Rating: 
Summary: Flawed D-Day Book Worth Buying
Review: During the genesis of U.S. amphibious warfare, in the late 1930s, Adrian Lewis correctly emphasizes Army-Navy rivalry creating great difficulties for the War Department. As a result, the Army's Engineer Amphibian Command opened its Headquarters at Camp Edwards on Cape Cod, Massachusetts 10 June 1942. Lewis fails to mention that several months later, the 1st Naval Beach Battalion (NBB) was formed at Little Creek, Virginia. The NBBs were created in order to achieve a closer coordination between the Navy afloat and the Army ashore during amphibious operations in WWII. Over 5,000 Army amphibians and attached NBB troops of the 5th and 6th Engineer Special Brigades were ashore Omaha Beach 6 June 1944. Responsible for moving men and equipment across the invasion beaches and providing seaward evacuation for the casualties, NBB sailors had something to do with the success in Normandy. On page 197, Lewis incorrectly reports, "The ESBs were not trained in amphibious assault." Tell D-Day combat engineers on the beach at 7:00 A.M. that they had no amphibious training and you'll get an earful. Although an interesting book with excellent footnotes and primary sources, the Army author devoted only a few pages to the invasion role of the ESBs and zero pages to the contributions of the of the 6th and 7th Naval Beach Battalions on Omaha Beach.
Rating:
Summary: Fallacious Arguement
Review: I enjoyed this book and the viewpoint presented. I did notice the Author's frequent references to Navy/Marine Corps experience in amphibious operations. However, by June 1944, the British and American Armies in the European Theaters had more hands on experience with Corps and Army sized landings than did the Navy/Marine Corps team in the Pacific.Prior to 6 June 1944, the largest landing operations conducted by the Navy/Marine Corps team in the Central Pacific had been Division sized or smaller landings, and not all of them had been unqualified successes. The landing on Saipan, on 15 June 1944, was the first Corps sized amphibious operation the Navy/Marine Corps team conducted in the Pacific. It was characterized by a number of mistakes, landing units on wrong beaches, overestimating the capabilities of some equipment, specifically amphibious tractors, and underestimating the Japanese capability to resist. The Saipan landings did not achieve what the planners expected them to achieve. By June 17, D+2, the two Marine Divisions had been stopped well short of their D+2 objectives and had taken 10% casualties. Further, the Navy/Marine Corps leadership had no clear plan for landing reinforcements on Saipan in the event that their plan did miscarry. The victory on Omaha Beach may have been flawed, but the Navy/Marine Corps team from the Central Pacific did not have the experience to eliminate the flaws.
Rating: 
Summary: Magnificent
Review: I had a unique perspective while reading this book that I am sad to say not everyone will be able to experience. I am one of Dr. Lewis's students at UNT and through reading his book and listening to him lecture about it at the same time, I was able to formulate a most complex thesis of my own as to why the invasion was a flawed victory. Pertaining to the book itself, I think that it is the first fully researched book that deals with the two stratgies for the conduct of war (Brottish and American) an dthen shows how they were melded together. Prior to reading this book, I thought that the British way of war was a factor in the invasion plans, but I did not realize how much of a factor it was. It is really quite a miracle that we pulled off the invasion with all the flaws and failures that we had. I would recommend this book to anyone who wants a clear representation of what really happened in the years leading up to the cross-channel invasion and the invasion itself.
Rating:
Summary: Demolishes Omar Bradley's reputation
Review: Lewis strongly critizes Omar Bardley's conduct during the planning for Operation Overload. Bradley did not allow enough commandos or air strikes to destroy the German beach obstacles on Normandy Beach. Bradley also ignored General Pete Cortlett's advice that the pre-invasion bombardment should be longer than planned. The invasion was planned in the early morning which made the invasion force easy targets for the German defenders. Bradley refused to plan the landing to place at night because he thought that airpower would neutralize the German defenders. But the aircraft used to disable the German defenses were heavy bombers which were inaccurate rather than smaller tactical aircraft more suited for the task. To make matters worse Bradley placed newly trained soldiers in the first wave while the veterans were in reserve. I would highly reccomend this book to anyone interested in the often overlooked flaws of commanders such as Omar Bradley.
