Rating: 
Summary: In the Middle East, all politics is global politics
Review: Michael Oren has written a captivating account of the diplomatic, political, and biographical circumstances around the war the Israelis call 'The Six Day War' and the Arabs know as 'The June War'. As the glowing reviews, on Amazon.Com and elsewhere suggest, this is a captivating, well researched book, that will almost certainly be known as a classic. After an introduction which traces the Israeli-Arab conflict to the 1960s, Oren starts unrolling the events that lead to the outbreak of the war - namely, the boarder clashes between Israel and Syria, the attacks by Palestinian Militants (or terrorists, or revolutionaries, take your pick), and the counter attacks (or raids, or Imperialistic demonstrations of power) by Israelis. The crisis took an escalation with the evacuation of the United Nation Emergency Force from Egypt, thus closing Israel's red sea port, and the movement of Egyptian forces into the Sinai desert. Oren's description of the political forces at work, going back and force from Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Moscow and Washington DC (with stops at Amman, Paris and the UN headquarters in New York City), is nothing short of masterful. He describes how internal power struggles within the Arab world and within Egypt moved Egypt towards a confrontation with Israel and the Unites States, and how political forces within Israel, as well as a wish to maintain close relationships with the US ruled Israeli political movements. I was struck by the major role U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations played in the conflict. By pulling the UN forces from the straits of Tiran that rapidly, Thant boosted Egyptian's pride. Had Thant stood up to Nasser, perhaps the war could have been evaded. Equally interesting is Oren's depiction of US President Johnson, heavily involved in the much criticized war in Vietnam, unable to give Israel the support that it asked for - and thus, in the eyes of the Israeli leadership, giving it the green light to strike. The attack, launched by Israeli airforce on the 5th of June 1967, caught the Egyptian unaware. Israeli operation Focus, the destruction of Egyptian air fields, was a resounding success. In a way, the war was already won. The greatest weakness of Oren's account is in the description of the military operation. Frankly, they were so confused, with hardly any maps, that I don't think you can understand much about the ground level events of the war, or about the military strategy at all the levels except the highest, unless you already know a great deal about it beforehand. This fault, however, does not really mar this otherwise excellent account, which goes on to describe the mix of responses in the Arab world, both desperation and euphoria (due to the phantasmagorial propaganda), the accusations that the US aided Israel (what Johnson called 'The Big Lie'), and the unfortunate attack on the USS Liberty by Israeli forces (Which Oren convincingly demonstrates was an accident). Most interesting, Oren describes the attempt to secure a cease-fire, and Israel's attempts to duck, delay and win time. After trying hard to avoid the war, Israeli leaders were unwilling to end it without a major change in the political landscape - the conquest of vast territories in the Sinai desert, the West Bank, and the Goal Heights. I was also amazed to read about the complete lack of strategic planning in the side of Israel. While military plans were finely drawn and perfectly executed, there was apparently no thought at all given to the goals of the war, beyond a somewhat naive wish to expand Israel's boarders and repay the Arab aggressors. Decisions such as weather to conquer East Jerusalem, to cross the tunnel, or to invade Syria, were done on the spur on the moment. Worse, they were often carried out not by the Government, but by the whims of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. This is perhaps the most extraordinary revelation I had while reading Oren's book - that Dayan, and virtually Dayan alone, decided almost all the important decisions of the war. Not Prime Minister Eshkol, not the Israeli government, and not the international community made the decisions. For better or worse, almost everything in the modern Middle East is the consequence of the solitary decisions of Moshe Dayan. Almost four decades later, in the middle of yet another wave of Israeli-Arab violence, I find that highly troubling, but strangely Ironic, and I fear that, in this regard at least, little has changed. In the event of an all out war, will the next forty or fifty years be decided by one charismatic leader in the Israeli cabinet?
