Nations and Nationalism

Rating:
Summary: The Siren Call of Nationalism
Review: A densely-written and concise book, as befitting Gellner's style, which is not usual in English writing. There is for example, a paucity in examples, unlike (say) Benedict Anderson's "The Imagined Community", another modern work on nationalism.

As an Irishman, I can see that parts of Gellner's thesis does fit Ireland. I can see how Irish Nationalism developed in the last century from the aspirations of working-class and middle-class townsmen adopting a metropolitan culture, and shifting away from their former communal and rural bonds. However, I am less sure that some historical memory did not play any part in this, the struggles of post-Reformation Ireland to maintain some independence from the English crown in the 17th century must have had its own influence. However, the arrival of French Revolutionary ideology at the end of the 18th century set the stage definitely for Nationalism, which at the time allied itself with democracy/ republicanism, possibly because as national communities were majorities in their own territories, these ideologies lent themselves to the nationalist case.

This is a facinating subject, and this book is a major contribution.

Rating:
Summary: The Siren Call of Nationalism
Review: A densely-written and concise book, as befitting Gellner's style, which is not usual in English writing. There is for example, a paucity in examples, unlike (say) Benedict Anderson's "The Imagined Community", another modern work on nationalism.

As an Irishman, I can see that parts of Gellner's thesis does fit Ireland. I can see how Irish Nationalism developed in the last century from the aspirations of working-class and middle-class townsmen adopting a metropolitan culture, and shifting away from their former communal and rural bonds. However, I am less sure that some historical memory did not play any part in this, the struggles of post-Reformation Ireland to maintain some independence from the English crown in the 17th century must have had its own influence. However, the arrival of French Revolutionary ideology at the end of the 18th century set the stage definitely for Nationalism, which at the time allied itself with democracy/ republicanism, possibly because as national communities were majorities in their own territories, these ideologies lent themselves to the nationalist case.

This is a facinating subject, and this book is a major contribution.

Rating:
Summary: Standard reference work, though not exciting
Review: As one of the most widely-cited works on nationalism, Gellner's book is certainly worth reading just for the sheer reference value. However, as a scholarly work, it fails to answer the question it seeks to demystify. Basically, it says that nationalism rose in industrial societies where people "needed" a new standardized form of identity -- which the "high culture" of the nation happily provided. It is a great macro-theory, but when put to the test of historical evidence, it falls short. Why do people love and die for particular national identities? If they just needed some modern standardized form of identity, most any form that enables dynamic communication and interchangability in society would do. In short, Gellner fails to take into account the specific historical cases where group identity, rooted in previous historical experiences, has acquired a national character that has withstood enormous historical changes.

