Rating: 
Summary: Critical Review of a critical history
Review: Although the book contains a lot of good information, readers should take into account that there is always biased opinion in any critical essay. Although Creveld doesn't overtly show his bias until near the end of the book, his obvious disdain for religious Judaism detracts from the content of the book, and causes one to call into question the accuracy of some of the material. The use of quotation marks for emphasis has the effect of highlighting this disdain and will result in causing offense to any religious reader. Although the documentation seems to be complete, missing references in certain strategic places throughout the book call certain arguments into question. For example, on page 347, the author tells of an incident where soldiers "used a bulldozer to bury captured demonstrators (they came out alive)," but no source reference is given for his information. The lack of reference leads one to wonder whether the author is relating an incident of fact or unsubstantiated rumor. The book is interesting and worth reading--but with discretion.
Rating: 
Summary: The Arms of Zion
Review: Detailing the evolution of the Israeli Defence Force from its pre -world war one beginning as a private company of guards (Ha-shomer), through its War of Independence and its "finest hour" in the 1967 Six Day War, and up to the 1990s with its failure to act during the 1991 first Gulf War and first Intifada (1986-1993), "The Sword and the Olive" is a compelling portrait of Israel's army, and, as the IDF is one of Israel's central institution, of the Israeli State and of Israeli society in the 20th century.
A world renowned military historian, Martin van Creveld's book is very well written and highly informed. It covers the military, social and economic aspects of the IDF, touching on almost everything, be it the role of nuclear weapons in Middle East, gender roles in the IDF (most controversial is van Creveld's thesis postulating an inverse relationship between the role of women in the Army and its prestige p. 361), or the similarities between the IDF's strategy and that of the Whermacht.
I often lament the shortages of maps in Military history books, but van Creveld's book is more offensive then most in this regard, normally there is only one map to each campaign, and I doubt anyone but the initiated can follow van Creveld's description of Israel's wars.
I am no expert in Israeli military history, most of which I gather from reading Israeli newspapers, but I was particularly surprised of van Creveld's assertions that a main motive behind Nasser's commencement of hostilities in the Six Day War was his fear of the Israeli Nuclear program. Van Creveld emerges as a critic of Israel's policy of nuclear policies, arguing that opacity failed to prevent the Six Day war and the Yom Kippur war (pp. 220-221). As a cause for the Six-Day war, van Creveld hardly mentions the internal political consideration of the Arabs, particularly in Egypt (see Michael B. Oren's brilliant "Six Days of War" for a very different perspective).
I never realized how limited the Egyptian military's moves were in the Yom Kippur war (van Creveld always refers to it as 'The October war'). In essence, Israel's maintenance of the Bar-Lev line, on the west bank of the Suez canal, was costly in terms of human life and military material, and made little or no strategic sense. By fighting on the line, Israel subjugated itself to heavy anti-aircraft and anti-tank fire, and this did not enjoy the superiority it had in mobile warfare as in the Six Days war and the 1956 war. Thus Israel utterly failed to take advantage of the strategic qualities of the Sinai desert as a barrier against attack on itself.
The subtitle of "The Sword and the Olive" is "A Critical History", and critical it is. Van Creveld does not spare criticism of the early pre State Israeli forces and personnel, as well as of Israel's army in the first twenty-five years of its existence, blaming Israelis for inciting Syrian fire on its tractors and questioning performances in the Six Day War.
After the 1973 war, though, van Creveld's criticisms become truly devastating. As heads of state, Golda Meir "frankly admit[ed] she did not know exactly what a division was", and Menachem Begin "kept meddling [with army affairs] even though his military knowledge had been acquired during his kindergarten years and barely developed thereafter" (p. 108). Nor is van Creveld kinder to generals: Moshe Dayan "failed to carry his point of view in the Cabinet" and "as usual" "found a way to shift responsibility [for the Bar Lev line] to others" (pp. 211-213). General 'Motta' Gur's "greatest intellectual achievement[s]" were "a series of children's books about Azzit, a heroic shepherd she-dog" (p. 249). The general intellectual poverty of the Israeli high command was manifested in Rafael Eytan "for whom wider cultural horizons simply do not exist" (p. 263).
