How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War

Rating:
Summary: Highly informative for a military novice like me!
Review: Amongst the hundreds of civil war titles I have read, this is the standout, because it shows why the war ended the way it did.

The argument made that Grant and Sherman invented a form of warfare new to the Civil War--the strategic raid--and that such raids were what ended the war, is overwhelmingly convincing.

The attention to military matters, particularly logistics, explains so much that has always puzzled me.

The judgments concerning character are always interesting, even when I disagree, and the evidence is given so fairly, that in many cases view contrary to those of the authors are as strongly supported as their own.

Particularly useful is the evaluation of Grant and the evidence (as I read it) of Lincoln's utter focus on public opinion, that directly caused so much military horror (a view evidently shared by Halleck: one wonders whether it was shared by Halleck's men, Sherman and Grant).

What is surprising are the evident but trivial flaws in the book. Occassional horrible writing, that any editor, or grammar checker should have corrected; occassional sentences that directly contradict previous conclusions, thus being as wishy washy as a Union general with the slows, suggest some problems in the writing of the book, perhaps between the authors. But these lapses are so obvious and easy to correct (by the reader) that they hardly detract from the power of the book.

I cannot imagine someone thinking the same way about the Civil War after he reads this book.

Rating:
Summary: A coolly realistic appraisal of Confederate defeat ...
Review: Apologists for the Confederacy usually emphasise the difficulties the South faced in building up a nation in the throes of a War of Independence. However, they often minimise the advantages which also accrued to the South. In fact it could be argued that the North faced the much more difficult task of conquering the South, and not only conquering it, but subjugating it thoroughly - something which (for example) the British Empire failed to do with the nascent USA in the 18th century and again with the Boers and Irish at the start of the 20th century. Jones and Hattaway outline the strategy which finally (after some initial stuttering) won the war for the Union. In the process, they rehabilitiate only Grant but Henry Wager Halleck, usually dismissed as a dull bureaucrat, but appearing here as a sound strategist and shrewd selector of subordinates. Hopefully, some enterprising biographer will soon fill out this picture of Halleck. This book was also very important in bringing Grant back into focus as the North's most visionary and most successful general. They point out that the destruction of Confederate logistics, and the preservation of the Norths', ensured Union victory. However, this is more than a dry recitation of dull facts and statistics. It is a full and lively military history also. Highly recommended, and worthy to sit on anyones shelves besides the works of the great historians of the Civil War - McPherson, Foote, Catton, Nevins & Co.

Rating:
Summary: Whoopty-do.
Review: Dr. Hattaway does an amazing job of taking an over-studied aspect of American history (the four years during which the Civil war took place) and manages to...talk even more! Another one of those un-critical historical works that chooses to act mostly as a chronology and focuses on the un-interesting aspects of the civil war, such as military strategy and the boring lives of the leaders. Please, please, please, our universities are jam-packed with obsessive civil war historians!

Rating:
Summary: the best military history of the Civil War
Review: Hattaway and Jones have written the best military history of the Civil War, one that makes many other studies, including ones published ater HOW THE NORTH WON appeared, outdated. Those interested only in "gun & trumpet" history instead of real military history should be warned, however, that Hattaway and Jones properly devote time to crucial issues such as logistics, organization, and administration--this is not simply a "battle narrative" of the war but sound and provocative military analysis.

Rating:
Summary: A telling analysis of Civil War strategy.
Review: This is a brilliant analysis -- and only incidentally a narrative -- of the military side of the Civil War. It should be read along with a companion volume, "Why the South Lost the Civil War," co-authored by Herman Hattaway, who also co-authored this book. The starting point for the book is a thorough understanding of mid-nineteenth century military theory, especially as expounded by the Swiss writer, Jomini. Briefly, the authors contend that the formations (corps/divison/brigade, etc.) introduced by Napoleon gave mass armies unprecedented tactical flexibility. At the same time, the rifled musket extended the infantry's reach. The result was that armies could be maneuvered so rapidly and put out so much defensive firepower that it was impossible to destroy one unless the opposing command made exceptional mistakes. Pemberton made such a mistake by bottling himself up in Vicksburg and something similar happened at Fort Henry. Otherwise, not ever the worse mauling could destroy the ability of a well-equipped army to stage a strategic retreat. This practical invulnerability explains why the long list of major battles in the East -- Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, the Seven Days, etc. -- had little effect on the war. (Even Lee once commented on the "curiously hollow" nature of his victories.) In short, the great battles of the war -- long the focus of Civil War history -- decided little or nothing. The stalemate in the East was the result not of inept leadership (e.g. Burnside) but of the real inability of either side, regardless of how led, to fatally damage the other. The war in the West was different because there the Union could take advantage of riverine communications. Nothing more clearly illustrates the old saw that "Amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics." Union command of the Tennessee allowed deep and successful penetration into the Confederacy by first Halleck and then Grant. But, as soon as those riverine lines were not available the Union bogged down and an eastern-like stalemate prevailed. Neither side could really annihilate the other. The authors also argue: 1. The blockade was virtually meaningless. 2. The division of the Confederacy at Vicksburg was, likewise, meaningless. The one tactic that did work was that of Grant and Sherman and it involved massive raids into the Confederate interior. Sherman's march to the sea is the best known, but his subsequent northern march to North Carolina was just as destructive. In these massive raids it was not necessary to engage the opponent's armies (which couldn't be destroyed, anyway.) But, the authors argue, what made the massive raids effective was the blow they dealt to Confederate morale. And, here, we reach the nub of their argument. Why did the Confederacy surrender? Not, the authors say, because it was defeated. It still had armies in the field and an organized government (albeit one on the lam.) It was defeated because Confederate "nationalism" was fradulent from the start. They compare, briefly, the ready Confederate surrender in 1865 with the guerilla fighting during the Peninular War in Spain. They also, briefly, allude to the American effort in Viet Nam. In the end, the Confederates (like the South Vietnamese) found so little real difference between themselves and their opponents that a scorched earth guerrilla war was never a viable option. After all, the North and South shared the same history, language, political system, religious outlook, and traditions. When faced with military reverses in the field, southern nationalism was insufficient to support southern political pretensions. This is a brilliantly argued book. It is not, however, for the Bruce Catton fan. It is, rather, a dispassionate analysis of nineteenth century military capacity. Its dismissal of landmark battles as largely irrelevant will anger some Civil War buffs. Its scorn for such longtime standbys as the blockade as the source of Confederate defeat will, likewise, draw protests. And, the authors rehabilitate despised commanders, such as Halleck. These, they argue, did rather well under the circumstances. For instance, Meade's refusal to pursue Lee is seen as the right decision: Lee's army could be turned back but not destroyed. Lincoln and Halleck knew that the war could not be won in the East. Stalemate was inevitable. It could be won in the West, due to the wild card of the western rivers. In Halleck, and then Grant, the right commanders were found. When Grant came east, he hit the same wall in his Overland Campaign that his predecessors ran into. A modern army simply could not be annihilated. But, the morale of the people could be broken. The North won because the South was willing to lose. In the end, its fradulent nationalism could not support the bloody and destructive guerrilla war that might have won real independence.