Rating:
Summary: A classic...but classic isn't necessarily good
Review: At first I thought this was going to be an enjoyable, positive reading exercise since Chapter 1 was clear and thought provoking. But by the sixth chapter I literally wanted to tear the book to pieces. Gellner's book is considered "a classic" in the literature on nationalism, but I contend that its weaknesses equal or outweigh its contributions. I found Gellner's theory extremely Euro-centric and remarkably exasperating. Moreover, Gellner's style of writing was excessively repetitive, "tedious and pedantic" (something he claimed in his conclusion to have avoided), besides being overly assertive.
Gellner's typology, in my opinion, is based on the faulty idea that there are only two types of societies: agrarian and industrial, and that the modern state is omnipotent vis a vis the society. While agrarian Europe was stagnating, other areas of the world had flourishing cultures based on trade *and* agriculture *and* small-scale industry. Some even had local identities (early ersatz nationalisms) that set them apart from the other localities with which they had regular contact through trade, diplomacy, wars and exploration. And while modern European societies are fully industrialized, with omnipotent states, many modern "third-world" societies are mixed agrarian/industrial, and the state vies with other groups in society for loyalty.
I do agree with Gellner's appraisal that nationalism and nationalities are not inevitable aspects of the human condition. But I disagree with his theory that industrial society led to the homogenization of cultures and appearance of nationalism. Much of my disagreement lies in his a priori assumption that the state is "only too conspicuously present" and that power is highly centralized in the state of the industrial era. In fact, Gellner went so far as to claim that having no state is not an "option". Certainly, having a state is the norm in the modern world, but it is by no means impossible that a state can fail, leaving a society essentially `stateless'. Moreover, presence of a state does not necessarily indicate that the state is able to control the society over which it nominally has authority.
Gellner's use of the term of culture is very ambiguous. Rather than rely on an anthropological definition of culture as a "system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating" Gellner claims it is better to focus on "what culture does". But, his explanation of what culture does is inadequate. According to Gellner, culture in agrarian society favored "horizontal" cleavages, whereas industrial society is more egalitarian and favors "vertical" cultural cleavages. In other words, cultural differences led to regionally cross-cutting societal hierarchies in agrarian society but in industrial society, cultural differences led to national divisions and culturally homogenous groups - which, according to Gellner, industrial society required for survival.
Do societies *need* to be homogenous or do individuals themselves *want* to assimilate in order to get ahead? And does assimilation necessarily mean the fading away of sub-cultures? These are the types of questions that came to mind as I read Gellner's theory, and his rejection of Elie Kedourie's theory that nationalism forces homogenization. Certainly, a common means of communication becomes crucial in a highly specialized industrial society. But Gellner's theory does not explain why people would die or kill to promote or protect their culture. His theory also implies that people can belong to only one culture.
Gellner, if alive today, would probably agree with Francis Fukiyama's and Ron Unz's assessment that the survival of the United States relies on the continued supremacy of Anglo-Saxon culture and the end of bilingualism and multi-culturalism. But I whole-heartedly disagree that a mono-culture is an "inescapable imperative" of industrial society. Especially in today's `global village', education should support awareness of other cultures and the skills needed to interact confidently with those other cultures. That, in my opinion, includes a strong basis in one's own sub-culture, the "national" culture and international cultures. I also disagree that traditional, kin-based groupings have no place in our modern society. In fact, I believe that educational systems in developing states should make use of traditional forms of education. This would require rejecting the industrial -age mode of education that Gellner described - unspecialized and suffering from "Diploma Disease" in favor of a return to the specialized training of the `agrarian era' that Gellner says it is impossible to return to. Let's hope he is wrong about that too!

