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Summary: Oren did it write right.
Review: Comprehensive and contains facts from boths sides with a fair presentation of Arab facts. The best work found anywhere concerning this war and leaves you with insight concerning the direction this area is heading. This is a book that will enlighten many and surprise as there are many falsehoods put clearly away and unknown truths which cannot be refuted. A completely satisfying read. I also recommend reading SB 1 or God By Karl Maddox, another surprising revelation of this countries background and future.
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Summary: Book sets record straight
Review: Michael Oren does a service as he explains not only the 6 days of war in June of 1967 but actually does it hour by hour, minute by minute. Other authors of books on the 6 way war have let agendas get in the way. Oren brillianly gives details on the buildup of hostilities that led to the 6 day war. Of course his most brilliant breakthrough was proof that the Soviet Union instigated the war by telling Egypt that Israel was amssing troops on the Sinai peninsula while they were not. Egypt expelled the UN forces and moved Egyptian troops to the Israeli border. When Israel saw this, they moved their troops their. Oren gives in wonderful detail how the US did not take on teh Soviets and instead cowtowed to them. This book as I said gives minite by minute accounts of the war of all 6 days. It's also important to remember that after the war Israeloffered to give the captured land back in return for peace. They were turned down. The Arab states don't know how to take yes for answer.
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Summary: Six Days that Shook the World!
Review: The events of June 1967 have been written about extensively. Never before, however, has a book been published that not only chronicles the six days of the war itself but also the factors which led to it. In this important new work, Michael Oren looks back and comprehensively examines each and every aspect of the conflict. Oren presents the history from a military, diplomatic, political and cultural perspective. Through the extensive examination of archives, official reports, memoirs and interviews with surviving figures, Oren details the roles played by all the major players from the perspective of, not just the Israelis but the Egyptians, Syrians and Jordanians as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. After beginning by presenting a brief synopsis of the Arab-Israeli conflict to that point, Oren describes the series of miscalculations by Nasser that led Egypt into war several years before he intended. A combination of Syrian bellicosity, support of Palestinian terrorist incursions in Northern Israel together with the goading of his unstable general Amer, led Nasser to force the United Nations out of the de-militarized Sinai and to illegally close the Tiran straits to Israeli shipping, tantamount to a declaration of war. As Oren clearly shows, war with Egypt was inevitable the moment the straits were closed. No sovereign nation could ignore a blockade of its shipping. Oren chronicles Israel's political struggle with the United States and the Soviet Union to permit an appropriate military response to Egypt's provocations.. Despite the clear act of war by Egypt, the Johnson administration, hobbled by Vietnam and fearful of a confrontation with the Soviets, urged Israel to show restraint. Oren describes the agony of Eskhol and the Israeli government in deciding how to attack preemptively without alienating the United States. In the famous meeting between Abba Eban and President Johnson, Johnson practically urged Israel to absorb a first strike. The execrable Charles De Gaulle did overtly demand this. Israeli military doctrine required the preemptive destruction of the enemy air forces. The tension drove Rabin to a temporary breakdown and probably took years off Eskhol's life. Once the war started with Israel's lightning strike on the Egyptian Air Force, Oren shows how events followed their own trajectory with Jordan drawn in and then Syria and Israel's military objectives changing on a constant basis. Indeed, what becomes clear is that Israel never had any particular political objective other than the elimination of the direct existential threat. Contrary to anti-Israel revisionists, Israel never had any specific designs on the West Bank or even the old city of Jerusalem. Ironically, the decision to conquer the old city of Jerusalem was not made until he last possible moment, even after much of the West Bank was already in Israeli hands. From the Arab perspective, Oren shows just how and why the war turned into a disaster. The Egyptian forces lacked any semblance of unified command or communications. Nasser's officers were afraid to tell him the truth. While her forces were in full retreat, her air force lying in ruins, Egypt continued to broadcast the basest propaganda that her forces were advancing towards Tel a Viv. Hussein, meanwhile, was trapped by his fear of Nasser and the Syrian radicals into attacking Israel in Jerusalem. Also fascinating is the extent to which political and diplomatic considerations played a role in military strategy and increased Israeli casualties. For example, Eskhol delayed for so long the decision to take the Golan heights, that the IDF was unable to take the proper preparatory steps which would have included artillery bombardments, air bombings and a night time attack. Instead the brave soldiers of the IDF advanced straight into murderous Syrian fire. This was true for the Jerusalem campaign as well. Ultimately, the value of this book is that it shows the context of the war. It is easy for revisionists to argue that Israel's conquests of the Golan and the West Bank were not necessary. What Oren shows is that, with the exception of Jerusalem, the Israeli offensives were not for the purpose of expanding Israel's territory but purely for geo-political diplomatic purposes. Once forced to fight, Israel was determined not to be forced to remain within indefensible cease fire lines as she was in 1948. There is no question that Israel's basic war aims were to eliminate the offensive capabilities of the enemies on her border and to force them to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, the nature of these regimes made a peaceful solution impossible and more bloodletting would be required. Oren contrasts the totalitarian Egyptian and Syrian regimes with the raucous Israeli democracy where decisions on basic war strategy were taken by consensus in the famous "pit". Oren makes a point of noting that, despite the general's dismay and outright disgust at Eskhol's restraint (borne of his fear of antagonizing the Soviets and the Americans), never for one moment did they consider disregarding his orders. The hallmark of a true democracy is the subordination of the military to civilian command. Nasser, by contrast, was in constant fear of military overthrow. Oren's dispassionate analysis reveals the positive and negative roles played by the major players in the drama. The Mercurial Moshe Dyan does not come across as positively as his reputation would suggest. His inscrutable nature would endanger Israel in 1973. Eskhol is fully exonerated. Indeed, when the full story is revealed, it is difficult to think of another Israeli political figure better suited to deal with the myriad of competing considerations. Nasser comes across as more deluded and broken than evil. Hussein appears to be a victim of forces beyond his control. The Soviets are revealed in all their villainy. This book is destined to be a true classic. It will be to the Six Day War what "O Jerusalem" is to the War for Independence. It is a must read for anyone interested in the history of Israel.
