Game Theory for Political Scientists

Rating:
Summary: Good concepts, bad writing
Review: I am currently using this book as a text for a graduate level game theory course for political scientists. Although Morrow does a good job covering the important concepts, the writing is wordy, awkward, and confusing. It makes it difficult to follow some of the more complicated problems, especially when learning the ideas for the first time. I would only recommend this book for people who already have a grasp of the ideas and want to learn more and see examples -- not so useful for first-time game theorists.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent introductory text: it's as technical as you want
Review: One of the nice things about this book is it can be as technical or mathematical as you want. If you just want the concepts, you won't be jarred by lots of equations. But if you like the technical aspects, they're all there, especially in the appendix.

Great simple treatment of everything from basic Nash Equilibrium to more sophisticated concepts such as Bayesian information analysis.

The only potential disappointment of this book is if you know game theory well and are looking for something very sophisticated, this is not the book for you -- not because there's anything wrong with this book, but because it wasn't designed for that level.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent introductory text: it's as technical as you want
Review: One of the nice things about this book is it can be as technical or mathematical as you want. If you just want the concepts, you won't be jarred by lots of equations. But if you like the technical aspects, they're all there, especially in the appendix.

Great simple treatment of everything from basic Nash Equilibrium to more sophisticated concepts such as Bayesian information analysis.

The only potential disappointment of this book is if you know game theory well and are looking for something very sophisticated, this is not the book for you -- not because there's anything wrong with this book, but because it wasn't designed for that level.

Rating:
Summary: Answer keys are a little bit questionable.
Review: There are apparently two versions floating around (from the same edition and same printing) with different answer keys in the back for some of the more difficult problems.

Otherwise, this is the standard textbook for game theory for political science. I'm inspired to read Schelling!

Rating:
Summary: Answer keys are a little bit questionable.
Review: There are apparently two versions floating around (from the same edition and same printing) with different answer keys in the back for some of the more difficult problems.

Otherwise, this is the standard textbook for game theory for political science. I'm inspired to read Schelling!

Rating:
Summary: Excellent graduate level textbook
Review: This book is an excellent introduction to game theory for the political science graduate student. Although some prior knowledge of economics and game theory would certainly help, the early chapters in the book are excellent in familiarizing the reader with basic formal concepts.

A few comments by the previous reviewer may be misunderstood by some readers. This is NOT a "general concepts" book - in other words this is NOT game theory for poets - not that I hold anything against poets. This book does require some undergraduate level mathematics, mainly differential and integral calculus. Those looking for rigorous formal proofs of all theorems will be disappointed, but this is a technical book with an emphasis on demonstrating the application of formal tools to common problems in political science. Some of the material such as the chapter on perfect and sequential equilibria can be quite challenging.

If you merely wish to get a sense of what formal political science is all about and do not intend to actually fire up the old calculator, I suggest Robert Axelrod's excellent book "The Evolution of Cooperation".

Rating:
Summary: Excellent graduate level textbook
Review: This book is an excellent introduction to game theory for the political science graduate student. Although some prior knowledge of economics and game theory would certainly help, the early chapters in the book are excellent in familiarizing the reader with basic formal concepts.

A few comments by the previous reviewer may be misunderstood by some readers. This is NOT a "general concepts" book - in other words this is NOT game theory for poets - not that I hold anything against poets. This book does require some undergraduate level mathematics, mainly differential and integral calculus. Those looking for rigorous formal proofs of all theorems will be disappointed, but this is a technical book with an emphasis on demonstrating the application of formal tools to common problems in political science. Some of the material such as the chapter on perfect and sequential equilibria can be quite challenging.

If you merely wish to get a sense of what formal political science is all about and do not intend to actually fire up the old calculator, I suggest Robert Axelrod's excellent book "The Evolution of Cooperation".