Rating:
Summary: A classic...but classic isn't necessarily good
Review: At first I thought this was going to be an enjoyable, positive reading exercise since Chapter 1 was clear and thought provoking. But by the sixth chapter I literally wanted to tear the book to pieces. Gellner's book is considered "a classic" in the literature on nationalism, but I contend that its weaknesses equal or outweigh its contributions. I found Gellner's theory extremely Euro-centric and remarkably exasperating. Moreover, Gellner's style of writing was excessively repetitive, "tedious and pedantic" (something he claimed in his conclusion to have avoided), besides being overly assertive.
Gellner's typology, in my opinion, is based on the faulty idea that there are only two types of societies: agrarian and industrial, and that the modern state is omnipotent vis a vis the society. While agrarian Europe was stagnating, other areas of the world had flourishing cultures based on trade *and* agriculture *and* small-scale industry. Some even had local identities (early ersatz nationalisms) that set them apart from the other localities with which they had regular contact through trade, diplomacy, wars and exploration. And while modern European societies are fully industrialized, with omnipotent states, many modern "third-world" societies are mixed agrarian/industrial, and the state vies with other groups in society for loyalty.
I do agree with Gellner's appraisal that nationalism and nationalities are not inevitable aspects of the human condition. But I disagree with his theory that industrial society led to the homogenization of cultures and appearance of nationalism. Much of my disagreement lies in his a priori assumption that the state is "only too conspicuously present" and that power is highly centralized in the state of the industrial era. In fact, Gellner went so far as to claim that having no state is not an "option". Certainly, having a state is the norm in the modern world, but it is by no means impossible that a state can fail, leaving a society essentially 'stateless'. Moreover, presence of a state does not necessarily indicate that the state is able to control the society over which it nominally has authority.
Gellner's use of the term of culture is very ambiguous. Rather than rely on an anthropological definition of culture as a "system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating" Gellner claims it is better to focus on "what culture does". But, his explanation of what culture does is inadequate. According to Gellner, culture in agrarian society favored "horizontal" cleavages, whereas industrial society is more egalitarian and favors "vertical" cultural cleavages. In other words, cultural differences led to regionally cross-cutting societal hierarchies in agrarian society but in industrial society, cultural differences led to national divisions and culturally homogenous groups - which, according to Gellner, industrial society required for survival.
Do societies *need* to be homogenous or do individuals themselves *want* to assimilate in order to get ahead? And does assimilation necessarily mean the fading away of sub-cultures? These are the types of questions that came to mind as I read Gellner's theory, and his rejection of Elie Kedourie's theory that nationalism forces homogenization. Certainly, a common means of communication becomes crucial in a highly specialized industrial society. But Gellner's theory does not explain why people would die or kill to promote or protect their culture. His theory also implies that people can belong to only one culture.
Gellner, if alive today, would probably agree with Francis Fukiyama's and Ron Unz's assessment that the survival of the United States relies on the continued supremacy of Anglo-Saxon culture and the end of bilingualism and multi-culturalism. But I whole-heartedly disagree that a mono-culture is an "inescapable imperative" of industrial society. Especially in today's 'global village', education should support awareness of other cultures and the skills needed to interact confidently with those other cultures. That, in my opinion, includes a strong basis in one's own sub-culture, the "national" culture and international cultures. I also disagree that traditional, kin-based groupings have no place in our modern society. In fact, I believe that educational systems in developing states should make use of traditional forms of education. This would require rejecting the industrial -age mode of education that Gellner described - unspecialized and suffering from "Diploma Disease" in favor of a return to the specialized training of the 'agrarian era' that Gellner says it is impossible to return to. Let's hope he is wrong about that too!

Rating:
Summary: Interesting, super important, but his diction bores the dead
Review: First, a few words on nationalism itself. Nationalism is important to study because during the 20th century, it has been one of the most despicable forces to ever hit this world and as such, needs to be understood. (And yes, I consider fascism a form of nationalism).

The twin founding fathers of nationalism, Hans Kohn and Carleton Hayes, construct the skeleton on which other authors (Gellner, Smith, Hobsbawm, Hutchinson, Breuilly, Armstrong, Anderson, etc.) try to fill in the gaps by narrowing one component, and exploring that area in extreme detail. Breuilly looks at solely the political aspects, Hutchinson and Anderson look at the cultural, etc. Gellner looks at the political tied to the cultural. In short, culture for Gellner is everything.

As Mel Brooks says in Robin Hood: Men in Tights, "the short, short version..." Gellner thinks that industrialization homogenized cultures, which in turn was bound to state-led educational facilities (schools, etc.). Teaching everyone the same thing, having them dress the same way, in short, nurturing a single identity created nationalism. Once culture bound with politics, nations emerged. Then nationalism came (independently).

Now for the more detailed review:

Gellner asserts the following explanation for the rise of nations and nationalism (two distinct things):

Nations are self-defined by the inhabitants within them. All nations share a culture.

Nationalism is a modern force which holds that politics and nations are congruent and inseparable.

Without one, you cannot have the other.

The reason for its modernity is simple to understand: allegiance to one's country hundreds of years ago was immaterial because people did not think in terms of nationality or country (and prior to 1648, there was no such thing as country). They may have thought in terms of religion or King, but certainly not nationality. And because of that central tenet, politics did not square with nationality. Politics was always present, but it squared with religion or king.

Gellner contends that there exist 3 general, but distinct, stages of human societal development throughout history:

Hunger-gatherer, agro-literate, and the industrial.

It is during the industrial stage where Gellner sees the emergence of both nations and nationalism. Both the hunter-gatherer stage as well as the agro-literate fall flat in producing either nations or nationalism, the first because HG's had no states (hence politics not bound to that region) at all, and the latter because cultural diversity was the hallmark of the day. The prerequisite, which emerged only after peasants moved into the cities to find work, was cultural homogenization. In short, there glue binding politics and culture was homogenization.

