Rating: 
Summary: The best we have so far.
Review: This volume is the best argument we have so far on behalf of the dismantling of Western philosphical traditions based on what has been learned about the human project by cognitive scientists. It is essential reading. The vehemence with which some have dismissed it is certainly a plus, but the book's true value is in every word of the text. We truly can begin again with a more correct understanding of our place in the universe -- the superstitions embedded in Plato's assumptions are seen for what they are: magical thinking.
Rating: 
Summary: Lakoff and Johnson gone too far
Review: Unlike the one reader below (from Oregon and other places) who posted repeatedly about the "problem" with this book, i.e. "reification of science," I have no problem with the basic points L & J are trying to make. It's preposterous to claim that ethics and other such things are immune to scientific inquiry. But this book is far from perfect.One problem is that in showing that metaphor is central to much thought, they themselves indulge in it with a bit too much gusto; take for example the chapter on Chomsky (and I'm _no_ fan of Chomsky), in which C's epistemological rationalism is related to his political anarchism. Gimme a break! "Metaphorically," this works, but only in the authors' minds. In that case, why haven't all rationalists been anarchists? And besides, this is hardly an effective critique by itself in the first place. This kind of uncritical treatment of the metaphor idea is unscientific, to say the least, perhaps even pseudoscientific. That is, it's not falsifiable. Where are the critical, perhaps (dare we say it?) formal criteria for determining the substantive content of this so-called Cartesian-anarchism metaphor? (Say that sentences 5 times fast.) This same problem pervades much of the book; there seems to be nothing that "philosophy in the flesh" can't explain, in which case it doesn't really explain anything. I can't help but feel a little put-down by this book. It's almost as asinine and pretentious as Pinker (if I hear one more person praising that do-nothing Chomsky's-coattails riding punk I'm gonna lose it), but doesn't have the ideological and political backing of Chomsky and his epigones. I don't know what the philosophy departments of universities will make of this book, but one can only hope that linguistics will awaken from the nightmare someday (where are you, Sydney Lamb?).
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