About the current state of the Israeli army van Creveld doesn't mince words. The state of the Israeli moral is so devastating that the army had to suppress research about it. "In an army that once prided itself on truthfulness, lying has become institutionalized" van Creveld writes (p. 350). Great public outcry about accidents led to a pre-approbation of exercises and to a sharp decrease in the quantity and quality of training (p.349). Indeed, the IDF has become "soft, bloated, frequently undisciplined and undertrained", and although every successive IDF chief of staff has promised to make the army "lean and mean" again, none delivered the promise (p. 318).
Van Creveld has little doubt as to the cause of the malaise: The Occupation and the war against the Palestinians. "War... is an imitative activity in which... the two sides will learn from each other and tend to resemble each other. Thus he who fights the weak will himself become weak, and he who by "fighting" the weak behaves like a coward will end up turning into one" (p.352).
You do not have to agree with every point of van Creveld opinionated study in order to appreciate its knowledge and learning. A Superb source about the IDF, "The Sword and the Olive" is a must read for anyone interested in Israel, the Middle East, or Military history.
Rating: 
Summary: An excellent history of the IDF
Review: Martin Van Creveld does an masterful job at writing about the rise and the decline of the IDF. The first part of the is about how the IDF was improvised in the early phases of the First Arabi-Israeli War. According to Van Creveld those who originated from the PALAMCH companies were much more effective in combat compared to their British trained compatriots within the Israeli army. In the middle section Van Creveld criticizes is the IDF's performance in the Suez Canal campaign and the Six Day War. Van Creveld credits the airforces of the British and French in making the Israeli's campaign successful, but the Israelis committed numerous mistakes such the as the paratroop landing at Mitla Pass that was a militarily useless objective. The next chapter Van Creveld questions the IDFs effectiveness during the Six Day War. Van Crevled theorizes that contrary to public opinion the IDF did not practice the much vaunted indircet approach. The IDF mainly attacked the northern and central Egyptian forces in the Sinai. This allowed those Egyptians in the southern sector to escape. The only general to practice the indirect approach was Yoffe, but since Yoffe was an reservist he never received the publicity and the credit that was due to him. The IDF also never made use of combined arms except in the case of Sharon's operations in the Sinai. Van Creveld harshly condems Israeli operations in the opening phases of the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The overcentralized yet disoganized command structure of the IDF led to near disasterous defeats in the early phases of the Yom Kippur War. Van Creveld then evaluates the IDF's performance in Lebanon during the early nineteen eighties. The IDF tried to put too many armored vehicles in a country that had a scarcity of roads. As a result the IDF became bogged down in traffic jams and the PLO was allowed to escape. The IDF proved itself to be incapable of dealing with insurgencys as to seen in their response to the Palestinian uprisings of the late eighties. The IDF would send it's most ill trained sildiers to deal with the uprising. As a result the IDF either used excessive force or prudence, both of which led to defeat. Van Creveld states the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is slowly stagnating the IDF and that the Israelis must pull back from these territories. Another aspect that is mentioned in the book is the situation of manpower within the IDF. In the first phase of it's history the IDF was a compact, highly trained, and motivated fighting force. But in the seventies and eighties the force became bloated and ineffective. The IDF accepted so many conscripts that all but the elite units were trained effectively.Van Crevled opionizes that the conscription of women has only made the problem worse. Van Creveld tells about how ill educated IDF officers are compared to their foreign counterparts. Unlike most Western nations the IDF has no formal service academy. Instead IDF officers had to prove their leadership ability while as an NCO and then go to officer training school. The attempt to introduce a defense university has only met with failure in Israeli history. In the eighties and nineties a vast majority of educated Israelis opted out of the IDF officer corps. But very ill educated but religious Israelis became a large percentage of the current Israeli officer corps. Van Creveld believes that these new religious officers pose a great threat to Israelis democracy. The only criticisms that I have with the book is that Van Creveld glosses over Israeli operations in the Golan Heights during the 1967 and 1973 wars. Other than these minor criticisms this is by far the best book about the history of the IDF.
Rating:
Summary: Contrarian, but valuable.