Rating: 
Summary: Well-Researched HALF-history is NO History
Review: While there are many objective books written by Israelis about Israel's conflicts with the Arabs, this book is not one of them. The problem with this book is more than just pro-Israeli bias, which may be forgiven. The problem here is this book tells only half the story, and little new at that. Much of what's in here has been already said in the old classics by Edgar O'Ballance "The 3rd Arab-Israeli War" and "The Electronic War in the Middle East", written shortly after the events. The military events themselves are misrepresented, to the extent of completely negating facts in some cases. For instance, both O'Ballance's book and "The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World," by Avi Shlaim directly contradict this book's claim that Israel helped "rebuild" Arab homes in the West bank destroyed by the war. The established references detail how instead Israel destroyed hundreds of homes in the town of Qalqilya, completely erased 3 villages from existence (Latrun, the Biblical Emmaus, and Beit Nuba), and drove hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees across the Jordan river into exile. Oren's book needs to at least address these issues if it is a truly objective book as it claims. "Six Days of War" prefers to parrot the official Israeli line rather than deal objectively with the evidence in many other issues, for example the Israeli bombing of the USS Liberty and the Israeli massacre of Egyptian POWs, among others. These are obviously serious issues and any serious book claiming objectivity needs to examine both sides of the coin and address the evidence without contradiction. "Six Days of War" needs to at least address the issues raised by other books such as "Body of Secrets," by James Bamford and "Assault on the Liberty" by James M. Ennes Jr. As for examining the political aspects of the war, this is actually the place where "Six Days of War" fails miserably. Offhand, the book dismisses the long-term Arab aspirations and thinking, replacing them with some crude models. Though the roots of the conflicts clearly extend well before 1948 and all the way back to 1917, the book focuses almost exclusively on the 1967 conflagration. Seen thus without even a minimal understanding of their grievances, the Arabs appear irrational and aggressive while Israel is seen as a victim. The Palestinians, a major Middle East player, are totally dismissed in "Six Days of War" as a non-entity and a non-people. Unfortunately, this book's concentration on the military aspects and its pro-Israeli perspective make it unbalanced and prevent it from providing a deeper analysis of events.
Rating:
Summary: excellent historical work
Review: Oren is a true asset to the field of history unlike so many postmodern hacks out there posing as historians under the Cultural Studies banner. This is quality research brought together into to a highly readable and exciting story about the 6 Day War whose repercussions are still felt to this day. Reviewer "Beijing Cat" obviously didn't even read the book, being one of those knee-jerk Israel bashers trying to puff his chest out and sound like a hero of the oppressed. Shame on your intellectual shallowness.
Rating: 
Summary: Good diplomatic history, less well done on the military side
Review: There are many histories of parts or all of the conflicts in the Middle East. In this book the author ambitiously tries to write the complete history of the Six Day War and its legacy in the politics of the region. The result, while generally good, is a bit uneven. For one thing, while the context of the war is wonderfully covered from a diplomatic viewpoint, it's not very well done from a military one. You get almost nothing on training, equipment, recruitment, organization, or the personalities of the military commanders involved, and the chapters that deal with the war itself are rather brief. The maps that accompany the text are rather unclear and don't reflect the text very well (the map of the Golan Heights shows Israeli units advancing after the text says the war stopped, with no explanation). This is unfortunate, given the context into which the war is placed. The diplomatic part of the book is the part that really shines. The war had a strange context, and (as has been pointed out elsewhere) this is pretty well examined, except for the Syrian angle, which remains mostly a mystery. The Egyptians and Soviets are an interesting pair, and the miscalculations that the U.S. and Israelis made in trying to interpret the actions of these and other nations are very interesting. The point to this part of the book, beyond the actual explanation of the circumstances that led up to the war, is that diplomatic maneuvers can be misinterpreted, and that can lead to further complications. There's also a final chapter on the aftermath of the war, which includes the fascinating fact that the English version of U.N. resolution 242 differs from the French and Arabic version, and that the difference implies that Israel can (or can't) keep part of the occupied territories when things are concluded. This misunderstanding, or deliberate misstatement, has led to much grief since. I enjoyed this book, but the military parts were not as satisfying as the diplomatic ones. I still do recommend it for the diplomatic context for the war.
