Peleliu 1944: The Forgotten Corner of Hell

Rating:
Summary: FINE GENERAL OVERVIEW
Review: A nice very easy access to this very bloody and forgotten battle. There is a very good section on how the battle figured in the overall strategic plans. In final analysis (and no one wants to admit it), like modern day Iraq, Peleliu was a battle that need never have been fought. Monday morning quarterbacking is easy, but there are some real glaring inconsistencies that someone should have taken the blame for at the time.

If aerial recce's were done of Peleliu they would have instantly reccognised the central ridge of about 200 metres in height poking out of the jungle (I have flown over it twice at several elevations and can assure you that it is VERY visible). Whay was this info. not conveyed to operational commanders?

Bleeding the Marines in this battle gained the Americans nothing. Better to have taken Anguar established their base there and left the rest of the Palaus alone. It would have worked because that is in fact what more or less happened: the landings at Peleliu and Anguar still left the main island and numerous lesser islands occupied but neutralised. Why not neutralise Peleliu as well.

That is the central question that will remain unanswered. This Osprey Edition does a good job of the overview of the battle and the hell that both sides faced in this "forgotten battle."

Text is good but suffers from inaccurate rendering of Japanese names into Roman Script (eg. Taksgo is not a Japanese name). As do so many books on the Pacific war. The easy Japanese phonetic alphabet make such mistakes inexcusable.

Rating:
Summary: Another Fine Addition to the Campaign Series
Review: Peleliu 1944, Osprey Campaign volume number 110, covers one of the more obscure but controversial battles of the Pacific War. Jim Moran and Gordon L. Rottman, two authors well versed in US Marine Corps history, have done a fine job synthesizing the available secondary sources on the battle into a succinct campaign narrative. A detailed, blow-by-blow campaign narrative, combined with excellent maps and photographs, makes Peleliu 1944 a fine addition to the Osprey Campaign series. The authors succeed in laying out the two most enduring questions about the battle: was the invasion of Peleliu necessary and why was it so costly?

In standard Osprey Campaign series format, Peleliu 1944 begins with short sections on the origins of the campaign, a chronology, and sections on opposing plans, commanders and forces. The campaign narrative itself is 48 pages long, followed by a brief aftermath section, comments on the battlefield today and a bibliography. There are a total of three "Birds-Eye View" 3-D maps (D-Day on Peleliu, Securing the North of Peleliu and the Reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket), six 2-D maps (Strategic situation, the Palau Islands, Peleliu Island, D-Day to D+8, Capture of Angaur Island and the Umurbrogol Mountains), and three battle scenes (Beach Orange on D-Day, the Japanese tank counterattack and Reducing the Umurbrogol Pocket). The authors also provide very detailed orders of battle for the 1st Marine Division, the US Army 81st Infantry Division and the Japanese forces on Peleliu.

The controversy about Peleliu began even before the invasion. Admiral Halsey wanted to neutralize the island by bombardment and then bypass it, as so many other islands had been bypassed. However, Admiral Nimitz disregarded this suggestion and ordered the invasion to proceed in order to remove a potential threat to General Macarthur's imminent invasion of the Philippines. The authors clearly point out that most of the Japanese aircraft and naval vessels in the Palau Island group had been destroyed by US air raids well before the invasion. Thus, the threat to Macarthur was minimal. Securing Peleliu provided the US Navy with a convenient but not critical base (although it did help to rescue the survivors of the sunken USS Indianapolis in 1945). Thus the question really devolves to whether or not the invasion was worth the cost, since it was clearly not critical to winning the war in the Pacific.

On the conduct of the battle itself, Moran and Rottman clearly place the blame for the heavy US casualties on two causes: inadequate intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and incompetent senior leadership. In modern parlance, IPB focuses on gaining information about the terrain, weather and enemy that will enable the friendly commander to make the best possible decisions. However, the US Marines landing on Peleliu were continuously presented with unpleasant surprises about the terrain, weather and enemy. Instead of the "mostly low and flat terrain" briefed prior to D-Day, the invaders were confronted with undetected anti-tank ditches, coral outcrops and the very nasty Umurbrogol Mountains. How did aerial reconnaissance miss mountains this size? The Marines had only expected a short three-day fight for Peleliu and had not really considered the weather. However, temperatures around 100? F fatigued the Marines and the monsoon rains disrupted the build-up. Finally, the Japanese altered their tactics on Peleliu. The Japanese were beginning to learn from previous battles that wild Banzai charges consumed their troops quickly and led to short battles. On Peleliu the Japanese demonstrated a new preference for protracted, attritional struggles based around interlocking and cunningly hidden defenses. Indeed, it is hard not to read this book and gain great respect for the incredible defense put up by the Japanese troops on Peleliu. All three factors - terrain, weather and new enemy tactics - ruined the American timetable and exacted a heavy toll on the invaders.

