Rating: 
Summary: seminal, yet definitive
Review: I live and work in the Middle East; I regularly, therefore, find myself either reading about or having to discuss many of the issues addressed herein. Among my colleagues are numbered many widely-traveled and well-read specialists in Middle Eastern affairs, and we have all read this book and know it well.
Though there has been an avalanche of well-meaning books about this part of the world since September 11th, the majority of them, it seems to me, are scuttled by either slipshod research or sheer vapidity.
Yet this innocuous-looking volume by David Pryce-Jones is regarded universally (even by those with widely divergent opinions) with a kind of hushed awe. The only other book that can even approach it, in our estimation, is Raphael Patai's "The Arab Mind," a fitting peer and complement to Pryce-Jones. (I note happily that, at least at the time of writing, Amazon was offering both together [v.s.] for a bargain price.)
In fact, every time a "new guy" comes out here and evinces an interest in or need to understand the culture or values of either Muslims or Arabs, he is invariably directed to Pryce and Patai. "And if you still have questions," he will be told, "read them again!" As a result, dog-eared, spine-cracked copies of these books eagerly circulate from reader to reader, as I imagine pieces of the true cross did among early Christians.
I can offer no higher praise.
Rating: 
Summary: Not "wrong," but limited
Review: If you are looking for a simple, conservative analysis of "what's wrong with those Arabs," then this is probably the book for you. Pryce-Jones speaks in huge generalizations, and he doesn't make much of an effort to examine his own assumptions. His point of view is valid, but only if you ignore some important things, such as:1) Does the West really want Arab Democracy? Since Sept. 11th, it has been accepted as an axiom that part of "what's wrong with the Arabs" is that they lack democracy. Not so fast.... Most Arabs live under non-democratic regimes that are heavily supported either by direct US and western assistance (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, the Gulf States and apparently now Yemen). The last thing on earth that the US wants is for democracy to start breaking out across the Arab world, because democratically-elected governments would be passionately anti-American. (The Zogby poll of 8 Arab nations in March 2002 found that an average of 92% of Arabs polled said that they "opposed the United States and American policies in the Middle East.") Thus the US actively supports non-democratic Arab regimes and hopes to prevent Arab democracy, while we simultaneously criticize the Arabs for their lack of democracy. 2) Do the Arabs Need More Western-Style Societies? Pryce-Jones shares this basic assumption with Bernard Lewis, neither of whom are fond of pointing out that the types of governments which have most failed the Arabs are indeed western-style 20th century institutions: Command Socialism (as in Libya and Syria, and before that in Egypt and Yemen), and/or totalitarianism (as in Iraq). Constitutional Monarchy (another worn-out western style of government) prevails in most of the peninsula and in Jordan. If there are any models of society that has failed the Arabs, they are the western models! Hence the appeal of religious fanatics like 'Usama bin Ladin, who issue the age-old call for a return to "pure" Islamic government. (After all, he can correctly point to Iran and say that the Persians have the only democratic country in the region.) 3) Is this Shame/Anger/Powerlessness Model Unique to the Arabs? Pryce-Jones is seeking a kind of emotional starting-point for "what's wrong with the Arabs," and he settles on post-imperial shame, due to weakness in the face of the West. Many other authors have used this model, and in fact I've seen it in action. I'm not saying he's wrong, but I'm skeptical as to whether this is some uniquely Arab phenomenon. After all, this is essentially the argument that Slobodan Milosevic has used (thus far very successfully) to play to his supporters back home in Serbia, as he stands trial for war-crimes. It is an argument that I have heard endlessly in debates about post-imperial Africa, and what has "gone wrong" there, too. In other words: maybe Pryce-Jones should have applied a broader lens and talked about post-imperial myths and syndromes, instead of just claiming to speak for the Arabs. Ah, but after September 11th, I have a feeling that wouldn't have made for such a hot-selling book title...
Rating: 
Summary: Should be on every desk in the State Dept's middle east div.