Rating: 
Summary: Hopeless military jumble
Review: Why do authors think we know how many men are in an Israeli or Syrian battilion? How many of us have intimate knowledge of topography? This book has an interesting diplomatic story to tell which it does with some skill, but the military part is just a mess. Maps-more than two-drawings and some semse of descriptive ability besides just a list of place names would go a long way towards making this book more interesting. The most stunning part of the book is how Arab propaganda permitted Israel to keep fighting because the arabs were loath to admit how badly the first day of the war went. You reap what you sow..
Rating:
Summary: Very Interesting
Review: I found that this book provided excellent insight into a modern use of mechanized warfare tactics. It can probably be said that this was the most recent example of Blitzkrieg warfare. The author's depiction of the actual war is very good, considering the short period of time it actually involved. The diplomatic events and causes leading up to the war, and those that occured during it are also very well researched. The author managed to do this without making the book excessively long, which many in depth studies of conflicts are for those who aren't students of history and geo-political matters. The author is also surprisingly objective, which is unusual for authors on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A more thorough look at the Liberty incident , however, would have been preferable. Otherwise, this book is an excellent look at the Six Day War and the events that made the Middle East the way it is today.
Rating:
Summary: extremely comprohensive
Review: Oren covers the Six Day war in great depth in this book. He starts out by focuing on the early history of Israel and how it got along with the superpowers like America, UK and the USSR as well as with its neighbors showing their interests in Israel and previous armed conflicts. The book then goes into the evnts leading upto the six day war such as troop diplomant and Arab concern over Dinoma's nuclear power. Then Oren covers each day of the war, looking at how each country fought and alliances created. The book also deals with how Europe, America and the USSR influence events in the region. It deals with military strategy and political and military outcomes. Oren then ends with how the SIx day war affected the Middle East and contininuing problems with the Middle East
Rating:
Summary: Essential text for any Middle East politicals class...
Review: Hands down, this is the most extensive text covering the events before the break out of war in 1967, during the actual battle, and the aftermath in the strategic and political arena. Nothing, I repeat nothing that is written in this book is baseless. The NOTES and the BIBLIOGRAPHY & SOURCES at the end of the book are a book by themselves. It fascinates me how much luck was invovled in the pure success of the Israeli operations. For example, during the massive Israeli air attacks of Egyptian airfields the Commander & Chief of the Egyptian forces was in a transport aircraft flying from one airbase to another. He commanded to halt all anti-aircraft firing (wether is be AAA or SAM) because they just might shoot his aircraft out of the sky. In result, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) experienced very little losses to anti-aircraft during this operation. This incident doesn't go against the fact that Israel's strategic performance on the battlefield was beyond amazing. I personally really found the quotes most interesting, especially when they were from lower ranked soldiers in the Arab or Israeli armies. The following is one that I think says a lot: "Some 30 seconds from the end of the first attack, a second wave of planes arrived...We ran about the desert, looking for cover, but the planes didn't shoot. They merely circled, their pilots surprised that the base was completly destroyed and that no targets remained. We were the only targets...weak humans scurrying in the desert with handguns as our only means of self-defense. It was a sad comedy...pilots of the newest and best-equipped jets fighting with handguns. Five minutes after the beginning of the attack the Israeli planes disappeared and a silence prevailed that encompassed the desert and the noise of the fire that destroyed our planes and the airbase and the squadron. They completed their assignment in the best way possible, with a ratio of losses - 100 percent for us, 0 percent for them." All in all, this book is truly a piece of art. This book should be read by ALL leaders of the Arab World, so they won't lead their nation to utter destruction once again.
