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Rating: 
Summary: A Sober Overview of a Heroic Tale
Review: The siege of the Alamo has become so imbued with a legendary aura that attempting to write a military history of the 1836 campaign in Texas is now a daunting task. Heroic visions of Crockett, Bowie and Travis fending off Mexican assault troops on the ramparts has tended to obscure the fact that the siege of the Alamo was neither the beginning or the end of the war for Texas independence. Noted Texas historian Stephen L. Harding has framed the 1836 campaign in its proper perspective, without embellishment or historical embellishment. The result is a lucid and well-written account that covers the entire campaign from February to May 1836, without over-focusing just on the Alamo. In accordance with the standard Osprey Campaign series format, the book begins with a section on the origins of the campaign and the chronology. While this section lays out the roots of the conflict clearly, the relationship between the fledgling Texan republic and the United States is left ambiguous, particularly in regard to military support and volunteers. The section on opposing commanders focuses almost exclusively on the Mexican General Santa Anna and the Texian General Sam Houston, both of whom are portrayed as very flawed commanders. Unfortunately, details on other significant commanders such as Travis, Bowie, Crockett and Fannin are inserted in the campaign narrative, which is disruptive. It was interesting however to see that attention given to the oft-neglected Mexican General Urrea's skillful operations. The section on opposing armies is weak, compounded by the fact that there is not even an order of battle provided for the Mexican army. Nevertheless, what the narrative lacks in military detail is often compensated for by an effective literary style is used to enhance the author's points. For example, the author notes both the rank discrimination and logistic difficulties in the Mexican army by asserting, "[Mexican] generals drank French wine from cut crystal, soldados drank stagnant water out of mud holes." The text is supported by five 2-D maps (Mexico & Texas in 1836, the Texas Campaign in 1836, the Battle of Coleto Creek, the San Jacinto Campaign and the Mexican Retreat) and three 3-D Birds-eye-view maps (two depicting the assaults on the Alamo and one on the Battle of San Jacinto). There are also three very good battle scenes: the death of Travis at the Alamo, Crockett falling back into the Alamo Church and the execution of Colonel Fannin. Numerous illustrations and modern photographs of the Alamo complement the narrative. In addition, the author has provided a detailed section on visiting the battlefield today and includes relevant Internet websites. Taken together, this book represents an excellent short history of the campaign and a useful battlefield guide for visitors.
The campaign narrative itself is quite good, with about ten pages devoted to the siege of the Alamo, nine to Fannin's pathetic efforts and the Goliad massacre, and nine to the San Jacinto Campaign. The author is a bit vague on casualties and military details, but he does detail the effects of the harsh winter weather and desolate terrain on the Mexican offensive. Indeed, weather and terrain probably played a bigger role in the Mexican defeat than Texian heroics. Concerning the fall of the Alamo, the author believes that Santa Anna launched a costly frontal assault for political rather than military reasons, but this downplays the fact that Santa Anna was de facto Mexican head of state and commander in chief. Santa Anna could not afford to waste too much time in sieges of minor rebel fortifications. Also, Santa Anna's "no quarter" policy to the Texian rebels was not out of step with other similar 19th Century sieges like the Paris Commune in 1870 or even Dublin in 1916. Imagine if Santa Anna had accepted surrender at the Alamo and allowed the rebels to go home on parole; could men such as Travis ever be trusted to live meekly under centralista rule? Not likely. If Santa Anna wanted to hold onto the rebels, he had to either kill them or drive them out, since there was no room for compromise. If anything is reaffirmed by the 1836 campaign, it is that war is tough on the defeated, whether Texians at the Alamo or Mexicans at San Jacinto. In the end, the author concludes that the Texians won in spite of the incompetence of Sam Houston, who refused to send a relief force to the Alamo, then avoided battle thereafter and retreated toward the US border. Houston was more politician than soldier and his troops were openly contemptuous of his leadership abilities. At San Jacinto, Santa Anna's own leadership flaws compensated for Houston's incompetence and Texian ferocity inspired by the Alamo and Goliad massacres was enough to tip the balance in their favor.