Rating:
Summary: Response to "a reader" from McLean, VA
Review: Lewis' scepticism of carpet bombing is well justified in the context of the book. While carpet bombing was an important part of the eventual breakout, it was not without its problems. For example, the initial bombing raid did more damage to the American infantry, indeed killing a four star general, than it did to the Germans. The breakout then had to be delayed while the American forces were rebuilt. The second carpet bombing raid was more successful. They didn't have time to conduct two raids to get one right on D-Day.
Rating:
Summary: Detailed analysis of Amphibian Doctrine.
Review: Omaha Beach details the doctrine based system of warfare or basically politics of war. It reads well and has lots of information about the different ideas and plans for the invasion that the commanders wanted to use but was scrapped as soon as the ramps opened. People expecting a forward account on the battle itself will be disappointed since only the first chapter actually talks about it. But if you want to know everything there is to know about the stratagies of warfare then this book is it.
Rating:
Summary: A good book that few will read
Review: Omaha Beach is a book that anyone interested in D-Day should read. Unfortunately, since it focuses on military doctrine and planning, rather than the actual battle, few people will actually read it. Lewis, in this extensively researched book, analyzes the planning of the Normandy assault, specifically looking to discover why the landings at Omaha Beach were nearly a failure. To do this, Lewis discusses the abilities and defects of the various generals involved in the overall planning (Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley). He also analyzes the different beach assault doctrines of the Americans and the British, and how those doctrines factored into the decisions the three leaders made. Lewis clearly shows that by the time these three had thoroughly screwed up, generals Gerow and Huebner (commanders of the II Corps and 1st Infantry Division, respectively) had very limited ability to make changes. They were, in fact, handed a flawed plan and commanded to carry out essentially a suicide mission. Lewis shows that beach assault doctrine for the British and Americans differed substantially. The British, who controlled operational planning in the Mediterranean and Western European theaters, preferred landings that maximized surprise. Thus, they conducted landings in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy at night with minimal shore bombardment. The Americans, on the other hand, preferred a direct daylight assault that maximized their firepower advantage (learned the hard way at Tarawa). Thus, by 1944 and 1945, landings in the Pacific used shore bombardments that lasted not minutes or hours, but days. Both doctrines produced successful landings. So what happened at Omaha Beach? Lewis argues that the near-failure occurred because new doctrine based on improper expectations was invented by Montgomery and allowed to be put in place by Eisenhower. Bradley compounded the problem by refusing to listen to the objections of Gerow and Huebner. This new doctrine was a bad blending of American and British doctrines. As a result, the planning produced a daylight assault intended to achieve tactical surprise. Essentially, two incompatible features of American and British doctrines were melded. This was particularly a result, Lewis argues, of Montgomery's over-reliance on airpower. It was assumed that a long naval bombardment was not necessary since heavy bombers would blast beach defenses and obstacles away in one quick bomb run. This would preserve surprise, but of course would require daylight landings. Since airpower in World War II was hardly accurate, it is no surprise that the bombers did not hit a single thing on the beach. Coupled with bad intelligence and other serious planning disasters, the landings at Omaha Beach nearly failed. The reader is left wondering how such incompetence at high levels was allowed, but is also left wondering in amazement at the achievement of the men who landed on that beach. Lewis shows that they stormed ashore after literally 99% of the landing plan had completely failed, yet they were still able to make it. This is a good book, one that demonstrates very well the difficulties of planning and coalition warfare. It also takes a lot of the shine off of the records of the top commanders in Europe. Many of the honors in the records of Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley are certainly well-deserved, but this book shows that some weren't, and that the successes of D-Day were due far more to tactical leadership (division HQ and down) and the sheer willpower of the ordinary soldiers. It certainly seems that the "top brass" set them up to fail.
