Six Days of War : June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

Rating:
Summary: An excellent history of an unusual war
Review: This is an excellent history of the Six Day War. It was made possible when the 30-year declassification period expired in 1997 and all sorts of material became available to historians.

Given that Egypt ought to have been aware of Israel's recalcitrance to fight and Israel's military strength, it has long been puzzling that Egypt committed acts of war that seemed highly likely to provoke an all-out Israeli response. It has also been puzzling that Jordan went along with the war, even when it stood to lose territory. And it was even puzzling that Syria kept shelling Israel during the early parts of the war when it stood to lose the Golan. But Oren shows how it all happened.

We see some preliminary skirmishes in which Syria provoked an Israeli reply. And false Soviet warnings of an Israeli buildup against Syria. We also see that Egyptian President Nasser was aware that there was no such Israeli buildup but in May of 1967 went ahead with kicking the UNEF forces out of the Sinai anyway. Nasser might have been prepared to risk an undesired war to do this. However, he then continued by closing the Straits of Tiran, an act of war which made a major conflict very likely. That would have been truly illogical had Nasser's intention been to avoid war. And we discover that Nasser did indeed plan a first strike (Operation Dawn) that was cancelled in the last few hours only because Nasser feared that the plan had been compromised. That allowed Israel to get away with its failure to act at once when Egypt closed the Straits. In June, Israel gained a big advantage by striking Egypt first and destroying two thirds of the Egyptian air force on the ground.

While there are excellent descriptions of exactly how the war proceeded, the most interesting questions Oren answers are when and how Israel made the decisions to liberate the rest of Jerusalem, capture the West Bank, and take the Golan heights from Syria. Oren stresses that none of these events, not even the taking of all of Sinai, were in any Israeli Master Plan, and that these decisions were made on the spot. Many other outcomes were still possible even a day after the outbreak of major hostilities.

This is a fascinating book. If there is any moral, it should be that ignorance can have deadly consequences.

Rating:
Summary: Truth about tired old formulas
Review: When I first got hold of Oren's stellar Six Days of War in April, 2002, I tore through the advanced readers' copy and swiftly predicted it would be a runaway best-seller. I was not wrong. As history books go, this one has had an extraordinary run, and it is must reading for anyone who wants to understand the true genesis of the current situation in the Middle East.

Oren rooted through boxes and boxes of declassified Presidential and U.S. State Department documents, as well as those of various Arab and Israeli government offices. What he found puts new historians like Avi Shlaim and Benny Morris to shame.

We knew, of course, that the Soviets in the 1950s and 1960s copiously supplied arms to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and others of the Arab nations. But Oren also shows that the Soviet government in 1966 and 1967 meddled more dangerously. For example, top Soviet officials spread false "intelligence" to Arab governments about alleged Israeli plans for a massive onslaught. Oren shows that Israeli restraint before the war actually encouraged the cataclysmic Arab aggression which followed.

Sound familiar? We can draw lessons from Oren's impressive history. Appeasing tyrants and offering more land to people who do not want peace is not the solution. I don't know what is. But this fantastic piece of historical investigation shows that recycling the same tired old formulas simply will not work.

--Alyssa A. Lappen