Rating: 
Summary: Something Very Clear To Understand
Review: I read this book 4 years ago, and remembered in it that it took great pains to NOT be a book of opinion, but, a investigative study into the real facts behing the conflict of the Israel-Palestinan conflict. Prof. Finkelstein asserts certain facts (not opinons) that we as humans must accept - when exposed to the truth of the conditions of life in Palestine. Easy & fascinating reading, unless you've decided that Palestinians don't really matter and could care less about genocide, anyway. You'll look at the Mid-East defintely, I guarantee! You know that anything that knocks Israel is 'anti-semitic' It's a very sad comment on how Zionists defend thier colonialism "we're God's people" and when they made 11,000 Palestinians homeless last montrh... well, ANY people would have made provisions for the people whose homes they demolished. BUT NOT ISRAEL!They cared less if they slept in the sewer. Another ugly fact...where were these 11,000 to sleep??? Israel didn't care. Israel's safety first
Rating:
Summary: A Rare Example of Scrupulous Scholarship
Review: If you want to understand the origins of the on-going tragedy of the Intifada, read this book. But it will take nerves of steel. You will be confronted with facts that will upset every one of your preconceived notions about Israel and the Palestinian conflict. If that prospect sacres you, don't read this book. Otherwise, reading this work is a great, liberating experience.Norman Finkelstein (Princeton University PhD & Professor at De Paul University) wows his reader with his scholarship but also his integrity. One can only admire his intellectual courage and probity for having painstakingly analysed the complex array of social, political and ideological forces that shaped the rise of the Zionist movement and which led simultaneously to the creation of Israel and the tragic displacement of the indigenous Palestinian population. And he accomplishes this remarkable feat in 240 pages. As a scrupulous historian, his most important contribution is the courage to debunk so many of the myths that surround the rise of the Israeli state and that pass as common currency in America. Finkelstein is loathe to advance a fact without detailed argumentation, backed up by very thorough research and abundant footnotes. 27% of his book is made up of very carefully crafted notes, each drilling down further his searh for historical veracity. He chases down the truth/falsehood of every fact, exposing the fraudulent work of so-called "experts" (Joan Peters), challenges the political bias of some of today's leading Israeli historians (Benny Morris), and punches holes through the inconsistencies of respected Zionist apologists (Anita Shapira), letting the historical cards fall where they may, without allowing Nationalist ideology to warp or intimidate his findings. Finkelstein's book renders a very considerable public service in enlightening our minds to the many inherited falsehoods that masquerade as truth regarding the reality of the Israel-Palestine conflict. For this, we all, Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans owe him a great debt.
Rating: 
Summary: Very bad research
Review: In Chapter 5, an essay on the Six-Day War, Norman Finkelstein attempts to dislodge historical facts. He tries to prove that Israel did not start the war in self-defense, to forestall an Arab attack aimed at Israel's destruction. As Israel explained at the time, its "Government ascertained that the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan are deployed for immediate multi-front aggression, threatening the very existence of the state." Finkelstein argues that this danger did not exist because Egypt, then the strongest Arab power, did not intend to strike, and that had Egypt stuck first, even Egypt's generals knew the Arabs would lose. But like everything else in this very bad book, this is false. In Six Days of War by Michael B. Oren, readers will see that Egypt did intend to strike Israel, and had an attack plan in motion, which was called off only hours before its execution because the US told Egyptian officials that it knew of the plans. Oren had interviews with Egyptian, United Nations and US commanders and diplomats, compared with secondary citations used by Finkelstein Israel knew that war was afoot, because Nasser made this clear by his actions. Finkelstein should be aware that Nasser blocked the Straits of Tiran, which was an open act of war. On May 21, Nasser told two top generals and his vice president that by closing the Straits of Tiran, he would increase the chance of war to 50%. But he closed the Straits of Tiran anyway. Nasser said that "closing the Gulf of Aqaba meant war," and that his objective in that war was to destroy Israel. Finkelstein says the Arabs did not plan to strike, because they knew they would lose. But Oren's readers learn that Arab commanders were actually oblivious to the fact that they would lose. They thought they could win, and Nasser thought so too! I don't like the fact that Finkelstein did not discuss Israel's intense vulnerability. Israel is very small and in 1967 it was only nine miles wide at the narrowest point. The biggest city, Tel Aviv, was minutes by air from Egypt's Sinai desert, and the Egyptians had forced the United Nations peace keeping forces out of the Sinai (a point Finkelstein also forgets to tell his readers) with no protest whatsoever from the international community. Egypt marched 100,000 troops and 1,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers into the Sinai right to Israel's southern border. Meanwhile, Syria massed troops at the northern border. This looked like a major threat, particularly since it followed by only 22 years the destruction of one third of the world's Jews and more than 66% of the Europe's Jews. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol feared for the state's existence. So did General Moshe Dayan. Israel took the state's potential annihilation hands very seriously, particularly since Arab leaders promised its destruction quite loudly. Arab plans were not a big secret. Finkelstein makes a big point at the beginning of the book that his parents were Holocaust survivors. I think he should also have recognized the real dangers to Israel. Finkelstein makes big assumptions about Arab intentions, but did not prove them through his research at all. Norman Finkelstein's version of events in 1967 does not even come close to the reality. This is a terrible book.
