Rating: 
Summary: Ignore the Detractors, This Book is Brilliant
Review:
My own discovery of how the threat changes depending on the levels of analysis would not have occurred without this brilliant book by Edward Luttwak. It was his careful and reasoned discussion of how specific capabilities and policies might not make sense at one level of analysis, but do when combined with others, that helped me understand why US (and other) intelligence communities continue to get so much wrong.
First to credit Luttwak: anti-tank weapons make no sense in isolation (tactical level), but if they slow the tank down enough to allow artillery and close air support to have an impact (operational level), they might close gaps and win victories (strategic level). Bottom line: nothing in war can be considered in isolation (including, one might add, the post-war needs that enable an exit strategy). It was from Luttwak's work that the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (today the Marine Corps Intelligence Command) developed the new model for analysis that distinguished between the four levels of analysis (strategic, operational, tactical, and technical), combined that with the three major domains (military, geographic, and civil), and then cross-walked that against every single mission area (infantry, artillery, tanks, aviation, etcetera). One simple example of the importance of Luttwak's work to intelligence: at the time (1990) the Libyan T-72 tank was considered by the US Intelligence Community to be a very high threat because it was the best tank that money could then buy--but on reflection, we found this was true only at the technical level of optimal lethality. At the tactical level the tank was being stored in the open, poorly maintained by poorly trained crews, parts cannibalization occurring regularly, this dropped the threat to low. At the operational level there were a significant number of the tanks scattered around and available, this raised it to a medium threat at that level. At the strategic level, the tanks could not be sustained in battle for more than two weeks, and dropped again to low. Edward Luttwak, in company with Colin Gray, Martin van Creveld, Ralph Peters, and Steve Metz, is one of the most brilliant and clear-spoken of the strategists writing in English, and this book will remain--for years to come--a fundamental building block in the learning and maturation of national security strategy.
Rating:
Summary: Ignore the Detractors, This Book is Brilliant
Review:
My own discovery of how the threat changes depending on the levels of analysis would not have occurred without this brilliant book by Edward Luttwak. It was his careful and reasoned discussion of how specific capabilities and policies might not make sense at one level of analysis, but do when combined with others, that helped me understand why US (and other) intelligence communities continue to get so much wrong.
First to credit Luttwak: anti-tank weapons make no sense in isolation (tactical level), but if they slow the tank down enough to allow artillery and close air support to have an impact (operational level), they might close gaps and win victories (strategic level). Bottom line: nothing in war can be considered in isolation (including, one might add, the post-war needs that enable an exit strategy). It was from Luttwak's work that the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (today the Marine Corps Intelligence Command) developed the new model for analysis that distinguished between the four levels of analysis (strategic, operational, tactical, and technical), combined that with the three major domains (military, geographic, and civil), and then cross-walked that against every single mission area (infantry, artillery, tanks, aviation, etcetera). One simple example of the importance of Luttwak's work to intelligence: at the time (1990) the Libyan T-72 tank was considered by the US Intelligence Community to be a very high threat because it was the best tank that money could then buy--but on reflection, we found this was true only at the technical level of optimal lethality. At the tactical level the tank was being stored in the open, poorly maintained by poorly trained crews, parts cannibalization occurring regularly, this dropped the threat to low. At the operational level there were a significant number of the tanks scattered around and available, this raised it to a medium threat at that level. At the strategic level, the tanks could not be sustained in battle for more than two weeks, and dropped again to low. Edward Luttwak, in company with Colin Gray, Martin van Creveld, Ralph Peters, and Steve Metz, is one of the most brilliant and clear-spoken of the strategists writing in English, and this book will remain--for years to come--a fundamental building block in the learning and maturation of national security strategy.