Review: Martin Van Creveld is a contrarian. This new history of the Israeli Defense Forces (TSAHAL) is by turns complimentary and critical. It starts with the development of self defense forces established in Palestine under the Ottomans and continues forward through the British mandate, then through the various wars up through the Intifada. Enough campaign history is provided to buttress the author's criticism and praise of various leaders. While Van Creveld is critical of the amateur (and often vengeful) nature of the early Zionist and Israeli forces, he does credit them for high morale, aggressive leadership, the ability to learn from mistakes, and to effectively improvise where needed. For Van Creveld the myth of Israeli invincibility rested on stunning successes and tight censorship that covered up mistakes and would-be mistakes. The fall of the IDF starts with the ill-considered invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and accelerated with the response to the Intifada in the late 1980s. Van Creveld sees the surest sign of IDF failure as the inability to participate in the Gulf War; this criticism is unfair and unrealistic as the Israeli military was not designed to project so much power so far, and any Israeli participation in the Coalition would have broken down the anti-Hussein consensus among the Arab participants. Van Creveld shows that the IDF no longer enjoys the invincible reputation and high status that it did 20 years ago. The book covers many topics : the development of Israel's arms industry, the "tank is king" mentality that was so disasterous at the beginning of the 1973 October War, the effect of Israel's nuclear capability, the entangling of party politics, the rise of the Air Force, the usually marginal nature of the Navy, and the status of women. Two interesting aspects of this book : the not-quite-standard English rendering of Hebrew and Arabic words (Mount Chermon for Mt. Hermon, Beqa Valley for Bekaa Valley) and the frequent citation to popular songs, jokes, and sayings that reflect the public image of the IDF. Highly recommended for anyone interested in the Middle East or in the development of national military systems.
Rating: 
Summary: Doesn't Meet its Potential
Review: Professor Van Crevald's stature as a lecturer and author in Military Theory should have made the Sword and the Olive a unique and indispensable resource for tracing the development and doctrine of the IDF. Prof. Van Crevald doesn't approach the subject objectively, and makes too many suppositions and assumptions for this to be a truly critical work. While discussing various aspects of Israeli military or diplomatic policies Prof. Van Crevald arrives at too many conclusions that contain phrases such as: 'It can be seen.'; 'It is obvious that...'; 'It is apparent...'; when none of these are truly the case. Despite his best efforts, none of the chapters go into the kind of depth expected from a scholarly, critical work. Certain other elements in the book also detract from its potential. The author's use of very non-traditional transliterations and spellings of Hebrew terms are confusing, even to the reader with no knowledge of Hebrew language but who has seen these words in the media. Finally the descriptive captions used in each chapter's photographs point to a pre-
determined agenda. One of the more obvious ones shows a dozen IDF soldiers in a bunker, smoking cigarettes. The caption tells us they're are cowering. All in all I was disapointed by a book that
showed such promise, yet never seemed to rise beyond rudimentary reviews of histroy and doctrine. Also recommended: Gates of Gaza, No Margin for Error, Spitfires over Israel.
Rating: 
Summary: Critical is the key word
Review: Reading this book is like watching bloopers after a good program.
The only problem is... there is no good program here, only the bloopers. The fact that the author is biased is not the big issue (all authors are), but Mr. Van Creveld doesn't even attempt to disguise it. As far as the writing is concerned, the book is boring and repetitious and the constant comparisons of Israeli tactics with those of the Nazis are utterly sickening. If you're interested in the History of the IDF, avoid this book. There are much better and serious works out there. But if you insist, I'll be selling it for 50 cents at my next garage sale.