Rating:
Summary: Very Good and Very Detailed Political and Diplomatic History
Review: This very good and carefully researched book is primarily a political and diplomatic account of the Six Day War (or the June War as it is called in many Arab nations). Oren's focus is on the events that led to the war and the decisions during the war that led to its final outcome and aftermath. This is not a military history, though it contains solid description of the events of the war itself, but rather a political and diplomatic history of decision making before and during the war. Oren has taken considerable pains to be fair and comprehensive. Based on a combination of interviews, extensive archival research, and systematic review of the extensive secondary literature, Oren attempts to reconstruct decision making by all the major actors. In particular, he tries very hard and successfully to devote equal time to both Arab and Israeli decision makers. Oren deals well also with the role of the United States but devotes less time to how the Soviet leadership acted, undoubtedly because sources for the Soviet leadership are limited. In his desire to be fair, Oren has perhaps been somewhat reluctant to draw conclusions about aspects of the war and seems to have aimed at a strategy in which he presents the story and lets readers draw conclusions. A couple of examples. It is clear from his narrative that various Arab governments, notably the Syrian and Egyptian leadership, precipitated the war. Nowhere in the book, however, does Oren explicitly condemn their reckless actions. It is clear also that members of the Soviet leadership acted irresponsibly and encouraged Arab aggression. Oren opens the book with a solid precis of events in the 2 decades prior to the Six Day War. He then presents a very detailed account of the specific events leading to the outbreak of war. The war, and the specific way it started, a pre-emptive strike by the Israelis, is shown to be a highly contingent event in the background of a very unstable situation. Important factors leading to the outbreak of war were not only the persistent Arab-Israeli conflict but also the very complicated and at times violent relations between different Arab states, and the messy internal politics of Arab states. In Egypt, rivalry between Nasser and his chief political competitor, Field Marshall 'Amer, seems to have been a major factor propelling Egyptian decision making. In the background, of course, was the Cold War and the Soviet Union, which had adopted several Arab states as clients. A European diplomat is quoted as remarking that the Middle East was like 1914 before the beginning of WWI and this is a good analogy. After almost 2 generations of Israeli regional military dominance, it is easy to forget how one-sided this combat appeared. Israel suffered from unfavorable geography; all its major population centers were in direct line of Arab artillery and it had few natural defensive barriers. The numerical disparity was immense, and there was great disparity in tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The relevant Arab nations were equipped well; the Soviets had supplied Egypt and Syria generously and Jordan had good American equipment. The Israeli Defense Force was primarily a citizen army wrapped around a core of professionals. A large component of the Arab armies were fully professionalized. The Israelis, however, had excellent training and many of the Arab formations were prepared poorly. One Egyptian officer remarked bitterly that the Israelis had trained for war and we had trained for parades. The Egyptian Armed Forces were less a military force than a patronage machine serving the political ambitions of its leadership. The Israeli Defense Force had superb leadership, mainly men who had served with distinction in the 1948 and 1956 wars. Arab military leadership proved to be dreadful. When Arab troops fought well, like the Jordanians in the West Bank or the Syrians defending the Golan Heights, their commanders wasted their efforts. Oren makes the excellent point that one of the primary outcomes of the war, the huge expansion of Israeli occupied territory, was very much the result of the unexpectedly overwhelming nature of Israeli success. Not only did the Arab leadership bungle the military aspects of the war but they also bungled the diplomatic aspects as well. In Oren's account, the actors that come out best are the Israeli cabinet, who struggled continuously with difficult decisions in a democratic manner, and the Johnson administration, who tried very hard to act in a manner would reduce the violence. Despite the subtitle, this book is not about the aftermath of the Six Day War and does not deal in any meaningful way with the impact of the Six Day War. Oren does make the general point that the Six Day War ensured that the Arab nations could not expect to destroy Israel, as they hoped to do in the Six Day War. On the other hand, Israel was not and is not powerful enough to impose a lasting peace. The war did not abolish the underlying problems in Middle East. Oren doesn't mention, however, one particularly important consequence of the Six Day War, which is that it really cemented the relationship between Israel and the United States, and this relationship remains a cornerstone of Israeli security.