Moran and Rottman blame Major General Rupertus, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, for much of the heavy casualties on Peleliu. Rupertus initially claimed that Peleliu would be secured in 3-4 days of hard fighting. It quickly became apparent on D-Day that the Marines were running into unexpectedly tough resistance, but Rupertus did not elect to alter his timetable. Instead, Rupertus continually urged his regimental commanders to make costly frontal assaults until his division was virtually decimated. Rupertus refused to ask for the 81st Division to relieve his Marines and he foolishly released his tank battalion just when his troops most needed armor support. Rupertus kept urging his exhausted marines into futile assaults until there was nothing left to give. At that point, the First Marines were relieved and replaced by the 81st Division, which eventually secured the island after two more months. In the end, it took the Americans over two months to secure Peleliu and cost over 1,500 dead. One big question left unanswered is why Nimitz didn't intervene to stop this senseless bloodletting and why Rupertus wasn't relieved until after the operation. Obviously, there were more than a few reputations to protect from fallout from the Peleliu slugfest. For military professionals, Peleliu 1944 provides an instructive lesson on the perils of over-confident predictions based on inadequate knowledge of the terrain, weather and a resourceful enemy.

Rating:
Summary: Another Fine Addition to the Campaign Series
Review: Peleliu 1944, Osprey Campaign volume number 110, covers one of the more obscure but controversial battles of the Pacific War. Jim Moran and Gordon L. Rottman, two authors well versed in US Marine Corps history, have done a fine job synthesizing the available secondary sources on the battle into a succinct campaign narrative. A detailed, blow-by-blow campaign narrative, combined with excellent maps and photographs, makes Peleliu 1944 a fine addition to the Osprey Campaign series. The authors succeed in laying out the two most enduring questions about the battle: was the invasion of Peleliu necessary and why was it so costly?

In standard Osprey Campaign series format, Peleliu 1944 begins with short sections on the origins of the campaign, a chronology, and sections on opposing plans, commanders and forces. The campaign narrative itself is 48 pages long, followed by a brief aftermath section, comments on the battlefield today and a bibliography. There are a total of three "Birds-Eye View" 3-D maps (D-Day on Peleliu, Securing the North of Peleliu and the Reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket), six 2-D maps (Strategic situation, the Palau Islands, Peleliu Island, D-Day to D+8, Capture of Angaur Island and the Umurbrogol Mountains), and three battle scenes (Beach Orange on D-Day, the Japanese tank counterattack and Reducing the Umurbrogol Pocket). The authors also provide very detailed orders of battle for the 1st Marine Division, the US Army 81st Infantry Division and the Japanese forces on Peleliu.

The controversy about Peleliu began even before the invasion. Admiral Halsey wanted to neutralize the island by bombardment and then bypass it, as so many other islands had been bypassed. However, Admiral Nimitz disregarded this suggestion and ordered the invasion to proceed in order to remove a potential threat to General Macarthur's imminent invasion of the Philippines. The authors clearly point out that most of the Japanese aircraft and naval vessels in the Palau Island group had been destroyed by US air raids well before the invasion. Thus, the threat to Macarthur was minimal. Securing Peleliu provided the US Navy with a convenient but not critical base (although it did help to rescue the survivors of the sunken USS Indianapolis in 1945). Thus the question really devolves to whether or not the invasion was worth the cost, since it was clearly not critical to winning the war in the Pacific.

On the conduct of the battle itself, Moran and Rottman clearly place the blame for the heavy US casualties on two causes: inadequate intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and incompetent senior leadership. In modern parlance, IPB focuses on gaining information about the terrain, weather and enemy that will enable the friendly commander to make the best possible decisions. However, the US Marines landing on Peleliu were continuously presented with unpleasant surprises about the terrain, weather and enemy. Instead of the "mostly low and flat terrain" briefed prior to D-Day, the invaders were confronted with undetected anti-tank ditches, coral outcrops and the very nasty Umurbrogol Mountains. How did aerial reconnaissance miss mountains this size? The Marines had only expected a short three-day fight for Peleliu and had not really considered the weather. However, temperatures around 100? F fatigued the Marines and the monsoon rains disrupted the build-up. Finally, the Japanese altered their tactics on Peleliu. The Japanese were beginning to learn from previous battles that wild Banzai charges consumed their troops quickly and led to short battles. On Peleliu the Japanese demonstrated a new preference for protracted, attritional struggles based around interlocking and cunningly hidden defenses. Indeed, it is hard not to read this book and gain great respect for the incredible defense put up by the Japanese troops on Peleliu. All three factors - terrain, weather and new enemy tactics - ruined the American timetable and exacted a heavy toll on the invaders.