Review: It's about time this book made it back into print! I wouldn't have understood a single day of the Persian Gulf War (II) without David Pryce-Jones' explanation of the Arab mind. When it first came out it was such an anachronism that it was widely ignored, despite the urgency of the issues it addressed. A book of ethnic psychoanalysis? In 1990, arguably the floodstage year of (multi)cultural relativism? Yet world events have hammered home the blunt fact that world cultures are not all alike but for cuisine and headgear, and that some cultures are flatly and demonstratably better than others. This is a book of ethnography, not of demonology. Pryce-Jones discusses components of the Arab world-view: shame/honor, money-favoring, etc., always with the understanding that there are exceptions to everything, but that cultural patterns may still be discerned. He cites many Western scholars, but allows Arab voices plenty of scope to speak, also. Indeed, the book is a good introduction to many interesting Arab writings. It is a demanding subject, even though the book is written for the educated layman, so it is slow going in spots. There is no confident sweep of history as in Bernard Lewis, nor many pungent polemics as in Daniel Pipes. Readers will find themselves skipping to chapters that are of immediate interest, but the entire book is a must-read. We can't afford to be PC--I mean, ignorant--anymore.
Rating: 
Summary: Hateful
Review: Mr. Pryce-Jones has managed to put together a multitude of reasons why we of the advanced West should never trust an Arab. They're untrustworthy, they care only about their own clan, they make a practice of political murder, etc, etc. Mr. Pryce-Jones has apparently never experienced the upside of dealing with Arabs, such as their ability to negotiate reconciliations and the basic freedom of belief that exists in most portions of the Arab world. This book reminds me of the kind of material printed about the Japanese during World War II. It provides us with all we need to hate the Arabs. How fitting that a new edition is coming out now, just while the USA is planning another war against Iraq. Perhaps the publisher should consider a gift-boxed edition for the Christmas season.
Rating:
Summary: Do you want to understand Arab culture?
Review: Mr. Pryce-Jones has written an essential description of the honor-shame nexus that is so central to Arab culture. Those who view honor and shame as people in the West do, must read this book to understand the very different properties honor-shame has in this culture. His description of power relationships is exemplary. He provides many examples of the dangerous consequences to which these power seeking conspiracies lead. The implications are discouraging, but having knowledge of probable consequences is much better than pursuing goals in ignorance. Perhaps we can then select goals and approaches that have some hope of success in this very different culture. I only hope any of our diplomats charged with a Middle East assignment understand the content of this book. I have recomended this book strongly to all my friends who have any interest in the Middle East.
Rating:
Summary: Outstanding writer and book
Review: Mr. Pryce-Jones powerfully makes his case in this oustanding book. Highly recommended.
Rating:
Summary: The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs
Review: Mr. Pryce-Jones presents some uncomfortable facts about the Muslim Middle East that should be understood by anyone who cares to begin to understand what's going on in the modern world populated by the likes of Osama bin Laden. One of the most powerful passages in his book is not opinion or conclusion, but rather a tragic listing of the murdered Arab leaders from 1948 onwards. This list is truly frightening. For Americans, it would be as if every president since Harry Truman had been assassinated during office and his successor the man responsible for the murder. Say what you want about cultural relativism and its reponsibility to respect the way of life of others, this fact (together with the other well-researched data that Mr. Pryce-Jones presents) paints a troubling picture of tribal society, feckless international intervention and, ultimately a fertile ground for the disaffected who are fed militant Islam at every turn. Take heed.
Rating:
Summary: Whither the Promised Freedom?
Review: Pryce-Jones explores the question why there are no modern Arab liberal democracies. He finds the answer in Arab social and political culture, specifically: 1. TRIBALISM. Pryce-Jones argues that Arab culture doesn't encourage Arabs to identify themselves as members of a state, but as members of a family or tribe. Arab political life therefore consists of a multitude of warring factions, none of whom seeks the good of the nation as a whole. As Karl Popper might describe it, they ask only the personal question "Who should rule?" (and answer: "I should!") and never ask the more fundamental institutional question "How should power be organized?" 2. THE SHAME / HONOR SYSTEM. Arabs place great weight on perceptions of their honor. This consideration therefore often trumps all others and results in behavior that looks, to western eyes, like insanity. An example is the Aswan dam. Nasser announces that he will build the dam and that it will be a great thing, thereby committing his honor to its construction and success. Therefore, when his own experts tell him that the dam is a bad idea (it will disrupt agriculture, increase the spread of some diseases, etc.), he suppresses the information and does not back down. When the Eisenhower administration revokes the promised funding for the dam (because it's a bad idea), Nasser's honor has committed him so fully to the dam that he reverses his foreign policy 180 degrees and cuddles up to the Soviet Union to get it done. And when the dam, as predicted, turns out to be a curse rather than a blessing, Nasser goes on shouting its virtues. 3. THE POWER-CHALLENGE DIALECTIC. You're either in power in the Arab world, in which case you're paranoid and watching your subordinates and allies as closely as your enemies, or you're no, in which case you lurk in the shadows, plot and scheme until your hand is ready and you make your move to challenge the power holder. There is no notion of shared power, no notion of purely institutional power. THEREFORE... The result is that calls for democracy, like calls for socialism, Palestinian independence and even repentance and return to the true tenets of Islam, are bogus. They mask what would otherwise be naked grabs for power by an individual or a tribal group. The Arabs are constantly and consistently betrayed by their leaders. Note that this is NOT a book about Islam. Pryce-Jones explicitly argues that this Arab culture pre-dates Islam and that Islam itself is often used as a tool or a pretext in power challenges (as in Wahhabism, for instance).
