BUT THEN CRITICIZED IN A SPECIOUS WAY BECAUSE THE READER HAS NOT READ THE BOOK CAREFULLY ENOUGH IN ORDER TO GRASP THE TOTALITY OF THE
AUTHORS' ARGUMENTS. This does not mean that everyone who reads this book should AGREE with the authors. What this means is that there are legitimate criticisms and those which are not. LAST CHANCE FOR VICTORY is a highly detailed book that provides in-depth analysis never before presented involving very complex historical and historigraphical issues. As such, it reveals the strengths and weaknesses of Robert E. Lee at his greatest trial by combat. The testiment to this book is in its accomplishments, which to date are: Winner of the 2001 Douglas Southall Freeman History Award Winner of the 2001 General N B Forrest Southern History Award Winner of the 2001 Grady McWhiney Award of Merit Winner of the 2002 Bonnie Blue Society Literary Award and, arguably the most telling accomplishment, part of the curriculum at the US ARmy Command and General Staff College. Buy the book; read and study it carefully; enjoy it. JS
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Summary: Best read on Confederate hign command at Gettysburg!
Review: This book is far and away the best book on the command decisions of Lee and how each aspect of the battle's 3 days evolved and progressed. I am glad to see a well documented and well supported facts that show how failures within the chain of command (corp and division) that hindered Lee's plans from being developed proply on the battlefield.
The author does a fantastic job debunking the myths and hearsay that has all too often been accepted as gospel by historians and authors of the past. Bowden and Ward offer supporting references and documentation to support their findings.
This book far surpasses Coddington's work with regards to the Confederate leadership. This book should now serve as the definitive text on Lee's conduct of the battle at Gettysburg. It is a refreshing read!!!
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Summary: Fantastic book about Lee's decision making during Gettysburg
Review: This book is really fantastic. Several books do exist that presents more details about the actual battle, whereas this book assumes that the reader has at least a certain degree of previous knowledge of Gettysburg.
However this book is really fantastic in the description and the analysis of Lee's plans and decision making during the Gettysburg campaign.
It analyses the information available at the time the decisions were made and makes clear what the possible choices were.
It is a fundamental book to understand Lee's art of war and his and his lieutenants behaviour during the battle.
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Summary: TERRIFIC---COULD NOT PUT IT DOWN!!!
Review: This book was so frustrating to read I couldn't finish it.
I have read several books by Scott Bowden that were excellent,but this one is too biased. Although the authors did extensive research and make several good points,the book is to much of an apology for Robert E. Lee. All to often the authors stretch common sense and the truth.
My biggest beef is the treatment of Ewell's failure to attack Cemetary Hill on July 1st. The Argument that Lee's Order was a direct but polite order to attack might make sense at first glance but is in fact flawed. Lee was fighting a battle he did not want against an opponent he had little intelligence on. He had no first hand Knowledge of the ground in front of Ewell. He did not have a complete picture of the condition of Ewells corps or that of the enemy's. There was no way to know for sure what parts of Meade's army was near or what direction they might be approaching from. Ewell knew he could get no help from Hill or Longstreet. And Johnson's division had not yet arrived. Yet we are expected to believe that under these circumstances Lee would give Ewell a direct and positive order to attack. It makes more sense that Lee with incomplete knowledge of the ground and the enemy defered to his corps commander on the spot. The authors often use quotes and sources that support thier view and ignore those that condradict. For Example, many confederate accounts of July 1st are used to paint a picture of the complete rout and demoralization of the Union troops, but ignores any Union Account that says otherwise. They Quote Winfield Scott Hancock that a continued attack would sweep the Union troops off Cemetary Hill, but conveniantly forget to mention his assertion that one hour later it was a position that could not be easily taken. There are so many examples of this kind of one sided history that I could go on forever. But I would rather stop and forget that I ever read this book.
I cannot recommend this book for any one except those who are die hard Lee fans or those who wish to self induce a headache.
For those who are looking for a more Balanced view of the battle I suggest Coddingtons' "The Gettysburg Campaign" or Stephan Sears excellent new book "Gettysburg".
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Summary: A Must for Every War Between the States Student
Review: This is not just another book on Gettysburg. It is a long-overdue study of this important battle written from the point of view of what Lee and his generals knew before and during the 1863 battle. The authors care-fully craft Lee's background and his history and relationship with other leaders including Jefferson Davis and Jeb Stuart. They describe Lee's plans and the actual battle, including the failure of subordinates to effectively utilize their artillery on the disastrous last day. The authors did not base their presentation on how the battle turned out. Instead they explored the actions of the Confederates and analyzed the facts known to Lee, Stuart, and the others to determine the basis for decisions and courses taken. In doing so, Bowden and Ward reach conclusions drastically different than those of many other historians, showing that many of the popular myths about the battle are indeed false. By using Stuart's initial troop movements while Lee was moving north, they show that Stuart did indeed have orders to move north rather than take his wayward ride around the Union forces. They show that Lee's orders to Richard Ewell to take Cemetery Hill were not discretionary. They not only look at actions taken; they also examine options not taken. Lee's generalship in this battle is shown to be much better than often credited to him. The arguments of many of Lee's critics are addressed and refuted in detail. Even a reader with great knowledge of this battle will benefit from this book. It is a "Must Read" for every student of the War.