Moran and Rottman blame Major General Rupertus, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, for much of the heavy casualties on Peleliu. Rupertus initially claimed that Peleliu would be secured in 3-4 days of hard fighting. It quickly became apparent on D-Day that the Marines were running into unexpectedly tough resistance, but Rupertus did not elect to alter his timetable. Instead, Rupertus continually urged his regimental commanders to make costly frontal assaults until his division was virtually decimated. Rupertus refused to ask for the 81st Division to relieve his Marines and he foolishly released his tank battalion just when his troops most needed armor support. Rupertus kept urging his exhausted marines into futile assaults until there was nothing left to give. At that point, the First Marines were relieved and replaced by the 81st Division, which eventually secured the island after two more months. In the end, it took the Americans over two months to secure Peleliu and cost over 1,500 dead. One big question left unanswered is why Nimitz didn't intervene to stop this senseless bloodletting and why Rupertus wasn't relieved until after the operation. Obviously, there were more than a few reputations to protect from fallout from the Peleliu slugfest. For military professionals, Peleliu 1944 provides an instructive lesson on the perils of over-confident predictions based on inadequate knowledge of the terrain, weather and a resourceful enemy.

Rating:
Summary: Good overview, poor editing
Review: This is a better Osprey book than most, but it doesn't reach its potential. In spite of the name, the book describes the U.S. Marine and U.S. Army infantry actions on all of the Palau Islands, though the emphasis is on Peleliu. In the typical Osprey format it begins with an overview of the campaign in the context of the Philipine campaign, describes the opposing commanders, and then delves into the details of the campaign itself. The last sections include the aftermath of the battle and a brief description of the islands today.

For the most part the book is pretty solid. World War II is not my specialty, and I'm just starting to read about the war in the Pacific. From what I have read elsewhere the book is reasonably accurate. The writing style is clean. Unlike when reading some of Osprey's other campaign books, I had little trouble following the action. Although the authors don't stick to a strict chronological order, they don't hop around more than is necessary. As always, the maps are gorgeous and excellent. I liked the Orders of Battle, though I wish they included the number of men at each organization level, but that's a minor quibble.

I had a couple of issues with the narrative. I wish they had spent more time explaining what was going on with the U.S. Navy elements during the campaign. The authors mention the initial, pre-invasion bombardment. They describe how Admiral Oldendorf declared that his ships had hit all available targets and ordered some to leave for the Philipines. They don't list the ships that were left, what they did during the rest of the campaign (were they conducting bombardment or just acting as a picket line?), or where they were located. This is important because several barges of Japanese reinforcements made for Peleliu during the battle, with 600 soldiers actually landing on the island. The book doesn't make clear how these soldiers managed to sneak through the navy cordon. There are some other details I'd have liked to have known, too, such as whether carrier airstrikes in support of the U.S. troops were a daily occurance, and when exactly the Marine fighters arrived on the island.

Although the authors did a good job of explaining the Japanese command structure, and the initial Japanese counterattacks, there is little on Japanese deployments, and virtually nothing beyond those counterattacks describing Japanese troop movements. They state that Col. Nakagawa was one of the two best tacticians the Japanese had, but there is no sense of why they believe this. The book doesn't describe any Japanese movements except in terms of their perimeter shrinking and the number of men left. Did Nakagawa place all of his men at the beginning of the battle and pretty much leave them there, or was he constantly shifting troops around? When the Marines first assaulted the Umurbrogol Mountains in the south, were there Japanese troops sitting around waiting in the north, or did Nakagawa move troops from quiet sectors to critical sectors? This isn't explained. I wanted an idea of the number of Japanese casualties per day, but Japanese casualties aren't mentioned except at a few key points in the battle. A couple of paragraphs describing Japanese infiltration techniques and the "limited counter-attacks" would have been most useful, but the book doesn't go into this level of detail for the Japanese (it does go into some of this kind of detail on the Marine side, especially in reference to a couple of the full color plates showing typical combat scenes). I really wanted a better idea of how the Japanese defenses were laid out, even if it was just a small diagram of a typical defensive layout but that wasn't supplied. Perhaps much of the information on the Japanese side of the campaign isn't available. If that's the case, it should have been mentioned.

In spite of these shortcomings I'd still give the book 4 stars for content, considering the size limitations. I only give it 3 stars because of the editing. This is, unfortunately, a common problem with Osprey books. The book was published in October, 2002, yet the text mentions something that happened in January, 2002. Nine months from finished manuscript to printed book is too fast to do a half decent editing job. Editing mistakes, such as sentence fragments, and phrases repeated at the end and the beginning of the same sentence, are found throughout the book, in the text and in picture captions. Editing problems throw some minor details into doubt. In one section of the text we are told that the island of Koror had a seaplane base. In another section we are told it was a submarine base. The map shows it as a seaplane base. Which is correct? Is the text and map right, or was the map based on the erroneous piece of text? A cursory reading of the book should have caught these errors (I certainly caught them easily enough). Osprey is sloppy, which is unfortunately the norm.

The book is a worthwhile overview of the campaign, in spite of its shortcomings. I only wish that it had a little extra detail and that more time had been spent editing it.