Rating:
Summary: A good book that few will read
Review: Omaha Beach is a book that anyone interested in D-Day should read. Unfortunately, since it focuses on military doctrine and planning, rather than the actual battle, few people will actually read it. Lewis, in this extensively researched book, analyzes the planning of the Normandy assault, specifically looking to discover why the landings at Omaha Beach were nearly a failure. To do this, Lewis discusses the abilities and defects of the various generals involved in the overall planning (Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley). He also analyzes the different beach assault doctrines of the Americans and the British, and how those doctrines factored into the decisions the three leaders made. Lewis clearly shows that by the time these three had thoroughly screwed up, generals Gerow and Huebner (commanders of the II Corps and 1st Infantry Division, respectively) had very limited ability to make changes. They were, in fact, handed a flawed plan and commanded to carry out essentially a suicide mission. Lewis shows that beach assault doctrine for the British and Americans differed substantially. The British, who controlled operational planning in the Mediterranean and Western European theaters, preferred landings that maximized surprise. Thus, they conducted landings in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy at night with minimal shore bombardment. The Americans, on the other hand, preferred a direct daylight assault that maximized their firepower advantage (learned the hard way at Tarawa). Thus, by 1944 and 1945, landings in the Pacific used shore bombardments that lasted not minutes or hours, but days. Both doctrines produced successful landings. So what happened at Omaha Beach? Lewis argues that the near-failure occurred because new doctrine based on improper expectations was invented by Montgomery and allowed to be put in place by Eisenhower. Bradley compounded the problem by refusing to listen to the objections of Gerow and Huebner. This new doctrine was a bad blending of American and British doctrines. As a result, the planning produced a daylight assault intended to achieve tactical surprise. Essentially, two incompatible features of American and British doctrines were melded. This was particularly a result, Lewis argues, of Montgomery's over-reliance on airpower. It was assumed that a long naval bombardment was not necessary since heavy bombers would blast beach defenses and obstacles away in one quick bomb run. This would preserve surprise, but of course would require daylight landings. Since airpower in World War II was hardly accurate, it is no surprise that the bombers did not hit a single thing on the beach. Coupled with bad intelligence and other serious planning disasters, the landings at Omaha Beach nearly failed. The reader is left wondering how such incompetence at high levels was allowed, but is also left wondering in amazement at the achievement of the men who landed on that beach. Lewis shows that they stormed ashore after literally 99% of the landing plan had completely failed, yet they were still able to make it. This is a good book, one that demonstrates very well the difficulties of planning and coalition warfare. It also takes a lot of the shine off of the records of the top commanders in Europe. Many of the honors in the records of Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley are certainly well-deserved, but this book shows that some weren't, and that the successes of D-Day were due far more to tactical leadership (division HQ and down) and the sheer willpower of the ordinary soldiers. It certainly seems that the "top brass" set them up to fail.
Rating: 
Summary: Criticism is justified , but Lewis misses the mark
Review: Patton's assessment of Omar Bradley is starting to look more and more accurate. Bradley and his cohorts badly underestimated several aspects of needed resources for the invasion of Omaha Beach. Failure to look to the Pacific campaign for the "been there and done that" on-the-job experience learned by the Navy and Marines, resulted in higher casualties than necessary. Throw in poor communication between the Army, Navy, and the Army Air Corps, and you have the makings of a near disaster. Lewis should be commended for his homework and thoughtful analysis, however this book reads like a long memorandum from one military officer to another.
Rating: 
Summary: So many acronyms, so little time...
Review: Patton's assessment of Omar Bradley is starting to look more and more accurate. Bradley and his cohorts badly underestimated several aspects of needed resources for the invasion of Omaha Beach. Failure to look to the Pacific campaign for the "been there and done that" on-the-job experience learned by the Navy and Marines, resulted in higher casualties than necessary. Throw in poor communication between the Army, Navy, and the Army Air Corps, and you have the makings of a near disaster. Lewis should be commended for his homework and thoughtful analysis, however this book reads like a long memorandum from one military officer to another.
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