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Rating: 
Summary: A Forgotten Chapter of WW II
Review: I bought this book more on the author's reputation than a burning interest in content. Morison was a fine historian, and this book tells a vital chapter of the history of WW II that is almost forgotten today, midst accounts of more dramatic sea battles like Midway, Leyte Gulf, and of course, Pearl Harbor. This theater of the war is also eclipsed by dramatic land and air battles in Europe, especially D-Day, and The Battle of the Bulge with the seige of Bastogne. Yet the war in Europe could not have been won without this vital piece of the war effort---no troops, no supplies, no victory! I gave this book five stars because I have been completely absorbed by it. Morison has woven this complex, and potentially boring chapter of WW II history into a tremendously interesting narrative. I am especially impressed because this book really hooks me each time I begin a new chapter, and recently my WW II history diet has consisted of oral history material like the fine works of Steven Ambrose and Cornelius Ryan. Morison holds his own, and I can't wait to start the next book in the series. Well worth the modest price, I have purchased the entire series. Highly recommended if you are interested in the big picture of World War II.
Rating:
Summary: A Forgotten Chapter of WW II
Review: This is the first volume in Morison's monumental history of the U.S. Navy in World War II, but it is hardly the most interesting. It covers submarine warfare in the Atlantic for the first years of the war. American losses were terrible during much of this period. As we now know, most of the damage was done by a few German U Boats that were successful because of inept tactics by the Americans. While Morison is an honest historian, and this book was not edited by the Navy, he still (in my judgment) fails to criticize sufficiently the Navy for its failings during this period. After all, the Navy knew that the major danger posed by the German Navy was the latter's submarine fleet; most of its small surface fleet having been sunk by the British Navy in 1940. Moreover, the American Navy had the advantage of access to British experience in fighting U Boats. However, despite having identified the threat years before facing it, and being able to learn from the British successes and failures, the opening of the submarine war in the Atlantic was a disaster for the U.S. Navy. It seems to me that Morison goes too easy on the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, Ernest King, who was well know for his loathing of the British. Another necessary aspect of this book that makes it less interesting than others in the series is that antisubmarine operations are necessarily small unit actions, unlike the great battles fought in the Pacific. It was a war of attrition, and was eventually won by improved tactics and equipment that caused the Germans to take unacceptable losses. Having made these criticisms, Morison's series is essential for anyone interested in the details of the U.S. Navy's role in World War II. While later historians have questioned some of his judgments, no one will ever assemble so much so source material on the subject again.
Rating: 
Summary: A slow start to a great series.
Review: This is the first volume in Morison's monumental history of the U.S. Navy in World War II, but it is hardly the most interesting. It covers submarine warfare in the Atlantic for the first years of the war. American losses were terrible during much of this period. As we now know, most of the damage was done by a few German U Boats that were successful because of inept tactics by the Americans. While Morison is an honest historian, and this book was not edited by the Navy, he still (in my judgment) fails to criticize sufficiently the Navy for its failings during this period. After all, the Navy knew that the major danger posed by the German Navy was the latter's submarine fleet; most of its small surface fleet having been sunk by the British Navy in 1940. Moreover, the American Navy had the advantage of access to British experience in fighting U Boats. However, despite having identified the threat years before facing it, and being able to learn from the British successes and failures, the opening of the submarine war in the Atlantic was a disaster for the U.S. Navy. It seems to me that Morison goes too easy on the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, Ernest King, who was well know for his loathing of the British. Another necessary aspect of this book that makes it less interesting than others in the series is that antisubmarine operations are necessarily small unit actions, unlike the great battles fought in the Pacific. It was a war of attrition, and was eventually won by improved tactics and equipment that caused the Germans to take unacceptable losses. Having made these criticisms, Morison's series is essential for anyone interested in the details of the U.S. Navy's role in World War II. While later historians have questioned some of his judgments, no one will ever assemble so much so source material on the subject again.
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