Rating:
Summary: A profound analysis
Review: Pryce-Jones' book, reissued in 2002, is the best book I've read
on the contemporary Middle East, and one of the best books I've
ever read, period. (This includes great books by Fouad Ajami
and Bernard Lewis.) If supposedly informed people in the West understood Pryce-Jones'
points about the Arab social order centered on clan, tribe, and
religious sect and driven by honor and shame; the decline of
Western models and influence; the absence of any recognizably
political institutions (like "nations," "governments," and
"laws") in the Western sense; and the classic pattern of armed
careerist gangs divided along tribal and sectarian lines and
locked in a perpetual cycle of challenge and power-seizure,
they would not be surprised by much. What happened on September 11, 2001, and what is happening
now in Israel are just the latest examples, albeit with higher
stakes. Suicide is a sign of the complete bankruptcy of a
society. Self-pitying rage, arising from shame-honor, blocks
reason. Mythologies of "imperialism" (more than 50 years
after European withdrawal!) and "Zionist conspiracy" are
clubs to beat dissidents and critics. The wealthy
and powerful of the Arab world pour their resources, supported
by oil revenue, into such delusions as these. The roots of
Middle Eastern stagnation start here.
Rating:
Summary: A thought-provoking description of Arab societies
Review: The Arab world today has some problems. Well, that's nothing new. All societies have had problems in the past and will in the future. But that ought not stop us or them from trying to learn lessons from mistakes.
Pryce-Jones starts by showing that Arabs have been showing surprising mercilessness to each other as well as to external enemies in recent years. And we see a reversion "to basic tribal and kinship structures" rather than a Westernization of Arab culture.
There is an interesting discussion of the "shame and honor" mentality with some startling anecdotes that illustrate how such attitudes make progress and reform far more difficult. And there's an explanation of how the underprivileged status of women contributes to making Arab society as a whole more backward.
The author describes the extent of Arab support for the Germans in World War Two. And from there he shows how the shame-honor attitudes have affected Arab relations with Israel. Obviously, many Arabs are well aware of the fact that Israel is just one more small nation. But Israel is omitted from most Arab maps and reference books, Arabs often avoid appearing with Israelis on public platforms, there are Arab boycotts of Israel and Israeli products, and Arab media saturate the region with antisemitic propaganda. While this is harmful to Israel, it doesn't help Arabs; it merely gets Arab behavior to be less than rational. Were Arafat's cronies to defeat Israel, that would help no one. There would be a slaughter of Jews, and Arabs would keep fighting Western "foes" afterwards, convinced that their victory against the Jews was a victory over the entire Western world. This surely would not help Arabs.
Pryce-Jones concludes that the Arab world still has no institutions that are evolved by common consent for common purposes, therefore "there is nothing that can be agreed as the general good." And that the world is thus deprived of much of what the Arab people could otherwise contribute. Islam is seen by the author as irrelevant to all this: it is not monolithic, but simply follows the prevailing culture. And the West, especially when it supports the worst elements of Arab society, is not helping.
This book does not leave one feeling optimistic. I for one doubt that the Arabs will ever make a big apology to Israel for all the hostility they have shown it. And that is, in my opinion, part of an overall problem: if Arab society continues to be dysfunctional, Arab nations will become ever more uncompetitive and hostile. And that is a very bad combination when one has a large and rich Empire to defend.
I highly recommend this book. I think it explains why Arab society is not improving the lives of most Arabs, and why the advice of other nations has made matters worse.
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