Rating: 
Summary: A Worthy Read
Review: It may be long, but it is well worth the time to absorb every detail in the book. I would like to take the time to clear-up some of the misconceptions that some reviewers appear to be spreading about the conclusions of the book:1) It definitely REFUTES claims that the CIA supported/trained Arab militants who would go on to make-up Al Qaeda;
2) It shows that the Clinton Administration was actively considering (and sometimes attempting to implement) countermeasures to deal with Bin Laden; however,
3) It also shows that the Clinton team was never able to decide on any strategy to deal with Bin Laden and the Taliban, nor was sufficient presidential authority spent to press the NSC into fomenting a unified strategy (i.e. no PDD over the years 1998-2000 concerning Bin Laden)despite numerous (and ultimately fruitless)internal debates;
4) It also shows (despite the sentiment of Clinton Administration officials, and albeit in a disputable manner) that the CIA was not given sufficient leeway to assassinate Bin Laden prior to 9/11;
5) It shows that the Bush team did not see terrorism as its top priority; however,
6) Nonetheless, the Bush team (in seven months)hammered out a strategy and had an NSPD ready for signature prior to 9/11 (something that its predecessor could not accomplish in over 2 years, despite probably seeing Bin Laden as a more immediate threat). In other words, it is a very nuanced book at both the tactical and strategic levels. Readers need to read carefully (and leave aside prior bias) to understand the nuances. For those interested in either the debate in the U.S. about 9/11, the way the national security apparatus in the U.S. operates, or the history of foreign engagement/civil war in Afghanistan, this is a must read.
Rating: 
Summary: I'm Scared of the Government
Review: This book is full of details of what we didn't know about Afganistan. It's scary how may screw-ups have been made... "Is There Any Policy?" Many adminisrations, including the Bushies, apparently didn't care. Is you care in the least about current events, read this! Steve Coll gives all the details (including some supremely amusing quotes!) about the rise of Bin Laden (aka UBL- you'll find that funny when you read the book) and terorrism in Afganistan, the war between Massoud and the Taliban, how Afgan jihadists got their skills, what Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (not to metion Unocal) did to shape our Afgan policy, and what our friends in D.C. and in the CIA did--and didn't do-- in Afganistan. Be warned: knowing everything in this book might make you a bit parinoid. Maybe about terorrism, maybe the CIA, FBI, White House, you name it. But it's worth it! All I have left to say is that it was a BIG mistake to arm Afgan guerrillas and tell them to "Go Raise Hell." Well, there you go. 20/20 hindsight says: why yes, we are "an Unlucky Country"
Rating:
Summary: Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and
Review: A Pulitzer Prize winner who covered Afghanistan for the Washington Post from 1989 to 1992, Coll explains how long and how deeply we've been entrenched there. Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information
Rating: 
Summary: Informative
Review: But also has some political bias. I think Morgan Norval's "The Fifteen Century War, Islam's Violent Heritage" is far better and clearly more straightforward.
Rating:
Summary: Masterful Depiction of CIA Nurturance Of MuslimTerrorism!
Review: This absorbing new book,"Ghost Wars", written by noted journalist Steve Coll, managing editor of the Washington Post, deftly describes and explains the origins, progress, and consequences of the CIA's ill-fated sponsorship of radical Muslim fundamentalists in a concerted effort to turn the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the late 1970s into a Russian version of Vietnam. The devil lies in the details, as they say, and Mr. Coll does a yeoman's job of explaining how the specific actions taken by the United States to influence the long term course of the Soviet aggression against the Afghan people wrought the absolutely catastrophic unintended consequences it did by way of the creation, training and sustenance of the fanatical Arab fringe group that eventually emerged in the early 1990s as Al Queda. Indeed, it is a tale full of unimaginable arrogance, thoughtless irresponsibility, and ultimate irony that many of the so-called masterminds of the various Arab groups loosely held together by Osama bin Laden's terrorist network were originally recruited, trained, and transported to Afghanistan by the CIA and its front organizations, and many of the most sophisticated of their members learned their tradecraft here in the United States in training courses offered and funded by the CIA. Operating with the cooperation of a number of other national security organizations such as the KGB, the Saudi General Intelligence Department, and the dreaded Pakistani ISI, the covert agents of the Central Intelligence Agency played a dangerous game in creating an effective and often deadly counterforce to the brunt instrument of the Soviet military machine, and by creating the guerilla forces to do so, gave radical Muslim fundamentalists an object lesson in how to fight quite effectively against superior military forces. In this fashion, the success enjoyed by the Arab terrorists in fighting against the Soviets encouraged them to think about how they could use their newfound capabilities to engage the forces that be within the orbit of the Middle East itself to effect change towards the creation of a theocratic fundamentalist Muslim state, or even a loose confederation, or Caliphate, of them, by employing such terrorist tactics against both the Western powers and (eventually) the Saudi royal family to accomplish their goals. It took us a while to recognize that the rag-tag confederation of Arab 'freedom fighters baptized by combat in Afghanistan were now forming into a most formidable and extremely dangerous enemy, one that could hide at pleasure and strike when it suited them best.Moreover, one of the most interesting aspects to the book is the way in which the author threads the story of the growing and evolving threat of Al Queda into the history of what is also transpiring in Afghanistan over that quarter century of time. Had we not cut and run, for example, after helping to defeat the Soviets, had we stayed behind to aid them in rebuilding the shattered country the Soviets left in their wake, we might have been able to do much to disarm the radical Muslim movement from gaining traction in the first place. Instead, we abandoned them to their misery and incredible tribal hatreds and animosities, and by so doing provided a haven in which radical Muslim fundamentalists could come to power, and thus creating a perfect setting for all that Al Queda did afterward. In tracing the sordid history of how these so-called ghost wars led to what happened later, eventuating in the attacks of the late 1990s and the events of 911, Coll argues powerfully for a more informed, logical, and rational foreign policy, one informed by a keen understanding of the world and our place in it. Until such transformation takes place, our country and we will continue to be at great risk. Enjoy!