Rating:
Summary: It vilifies but does not inform
Review: Mr Finkelstein is so obsessed with vilifying Zionism (which he compares to Nazism) that he never even tries to discover what Zionism is. Zionism is a movement of national liberation and has all the attributes of such a movement. Had Mr. Finkelstein paused to consider this, he might have realized that Zionism may be clashing with another movement of national liberation. If he had done so, his book might have been at the least honest. As it is, he is so busy vilifying Zionism and praising everything and anything opposed to this evil straw man he has set up in his mind, that he is simply incapable of writing a scholarly work on this conflict. A pity because he is obviously a gifted writer.
Rating: 
Summary: Highly Intelligent, Fascinating, Partisan
Review: My adjectives refer to Chapter 5, an essay on the Six-Day War (June 5-10, 1967), which pitted Israel against Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. As in the book's other essays, Finkelstein rebuts influential views that he considers unfounded. In this case, the "unfounded" view is that Israel began the war in self-defense, to forestall an Arab attack aimed at Israel's destruction. As Israel stated, explaining its decision to strike: "[T]he Government ascertained that the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan are deployed for immediate multi-front aggression, threatening the very existence of the state." Finkelstein argues that no such danger existed, since (1) there was no evidence that Egypt, which led the Arab coalition, meant to attack, and (2) it was "taken for granted" that if she did, she would be routed by Israel. In early May, 1967, Israeli leaders were threatening military action to punish Syria for sponsoring Palestinian terrorism against Israel. The Soviet Union, a strong supporter of Syria and Egypt, notified them (incorrectly) that Israel had massed troops near the Syrian border, in order to invade. Egypt, allied to Syria, responded by (1) deploying 100,000 troops in the Sinai peninsula, (2) ordering the evacuation of the UN Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli boundary, and (3) barring Israeli shipping through the Tiran Straits. Did Egypt mean to follow up with a military attack? If Finkelstein's citations are correct, US and Israeli intelligence both concluded that Egypt did not intend to attack Israel. Reporting that most observers took this position, an Israeli publication, Middle East Record, argued that pledges by Egypt to the UN and to the Great Powers not to start shooting should be taken at face value. A leading Israeli general stated that Egyptian troops in the Sinai peninsula were not deployed for offensive action, though it is unclear when this statement was made. On the second point, the CIA estimated in late May that Israel would win a war against one or all of the Arab countries within a week, no matter who struck the first blow. The prewar British intelligence estimate was nearly the same. Shortly before the Israeli attack, its military leaders assured the government that they would "rout the enemy." Finkelstein's evidence is pertinent and plausible, much of it previously unknown to me. He does not tell us why intelligence and other observers were sure that Egypt did not intend to attack. Of course, if the Arabs assumed they would lose, presumably they wouldn't start a fight. But no evidence is cited that the Arab leaders thought they would lose. If they didn't mean to attack, why take measures that could easily provoke an Israeli attack? Having taken such measures, why not seize the military advantage of striking first? Egyptian assurances to non-Arab diplomats that they would not attack were apparently private: no public commitments to that effect are mentioned. If the prewar reality was that the Arabs did not mean to attack, and could not have won if they had, why did the Israeli public and much of the world believe that Israel was in mortal danger? Israel is a tiny country, with most of its population in cities vulnerable to air and/or naval bombardment. Israeli civil defense preparation was intense, with some foreboding of a "Second Holocaust." Finkelstein does not mention these fears. More important, he says nothing about the vehemently hostile statements issuing from Arab governments and media. This absence reflects his partisanship: throughout the essay the Israelis are portrayed as aggressive, high-handed and violent; the Arabs, as defending their rights, but open to reason and diplomacy. The *Israel-Arab Reader* (Fifth Edition), edited by Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, provides extensive excerpts from speeches by Egypt's President Nasser on May 25, 26 and 29, 1967. In the first speech, Nasser defended Egypt's moves as a show of strength in answer to Israel's threats against Syria. He did not threaten to attack or promise not to. "The Jews," he said, "threaten war. We tell them you are welcome, we are ready for war. . . [U]nder no circumstances will we abandon any of our rights." On May 26, Nasser asserted that "we are strong enough, that if we were to enter a battle with Israel, with God's help, we