The Missing Peace : The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace

Rating:
Summary: Eye opener
Review: A very detailed book with what seems like an endless cast of characters. I enjoyed it, but labored at times trying to keep the issues/concerns straight.

I can't say I am optimistic about the future for Israel and Palestine, but I definitely feel more informed about why this conflict is so hard to resolve.

I hope with time and growing interdependence, wounds will heal.

Rating:
Summary: A Riveting Political Memoir About A Never-Ending Conflict
Review: Author, Dennis B. Ross is currently Distinguished Fellow and Counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is best known, however, for the leading role he played in shaping US involvement in the Middle East peace process from 1988 to the breakdown of talks in 2001. Ambassador Ross, a highly skilled diplomat and negotiator, worked tirelessly as our country's point man in both George H. W. Bush's and Bill Clinton's administrations, and dealt directly with all parties involved in the negotiations. Ross assisted the Israelis and Palestinians in reaching the 1995 Interim Agreement. He successfully brokered the Hebron Accord in 1997, and facilitated the Israeli-Jordan peace treaty. Bringing Israel and Syria together was also a priority on his agenda. There was a time when Ross strongly believed that Assad would make a deal with Israel.

"The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace}" is an extraordinary book which chronicles the intricate dance toward peace over a period of 12 years - with all the missteps and crushed toes in between. The period was filled with extraordinary optimism and terrible frustration, from the highlights of the face-to-face negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, which led to the signing of the Oslo Accords, made famous by the handshake on the White House lawn between the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, to the last days of negotiations before President Clinton left office.

Prime Minister Rabin was murdered by a Jewish fanatic two years after the Accords were signed. It was hoped that Shimon Peres, Rabin's successor, would win the 1996 elections. Suicide bombings and violence caused Israelis to seriously doubt the Palestinians' intentions to be "Partners in Peace." Peres was defeated by Benjamin Netanyahu, a conservative and a hawk. The situation improved when Ehud Barak won the 1999 Israeli election. Unlike Netanyahu, Barak pledged to do everything in his power to work for peace. In July 2000 President Clinton met with both Barak and Arafat at Camp David to come to a final agreement. Although Barak made surprising offers, detailed in the book, Arafat backed out, not even willing to use Barak's offers as a basis for further negotiations. Ross recalls, the Palestinian leader "said no to everything," and did not present "a single idea or single serious comment in two weeks." Clinton did not give up until he had to turn the White House over to George W. Bush. The author believes that Arafat was never up to "ending the conflict" - for him "violence was always an option." And then the al-Aqsa intifada began.

This political memoir is a work of historical significance. Ross, the ultimate insider, shrewdly analyzes the entire process, and really sets the record straight. Ross writes, "Only by telling this story can we debunk the myths that prevent all sides from seeing reality and adjusting to it. Indeed, only by telling the story can we hope to learn the lessons from the past and make it possible to shape a different future."

I just finished the book, all 872 pages, and I must say I am surprised at how easy it is to read, although it is a bit too long. The narrative moves along at a good pace and is filled with fascinating anecdotes and insightful descriptions of the personalities involved. There are also poignant passages, as when Ross, with prescience, tells a Palestinian negotiator that after the Camp David debacle, G.W. Bush would not touch the issue - that Sharon would become Prime Minister and everything the Palestinians had gained would be lost. So very sad.
JANA


Rating:
Summary: Dealing with diplomatic pride and prejudice
Review: Dennis Ross is certainly an authority on the story of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. His book offers a historic background of this conflict, the version of each party and the diplomacy buildup that sometimes led to breakthroughs in peacemaking and in other times reached the brink of peace but later stalled.
The book is unnecessarily long (872 pages), but is entertaining as it includes anecdotal details and some other less important details about how Ross boarded planes and took showers prior to his meetings.
The book also sheds light on how, on several occasions, arrogance, pride, prejudice, electoral considerations and pulling diplomatic stunts to muster further support of followers have always affected peace negotiations.
It also shows that terrorists and other anti-peace factions succeeded in so many instances in delaying peaceful efforts and in other instances completely sabotaged them.
Ross has been a witness of the diplomatic effort between Israelis and Arabs, which was interrupted in 2000. His book is certainly a reference document for all those interested in taking a deeper look into the Middle East conflict and international attempts at resolving it.