Rating:
Summary: inside the tactical ops
Review: Coll has written an inside history of the CIA in Afghanistan that seems revealing on a nuts-and-bolts level, but fails to address the big picture. I am writing this review on the day that George Tenet is testifying before the 9/11 Commission, and Coll's work is directly relevant. What does "Ghost Wars" cover? It gives a brief overview of the massive CIA program to arm the Afghan mujahadin against the Soviets in the 1980s. There is a tantalizing brief mention of Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) role in this, but do you suspect that what we are told is a partial account? It ends the day before 9/11. So what it covers in some detail is the period between the Soviet withdrawal and 9/11, including the period of civil war among warlords, the rise of the Taliban, and UBL estblishing his base there, and the story is told mainly from the point of view of mid-level CIA officials who were responsible for tracking UBL and al Qaeda. These officers, some only referred to only as "Mike" and "Rich" to protect their identities, were clearly consumed by their task and did all in their power to succeed in the years between 1997 and 9/11. Tenet, Black and other higher-ups are also portrayed as being quite focused on the threat and doing what they could. Coll's book doesn't provide any startling evidence to suggest a radical change one way or another in the Clinton-Bush transition. The most interesting part of the book is in the details of surveillance and planned ops -- UBL is watched making a regular circuit with his convoy of SUVs in Afghanistan from his base in Kandahar looping around to the NW and back. The Pakistani military is monitored for beards -- Islamic fundamentalists are required not to cut their beards, and so this would be an indication of a fundamentalist takeover of the Pakistani military. A group of UAE sheikhs goes hunting with hawks in Afghanistan, and the CIA group monitoring UBL thinks he is there -- a missile strike is considered, but rejected. If you find this level of detail interesting, you will enjoy Coll's book. I found more interesting what was left out. There is little or no discussion of U.S. strategy in all the profusion of tactical details. What about oil? What about Unocal and pipelines to carry oil and natural gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan? What about our questionable alliances with the Saudis and Pakistan? Coll's reporting offers little by way of answers, and mainly raises more questions. Plus, frankly, I am suspicious even of what is revealed, given the likelihood that important pieces are still classified. Overall, perhaps a good read for those thinking on the level of "getting the bad guys," but of limited value for those of us wondering about what is creating the bad guys, including U.S. strategy, and how to change the conditions that continue to create them.
Rating:
Summary: Along party lines,
Review: As I write this I am listening to members of the 9-11 Commission reading and quoting from this book. It seems our fellow reviewer from Sag Harbor, who doesn't have the fortitude to sign his/her real name, has a lot of criticism for those who do have the courage to act. If, as this character from Sag Harbor suggests, the book is as poor as he states, why is the 9-11 Commission interested in it enough to include it in the hearings? If you have watched any of the hearings, read this book and put the pieces of the puzzle together, as far as it can be done at this time. I think you will find it goes well with the line of questioning on parts of the Commission hearings.
Rating:
Summary: Comprehensive Review of What Went Wrong
Review: If you are interested in Afghanistan's recent history, the counter-terrorism efforts of the Clinton Administration, independent confirmation of Dick Clarke's accounts, or the creation of Osama Bin Ladin, than this book is for you. Coll has written a great history that's both easy to read and informative. The one major flaw is his tendency to mix theory with history. The theory slows the pace of the book down, but doesn't stop it totally. Never-the-less, this book is well worth the time and money.
Rating:
Summary: A true behind the scenes look
Review: This is an excellent and detailed look at the interplay between the CIA, the White House, Pakistan, Afghanistan, ISI, Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia. The facts presented by the author have become all the more relevant after the Dick Clarke and Condi Rice's testimony before the 9-11 commission.
Rating:
Summary: Just the facts
Review: This is a good review of events in Afghanistan over the last 20-25 years. Coll pulled no punches nor made accusations. He stated the facts and events that happened, exploring the personalities and relationships (personal, governmental, and within our own gov't). He leaves it to the reader to form his own opinion. This book goes a long way in explaining how we arrived at where we are today in Afghanistan and the war on terror.
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