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Summary: Best Book on Modern Middle East - Better than Clancy Tales
Review: Michael Oren's book is a gripping account of the Six-Day War, one that is clear from his extensive research, no one wanted. Oren shows the complex issues that moved the Egypt and Israel into a deadly tragedy. Putting the Six-Day War into his vast Cold War context illuminates the impotence of the Superpowers, the incompetence of Egypt and Syria, and the dangerous gamble Israel took when launching its necessary strike. Oren gives us as many perspectives as he can; American, Russian, Israeli, Eqyptian, Jordanian, English participants all have their say. The brilliance of this book is not just Oren's gripping account of the war, but his making the reader understand the incredible pressure that Nasser, King Hussein, and Levi Eshkol were under. This book made me feel some sympathy for the Egyptians, poorly-led, sacrificed to Nasser's macho posturing and cronyism, to Cold war cant, and massive poverty. What is chilling about this book is that nearly forty years later, not much has changed, as Oren points out. Readers of Tom Clancy will find real people and real tragedy more gripping than fake heroics; no heros here, just survivors.
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Summary: Impressive book
Review: This is an excellent and timely account of the Six Day War of 1967 when Israel began its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The book is written in fairly objective manner and is incredibly informative on details. Highly recommended.
Also highly recommended in non-fiction: "Decoding Darkness" by Tanzi and Parson,
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Summary: If You Have Time for Only One Book on the Middle East
Review: If you have time for only one book on the Middle East, purchase this book. Much of the current dispute is a result of the events of the 6 Day War. Mr. Oren's work incudes over 80 pages of footnotes, many referencing recently declassified files and personal interviews with the key players. Although packed with information, the book is well edited and a relatively easy read - managing to build suspense although the outcome is well known. No one emerges as a complete hero or a complete villian in Mr. Oren's gripping narrative - a tribute to the balanced, objective nature of the work. After reading this book, the reader will never view current developments in the Middle East in the same light.
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Summary: everything you want to know about the 6 day war and more
Review: this is one of the finest book written about any war. not only does it cover in fascinating detail the actual battles of the war, but the circumstances that led up to this war, the diplomat intrigue before, during and after the war and what were the consequences of the conflict. this book reads like the best war fiction written, but it's all true. absolutely worthy of a read
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Summary: A Textbook Example of Top-Notch Historical Research
Review: Michael B. Oren's "Six Days of War" is not only the definitive book on the 1967 Israeli-Arab conflict, but it is also a perfect primer in how to conduct historical research. Oren is meticulous and thorough in reviewing all of the available research to date -- books, newspapers, autobiographies, declassified government documents, oral interviews -- and synthesizing them into an accurate reference work. "Six Days of War" shows how to conduct fair and balanced research into an emotional issue. Nobody -- not anybody from the Israeli or Arab side -- could take issue with the book since Oren lets the facts and the main actors do the talking, and keeps his personal biases and beliefs to a minimum. Oren does a great job in presenting the viewpoints of both the Arab and Israeli sides. Some of the anecdotes from the Arab side -- such as the comment "We shall meet in Tel Aviv" when the Arab armies were on the run, or the plea from Nasser's chief aid Amer that his plane not be shot at by Egyptian forces during the 1st day of the war -- are as illuminating of the chaos and lies during the "fog of war" as they are funny. Some people claim that Oren is biased towards the Israeli side. This confuses two words -- bias and objectivity -- that are often used interchangeably, but have different meanings. If Oren were of Arab descent or if any Arab historian were to write an account of the 1967 conflict, it would have to follow the same path as Oren took. Bias deals with predisposition to favor one side or another; whether Oren does or doesn't is irrelevant. One can be biased towards one side or the other and still be objective. Of course, most instances concerning lack of objectivity concern individuals who allow their biases to color their judgment. Since Oren deals strictly with the facts of the 1967 conflict and the events leading up to it, there really isn't an opportunity for him to show "bias" by justifying the Israeli positions. Mind you, Oren does show Israel's position on the War -- just as he presents the Arab position with regard to the War and also the creation of the state of Israel (the real reason for the War and the 20 years of conflict up to that time). Anybody saying this book is "biased" either doesn't know the definition of the word biased, is confusing it with being objective (the two are not mutually exclusive), or hasn't read the book. My only quibbles with this book are that like many history books, it goes into great detail on the events leading up to the conflict, and the early days of the conflict, but then it seems to "rush" a bit at the end. This is especially noteworthy in the chapter "Aftershocks" where I felt that a bit more detail on the events post-1967 could have been written. I also would have preferred additional commentary on the "where are they now?" discussions of the major Middle East players. Oren does spend some time talking about the major figures -- Sharon, King Hussein, Nasser, Arafat, Dayan -- but I would not have minded hearing his thoughts on the 1970's peace initiatives with Sadat and Egypt as well as Begin's tenure, the Oslo accords, etc. Of course, this has little to do with the 1967 conflict per se, but it would have been a nice "what has it led to?" ending to the story. Of particular interest, the controversy regarding Security Council Resolution 242 is treated rather quickly. Given the focus today on land-for-peace the question of whether 242 refers to "territories" or "the territories" (the former implying Israel can hold on to some land, the latter demanding a return to the 1967 Green Line) is or paramount importance. Oren states that the official English translation refers to "territories" while the French and Arabic versions translate as "the territories." This may seem like a minor issue, but given the importance today, it deserved a few extra paragraphs at least, especially on how 242 was interpreted in the respective countries immediately after it was passed. It is possible that the two sides have been reading their own (correct) interpretations into the resolution since mid-1967, which goes along way to explaining the difficulties in achieving a peace agreement even today. The meticulousness of the research is shown by the nearly 100 pages (almost 20% of the book) that are devoted to the bibliography and footnotes. Note the large number of personal interviews with many key players and actors from that time; only current historical books (like Bob Woodward's) are noted for their voluminous 1st-contacts and interviews with individuals actually involved in events. Oren interviewed dozens of Israeli, Arab, Russian, and American sources to get specific information not available from the books and newspapers and government documents dealing with the 1967 War. Take a look at the photo section. There are some very good photos of younger-looking names you might know and some you might not: Begin (deceased) and Sharon (the current prime minister) come to mind. The cartoons from the Israeli and Arab press are also very informative. Several of the Arab cartoons directed at Israel are very chilling in presenting the atmosphere that Israel was contending with at that time. They show why Israel could not afford to take chances and endanger their survival. All in all, an outstanding research piece which not only dissects the events leading up to, during, and after the 1967 War, but also shows how one should conduct research on any topic of history, by hitting all the available research materials (printed, classified, oral testimony) and interpreting it in the context of the time in which the events occurred.
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Summary: one of the best books on the Modern Middle East
Review: A riveting read from an excellent and eloquent historian and former military man.
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Summary: An excellent history of an unusual war
Review: This is an excellent history of the Six Day War. It was made possible when the 30-year declassification period expired in 1997 and all sorts of material became available to historians.
Given that Egypt ought to have been aware of Israel's recalcitrance to fight and Israel's military strength, it has long been puzzling that Egypt committed acts of war that seemed highly likely to provoke an all-out Israeli response. It has also been puzzling that Jordan went along with the war, even when it stood to lose territory. And it was even puzzling that Syria kept shelling Israel during the early parts of the war when it stood to lose the Golan. But Oren shows how it all happened.
We see some preliminary skirmishes in which Syria provoked an Israeli reply. And false Soviet warnings of an Israeli buildup against Syria. We also see that Egyptian President Nasser was aware that there was no such Israeli buildup but in May of 1967 went ahead with kicking the UNEF forces out of the Sinai anyway. Nasser might have been prepared to risk an undesired war to do this. However, he then continued by closing the Straits of Tiran, an act of war which made a major conflict very likely. That would have been truly illogical had Nasser's intention been to avoid war. And we discover that Nasser did indeed plan a first strike (Operation Dawn) that was cancelled in the last few hours only because Nasser feared that the plan had been compromised. That allowed Israel to get away with its failure to act at once when Egypt closed the Straits. In June, Israel gained a big advantage by striking Egypt first and destroying two thirds of the Egyptian air force on the ground.
While there are excellent descriptions of exactly how the war proceeded, the most interesting questions Oren answers are when and how Israel made the decisions to liberate the rest of Jerusalem, capture the West Bank, and take the Golan heights from Syria. Oren stresses that none of these events, not even the taking of all of Sinai, were in any Israeli Master Plan, and that these decisions were made on the spot. Many other outcomes were still possible even a day after the outbreak of major hostilities.
This is a fascinating book. If there is any moral, it should be that ignorance can have deadly consequences.
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