Once industrial societies emerged, however, all hell broke loose: shared culture, customs, languages, etc. replaced local, village-type culture. Regional dialects gradually gave way to a universal dialect. And the reason for homogenization? One Gellner offers is to maintain the status-quo. This homogenization shaped individuals into a more cohesive unit, and thus emerged collective group-think (dress alike, think alike--almost like Truman Show).

In addition, when societies moved from the agro-literate stage to the industrialized state, the nature of the type of work changed: it went from manual and static, to more sophisticated and fluid. According to Gellner, this feature produced the unintended effect of leading to both impersonalization and homogenization amongst the masses (within a region). Regional differences dissipated. So at this point in his argument, we have a standardization of culture.

Another secondary point that he adds to his thesis is that any society based on capitalism needs to grow, and that growth spurs more societal transformations. This has the effect of a catch-22: on one hand, the need for a high-level of technical skill promotes egalitarianism because it is mobile. Contrast this with agro-literate days, where work was static and hence people were stuck in societal roles. On the other hand, specialization was not so great as no one could learn it--quite the opposite: give workers generic training, and they will venture off on their own and become masters of their trade.

Gellner posits that since industrialization spurred great transformations in education, with little instruction after having acquired the basics, people can fluidly move from one position to the next (like going from HR to marketing to sales to data entry) within a company. Here is the gravy: people's fates are bound to education, because it is the key to societal mobility. And since educational institutions needed to be standardized, that is where the state comes in. Thus, politics is bound with culture.

And as for nations and nationalism?

They can emerge only when social conditions result in homogenization across the entire populace.

Isolated pockets that retain their old, immature culture (in contradistinction to high culture) eventually acquire the high culture because inhabitants that seek work in the cities return to those very villages (more or less, civilized). In short, they saw their own shortcomings and adopted a higher level of culture (which is exactly what John Plamenatz contends in his distinction between the Eastern and Western types of nationalism).

So there you have it.

Some issues I have with his contentions:

Clearly, Gellner looks only at the outcome of industrialization as nationalism. In short, if a society did not undergo industrialization, guess what? No nationalism or nations! That is why it is too Euro-centric (and Gellner's thesis is SILENT on the case of the Slavs--who had NO IDENTITY & did not even undergo industrialization until way later.

Not to mention the developing countries. Are the Kurds industrialized? Do they not constitute a nation? And the Palestinians?

Gellner confuses the differences between nationalism based on unity and nationalism based on independency (+ unity). He offers a cookie-cutter approach, a one-size fits all thesis that is profound, and certainly helps us to understand how Western Europe, which underwent industrialization, adopted a universal culture, and then had a nationalist movement, but he should have stopped there. It certainly was the case in England, France, Germany, Italy, and the US, but how about Romania? Or the Slavs? When did they industrialize? It was when the Austro-Hungarian empire split after WW1 did they undergo a nationalist movement. And then, arguably, came their nation.

In sum, Gellner's book is so profound because it explains how nations and nationalism emerged--at least in the industrialized, Western-European societies. A bit dry reading--certainly dont take it to the beach! Better yet bring a lot of coffee, highlighters, and keep the lights bright. But such an important work.



Rating:
Summary: OUT OF THE IRON CAGE
Review: The importance of this book stretches beyond academic theorizing: it should be re-marketed for mass consumption. Gellner's gifts are easy access and aptness. In a globalized world advancing toward force-fed monoculture, never before have the issues of defining and understanding nationalism demanded such focus. Nations and Nationalism, first published in 1983, forms part of a provocative, important overview of the human condition (to be found in Plough, Sword & Book, 1988) that essentially argues for a no-choice cultural pluralism and (key concept) de-fetishization of land. In Gellner's last work (Nationalism, London, 1997) published posthumously, he accepts the cage of existential anguish that dictates nationalism but insists on scientific optimism: "Better to try and deal with the conditions which engender nationalism than to preach at its victims and beg them to refrain from feeling what, in their circumstances, it is only too natural to feel." There is, beyond academe, compassion and prescience in Nations and Nationalism, and urgency in its follow-up. Faced with the biophysical issues of global survival, the virulence of modern weaponry, the accelerator of IT, we are commanded - at firesides, as well as campuses - to think again of the dangers of ethnic conflict and misunderstandings among nations and men.