Rating: 
Summary: One sided view of Gettysburg
Review: This isn't actually a study of the Battle of Gettysburg so much as a study of Robert E. Lee's generalship there, and even then, it should be noted that it's really a defense of his generalship. Somewhere in the front of the book there's talk of an objective critical analysis, or something to that effect. Depends on your point of view, of course, but I wouldn't call it that at all. More along the lines of a nearly complete exoneration, something Lee himself never did or even tried to do. For one thing the book has an almost relentless pro-Confederate bias, in all aspects of its arguments. One example will suffice. In the early stages of the book, while discussing Lee's early career, the authors note that the U.S. Army in Mexico paid for all the food they foraged from the residents, which is true. The authors then opine that this probably was Lee's cue to act similarly during the 1863 campaign in Pennsylvania. This is one of those hoary old myths that deserve to be put to rest. The Army of Northern Virginia did pay for all the livestock and food they took while they were in the North---in useless Confederate paper money! They didn't pay, however, for the several hundred African-Americans (escaped slaves and freedmen) that they kidnapped and took south with them when they retreated. Neither of these two facts makes Lee look like the gallant cavalier the authors want you to be thinking of, however, so you need to ignore the little man behind the curtain for a minute while they regale you with the great general's gallantry. This is just the start, however. Everyone, it seems, made mistakes at Gettysburg. Davis goofed in not reinforcing Lee's army before it headed north. This is the only place I've ever heard the fantastic argument that Lee should have been reinforced from the west, rather than the other way around. The authors make the point that only in the east could the war be won by the Confederate army (as opposed to simply avoiding defeat) and feel that defeat in the west, at least in the short run, wasn't decisive. The part they leave out is that while victory in the east was possible, it would have been very difficult to pull off, and the Union armies there would have had an equally difficult time (and did, in actuality) defeating Lee's army. If Lee had reinforced either the Johnston/Pemberton armies, or Bragg's facing Rosecrans, the situation in the west might have recovered some, and it's difficult to see how things in the east would have been much worse. True, the farmers in northern Virginia would have had to endure Yankee occupation for another summer, but can anyone imagine Hooker (still in command of the army, presumably) doing anything intelligent, given a second chance? One major emphasis of the book is that Lee's plan for the battle, and the orders that he gave laying these things out, were basically brilliant, and that scores of other historians (Alan T. Nolan, Harry Pfanz, Edward Coddington, Glenn Tucker) simply don't understand the fine points of Lee's brilliance. The famous discretionary order to take Cemetery Hill given to Ewell at the end of the first day turns out to be peremptory, with the phrase "if practicable" just a courtesy. His resignation after the battle was an attempt to cover for incompetent subordinates. The authors argue that Lee's system of making suggestions rather than giving orders basically never existed, or at least wasn't in use here, when everyone else agrees that it did and was. Most other historians prefer Richard M. McMurray's point that the suggestion command system only really ever worked when Lee was in command of the army, with Jackson, Stuart, and Longstreet his principle subordinates. Instead this book goes on and on, repeating and hammering home the arguments that Lee made few mistakes until the third day of the battle (which, by a weird coincidence, gets the least coverage by far of the three) and that all of the responsibility for the defeat rests with Lee's subordinates, and Davis' refusal to reinforce the army before the battle. One side point: Longstreet is relatively gently handled, and rather extensively praised for his handling of his part of the second day's attack, which the authors see as achieving its objectives. This is one of the points that the author's make which is actually worthwhile: they believe that the assault on the second day was intended to lead to an attack by Dorsey Pender's division, which would have captured Cemetery Hill, and which was derailed when Pender was mortally wounded by an artillery shell. This is actually a good point, but the authors manage to obscure it. They also think Hood's wounding earlier had a negative effect. They do tend, however, to think that if things went according to plan, the Union army would have been powerless to stop the Confederates, and never consider the riposte that Meade would have come up with for a particular stratagem. Lastly, I must concur with the one reviewer who complained about the typos. There are numerous errors; they detract from the book greatly. I also can't see what the various Dale Gallon paintings are doing in a serious history of the battle. It's been a long time since I've read such a polemic history of anything. You almost never come across a book which criticizes other books by respected works on the subject as "flat wrong" and "mistaken." The authors have a habit of cherrypicking too. When Glenn Tucker praises Lee, he's brilliant, but when he criticizes him...you get the picture. There are some good points here, but I can't recommend the book for anyone but the most serious student of the battle, and he needs to be aware of the bias of the book prior to putting it to use, or at least recognize it.
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