Rating: 
Summary: Paradoxical Logic Is Not A Natural Law of War
Review: Edward Luttwak is an example of yet another political scientist trying to apply a general theory to explain the chaotic nature of warfare. Luttwak fails to prove his general contention that paradoxical logic rules the outcome of strategy and war. Paradoxical logic is the coming together of opposites or the reversal of opposites. In warfare, "the longest way round, is often the shortest way home." This is paradoxical because linear logic suggests that the shortest way home is a straight line. But in war, the short straight way might take you right into the enemy's strongest part, thus you will want to take the long way around and strike the enemy at his weakest point. This paradoxical because it is opposite of linear logic. It is true that these "paradoxes" do occur. But paradoxical logic cannot be construed as a general theory to explain strategy in its totality. For example, there is a mainstream historical belief that the German bombing of London during the Battle of Britain raised the morale of the English. Thus the bombing of Great Britain is an example of paradoxical logic. It is the coming together of opposites. The Germans intended to destroy the morale of the British through bombing, but raised it instead, a paradox in the making. A naive general might even try to use this example of paradoxical logic to tell his commander in chief that it is useless to bomb cities, because, "it will just raise the morale of the enemy." Upon closer historical examination one can see that there is no consensus amongst historians as to whether or not the morale of the British was destroyed by the bombing. One school of historians believes that British morale was drastically lowered by the bombing. Crime and other social indicators suggest that the social fabric of Great Britain began to come apart as the bombing intensified. So using this historical interpretation the Germans accomplished what they set out to do, which was to lower the morale of the British. This follows a linear form of logic. The Germans bombed England with the intent of lowering morale. The bombing lowered morale. Therefore the linear logic of the Germans worked in this instance. There was no paradox. Military history is a in many ways subjective, especially when political scientists and academic strategists put it to use. You can't build objectivity on subjective standards and that is what Luttwak attempts to do. He uses military history examples to prove his point that paradoxical logic rules strategy. However there are always counter historical points to the ones he uses. Paradoxes in war do show up, and Luttwak correctly points out some. But paradoxical logic is not a hard and fast rule of strategy. It is not an eternal law that guides strategy. Luttwak goes so far to claim that paradoxical strategy rules strategy even though most strategists aren't aware of it. No matter what they do, the paradoxical logic will always be there. Ethicists would also find fault with Luttwak's brutal lack of ethics. Luttwak basically justifies the extermination of one culture by another. You see, Luttwak's logic is that war eventually creates peace by wearing itself out. War makes armies and nations run out of resources, eventually causing peace, because no one has the stamina or means to continue it. So
uninterrupted war is good, because it eventually brings peace. Luttwak is against U.N. armistices and peacekeeping missions, because they interrupt war and delay peace (which is caused by war exhaustion). Luttwak states, "The outcome of uniterrupted war would certainly have been unjust from one perspective or another but would eventually have imposed some sort of peace, allowing people to rebuild their lives and communities." (Strategy, page 61) Suuurrrreeeee. I bet the Hutu would have been real glad for peace to come after they exterminated the Tutsis. How can an exterminated people or culture enjoy peace? If the ends of the war being waged are to exterminate a culture, how can that targeted culture rebuild its community after it has been destroyed? I don't like U.N. peacekeeping missions either. The U.N. is a lackluster organization that never does anything right. But I don't like Luttwak's explanation as to why U.N. armistices are bad or why war should be allowed to go on interrupted. Overall, the book has some good historical references, but fails to prove its thesis, which is that paradoxical logic guides strategy.
Rating: 
Summary: Paradox is only part of the story.
Review: Historians and political scientists have coined many theories to contain and explain warfare. Systems theorists like Robert Jervis attempt to study conflict from the point of view of complex hierarchies and nonlinear feedbacks: a nation cannot always attain its goals because of how its neighbors and opponents will react. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the linear logic of cognitive approaches to war: individuals have certain intentions and we can explain their actions according to their understanding of the world. Luttwak's book is between these two: according to the paradoxical approach, individuals may seek certain objectives, but the consequences of their actions don't always follow as expected. This approach finds its expression more recently in Zeev Moaz's Paradoxes of War. The strength of the paradoxical approach is that it deals with units that strategists can understand and manipulate: individuals and nations. Systems approaches are valuable for their historical perspective, but one cannot easily understand or manipulate the international power structure on a daily basis. Paradoxical approaches also help in isolating the perversity of strategy: every action implies some equal but unknowable reaction. Radar invites chaff. Maneuver warfare invites a defense in depth, or counterattacks. Overall superiority invites assymetrical counterstrategies. The major weakness of the paradoxical approach is that intentions and consequences conflict only some of the time. We might explain the failure of the Maginot Line by paradoxical theories, but how do we explain an attack or a defense that was successful? That said, Luttwak's work is important for two reasons: first, it highlights the necessity of trying to anticipate how your neighbors and opponents will react to new techniques, tactics, operations, etc. Second, it is overall one of the best general introductions to the different levels of warfare: technical, tactical, operational, strategic, and diplomatic. Other texts, such as Leonhard's Art of Maneuver deal with particular levels, without any attempt at synthesis. Students of warfare will find the paradoxical approach helpful at times, and useless at others. If we accept that sometimes intentions don't match consequences, we can dramatically improve the prospects for success. Unfortunately, this approach is not the panacea that Luttwak hopes it can be.
Rating:
Summary: A superb analysis of strategy
Review: Luttwak makes an excellent argument that strategy is different from other plans of action, in that a strategist must contend with active, intelligent opposition. Consequently, a plan can be good simply because it is bad, or vice versa, which Luttwak calls "paradoxical logic". He takes as a primary example the use of infantry anti-tank weapons in the defense of West Germany from the Warsaw Pact (the example is still clear, even if dated), and examines the effects of such weapons on a technical, tactical, operational, theater, and political level, each building on the last. Luttwak carefully examines the advantages and disadvantages of doing the unexpected, of maneuver versus attrition and why World War II was fought the way it was, and of the consequences of fighting in a way that does not support the ultimate goals of the theater of war. He takes the examination of strategy to a level I haven't seen since Clausewitz, and is much more readable.