Rating:
Summary: even-handed and readable account of controversial event
Review: After 9-11 and during Enduring Freedom, the reading public fixated on a slew of books on terrorism, Islam, and the Middle East, producing some bestsellers that otherwise would not have received that status or, worse, did not deserve it in the first place. But Oren's excellent book richly deserved its bestseller status and, one hopes, would have been widely read had there not been high interest in 2002 (the war's thirty-fifth anniversary). Oren opens with the background to the conflict, particularly the 1948 and 1956 wars, whose conclusions left tensions at heightened levels, not to mention issues that were unresolved. Admittedly, this general treatment isn't overly exciting, but it is absolutely necessary to know the context, since so much of Middle East conflict is rooted in history (or perceptions of it), as much today as in 1967. It is also important to know the mindsets prevailing at the time: Israel's dual and paradoxical sense of invincibility and vulnerability and Egypt's desire to effect Arab greatness and unity. Moreover, Oren also explores the Cold War aspects of the conflict. The Arab world is frequently discussed as a Cold War battlefield, in which the United States and the Soviet Union jockeyed for power and in which nations, especially Egypt, tried to play both sides to its own advantage. The Suez Crisis of 1956 is usually adduced as an example of the Cold War in the Middle East, but too seldom is attention given to the Six Day War as part of the greater superpower conflict. Not a proxy war in the sense that Vietnam or Afghanistan were, the 1967 war nevertheless witnessed intense diplomatic activity and tension between the US and USSR, including the danger of war over Israel's accidental bombing of the USS Liberty. The Cold War provides part of the background for the war, as well as for the course it took, and Oren's perspectives are appreciated. The meat of the book is devoted to a day-by-day, sometimes hour-by-hour, account of the war, from the events precipitating it through its conclusion in the Golan Heights in Syria. If the book's opening contextual section was slow (though interesting), the actual account of the war itself was, as one review had it, "seamless." Oren's narrative is exciting, gripping, riveting--indeed, hard to put down. We read of the war's opening on June 5, with the launching of the aerial attack on Egypt's air force (Israeli intelligence had pinpointed the exact location of many Egyptian aircraft and even knew the names of the pilots) and the accompanying uncertainty among Israel's leaders. We find Ariel Sharon leading the assault on Umm Qatef in Sinai. Oren takes us to the streets of Jerusalem, to the northern settlements under Syrian bombardment, to the halls of power in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Oren's close focus on these halls--on individuals and their interactions--is a major strength of his work. Enigmatic Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan grabs for power in the Cabinet over indecisive (or moderating) Prime Minister Eshkol; Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin bears the weight of the planning, collapses, and emerges a hero. Gamal Nasser imagines himself the leader of the Arab world and seeks the honor of crushing the "Zionist entity," all while his Field Marshal 'Amer creates incoherent and untenable military strategy and policy and feeds fabricated reports of Egyptian victories to Nasser and the public (to damaging effect, a mistake Syria would repeat). Jordan's King Hussein charts a potentially dangerous middle path, cooperating with Egypt in order to appease his people but trying to avoid a split with his supplier, the US. Oren's analysis of these men and their relationships are truly fascinating. My one complaint about the book is the lack of attention it gives domestic politics. Oren does touch on the matter, particularly as it related to King Hussein and, to a lesser extent, Nasser. But Israel's domestic situation--except for a few mentions of its economy and of the lobbying for action by residents of settlements under Syrian bombardment--receives little substantive treatment. It would have been insightful, for example, to read what the Israeli people were saying about their leadership at the time and what, if any, constraints they were placing on their leaders. But this is a minor quibble with a book that is, ostensibly, military history. Oren's goal was to rise above his own prejudices and above the ideological warfare of other historians and produce a balanced account of the Six Day War. He has succeeded in crafting an even-handed and eminently readable chronicle of this important event.
|