Rating:
Summary: Emphasis on "Critical History"
Review: This is a highly engaging book by a very influential Israeli military historian, who having made his reputation addressing other topics, now takes on the IDF. Though the book is a must for anyone with an interest in Middle East military matters, and the IDF in particular, the tone of the book at times is more legal brief than history, as the author presses to complete his thesis. In general, that thesis is that the IDF has been overrated in the past, though it achieved certain heights of glory between 1967 and 1973, and since has been on a rather steady decline. Basically, this is a sound thesis, but pursued too ardently at times. For example, Van Creveld endorses the view put forth by Seymore Hersh that the Syrian offensive on the Golan in 1973 was only halted in the end by Israel "rattling the nuclear saber". ...This is a famous story, much written about, and which produced a number of Israeli heros. To attribute the success of these tankers, whose tactics were much studied and copied by NATO tankers over the years, to a speculative nuclear threat, is a bit much for a historian. There are many more numerous prosiac factors which credibly led to the withdrawal, among them, the fanatic Israeli resistance, the Syrians own heavy losses, the prior commitment of Syria's armored reserve, including the elite Republican Guard, and the effect of IAF interdiction strikes on Syrian supply lines, to name a few. This is not the only example. Van Creveld has virtually nothing positive to say about the 1982 Lebanon campaign, which is already received wisdom in much of Israel and among Israel's critics, and so somewhat tiresome. But his analysis is overly harsh in a purely military history sense. The campaign's early stages were relatively well conducted, though not mistake free, but it is difficult to imagine any other modern army having done better under the circumstances the Israelis faced. This is true regardless of whether the campaign was ultimately was a strategic mistake. As far as further criticism of the book goes I would add that some of the footnotes (the book is heavily footnoted) do not seem to match up to the point being made. This may have something to do with translation problems. The real strength of the book is the last chapters in which Van Creveld takes the IDF to task for undermining its own warrior spirit through Israeli versions of political correctness, overreliance on technology, coddling, etc. Of course, almost everything said could be applied to most modern western armies, and in particular the U.S. Armed Forces. Pretty obviously, the IDF's close links with the U.S. military, which did not realy begin until after the 1973 War, also correlate with the IDF's perceived decline.
Rating:
Summary: Emphasis on "Critical History"
Review: This is a highly engaging book by a very influential Israeli military historian, who having made his reputation addressing other topics, now takes on the IDF. Though the book is a must for anyone with an interest in Middle East military matters, and the IDF in particular, the tone of the book at times is more legal brief than history, as the author presses to complete his thesis. In general, that thesis is that the IDF has been overrated in the past, though it achieved certain heights of glory between 1967 and 1973, and since has been on a rather steady decline. Basically, this is a sound thesis, but pursued too ardently at times. For example, Van Creveld endorses the view put forth by Seymore Hersh that the Syrian offensive on the Golan in 1973 was only halted in the end by Israel "rattling the nuclear saber". ...This is a famous story, much written about, and which produced a number of Israeli heros. To attribute the success of these tankers, whose tactics were much studied and copied by NATO tankers over the years, to a speculative nuclear threat, is a bit much for a historian. There are many more numerous prosiac factors which credibly led to the withdrawal, among them, the fanatic Israeli resistance, the Syrians own heavy losses, the prior commitment of Syria's armored reserve, including the elite Republican Guard, and the effect of IAF interdiction strikes on Syrian supply lines, to name a few. This is not the only example. Van Creveld has virtually nothing positive to say about the 1982 Lebanon campaign, which is already received wisdom in much of Israel and among Israel's critics, and so somewhat tiresome. But his analysis is overly harsh in a purely military history sense. The campaign's early stages were relatively well conducted, though not mistake free, but it is difficult to imagine any other modern army having done better under the circumstances the Israelis faced. This is true regardless of whether the campaign was ultimately was a strategic mistake. As far as further criticism of the book goes I would add that some of the footnotes (the book is heavily footnoted) do not seem to match up to the point being made. This may have something to do with translation problems. The real strength of the book is the last chapters in which Van Creveld takes the IDF to task for undermining its own warrior spirit through Israeli versions of political correctness, overreliance on technology, coddling, etc. Of course, almost everything said could be applied to most modern western armies, and in particular the U.S. Armed Forces. Pretty obviously, the IDF's close links with the U.S. military, which did not realy begin until after the 1973 War, also correlate with the IDF's perceived decline.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent
Review: This man wears his strong biases on his sleeve. He shows his contempt for those who are religious on several occasions. He is also willing to see Israeli motives in the worst possible light while minimizing the culpability of the Palestinians. Yes there is some good info in the historical background (most people wouldn't realize that the US embargoed Israel for half of its history and certainly didn't provide any support during much of its existance and most of its wars) but there is a lot of bad information one has to wade through. The biggest danger is that this guy claims to be unbiased (while also pointing out that he lives in Israel and has children that served in the IDF to imply that all his critizisms are legitimate) while he is anything but... Unfortunately, this book is full of opinion and unsupported conjecture presented as if it was fact. One quote about the kippot sruggot (Religious Zionists):
"It also excercised a powerful attraction on the kind of diaspora Jew...who, perhaps because of anti-Semitism suffered during youth, hoped to act out aggressive fantasies on defenseless Arabs." (P 339) I know several who are Zionist and religious and, even though I am not a Religious Zionist (though I am both observant and Zionist), I find this protrayal wrong and offensive. First, what gives this reporter the right or the qualifications to psychoanylize an entire group of people. As a future mental health professional (my BA is psychology) I don't know much yet but I certainly recognize BS when I see it and take offense when people think they are qualified when they aren't. Also, the Religious Zionists I know are all good people and genuinely wish for peace, they aren't the genocidal bullies that Creveld suggests. Then there is his attitude towards the religious in the military (especially the officer corps):
"Wheras until the late seventies religious commanders had been as rare as winged cows, in 1996 they constituted almost 50 percent of company grade officers in combat units. From 1995 to 1996 alone the number undergoing pilot training doubled; by one account kppot sruggot are said to make up no less than 30 percent of troops in some combat units. The effect is to set up social and ideological barriers between the officers and their secular-minded men...as well as between them and society at large." (P 317-318) What?!!! First, I want to know how a secular soldier having a religious officer is bound to cause more problems between them and the men than a socialist kibbuts raised officer (a few paragraphs before he was just praising such an officer corps) and soldiers from the city (rural v. urban barriers) or business owners and conservatives (who may strongly disagree with the socialist outlook of most kibbutsim and people raised there)? Second, he states this as if it is gospel but then provides no documentation whatsoever, no footnote leading to a study or even one interview and nothing in the following text. He simply states his opinion as fact (as he does throughout the book). But it gets even better:
"...Yet as long as the IDF retains its traditional character as an army of short-time conscripts and reservists, any danger this will lead to a coup remains minimal. However, it is not impossible to imagine a day when a mainly right-wing, orthodox, nationalist officer corps will command an all-voluneer rank and file consisting, as tends to be the case in so many developed countries, primarily of the down-and-out. Should that come about, the handwriting clearly will be on the wall." (P318) Where to start about this horribly offensive and patently wrong statement. First, how does a non-religious officer corps minimize the danger of a coup (he doesn't say)? Second, with an Orthodox officer corps "the handwriting clearly will be on the wall" in the context of discussing a possible coup?!!! Can you even imagine if he said that about anyother group (say, socialists or Sephardim), the outcry. Can you think of a more offensive and inflammatory statement? Where is his documentation showing this to be the case? Where are his studies showing that those of us who are Orthodox are any less democratic than our secular (and often in Israel, socialist) counterparts? Actually, given a look at the history of the 20th century I'd say the socialists who used to run the IDF were potentially more dangerous (until recently Israel was a hard core socialist nation, though it is changing slowly). Once again he is reporting his opinion, and a very offensive one at that, as fact. I guess the religious can't win. Those who take deferments to study Torah are criticized for not serving. The Religious Zionists and others who do serve (and, even by his numbers, serving as professionals in the officer corps) are criticized for serving and in his twisted mind thus posing a danger to democracy! There are plenty of other ugly quotes and bad scholarship (on many areas, not only religious affairs) but this should give you a pretty good idea that Creveld is anything but unbiased.
Rating:
Summary: Creveld shows why Israel can't win against terrorists
Review: While the entire book is an excellent account of the origins, growth, and future of the Israeli Defense Forces(IDF) it really stands out as a perceptive take on the current Arab-Israeli conflict. Creveld holds that there is no military solution to the conflict. In fact, it is not even war since the two sides are not matched up evenly. And this is not a good thing for the stronger(Israeli)side. Creveld makes a convincing argument that the activities of the IDF in the occupied territories is in realiy sapping the IDFs will and capability to fight a real war. Every time the IDF acts against the terrorists it is perceived as being a big bully beating up on the little guy. Every time the DF looses a soldier it is perceived as incompetent since it is so much bigger and stronger than the enemy. This will, in the end, make for a situation like the one in the US military in Vietnam with serious discipline problems and lack of war-fighting capabilities. Even to this day the US military has not pulled clear of the fiasco in Vietnam. Finally, "The Sword and the Olive" also serves as a nice case study to go along with Creveld's other book "The Transformation of War"
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