Rating:
Summary: OUT OF THE IRON CAGE
Review: The importance of this book stretches beyond academic theorizing: it should be re-marketed for mass consumption. Gellner's gifts are easy access and aptness. In a globalized world advancing toward force-fed monoculture, never before have the issues of defining and understanding nationalism demanded such focus. Nations and Nationalism, first published in 1983, forms part of a provocative, important overview of the human condition (to be found in Plough, Sword & Book, 1988) that essentially argues for a no-choice cultural pluralism and (key concept) de-fetishization of land. In Gellner's last work (Nationalism, London, 1997) published posthumously, he accepts the cage of existential anguish that dictates nationalism but insists on scientific optimism: "Better to try and deal with the conditions which engender nationalism than to preach at its victims and beg them to refrain from feeling what, in their circumstances, it is only too natural to feel." There is, beyond academe, compassion and prescience in Nations and Nationalism, and urgency in its follow-up. Faced with the biophysical issues of global survival, the virulence of modern weaponry, the accelerator of IT, we are commanded - at firesides, as well as campuses - to think again of the dangers of ethnic conflict and misunderstandings among nations and men.

Rating:
Summary: A classic
Review: Though Anthoney D. Smith and others have attacked Gellner's classic work, it still remains THE book explaining the birth of nations. In brief, Gellner's theory holds that the rise appearance of capitalism made national formations necessary. When people from radically different "low cultures" came together in the new industrial cities of Europe, a cultural bond became necessary. Grouping society into national units served this need by creating "high cultures". Smith, who provides the principle opposition to Gellner's theory argues that nations "have navels"--that is, they are created from previously existing "ethnae." Unfortunately for Smith, historical evidence actually suggests that nations do not, in fact, have navels. Thus, Gellner's theory is correct. Well written and accessible to the non-academic, Nations and Nationalism is a must read for anybody concerned with the creation of the most important political ideology in the world today.

Rating:
Summary: classic modernist account of nationalism
Review: Truly one of the most important books ever written about nationalism, this is also one of the few modernist accounts of nationalism that ages well. While this book was published in 1983, it is basically an expanded version of a chapter from Gellner's earlier _Thought and Change_ (1964) with some alterations. However, even 36 years later his thesis is still as strong as ever: nationalism is a result of the transformation from agrarianism to industrialization. I'll try to summarize his thesis briefly.

Gellner describes the agrarian society as one where power is concentrated at the top with a complex division of labor and an emphasis on informality and intimacy. Basically each group lives in their own happy little world cut off from the rest.

But then things begin to change. The transformation to modernity involves a huge number of changes in society: the peasants have to pick up and move to the city for work. There mobility, formality (the 'Diploma Disease') and a universalised high culture replace intimacy, informality and various low cultures, and the peasants feel alienated (a touch of Marx?). The intelligentsia of the peasant group then decide to save their low culture by turning it into a high culture, which can only survive through state-supported education. Thus the peasant people decide to return home, seceed to form a new state and - presto - they've become a nation. This part of the story is obviously the violent part: Gellner claims that things will get better in late industrialism, where we'll have 'muted nationalism' after all those secessions have taken place.

While simplistic, there is a lot of truth to this story, which is well documented in the large number of nations which emerged in this way, especially in eastern Europe. However, Gellner neglects several things, most importantly what basis these peasants have for feeling like they have something in common besides their class. He also relies too much on the structural changes in society - nothing is left up to individuals or even groups, since nationalism is socially, not ideologically determined. Therefore the peasants themselves have no say in any of this: they're just riding the wave of history (Marx again?).

Yet for its faults, this book is still a classic: it has influenced all other writers on nationalism and will continue to do so for quite some time. Definitely a worthy read.