Rating:
Summary: Read Clayton Swisher's "The Truth About Camp David" instead
Review: Dennis Ross only justifies himself. Camp David was a total disaster for all concerned and permanent Mideast honcho Dennis Ross is the reason.
For "The Truth About Camp David," read Clayton Swisher's book by that name.
I work at a foreign policy think-tank. My buddies at the State Department tell me that Swisher's book is their textbook on how not to run a future summit. Read that one -- not Ross's badly-written,endless, longwinded self-apologia. Who cares that Dennis plays basketball at the DCJCC? Can he be more self-referential?

Rating:
Summary: Whitewash
Review: Dennis Ross's book is a abdication of responsibility of Mr. Ross, the US government and Israel. The central question of the Camp David II negotations was whether Israel was willing to offer the Palestinians a viable Palestinian state. The answer to that must be a ringing "no".
Barak's offer was for 80% of the westbank (not 90,91,95 or even 97%), with 10 percent of the 'green area' (the eastern border with Jordan to be leased indefinitely (to be given back by Israel at a time it itself deemed appropriate) and 1% (after pressure from the US) 'compensation' in the form of territory next to Gaza. This 1 percent was mostly a chemical waste dump is maybe worth mentioning. The map of the 'offer' of Camp David wasn't published by Israel until December, 4-5 months after the negotiations failed. Thereby accusing Arafat of not signing a blank cheque at Camp DAvid in July.
(...)
Dennis Ross who played a great role in preparing the CAmp David summit and has not been able to realise that there was a bottom line of basic needs for Palestinians that needed to be met.
(...)

Rating:
Summary: Exactly what we needed....
Review: If you've had the pleasure of hearing Dennis Ross speak, you know he never answers a question without putting it in context. The Missing Peace lives up to Ross's wonderful tradition of always giving you the story in it's context.

The Missing Peace is a wonderfully complete, entertaining, and honest tale of both the history of the regions and peoples involved eith the conflicts, and the diplomacy during the time we were lucky enough to have Ross working in the region. Ross does a great job of giving you his analysis of why a leader is acting in a certain way, what events might be effecting his psychology, and what he, as a negotiator, will do about it.

The book is complete with the maps of all pertinent regions and deals, a list of all the people involved and their titles, an in depth glossary/index, and a wonderful epilogue which brings Ross's special brand of optimism to a situation in dire need of more committed people like the Ambassador.

This text is a must-read for anyone with any interest in the region or the conflict, its in-depth and comprehensive style is indicative of Ross's command of the subject, and the fact that it remains fun and interesting to read the whole way through is a tribute to Ross as a writer.

Rating:
Summary: Naive Until the End of the "Peace" Process
Review: Many years ago, as an undergraduate at UCLA, I was sitting in my Poli-Sci class on Arms Control when this lanky, bespectacled young Teaching Assistant came into the room to lecture to us.

That lanky, bespectacled TA was Dennis Ross, and on that particular winter day he was talking about the trajectory of Soviet ICBMs. He said words to the effect that if a Soviet missile with an 15 megaton warhead missed downtown Los Angeles by 5 miles, it would be regarded as a failure.

Incredulous, I turned to my classmate and said - heck, the crater created by the detonation of such a warhead would be at least a mile wide - not to mention the destruction that would be widespread for many more miles and in so many nearby communities.

As bright and gifted as Dennis Ross was - he didn't get it then, and didn't get it when he shifted gears to practically run United States Middle East Foreign Policy, first under the anti-Israel Jim Baker, and later for Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright. Ross headed a team of "Jewish"-Americans (i.e., Ross, Aaron Miller, Richard Haass, Dan Kurtzer) who felt that pressuring Israel to make dangerous concessions, and appeasing Arab terrorists like Yasser Arafat and brutal dictators like Hafez Assad would bring peace to the Middle East.

In shaping Israel in their myopic, "peace now" warped state of minds, Ross and company only made things worse for both the United States and Israel, and encouraged, if not deliberately, the scores of genocidal bombings and violations of the Oslo Accords by the Palestinians.

If not directly involved, as both Kurtzer and Miller were, in drafting James Baker's notorious "Greater Israel" speech at the beginning of the George H.W. Bush Presidency, Ross aided and abetted that "stick it to Israel" mind-set that was so prevalent in the Bush I White House, and so thankfully gone from W.'s
Ross, always uncomfortable with Republicans, gleefully accepted Clinton's request to stay on in the State Department and saw his career rise under Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright, both of whom shared Jim Baker's moddycuddlying of Arab dictatorships, Palestinian extremists, and an animus towards Israel.