Rating:
Summary: A superb analysis of strategy
Review: Luttwak makes an excellent argument that strategy is different from other plans of action, in that a strategist must contend with active, intelligent opposition. Consequently, a plan can be good simply because it is bad, or vice versa, which Luttwak calls "paradoxical logic". He takes as a primary example the use of infantry anti-tank weapons in the defense of West Germany from the Warsaw Pact (the example is still clear, even if dated), and examines the effects of such weapons on a technical, tactical, operational, theater, and political level, each building on the last. Luttwak carefully examines the advantages and disadvantages of doing the unexpected, of maneuver versus attrition and why World War II was fought the way it was, and of the consequences of fighting in a way that does not support the ultimate goals of the theater of war. He takes the examination of strategy to a level I haven't seen since Clausewitz, and is much more readable.
Rating: 
Summary: A provocative look at the essence of strategy
Review: Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace makes for stimulating reading. Luttwak's chief argument is that strategy is conditioned by its own paradoxical logic. For example, according to the logic, any success contains the seeds of its own reversal. Thus, a highly successful weapon will soon be rendered less effective by the enemy's efforts to design countermeasures. Although much of Luttwak's ideas come from Clausewitz, the concepts are taken to a much further extreme, which results in very different conclusions. Overall, the book is well-written and readers interested in strategy will find it a must. The first section of the book (60 pgs.) outlines the main concept and is the most interesting part.
Rating: 
Summary: Much detail, Little use
Review: The Author uses many interesting details from modern military history to put forth a his theory on 'the paradox of strategy'. I am glad I read this book to learn about the various hard-to-find facts of Twentieth Century events that would have been very difficult to research on my own. I am NOT glad I read this book for the strategic principles it alleges to contain. I could not find anywhere in this book any advice by the author on strategic priorities, guides to decision-making, or clarifying objectives. Instead, the author repeatedly makes the point that priorities may be contradictory, Rules-of-Thumb depend on the situation, and that one man's goals may be a fools' errand for another. All of this is written off as 'the Paradox of War'. I did not see any serious effort to conclude anything of substance from these observations. The concluding chapter of the book is only two pages long and contains nothing but a recommendation from the author that the matter requires further study! To his credit, the author does view various military endeavors through multiple perspectives: the technical level; the tactical level; the operational level; the strategic level; and the level of grand strategy. It is pointed out that the methods, priorities, and goals at one level may not match up (and may even contradict) the methods, priorities,a and goals of another level. Unfortunately, there is no advice on what to do when faced with a contradiction. I would think the author would have suggested at least something. Furthermore, I feel there should have been one more perspective level: a 'grander' grand strategy. One that deals with the perspective of peace, and it's optimization. Peace is a matter entirely neglected in this book. A shame, considering the title professes it teaches logic on War and Peace.
Rating:
Summary: A Penetrating Analysis on Strategy
Review: This book discusses the dynamic and sometimes contradictory uses of 'strategy' in five different levels: Grand Strategic level, Theater Strategic level, Operational level, Tactical level, and Technical Level. Because of the dynamic nature of strategy, conflicts of interests often arise between different levels - so that what one sees as logical at one level may not be acceptable in another. Indeed, this book sets out to address the confusing nature of the problem and puts the entire issue into perspective with the concept of 'paradox'. Historical examples are used to expound his arguments. As always, Luttwak's work is incisive and provocative. Enjoy it!
Rating:
Summary: One of the best books on strategy
Review: This book is not for the greenest of novices, and it contains no recipes or easy plans that will make your military or business plans unassailable. Instead, Luttwak presents as a central thesis that all war (and peace) is paradoxical. Paradox arises because the enemy is a living, thinking, acting person, dedicated to fouling your plans and making your goals and tactics irrelevant. For example, Luttwak states that the Maginot line was one of the most brilliant defenses in history. It truly was impenetrable. So impenetrable, that the Wermacht just went around it! The mistake of the French, therefore, was not constructing the line (as many have argued), but assuming that it would ever be attacked. The book is now a bit dated, as it uses anti-tank defense in Western Europe as an exercise in the different levels of understanding war, but it remains an excellent treatise on how to think about war. In this way, it is quite similar to Clausewitz's _On War_, a manual for thinking about war, not winning one. Luttwak also pushes Clausewitz's dictum that all levels of war are subject to and determined by the political, or grand strategic level. Contradictions are always resolved in favor of the higher level. Thus, the rifle fits the tactics, which are determined by the operation, which is suited to the theater, which is selected and fought in because of national policy. Peace begets war, and war begets peace. This book is rather like the yin-yang of combat.
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