could triumph. On this basis, we decided to take actual steps. . . If Israel embarks on an aggression against Syria or Egypt the battle against Israel will be a general one . . . and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel." Again, there is no threat to attack, and no promise not to attack. On May 29: "[W]e have restored Arab honor and renewed Arab hopes. . . [W]e will decide the time and the place and not allow them to decide." Isn't this an implied threat to attack? Nasser continues: "The issue now at hand is . . . the rights of the Palestine people. . . It is the expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine, the usurpation of their rights, and the plunder of their property." This certainly enlarges the issues at stake in the confrontation. Finkelstein's evidence is persuasive that, whatever the public feared, the Israeli leadership did not think the country in mortal danger. They launched a surprise attack for the advantages therein, not because they expected to lose if Egypt attacked first. Concerning Arab military inferiority, Finkelstein's evidence is plausible, and vindicated by the actual result - Israel did triumph in six days. About Arab intentions he lacks evidence, and we are not much better off after reading the tea leaves of Nasser's speeches. My hunch is that Nasser hadn't decided whether to attack, but might have risked it. He could not be sure of winning, but he could assume that a UN cease-fire would prevent his losing badly.
Rating:
Summary: A Brave Man
Review: Norman Finkelstein is a brave man who has received a lot of flak for writing this book. One response that authors who criticise Israel always have to contend with is the accusation that they are motivated by anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism. Jewish authors (Finkelstein is the son of Holocaust survivors)are additionally accused of being 'self hating' Jews. It's almost as if, in the eyes of Israel's unquestioning supporters, there can be no legitimate reason to criticise anything that Israel does. Maybe Israel, unlike any other country which has ever existed on Earth, is a perfect society which is completely above criticism - or is it? The aim of this brilliant book is to ask questions about the view of Israel's history that Zionists would like the rest of us to believe. Many aspects of this history are hotly disputed so it's a perfectly legitimate area of study. Reading the book will probably challenge your preconceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and will make some people feel distinctly uncomfortable. But like nasty tasting medicine that ultimately does you good, it's essential reading for anyone who really wants to understand what's going on in that tragic part of the world. And the fact that all Finkelstein's opponents can do to counter his arguments is come out with the same old knee-jerk reactions says it all. Buy it!
Rating:
Summary: A Relentlessly Thorough Study
Review: Norman Finkelstein is a first rate scholar -- and a brave one. If you read one book about the conflict, let it be this one.
Rating:
Summary: A Relentlessly Thorough Study
Review: Norman Finkelstein is a first rate scholar -- and a brave one. If you read one book about the conflict, let it be this one.
Rating:
Summary: Fiction a la Finkelstein
Review: Norman Finkelstein is well know for his warped view of reality in the Israel Palestinain conflict and this book proves it beyond all doubt
Probably the worst feature is the way he misrepresents the current views of Benny Morris, who has made it very clear that some of his earlier thinking was wrong.
What a misnomer the word "reality " is in the title of this book.
The only reality is the fact that Norman Finkelstein has got it badly wrong and is misinforming people who have the right to expect to read the truth when studying this sad and prolonged conflict
Joy Wolfe
Manchester UK
Rating:
Summary: Selective Distortion of History
Review: Norman Finkelstein practices the worst type of historiography. He uses each chapter to selectively pick out quotes from single authors and state them out their proper and greater historical context thereby distorting the record. He selectively ignores or severly downplays any evidence against his arguments. For example he never mentions the vitriolic hatred coming out of the greater Arab world during this time period, severly downplays terrorism and its effects on Israel and never mentions directly the cold war context during the years of the conflict. His comparisons and extensive quotations of Hitler and Himmler with Israeli officials and soldiers was obviously written for effect and was a revolting abuse of the written word. He seems to me to be an author with no real first hand experience or feel for this area of history. The incredibly one sided bulk of his narrative discredits any legitmate points he tries to make throughout the work.
The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict is complex and there are legitmate grieviences on both sides with some very good impartial books and sources of information. Mr Finkelstein's is not one of them.
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