The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform

Rating:
Summary: Concise analysis of German rearmament in the Interwar years.
Review: Corum, a historian, German linguist, and former military intelligence officer has written a fine study of how Germany was able to absorb the lessons of its defeat in WWI, overcome the restrictions placed on the size and composition of its armed forces, and develop the revolutionary military doctrine that swept it to astonishing victories against every European country it engaged. Corum focuses on General Hans von Seeckt, enigmatic Chief of the German General Staff -- twice awarded the Pour le Merit, Germany's highest decoration for valor -- as the architecht of this remarkable feat. Seeckt set the stage for reform of the Army by fostering a climate of open discussion on all matters regarding doctrine development in which the ideas of the best thinkers -- regardless of rank -- were given a full hearing. A tremendous number of experimental programs were conducted to try out various tactical doctrine. Many of these, secretly carried out in the USSR. Corum cites numerous training manuals, military correspondence and other primary resource documents to illustrate the revolutionary nature of Seeckt's impact on the German military. The book appeared about the same time as a book on American preparation for WWII -- There's a War to be Won -- that is very instructive when read together with Roots of Blitzkrieg. Current military leaders and their civilian overseers should read both books and bear in mind that the constrained resourses available to our armed forces today make the German model the more relevant of the two. Americans, fifty years ago could count on the full mobilization of our industrial and population base to prepare for war. Today's headlines continually reflect lack of preparedness in training exercises, inability to recruit and retain quality personnel (especially pilots), and inadequate funding for research and development programs -- a formula for disaster. Our political focus on humanitarian missions conducted by our armed forces has diverted training and R & D funds and that other scarce resource -- time -- from their intended purposes and prevented implementation of new information age technology. Corum's book demonstrates that, with even minimal support from the political establishment, the U.S. could revive its rapidly deteriorating military capability.

Rating:
Summary: Concise analysis of German rearmament in the Interwar years.
Review: Corum, a historian, German linguist, and former military intelligence officer has written a fine study of how Germany was able to absorb the lessons of its defeat in WWI, overcome the restrictions placed on the size and composition of its armed forces, and develop the revolutionary military doctrine that swept it to astonishing victories against every European country it engaged. Corum focuses on General Hans von Seeckt, enigmatic Chief of the German General Staff -- twice awarded the Pour le Merit, Germany's highest decoration for valor -- as the architecht of this remarkable feat. Seeckt set the stage for reform of the Army by fostering a climate of open discussion on all matters regarding doctrine development in which the ideas of the best thinkers -- regardless of rank -- were given a full hearing. A tremendous number of experimental programs were conducted to try out various tactical doctrine. Many of these, secretly carried out in the USSR. Corum cites numerous training manuals, military correspondence and other primary resource documents to illustrate the revolutionary nature of Seeckt's impact on the German military. The book appeared about the same time as a book on American preparation for WWII -- There's a War to be Won -- that is very instructive when read together with Roots of Blitzkrieg. Current military leaders and their civilian overseers should read both books and bear in mind that the constrained resourses available to our armed forces today make the German model the more relevant of the two. Americans, fifty years ago could count on the full mobilization of our industrial and population base to prepare for war. Today's headlines continually reflect lack of preparedness in training exercises, inability to recruit and retain quality personnel (especially pilots), and inadequate funding for research and development programs -- a formula for disaster. Our political focus on humanitarian missions conducted by our armed forces has diverted training and R & D funds and that other scarce resource -- time -- from their intended purposes and prevented implementation of new information age technology. Corum's book demonstrates that, with even minimal support from the political establishment, the U.S. could revive its rapidly deteriorating military capability.

Rating:
Summary: The Reichswehr: A very sticky topic
Review: Professor Corum has produced a very concise (c. 200 pages) history of how the German Army spent its inter-war years. Including chapters on doctrinal development (air and ground), training, and weapons design and implementation, Dr. Corum has done his best to avoid political/strategic questions that are inherent in a text covering the rebirth of the German military.

Dr. Corum also makes a statement in focusing on General Hans Von Seeckt as the driving force behind many of the reforms the Reichswehr undertook during his years as chief of the general staff. By taking the spotlight away from Heinz Guderian, Corum has placed the emphasis on the man who fostered the kind of general staff where sweeping tactical and organizational changes were possible. Professor Corum also makes it very clear that those changes were in large part due to a serious assessment of the lessons of the First World War.

A reader from an allied country may have difficulties in trying to separate the great advances in warfare made during the period of the Reichswehr, and how these principles were misused only a few years later. However, one can not avoid marveling at the professionalism and flexibility of the tradition of the Prussian General Staff, and it is those qualities that Professor Corum has focused on in his text.

Rating:
Summary: The Reichswehr: A very sticky topic
Review: Professor Corum has produced a very concise (c. 200 pages) history of how the German Army spent its inter-war years. Including chapters on doctrinal development (air and ground), training, and weapons design and implementation, Dr. Corum has done his best to avoid political/strategic questions that are inherent in a text covering the rebirth of the German military.

Dr. Corum also makes a statement in focusing on General Hans Von Seeckt as the driving force behind many of the reforms the Reichswehr undertook during his years as chief of the general staff. By taking the spotlight away from Heinz Guderian, Corum has placed the emphasis on the man who fostered the kind of general staff where sweeping tactical and organizational changes were possible. Professor Corum also makes it very clear that those changes were in large part due to a serious assessment of the lessons of the First World War.

A reader from an allied country may have difficulties in trying to separate the great advances in warfare made during the period of the Reichswehr, and how these principles were misused only a few years later. However, one can not avoid marveling at the professionalism and flexibility of the tradition of the Prussian General Staff, and it is those qualities that Professor Corum has focused on in his text.