Rating:
Summary: A Sober Overview of a Heroic Tale
Review: The siege of the Alamo has become so imbued with a legendary aura that attempting to write a military history of the 1836 campaign in Texas is now a daunting task. Heroic visions of Crockett, Bowie and Travis fending off Mexican assault troops on the ramparts has tended to obscure the fact that the siege of the Alamo was neither the beginning or the end of the war for Texas independence. Noted Texas historian Stephen L. Harding has framed the 1836 campaign in its proper perspective, without embellishment or historical embellishment. The result is a lucid and well-written account that covers the entire campaign from February to May 1836, without over-focusing just on the Alamo. In accordance with the standard Osprey Campaign series format, the book begins with a section on the origins of the campaign and the chronology. While this section lays out the roots of the conflict clearly, the relationship between the fledgling Texan republic and the United States is left ambiguous, particularly in regard to military support and volunteers. The section on opposing commanders focuses almost exclusively on the Mexican General Santa Anna and the Texian General Sam Houston, both of whom are portrayed as very flawed commanders. Unfortunately, details on other significant commanders such as Travis, Bowie, Crockett and Fannin are inserted in the campaign narrative, which is disruptive. It was interesting however to see that attention given to the oft-neglected Mexican General Urrea's skillful operations. The section on opposing armies is weak, compounded by the fact that there is not even an order of battle provided for the Mexican army. Nevertheless, what the narrative lacks in military detail is often compensated for by an effective literary style is used to enhance the author's points. For example, the author notes both the rank discrimination and logistic difficulties in the Mexican army by asserting, "[Mexican] generals drank French wine from cut crystal, soldados drank stagnant water out of mud holes." The text is supported by five 2-D maps (Mexico & Texas in 1836, the Texas Campaign in 1836, the Battle of Coleto Creek, the San Jacinto Campaign and the Mexican Retreat) and three 3-D Birds-eye-view maps (two depicting the assaults on the Alamo and one on the Battle of San Jacinto). There are also three very good battle scenes: the death of Travis at the Alamo, Crockett falling back into the Alamo Church and the execution of Colonel Fannin. Numerous illustrations and modern photographs of the Alamo complement the narrative. In addition, the author has provided a detailed section on visiting the battlefield today and includes relevant Internet websites. Taken together, this book represents an excellent short history of the campaign and a useful battlefield guide for visitors.
The campaign narrative itself is quite good, with about ten pages devoted to the siege of the Alamo, nine to Fannin's pathetic efforts and the Goliad massacre, and nine to the San Jacinto Campaign. The author is a bit vague on casualties and military details, but he does detail the effects of the harsh winter weather and desolate terrain on the Mexican offensive. Indeed, weather and terrain probably played a bigger role in the Mexican defeat than Texian heroics. Concerning the fall of the Alamo, the author believes that Santa Anna launched a costly frontal assault for political rather than military reasons, but this downplays the fact that Santa Anna was de facto Mexican head of state and commander in chief. Santa Anna could not afford to waste too much time in sieges of minor rebel fortifications. Also, Santa Anna's "no quarter" policy to the Texian rebels was not out of step with other similar 19th Century sieges like the Paris Commune in 1870 or even Dublin in 1916. Imagine if Santa Anna had accepted surrender at the Alamo and allowed the rebels to go home on parole; could men such as Travis ever be trusted to live meekly under centralista rule? Not likely. If Santa Anna wanted to hold onto the rebels, he had to either kill them or drive them out, since there was no room for compromise. If anything is reaffirmed by the 1836 campaign, it is that war is tough on the defeated, whether Texians at the Alamo or Mexicans at San Jacinto. In the end, the author concludes that the Texians won in spite of the incompetence of Sam Houston, who refused to send a relief force to the Alamo, then avoided battle thereafter and retreated toward the US border. Houston was more politician than soldier and his troops were openly contemptuous of his leadership abilities. At San Jacinto, Santa Anna's own leadership flaws compensated for Houston's incompetence and Texian ferocity inspired by the Alamo and Goliad massacres was enough to tip the balance in their favor.
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