While he might not have been as blatant as Bill Clinton, Albright, and James Carville were in the undermining of the Netanyahu government, Ross and his new sidekick Marty Indyk certainly were not unhappy to see Netanyahu replaced by the pliant ehud barak. After all, that kind of moderation would help Arafat - whom, even after he had started to violate the Oslo Accords, was still considered to be a man of "peace" - a statesman.

The blinkers finally came off Dennis Ross' naive eyes when Arafat, angrily rejecting a Camp David peace plan largely drafted by Dennis and giving the Palestinians 97% of the West Bank (Judea-Samaria) and half of Jerusalem, walked away and resorted to murder and mayhem. Dennis Ross finally had the intellectual courage to blast Yasser Arafat and cite him as the main reason why "peace at any price" failed. It was only 10 years too late. Thankfully Dennis Ross chose not to stay with W.'s incoming administration - and thankfully that had no great desire retaining him.

Why two stars instead of one? Simply because Ross' book should be read for his retelling of historical events and how he conducted, or misconducted U.S. Policy; even if the book itself is a ponderous read. The reader though, would be urged to also read Yossef Bodansky's brilliant and insightful "The High Cost of Peace" to show how the appeasing Arafat-pressuring Israel policies of BushI-Baker-Clinton-Albright and Dennis Ross ultimately failed, and also harmed the national security interests of the United States.

Rating:
Summary: He still doesn't get it
Review: This book contains plenty of information about negotiations for peace between Israel and its Arab opponents. But it does so from a perspective that I think we need to realize is ridiculous.

Yes, Ross does wonder, even in this book, if Arafat ever really wanted peace. And if all the incitement and lack of preparation for peace was a major factor in all these misadventures. But let's look at what Ross still doesn't get.

First, Ross managed to help get an Israeli government to agree to a proposal that would have granted well over 90% of the West Bank to the Arabs, as well as a portion of the Israeli capital city. That would be more than most nations would agree to give even to a completely friendly neighbor. Israel is, after all, quite land-poor, with a population of over six million (including over five million Jews) in about ten thousand square miles (including the entire West Bank). But Israel agreed, under prodding from the United States, to give land not to a friend but to a terrorist enemy that was almost certain to pocket any gains, start a war, and then blame Israel.

Next, Ross laments the fact that Arafat was unable to agree to the proposals that were offered. I doubt that he realized the extent to which both sides disliked them. Nor does he realize how lucky he is that there was no agreement. Arafat would have violated any agreement and would then have blamed Israel. As for starting a war, Arafat has been able to do that at will. All he needs to do is claim that a Jew walked down the street, and his troops will waltz up to Israeli soldiers and civilians and attack them. Had there been an agreement, we'd still have the war we now have, but with the added misfortune of having "ethnically cleansed" tens of thousands of West Bank Jews.

Finally, the worst part has to be the frantic efforts that Ross was involved in to try to reach an agreement at the end of the year 2000. This truly was "negotiating under fire." Arafat had already launched an attack on Israel. Arafat had already come up with a totally bogus excuse for the attack. Arafat had already blamed Israel for the violence when all Israel had done was defend itself. And Arafat was not arrested and put on trial. Instead, he was rewarded with Israel's best offer ever!

Two main obstacles to peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors are antizionist incitement and antizionist lies. These are as serious as the antizionist aggression and terror that often accompany them. I think Ross should have discussed these problems to a much greater extent.

If you have to read this book, you may want to try a couple of other books on the subject as well. There are plenty of them. But in order to get a different perspective, I suggest including Bodansky's "The High Cost of Peace," and also "The Mideast Peace Process" edited by Neal Kozodoy.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting, but
Review: This book is definately an interesting read. Dennis Ross has all of the details on all the negotiations betweem Israel and Syria, and between Israel and the Palestinians. And, it's all recounted in detail (Ross clearly took a lot of notes). However, the major problem with the book is that it doesn't give the big picture...you can get lost in all the minutia of negotiating detail. For instance, was Arafat ever really serious about making peace with Israel???? On a few occasions, Ross does mention the terrorism of the Palestinians, but refuses to put it into the larger context - on the overall intentions of the PA/PLO. Read this book for the detail, and for the detail on how Arafat refused to really negotiate at Camp David, but read other books to put it all in context.

Rating:
Summary: Very interesting book - info about Arafat
Review: This is a very interesting book.

The reader will see in a heartbeat the Yasir Arafat NEVER wanted peace.

Arafat could only succeed by hating Israel. If he ever would make peace, he would have to do more than kill the innocents. [...]